The Presumption of Atheism

…what would be wise expediency?—to try and determine the best consequences by concealment, or to brave other consequences for the sake of that openness which is the sweet fresh air of our moral life.     

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

One takes one’s word that p when a source vouches for p and one accepts the word of that source. If the source is reliable in this case, p is acceptable. The reliability of the source is a measure of its plausibility. If a source has the relevant competence, credibility, authority, that word is acceptable. Likewise, the word may be acceptable if accompanied by a cogent argument, but presumption may be misplaced. One may recognize a presumption for a statement when such recognition is not justified, the positive version of the fallacy. One may refuse to recognize a presumption for a statement when there really is a presumption for the statement, the negative version of the fallacy. The essay proceeds to explore various dimensions of when it is justified to take a source’s word for a claim, and when it is justified to reject a claim from a source. The discussion ranges over considerations of sexism and race, cultural differences, and the relationship of presumptions to fallacies. Also considered is the role of trust in taking someone’s word and the factors involved in trusting someone.

     

《庄子》:从“道”到“无”的过渡

The first and foremost meaning of Tao in Laozi is the origin of Heaven and Earth, and the second is the root of the growth and development of myriad things. However, Laozi does not explicitly distinguish between these two meanings. It is Wang Bi in his commentaries of Laozi who converted the meaning of Tao as the origin to the foundation of things-as-they-are, and named such foundation Nothingness. He claimed that Nothingness is the foundation of myriad things. This transition of problem-consciousness and t...     

Nothingness and the Human Umwelt

In the paper I argue that the great impact of empiricism on psychology and the enclosed dualist agenda traps psychological phenomena into subjectivism. By discussing the phenomena of nothingness in biological and cultural life it is argued that meaning must be considered as a phenomenon that represents both a fit and a misfit of the individual with the environment. By stressing the overall presence of nothingness phenomena it is argued how the reduced ontology of empiricism—and its blindness to relations and transformations out of which meaning grows—should be overcome. In human cultural life, transformations are constitutive and ongoing changes are being produced to make sure that continuity as well as discontinuity will happen. The analysis of especially one case—the removal of an Amish school after a shooting episode—serves to prove how meaning grows out of cultural processes as people produce their own conditions of life. From a cultural-ecological point of view, analyzing meaning at the level of individual phenomenology, hence, means analyzing the ‘total psychological situation’ (legacy of Kurt Lewin). This may for instance include analyzing how people live, what they consider important and worth preserving, what must be changed, what are their core values and how do institutional arrangements contribute to keeping up that which is valued or to changing that which is not, etc. Meaning may be viewed the lived-out experience—the domain of self-generativity in human life.     

Nothingness,Meinongianism and inconsistent mereology

Synthese - Within the framework of Meinongianism, nothingness turns out to have contradictory features—it seems to be an object and not. In this paper, we explore two different kinds of...     

Ressentiment and power: On Reginster's The Will to Nothingness

A critical discussion of Bernard Reginster's book The Will to Nothingness. The contribution engages with Reginster's interpretation of Nietzschean ressentiment, arguing that it is an essentially interpersonal attitude in two different senses. It is a response to a social situation of structural deprivation, and it involves an element of antagonism toward those who are better off within this social structure. The contribution then discusses Reginster's claim that modern morality restores the sense of power of the masses by adjusting the goals that they aim to pursue. I argue that this interesting interpretation does not do full justice to the themes of hostility or hatred that permeate the Genealogy of Morals, extending from Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt to his treatments of the bad conscience and of ascetic ideals.     

