Occupational prestige: Exploration of a theoretical basis

Drawing on the theory and research of psychophysics, a nonlinear model is hypothesized to explain the connection between education and income and occupational prestige. To achieve this, Weber's (R. L. Gregory, 1981, Mind in Science, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 501–503) and Stevens' (S. S. Stevens, 1970, Science170, 1043–1050) laws are brought together in an intrinsically nonlinear model. Guided by the earlier work of R. L. Hamblin (1971, Sociometry, 34, 423–452) and others, the work of O. D. Duncan (1961, in A. J. Reiss, Jr., O. D. Duncan, P. K. Hatt, & C. C. North (Eds.), Occupations and Social Status, New York, Free Press) is reanalyzed testing the possibility that work on the socioeconomic index can be understood as a prestige allocation process which follows psychophysical principles. That is, prestige is assigned to occupations, given specifiable levels of educational and income attainment, in a manner parallel to the way in which individuals respond to changes in the intensity of other stimuli. Using first the data developed by Duncan (1961) to test the model and the 1963 NORC data (R. W. Hodge, P. M. Siegel, & P. H. Rossi, 1964, American Journal of Sociology, 70, 286–302) to replicate it, a measurement model consistent with the theoretical model is evaluated. Comparing the results of the nonlinear model to that of the linear, it is concluded that a model is obtained yielding theoretical confirmation with no loss in predictive accuracy. The resultant nonlinear model yields alternative substantive implications concerning the relative influence of income and education on occupational prestige to those to be inferred from linear models. Perhaps most important, however, is the candidacy given by these results to psychophysics as the explanatory mechanism in the prestige allocation process.     

Stimulus-reinforcer and response-reinforcer relations in the control of conditioned appetitive headpoking (“goal tracking”) in rats

Experiment 1 studied the effect of several Pavlovian appetitive conditioning procedures on rats' headpoking into a food tray (goal tracking). The procedures included forward delay conditioning, CS-alone extinction, differential conditioning, and simultaneous compound conditioned inhibition training. In general, the headpoke behaved in all of these treatments much like a Pavlovian CR; however, one could also say that the headpoke behaved like an adventitiously reinforced operant for which the CS was an S^D. Experiment 2, therefore, used the differential-nondifferential technique (E. Gamzu & D. R. Williams, Science, 1971, 171, 923–925), and Experiment 3 used an omission technique (F. D. Sheffield, in W. F. Prokasy, Ed., Classical conditioning, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965; D. R. Williams & H. Williams, Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1969, 12, 511–520), to try to separate the role of stimulus-reinforcer and response-reinforcer relations in controlling the headpoke. These techniques proved inadequate. The results of Experiment 2 could be given either operant or Pavlovian interpretations. Those of Experiment 3 showed that headpoking is dominated by response-reinforcer, rather than by stimulus-reinforcer, relations when the two compete but forced no conclusion about which dominates when the two act together as in acquisition. Implications for pigeon autoshaping are discussed.     

Need for uniqueness,self-schemas,and thought as moderators of the false-consensus effect

L. Ross and his colleagues (L. Ross, D. Greene, & P. House, 1977, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 880–892) have demonstrated the tendency for people to expect peer similarity in behavior, termed the “false-consensus” bias. The present study was concerned with factors that might affect the generality of this bias. Specifically, we looked at the impact of level of need for uniqueness (C. R. Snyder & H. L. Fromkin, 1977, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 5, 518–527), existence of a self-schema (H. Markus, 1977, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78), and thought on expectations of peer similarity. It was predicted that thought would polarize the estimates of high and low N Uniq individuals in opposite directions, but only when the individual possessed a self-schema along the relevant behavioral dimension. The results for behaviors reflecting independence supported this prediction. Discussion centered around limits of the false-consensus bias, along with consideration of the complexities involved in the link between availability factors and interpersonal judgments.     

Effects of schedule and magnitude of reinforcement under conditions of thirst motivation

In contrast to a recent finding (Macdonald, G. E., & De Toledo, L. Learning and Motivation, 1974, 5, 288–298.) the results of three experiments investigating various partial reinforcement (PRF) manipulations under conditions of thirst motivation demonstrated strong similarity to analogous manipulations involving food reward. Specifically, for animals receiving water reinforcement, PRF was shown to generate greater resistance to extinction than continuous reinforcement (Expt 1 & 3), the schedule of reinforcement was shown to interact with level of acquisition (Expt 1 and 2), and the magnitude of the partial reinforcement extinction effect was shown to be a function of reward magnitude (Expt 3). These results provide strong evidence that mechanisms which operate in partial reinforcement situations are highly similar, regardless of the type of appetitive reinforcement.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.     

