Luck,envy and gratitude: It could have been different

Previous studies have shown that people feel lucky in situations that could easily have turned into something worse. The present investigation was designed to focus more closely on the comparative aspect of luck, using a linguistic approach (Study 1 and 2) as well as self-reports of perceived luck accompanying selected emotional episodes (Study 3). The participants in Study 1 were asked to comment upon the difference between describing a state of affairs as “lucky” vs. “good”. The term “lucky“ was frequently seen to imply a comparison process, sometimes expressing gratitude (“It is lucky I have a family”) and at other times envy (“it is lucky you have a job”). This was confirmed in Study 2 where statements about self and other being lucky or unlucky were rated for implying comparison, gratitude, envy, concern, and impression of speaker. In Study 3, 60 students described situations in which they had felt grateful towards other people as well as towards “life in general”. Questionnaire answers revealed that they also had felt very lucky and had been thinking “it could have been different”. They also produced recollections of envy, which were rated to imply others' good luck and own bad luck, which could easily have been interchanged (“it could have been merdquo;). It is concluded that counterfactual thoughts are decisive for the experiences of luck, gratitude, and envy.     

Economic Envy

Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions under which these presentations can be satisfied by differences in material possessions. My conclusion is that no difference in material possessions can simultaneously be all the ways envy presents it as being. Consequently, economic envy is systematically irrational: it is never a warranted response to the distribution of material wealth. Recognising this bolsters the prudential and moral case for reducing the degree to which we feel it and for resisting the inclinations it gives rise to when we do.     

Envy: Further thoughts

Urges toward the good may be hidden in bad acts. A case in point is envy, which is often motivated by desire for the good. Its ill effects can be counteracted by this realization.Ann Belford Ulanov, M.Div., Ph.D., is Christiane Brooks Johnson Professor of Psychiatry and Religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York, a psychoanalyst in private practice, and Co-Editor of theJournal of Religion and Health.     

Envy and Generosity Between Co-Therapists

This paper explores the dynamics of envy and generosity between co-therapists. Generally speaking, co-therapists can be drawn into the same social comparisons (overt and covert), competitiveness, and envy as their group members. The list of valued resources can include the group's affection, appreciation, and recognition, or, more generally, one's status, popularity, creativity, sensitivity, understanding, or parental functioning. The group in turn, will sometimes tend to divide the therapists into the good one and the bad one in order to serve its own developmental needs. This process can increase the tension between the therapists, and feed their envy. I present an argument for processing those feelings and assert that awareness of co-therapist envy can promote the expression of generosity and enhance the capacity of group members for similar experiences. Clinical material will be presented to demonstrate how this works.     

Reply to Crastnopol and Sandmeyer

This response focuses on four points brought up by the discussants: connections between shame and competition, links between competition and envy, the issue of splitting into “all good” and “all bad,” and the question of “digging into” the “dark” side of competition and envy in psychodynamic work. The conclusion: There is no unilateral or definitive explanation for or way of working with the many different issues that can emerge in relation to competition for women in psychoanalysis. However, acknowledging the importance and complexity of competition in women’s lives can make it possible for an analytic dyad to begin to make space for multiple meanings of and defenses against competitive feelings and thoughts, bringing them out of the realm of acting out and into the world of thought representation.     

Envy and Its Consequences: Why It Is Useful to Distinguish between Benign and Malicious Envy

Envy is the pain that arises from the good fortune of others. Recent research identified two subtypes of envy, benign and malicious envy. Malicious envy is the envy subtype with action tendencies aimed to pull down the envied person from their superior position. Benign envy is also a frustrating experience, but activates action tendencies aimed at improving oneself. This article provides an overview of the empirical support for making this distinction in envy subtypes. It then discusses the benefits of a subtype approach to envy, with the main advantages of distinguishing benign and malicious envy being that it (a) provides researchers with the language to be clear in how they conceptualize envy and (b) allows novel predictions. A next section provides a response to some criticism on making this distinction. Finally, I conclude with a section on how envy in general, and benign and malicious envy in particular, could be measured.     

Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence

From the Ancient Greeks, through medieval Christian doctrine, and into the modern age, philosophers have long held envy to be irrational, a position that increasingly accompanies the political view that envy is not a justification for redistributing material goods. After defining the features of envy, and considering two arguments in favour of its irrationality, this article opposes the dominant philosophical and political consensus. It does so by deploying Rawls's much‐ignored concept of ‘excusable envy’ to identify a form of envy that is not imprudent and does not mis‐describe. With this work completed, the article then argues – no doubt controversially – that excusable envy constitutes good grounds for redistribution or inequality‐mitigation. In so doing, the article throws light on the moral significance of certain forms of uncivil disobedience, and also offers a new vocabulary for popular ‘politics of envy’ debates, which are yet to acknowledge the role of social institutions in reproducing envy‐excusing economic inequalities.     