Hegel,Schelling and Laozi on Nothingness

This article looks at Hegel’s and Schelling’s discussions of Laozi’s wu 無 in History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Mythology respectively, and then relates them back to those two Western thinkers’ own understandings of the concept of nothingness. This exploration demonstrates that while Hegel sees nothingness more as a logical concept not different from being, Schelling equates Laozi’s wu with Nichtseiende of the first potency in his theory of the potencies of God. This article will further put the question in perspective by examining or speculating how the three philosophers would address the problem of ex nihilo nihil fit. Finally, it will highlight the striking similarity between the views of Schelling and Laozi regarding the role of the will or desire (yu 欲), in our knowledge about nothingness: While Schelling’s first potency, Nichtseiende, is a “not willing will,” the second potency is “willing” and therefore the beginning of existence. Laozi, on the other hand, believes that without desire we can discern the ultimate mystery, while with desire we can only see the outer fringe of things. However, Laozi differs from Schelling in that the latter’s willing God is absent in his philosophy.     

虚无与虚假之辨：柏拉图的Not-being概念

本论文集中探讨柏拉图哲学中的Notbeing概念。这个概念在“虚无”和“虚假”这两个语义之间的混淆使得柏拉图的哲学论证在多个场合出现困难。首先,它反映在《国家》第五卷中关于“意见”(doxa)的对象问题上;然后,它出现在《泰阿泰德》中在关于“虚假的意见”之可能性问题上;最后,在《智者》中,柏拉图试图彻底澄清这个问题,并最终以他特有的方式解释了Notbeing的“本性”。     

从物化到虚无:关联与重思

作为一个现代性反思的概念,"物化"应予以细分。分别对应Verdinglichung和Versachlichung的是"物化"与"物象化"("事化")。"物象化"("事化")是切入问题的关键,它意味着制度愈来愈成熟、规范、严格、见事(物)不见人。是着眼于其效率的提高还是对个性的压抑?无论如何,立场的选取,相应的认知方式,都会驱使"虚无"问题的呈现。"虚无主义"意味着一种现代化的方案,意味着一种整合各种价值的雄心,一种整体地把握世界的冲动,更意味着难以割舍的主体性立场。这个主体性立场规定着谈论"物化"与"虚无"的基本边界。     

一个论及“无”的西方思想家:约翰·司格脱·爱留根那

中世纪早期爱尔兰基督教哲学家约翰·司格脱·爱留根那(约公元800-877年)的重要性不仅在于他将希腊神秘主义作家如亚略巴古的狄奥尼修斯的作品翻译成拉丁文,而且还在于他在其巨著《自然的分类》中所构建的一个包括上帝与自然的宇宙论。爱留根那将神圣自然视为超越于所有存有与非存有的"无"。"创造"被视为这种超越的无以存有的形式的自我显现。爱留根那将人的心灵也看作是避免所有限制与定义的无的形式。其作品深深地影响了包括埃克哈特大师在内的中世纪晚期的神秘主义者。爱留根那的思想早已被用以与佛教相比较,而我将通过本文来探寻这种比较的合理性。     

Sartre and Bergson: A Disagreement about Nothingness

Abstract

Henri Bergson's philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre's central argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre's argument is in part a response to Bergson's dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in Creative Evolution (1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are precisely those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre's account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful.

My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre's and Bergson's discussion of nothingness: here I point to some important aspects of Sartre's early philosophy, including some features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson's positive influence on his thought.     

Persistent Vegetative State: A Presumption to Treat

The article briefly analyzes the concept of a person, arguing that personhood does not coincide with the actual enjoyment of certain intellectual capacities, but is coextensive with the embodiment of a human individual. Since in PVS patients we can observe a human individual functioning as a whole, we must conclude that these patients are still human persons, even if in a condition of extreme impairment. It is then argued that some forms of minimal treatment may not be futile for these patients; they may constitute a form of respect for their human dignity and benefit these patients, even if they are not aware of that. Moreover, it is important to consider the symbolic significance of care: while many believe that PVS is a kind of imprisonment, for others providing food and fluids is the only way to testify our proximity to these persons. The best policy would be to provide, as a general rule, artificial nutrition and hydration to PVS patients: this treatment could be withdrawn, after a period of observation and reflection by the family and proxies, on the basis of the proxies' objection to the continuation or of the patient's advance directives specifically referring to this situation.