马克思主义哲学:我们时代的真理和良心——纪念马克思逝世130周年

一个伟大的哲学家、思想家逝世之后,对他的观点、思想和学说进行持续性研究在人类思想史不乏先例。但是,像马克思主义哲学这样在世界范围内引起如此广泛、深入而持久的研究却是罕见的。更重要的是,每当出现重大历史事件,每当历史处于转折关头,人们都不由自主地把目光转向马克思,并对马克思主义哲学进行新的研究。当然,我们注意到,在对马克思主义哲学不同维度、不同层     

Descartes and the Primacy of Practice: The Role of the Passions in the Search for Truth

This paper argues that Descartes conceives of theoretical reason in terms derived from practical reason, particularly in the role he gives to the passions. That the passions serve — under normal circumstances — to preserve the union of mind and body is a well-known feature of Descartes's defense of our native make-up. But they are equally important in our more purely theoretical endeavors. Some passions, most notably wonder, provide a crucial source of motivation in the search after truth, and also serve to reinforce memory. Our cognitive successes and failure scan also be tracked by passions and trains of passions.     

Semantics without Truth in Later Mohist Philosophy of Language

In this paper, I examine the concept of truth in classical Chinese philosophy, beginning with a critical examination of Chad Hansen’s claim that it has no such concept. By using certain passages that emphasize analogous concepts in the philosophy of language of the Later Mohist Canons, I argue that while there is no word in classical Chinese that functions as truth generally does in Western philosophy for grammatical reasons, the Later Mohists were certainly working with a notion of semantic adequacy in which a language-to-world relationship is made an object of investigation, challenging Hansen’s position that classical Chinese functions within a primarily pragmatic linguistic framework in which a language-to-user relationship determines the meaning of words.     

别一种真理观：对客观性的颠覆——20世纪背景下的俄罗斯宗教哲学中真理的本质

"真理"这个神圣的称谓一直是传统哲学中的核心概念,也是人类为之奋斗的目标与生命存在之意义所在。然而,近一个多世纪以来,思想家们却从真理存在的前提、内容与运思方式上等,颠覆了传统意义上的客观真理观念,而强调真理的"主观性"、强调作为一种认识方法的真理观。随着真理自身神圣性的丧失,附着其上的意义与价值也失去了。20世纪初,俄罗斯宗教哲学家们提出了一种既有别于传统哲学、又不同于现代哲学的真理观念,即从信仰与主观体验的角度诠释了真理的含义,力图恢复真理自身与人之存在的神圣性,以此抗击虚无主义对现代人精神领域的冲击与损害。     

Truth Values and the Value of Truth

This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like It is raining seem to fit best the bivalent scheme of classical logic, the general proposition It is always raining is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a practically vague proposition like The lecture will start at 1 is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this rating system are commented on.     

Philosophy for Children and the Reconstruction of Philosophy

In this paper I trace the dialogical and narrative dimensions of the philosophical tradition and explore how they are reconfigured in the notion of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI), the mainstay of the collection of novels and discussion plans known as Philosophy for Children. After considering the ontology and epistemology of dialogue, I argue that narrative has replaced exposition in our understanding of philosophical discourse and that CPI represents a narrative context in which truth comes to represent the best story, in a discursive location in which there are always multiple stories. Finally, I raise the issue of children's philosophical voice. Can children philosophize, and if they can, do they do so in a voice different from adults'? If so, what are the distinctive features of that voice? I assert that it is children's historical marginalization in the Western construction of rationality that now – as that rationality undergoes its crisis – makes of them, like women and other “natives,” privileged strangers to the tradition, who are, through CPI, enabled to enter it through dialogue and narrative.     

Bi-facial Truth: a Case for Generalized Truth Values

We explore a possibility of generalization of classical truth values by distinguishing between their ontological and epistemic aspects and combining these aspects within a joint semantical framework. The outcome is four generalized classical truth values implemented by Cartesian product of two sets of classical truth values, where each generalized value comprises both ontological and epistemic components. This allows one to define two unary twin connectives that can be called “semi-classical negations”. Each of these negations deals only with one of the above mentioned components, and they may be of use for a logical reconstruction of argumentative reasoning.     

Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.