Varieties of envy

In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy as a psychological state, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive, and spiteful envy. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The second section proposes and explains in detail a definition of envy tout court. The third section presents a recurring distinction between the behavioral tendencies of envy that have been explained in two distinct ways, one mostly proposed by psychologists, the other discernible in the philosophical tradition. The fourth section argues that these models of explanation track two variables—focus of concern and obtainability of the good—whose interplay is responsible for the existence of the four kinds of envy. The fifth section illustrates four paradigmatic cases and provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenology, motivational structure, and typical behavioral outputs of each. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the implications of the taxonomy for moral education.     

Who Turns Green with Envy? Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives on Dispositional Envy

Previous research has conceptualized dispositional envy as a general construct that does not vary across comparison domains. In five studies (N = 1393), we examine dispositional envy as a domain‐specific construct. In Study 1, we present the development of a domain‐specific measure of dispositional envy. Across samples from different populations and two countries (Studies 2 and 3), the measure is shown to have good reliability, construct validity and stability over three months, highlighting the trait‐like character of the construct. State levels of envy were also examined in the academic domain (Study 4) and in dyadic interactions between unacquainted participants (Study 5). Results show a Person × Situation Interaction effect (i.e. Dispositional Envy × Situation) on experiences of envy. By placing domain‐specific dispositional envy into a network of similar and dissimilar constructs, the current findings serve as a foundation for drawing conclusions about the nature of dispositional envy. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

嫉妒与幸福感因果机制：基于追踪和日记法研究

追求幸福是人类永恒的主题。尽管影响幸福的因素很多, 但社会比较是影响个体幸福感最普遍的因素。基于社会比较理论视角, 分别采用纵向追踪研究和日记法研究探讨了向上社会比较中典型情绪——嫉妒与幸福感的因果关系机制, 并首次尝试建立了嫉妒与一般主观幸福感(SWB, Subject Well-being)因子的循环假设理论模型。在研究1中, 对290名参与者进行间隔1年的两次(T1和T2)追踪调查, 探讨特质嫉妒与主观幸福感双因子模型之间的关系。研究结果显示：(1) T1的特质嫉妒可以显著正向预测T2的消极情感(NA, Negative Affect)和SWB因子, 显著负向预测T2的积极情感(PA, Positive Affect)和生活满意度(LS, Life Satisfaction); (2) T1的一般SWB因子负向预测T2的特质嫉妒。在研究2中, 进一步采用日记法对178名参与者进行了持续14天的研究, 结果发现每日嫉妒仅能正向预测主观幸福感双因子中的NA。首次基于社会比较的理论视角, 采用多方法学视角深入揭示了嫉妒与主观幸福感的PA、NA和LS之间的复杂因果关系机制, 弥补了学术界在相关领域的不足。更重要的是, 还首次自主提出了嫉妒与一般SWB因子的循环假设理论模型, 对从社会比较理论视角去拓展、理解、重评SWB的社会基础提供了较新的思路。     

Burning With Envy? Dispositional and Situational Influences on Envy in Grandiose and Vulnerable Narcissism

Research on narcissism and envy suggests a variable relationship that may reflect differences between how vulnerable and grandiose narcissism relate to precursors of envy. Accordingly, we proposed a model in which dispositional envy and relative deprivation differentially mediate envy's association with narcissistic vulnerability, grandiosity, and entitlement. To test the model, 330 young adults completed dispositional measures of narcissism, entitlement, and envy; one week later, participants reported on deprivation and envy feelings toward a peer who outperformed others on an intelligence test for a cash prize (Study 1) or earned higher monetary payouts in a betting game (Study 2). In both studies, structural equation modeling broadly supported the proposed model. Vulnerable narcissism robustly predicted episodic envy via dispositional envy. Entitlement—a narcissistic facet common to grandiosity and vulnerability—was a significant indirect predictor via relative deprivation. Study 2 also found that (a) the grandiose leadership/authority facet indirectly curbed envy feelings via dispositional envy, and (b) episodic envy contributed to schadenfreude feelings, which promoted efforts to sabotage a successful rival. Whereas vulnerable narcissists appear dispositionally envy‐prone, grandiose narcissists may be dispositionally protected. Both, however, are susceptible to envy through entitlement when relative deprivation is encountered.     

The empty mother: women's fear of their destructive envy

This paper explains the importance of understanding the little girl's envy of her mother and how the resolution of this envy (and her fear of other women's envy) is crucial to a woman's development. I postulate that envy is a universal part of female development (with more or less destructive effects on a woman's personality, depending on the libidinal/sexual components of her attachment to both parents). I hope to show that by interpreting a woman's fear of her destructive envy, one can free her not only to enjoy her own sexuality and to find appropriate ways to express her aggression, but also to be more creative. I believe that guilt about these envious feelings often leads to profound inhibitions and masochistic behavior. Two clinical examples illustrate how envy manifests itself in treatment with a woman analyst, and how the working through of intense envious feelings leads to a greater ability to enjoy one's own capacities without constant fear of retribution.     