Speech comprehension after unilateral injection of sodium amytal

A unilateral cerebral dominance model predicts that speech comprehension will be disrupted after injection of sodium amytal into one hemisphere but not after the other. This model was supported when an auditory receptive task involving relatively nonredundant stimuli similar to that contained in the Token Test (E. DeRenzi & L. Vignolo, 1962, Brain, 85, 665–687) was administered to 17 epileptic patients undergoing bilateral amytal injections.     

Task performance and magnitude of goal valence

J. W. Brehm and his associates (J. W. Brehm, R. A. Wright, S. Solomon, L. Silka, & J. Greenberg, 1983, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 21–48) recently argued that the magnitude of goal valence (the attractiveness or unattractiveness of a potential outcome) varies directly with motivational arousal level. Motivational arousal, in turn, is thought to be a function of the perceived difficulty of goal attainment. This formulation was tested in the present study by examining the relationship between goal attractiveness ratings and performance on an anagram task. According to the Yerkes-Dodson law (R. M. Yerkes & J. D. Dodson, 1908, Journal of Comparative Neurological Psychology, 18, 459–482), the relationship between motivational arousal and performance should be curvilinear; optimal performance is usually observed for moderate levels of motivation relative to either low or very high motivation levels. Consistent with the Brehm et al. hypothesis, optimum performance in the present study was observed for subjects who reported moderate levels of goal attractiveness relative to subjects who reported either low or high levels of goal attractiveness. Anticipatory ratings of the difficulty of the anagrams were also congruent with the Brehm et al. model. These findings converge with data from other studies supporting the utility of goal attractiveness as an index of motivational arousal and provide an additional dimension of support for the model proposed by Brehm et al.     

Developmental aspects of the generation effect

Children from Grades 2, 3, 5, and 7 (7.6, 9, 11, and 13 years of age, respectively) were required to generate or study exemplars of semantic categories (semantic orientation) or rhymes to stimulus words (phonetic orientation). Each child then participated in one of three retention tests: free recall, standard recognition, and rhyme recognition. The results indicated that the developmental emergence of the “generation effect” (C. E. McFarland, Jr., T. J. Frey, & D. D. Rhodes, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1980, 19, 210–225; N. J. Slamecka & P. Graf, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1978, 4, 592–604) was dependent on both encoding orientation and the type of retention task employed. A substantial generation effect first emerged (7-year-olds) for standard recognition in the semantic condition. A similar effect for recall was evident for 9-year olds, but not for younger children. Internal stimulus generation became a strong memory facilitator for phonetically encoded items at age 11 for standard recognition, but not until age 13 for recall. The results of the rhyme recognition test indicated that internal generation facilitated “transfer-appropriate processing” (C. D. Morris, J. D. Bransford, & J. J. Franks, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1977, 16, 519–533) only for seventh graders (age 13). The processes underlying this developmental pattern were discussed.     

The role of CS-US contiguity in classical conditioning of the rabbit's nictitating membrane response to serial stimuli

The rabbit's nictitating membrane response was classically conditioned to a serial tone-light compound (CS1-CS2), in which the CS1-CS2 and CS2-US intervals were each manipulated over the values of 200, 400, 800, and 1600 msec in a between-groups, factorial design. In addition, at each level of the CS2-US interval, there was a control group that received CS2 and the US. Within the serial compound, the CS2 was found to be highly efficacious in that the CS2-US interval determined the rate of CR acquisition to the compound as a whole and to CS2 in particular. Moreover, CR probability during CS2 largely overlapped the performance of the corresponding single-stimulus controls. Outside the context of the compound, CR frequency on CS2 test trials fell below control levels at the 200- and 400-msec CS2-US intervals. The results can be interpreted as indicating that a generalization decrement or information loss occurred in transferring from compound training to CS2 testing. In addition, the theories of Rescorla and Wagner (In A. Black & W. F. Prokasy, Eds., Classical conditioning II, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972) and Mackintosh (Psychological Review, 1975, 82, 276–298) may be extended to account for the present results.     

