Testimony,epistemic egoism,and epistemic credit

It is generally acknowledged that testifiers can play a central role in the production of knowledge and other valuable epistemic states in others. But does such a role warrant any form of epistemic credit and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I here propose an affirmative answer to both questions. The core of the current paper consists in a sustained defense of this proposal against a series of objections. I further argue that the proposal allows us to recognize an important additional epistemic harm that arises in cases of testimonial injustice beyond those described by Miranda Fricker. Finally, I conclude by distinguishing between four kinds of credit—distinctions that allow us to avoid inappropriately attributing epistemic credit in problematic cases. If the current proposal is correct, our understanding of successful epistemic agents needs to be significantly modified in order to take into account their role in producing epistemically valuable states in others.     

Science and community psychology: social norms for pluralistic inquiry

The concept of science linked to the concept of community psychology requires adaptation. In the case of community psychology, science is public to citizens as well as to the scientist. The community psychologist, as scientist, works from the expectation that choices of topics, methods, and interpretation of findings are done in concert with representatives of the community. The following remarks offer 7 ways to keep vital the research of the community psychologist while contributing to robust and useful knowledge.     

Value Inquiry: Duty and inclination in ethical theories

Editorial

Value Inquiry: Duty and inclination in ethical theories     

Board oversight of community benefit: an ethical imperative

Board oversight of community benefit responsibility in tax-exempt organizations in the nonprofit health care sector is attracting considerable attention. Scrutiny by the IRS and other official bodies has led to stricter measures of compliance with the community benefit standard. But stricter compliance does not sufficiently engage the underlying ethical imperative for boards to provide effective oversight--an imperative that recent research suggests has not been sufficiently honored. This analysis considers why there is a distinctively ethical imperative for board oversight, the organizational nature of the imperative involved, and practical ways to fulfill its obligations. We adopt an organizational ethics paradigm to illuminate the constituent components of the ethical imperative and to clarify emerging benchmarks as flexible guidelines. As these emerging benchmarks enhance board oversight of community benefit they also can shed light on what it means to be a virtuous organization.     

Ethical egoism and the moral point of view

I thank Peter Winch and Robert Stecker for their critical comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Value Inquiry: On concepts of good and evil in ethical theories

Editorial

Value Inquiry: On concepts of good and evil in ethical theories     

Creating an ethical organizational environment: The relationship between ethical leadership,ethical organizational climate,and unethical behavior

The purpose of this research is to provide a richer lens on the ethical organizational environment by examining the relationship between ethical leadership and unit-level unethical behavior through ethical organizational climate (EOC), with collective moral identity as a boundary condition. In testing our theoretical model, we first develop and validate a measure of EOC to address concerns with existing measures of ethical climate. Second, we examine the role of collective moral identity as a moderator of the relationship between EOC and unit unethical behavior. We discuss implications regarding the importance of developing a more comprehensive conceptualization of EOC.     

Between Insensitivity and Incompleteness: Against the Will Theory of Rights

This paper recasts an old objection to the will theory in the light of recent attempts to defend that theory, notably by Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner. It enlists the idea of duties of care—effectively restrictions over legal officials’ discretionary exercise of powers—to form a dilemma for such theorists: either legal officials’ discretion over powers is restricted by duties of care for the unempowerable, or it is not. If their discretion is unrestricted, then the will theory is insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, in virtue of the fact that these lives are viewed as not meriting direct normative consideration. If, on the other hand, their discretion is restricted by duties of care, then the will theory has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify them. It is therefore incomplete as a theory of rights.     

Altruism and egoism: prosocial motivations for helping depend on relationship context

Findings from the current study suggest that the link between helping and empathic concern—a hypothesized motivator of altruistic behavior—may be more pronounced in the context of kinship relationships than among strangers. Participants expressed their willingness to help a kin‐member or stranger in specific need situations. Putative mediators of helping (empathic concern, general negative affect, perceptions of oneness) were measured. Empathic concern appeared to partially mediate effects of relationship context on willingness to help. Moreover, while controlling for egoistic motivators (negative affect, oneness), empathic concern was linked to participants' willingness to help a kin‐member but not a stranger. Findings suggest that factors motivating prosocial action in close relationships may be different from those that motivate helping among strangers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.