Envy divides the two faces of narcissism

In this article, we test psychodynamic assumptions about envy and narcissism by examining malicious envy in the context of narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability. In Study 1, students (N = 192) and community adults (N = 161) completed trait measures of narcissism, envy, and schadenfreude. In Study 2 (N = 121), participants relived an episode of envy, and cognitive‐affective components of envy were examined in the context of both self‐ and informant reports of their envy and narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 69), narcissism was linked to reports of envy covertly induced in the laboratory. Vulnerable narcissism was strongly and consistently related to dispositional envy and schadenfreude (Studies 1–2), as well as to all cognitive‐affective components of envy (Study 2). Furthermore, it facilitated envy and schadenfreude toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). Grandiose narcissism was slightly negatively related to dispositional envy (Studies 1–2), and it did not predict informant reports of envy or cognitive‐affective components of the emotion (Study 2). Finally, it did not exacerbate envy, hostility, or resentment toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). The results suggest envy is a central emotion in the lives of those with narcissistic vulnerability and imply that envy should be reconsidered as a symptom accompanying grandiose features in the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder.     

How mindfulness affects benign and malicious envy from the perspective of the mindfulness reperceiving model

At present, mindfulness is a hotspot in psychological research. Mindfulness is an effective tool that enables people to effectively inhibit negative emotions. Previous studies have shown that envy is a typical negative emotion; however, envy can be divided into two completely different types: benign envy and malicious envy. The question then arises, how does mindfulness affect both types of envy? Using a mindfulness reperceiving model, we explored the effect of mindfulness on these two different types of envy and on the mediating mechanism of psychological resilience. To accomplish this, we recruited 676 Chinese undergraduates to complete the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BEMAS) and the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC). The results we obtained showed that mindfulness and psychological resilience significantly and negatively predicted malicious envy and that psychological resilience played a partially mediating role in the relationship. In addition, the results showed that there was no significant effect between mindfulness and benign envy; however, psychological resilience can significantly and positively predict benign envy and played a completely mediating role between mindfulness and benign envy. These results effectively extend theories based on the mindfulness reperceiving model while also being important for promoting benign envy and inhibiting malicious envy in terms of improving mindfulness and psychological resilience.     

Appraisal patterns of envy and related emotions

Envy is a frustrating emotion that arises from upward social comparison. Two studies investigated the appraisals that distinguish benign envy (aimed at improving one's own situation) from malicious envy (aimed at pulling down the superior other). Study 1 found that appraisals of deservingness and control potential differentiated both types of envy. We manipulated these appraisals in Study 2 and found that while both did not influence the intensity of envy, they did determine the type of envy that resulted. The more a situation was appraised as undeserved, the more participants experienced malicious envy. Benign envy was experienced more when the situation was not undeserved, and the most when the situation was appraised as both deserved and controllable. The current research also clarifies how the types of envy differ from the related emotions admiration and resentment.     

When people want what others have: the impulsive side of envious desire

Envy is the unpleasant emotion that can arise when people are exposed to others with superior possessions. Common wisdom and scholarly opinion suggest that when people experience envy they may be motivated to obtain the others' superior possession. Despite the vast interpersonal, societal, and economical consequences attributed to this potential aspect of envious responding, experimental demonstrations of the affective and behavioral consequences of envy-inducing situations are scarce. We propose that social comparisons with better-off others trigger an impulsive envious response that entails a behavioral tendency to strive for their superior good. However, given that the experience of envy is painful, self-threatening, and met with social disapproval, people typically attempt to control their envious reactions. Doing so requires self-control capacities, so that envious reactions may only become apparent if self-control is taxed. In line with these predictions, four experiments show that only when self-control resources are taxed, upward comparisons elicit envy paired with an increased willingness to pay for, to spontaneously purchase and to impulsively approach the superior good.     

Episodic Envy

Episodic envy, the unpleasant emotion resulting from a specific negative social comparison, is discussed. A new measure designed to assess it is developed, validated, and cross-validated in 3 studies. The implications of episodic envy are also examined. Results show that episodic envy is composed of a feeling component and a comparison component; and is different from unfairness, admiration, and competition. The feeling component is strongly correlated with negative emotional reactions (anxiety, depression, negative mood, hostility) and behavioral reactions (e.g., harming the other, creating a negative work atmosphere) to envy. The comparison component is correlated with behaviors intended to improve one's position in the organization. Episodic envy predicts reactions to envy above and beyond dispositional envy.     

Comprehending envy

The authors reviewed the psychological research on envy. The authors examined definitional challenges associated with studying envy, such as the important distinction between envy proper (which contains hostile feelings) and benign envy (which is free of hostile feelings). The authors concluded that envy is reasonably defined as an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons. The authors examined questions such as why people envy, why envy contains hostile feelings, and why it has a tendency to transmute itself. Finally, the authors considered the role of envy in helping understand other research domains and discussed ways in which people cope with the emotion.