An experimental and theoretical investigation of the constant-ratio rule and other models of visual letter confusion

The constant-ratio rule (CRR) and four interpretations of R. D. Luce's (In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of mathematical psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1963) similarity choice model (SCM) were tested using an alphabetic confusion paradigm. Four stimulus conditions were employed that varied in set size (three, four or five stimulus elements) and set constituency (block letters: A, E, X; F, H, X; A, E, F, H; A, E, F, H, X), and were presented to each subject in independent blocks. The four interpretations of the SCM were generated by constraining one, both, or neither of its similarity and bias parameter sets to be invariant in across-stimulus set model predictions. The strictest interpretation of the SCM (both the similarity and bias parameters constrained), shown to be a special case of the CRR, and the CRR produced nearly equivalent across-set predictions that provided a reasonable first approximation to the data. However, they proved inferior to the least strict SCM (neither the similarity nor bias parameters were constrained; the common interpretation of the SCM in visual confusion). Additionally, the least strict SCM was compared to J. T. Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50, 449–454) overlap model, the all-or-none model (J. T. Townsend, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978, 18, 25–38), and a modified version of L. H. Nakatani's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 104–127) confusion-choice model. Both the least strict SCM and confusion-choice models produced nearly equivalent within stimulus set predictions that were superior to the overlap and all-or-none within-set predictions. Measurement conditions related to model structure and equivalence relations among the models, many of them new, were examined and compared with the statistical fit results of the investigation.     

A reexamination of the faithful subject role

Fillenbaum (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 532–537; Fillenbaum & Frey, Journal of Personality, 1970, 38, 43–51) has proposed that a relatively large number of subjects within certain experiments will adopt a faithful subject role, that is, they will intentionally avoid basing their behavior on any suspicions they may have regarding the experimenter's hypothesis. However, examination of the studies on which this conclusion was based casts doubt on whether Fillenbaum's subjects were truly faithful or whether they may have become aware of the nature of the deception after all opportunity for awareness to influence their responses had passed. To test this hypothesis, awareness measures were administered to subjects either before they took an incidental learning test or (as in Fillenbaum's studies) after the test. As predicted, fewer subjects were classified as faithful in the first condition than in the second. It was concluded that, in fact, very few if any subjects are actively faithful. Discussion also concerned the problems associated with role analyses of subject behavior.     

Children's preference for novelty in selective learning: Developmental stability or change?

Data relating novelty preference to age for normal children are inconsistent, although a current theory predicts a developmental shift from novelty to familiarity preference in selective learning (D. Zeaman, 1976, in T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology (pp. 297–320), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum). Support for this theory, however, has been derived primarily from studies of retardate learning. Normal children's novelty preference was examined within a modified Moss-Harlow (E. Moss & H. F. Harlow, 1947, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 40, 333–342) design to compare Zeaman's model with that of S. L. Witryol and W. Wanich (1983, The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 3–8). Each of 16 problems, consisting of three single-stimulus demonstration trials and one two-choice test, was administered to 180 children (mean CA 4, 5.5, and 7 years) in three reward conditions. Novelty was manipulated by varying stimulus familiarization in the demonstration trials. Experiment 1 showed strong preferences for novel over familiar (demonstrated) stimuli at each age. Experiment 2 revealed novelty preference across age levels, two levels of reward contrast, and two levels of task difficulty. It was reasoned that Moss-Harlow tasks designed for normal children typically present a much higher level of difficulty than that intended by researchers. Furthermore, developmental decreases in novelty preference by retardates may derive from (a) transfer of training from prior experiments and (b) specific, repetitive instructions which may have directed attention away from stimulus novelty.     

Examining the reliability and validity of an adapted scale of educational-vocational undecidedness in a sample of graduate students

The present study was an attempt to determine the reliability and validity of an adapted vocational indecision scale designed for undergraduates (Osipow, S. H., Carney, C. G., Winer, J. L., Yanico, B. J., & Koschir, M., In Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1976, 9, 237) for use in a graduate student population. Internal consistency, test-retest, interrater reliability, and validity coefficients were calculated. A factor analysis and a multiple regression were also conducted. The findings suggest that the characteristics of the adapted indecision scale for the graduate students sample are similar to the characteristics of the unadapted instrument for the undergraduate sample in the S. H. Osipow, C. G. Carney, and A. Barak (Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1976, 9, 223–243) study. Potential therapeutic and research uses of the adapted indecision scale are also discussed.     

Intervention and sleeper effects: A reply to Victoria Seitz

Victoria Seitz (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 361–373) has misperceived and misunderstood our position (A. D. B. Clarke & A. M. Clarke, Developmental Review, 1981, 344–360). For example, our argument endorsed a transactional and not a main-effect model, nor was our aim to argue that early intervention has no important later consequences, nor did we dispute Consortium findings (I. Lazar & R. Darlington, Lasting effects after preschool, Washington, D.C.: DHEW Publication No. (OHDS) 79-30178, 1978). In fact, agreements with Seitz greatly exceed disagreements. Our skepticism about whether a behavioral treatment can have long-range effects without also having earlier ones remains. Long-term changes appear to result from ongoing long-term processes.     

An assessment of cerebral dominance in language-disordered children via a time-sharing paradigm

A time-sharing paradigm was used to assess language lateralization in language-disordered and normal children aged 4–7 years. Several expressive language tasks as well as a vocal, but nonlinguistic, task were administered concurrently with unimanual finger tapping. Dependent variables were percent disruption scores and number of syllables produced per concurrent trial. All language concurrent tasks produced tapping reductions for both hands for both groups. This result contrasts to similar time-sharing studies claiming asymmetrical interference and hence language lateralization in children (N. White & M. Kinsbourne, 1980, Brain and Language, 10, 215–223; J. Obrzut, G. Hynd, A. Obrzut, & J. Leitgeb, 1980, Brain and Language, 11, 181–194). A multiple regression analysis revealed a significant interaction effect differentiating language-disordered from normal children. Normals exhibited a parallel response pattern for speech and tapping (both increased or decreased in rate) under all lateralization conditions. Language-disordered children exhibited an inverse response pattern (e.g., if speech output increased, tapping rate decreased) only under left-hemisphere time-sharing.     

Why Reading? Because it's there

Three papers (V. A. Mann, Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15; G. Wolford & C. A. Fowler, Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35; F. J. Morrison, Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47) are critiqued from the standpoint of their adequacy in advancing our understanding of a problem as complex as reading disability. Experimenters should be explicit about their guiding theoretical assumptions, and should think through the relations, if any, between their laboratory tasks and the actual processes of reading. The reading protocol of a dyslexic child is provided, and is interpreted within the frameworks of the Mann, Wolford and Fowler, and Morrison viewpoints.     

Finite and infinite state confusion models

A confusion model is defined as a model that decomposes response probabilities in stimulus identification experiments into perceptual parameters and response parameters. Historically, confusion models fall into two groups. Models in Group I, which includes Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50) overlap model, were developed on the basis of the notion that stimulus identification is mediated by a finite number of internal states. We call the general class of models that have this processing interpretation finite state confusion models. Models in Group II, which includes Luce's (R. O. Luce et al., Eds., Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. I), New York: Wiley, 1963) biased choice model, were not developed on the basis of an explicit processing interpretation. It is shown here that models in Group II are not finite state confusion models. We prove in addition that except for Falmagne's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 206–224) simply biased model models in Group II belong to a certain class of infinite state confusion models, namely, models asserting that stimulus identification is mediated by a continuous space of vectors representing detector activation levels.     

Mixture Models of Categorization

Many currently popular models of categorization are either strictly parametric (e.g., prototype models, decision bound models) or strictly nonparametric (e.g., exemplar models) (F. G. Ashby & L. A. Alfonso-Reese, 1995, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 39, 216-233). In this article, a family of semiparametric classifiers is investigated where categories are represented by a finite mixture distribution. The advantage of these mixture models of categorization is that they contain several parametric models and nonparametric models as a special case. Specifically, it is shown that both decision bound models (F. G. Ashby & W. T. Maddox, 1992, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 16, 598-612; 1993, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 37, 372-400) and the generalized context model (R. M. Nosofsky, 1986, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 39-57) can be interpreted as two extreme cases of a common mixture model. Furthermore, many other (semiparametric) models of categorization can be derived from the same generic mixture framework. In this article, several examples are discussed and a parameter estimation procedure for fitting these models is outlined. To illustrate the approach, several specific models are fitted to a data set collected by S. C. McKinley and R. M. Nosofsky (1995, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 128-148). The results suggest that semi-parametric models are a promising alternative for future model development.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

Procedural knowledge versus fact retrieval in mental arithmetic: A reply to Baroody

Based on a review of reaction time studies, a model of mental arithmetic performance which emphasizes the process of fact retrieval from organized memory representations was proposed (M. H. Ashcraft, Developmental Review, 1982, 2, 213–236). In contrast to this view A. J. Baroody (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 225–230) proposes that most mental arithmetic performance depends on procedural knowledge such as rules, heuristics, and principles. While Baroody's idea is both intriguing and potentially important, its exposition is quite vague and speculative. Without concrete suggestions as to the nature of the proposed rules and heuristics, especially for routine problems like 4 + 3 and 8 × 5, Baroody's proposal appears to be pertinent only to special cases like N + 0 and N + 1. Lacking this sort of elaboration, the alternative does not provide a useful or compelling explanation of the existing Chronometric results, and seems, at best, to be premature.