Judgment by Outcomes: Why Is It Interesting? A Reply to Hershey and Baron: \"Judgment by Outcomes: When Is It Justified?\"

Hershey and Baron (1992) have criticized the validity of research on judgment by outcomes, which fail to establish that this judgment constitutes a bias. This reply argues that Hershey and Baron′s criticism is based on a probabilistic version of affirming the consequent and that judgment by outcomes can be studied independently of the issue of bias.     

Why,and to What Extent,Is Sexual Infidelity Wrong?

Sexual infidelity is widespread, but it is also widely condemned, yet relatively little philosophical work has been done on what makes it wrong and how wrong it is. In this paper, I argue that sexual infidelity is wrong if it involves breaking a commitment to be sexually exclusive, which has special significance in the relationship. However, it is not necessarily worse than other kinds of infidelity, and the context in which it takes place ought to be considered. I finish the paper by looking at how the hegemonic norm of monogamy makes infidelity both more likely and more difficult to deal with.     

Is It Possible and Sometimes Desirable for States to Forgive?

After discussing at some length the nature of interpersonal forgiveness and its relation to punishment, the author addresses the main question of the essay: are states the sorts of entities that can forgive; and if they are, is it sometimes desirable that they forgive? The author argues that states can forgive and very often do; and that sometimes it is desirable that they do so. The essay closes by considering the complexities that arise when the state wants to forgive but the victim does not, and conversely.     

Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar

Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar’s asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit—which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting—while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar’s reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.     

Texting and Driving: Is It Just Moral Panic?

Significant public efforts have been mounted to stop the perceived epidemic of texting and driving, especially among younger drivers. However, despite the taken-for-granted nature of these fears, cell phones are reported as a contributing factor in only about 1% of all crashes. This study examines 11 years of crash data from Kentucky to demonstrate that despite the exponential growth of cell phones in American culture, cell phone-related crashes have remained stable over time, and they represent far less of a public health risk than most people are led to believe. The conclusions are presented in the context of moral panic theory.     

Psychology: Is It Applied Enough?

The question “Is psychology applied enough?” can be regarded in two ways. In the first place, it could refer to the distinction “pure versus applied science”, and the reproach that modern scientific experimental psychology has little to offer to the practitioner. It is argued that this distinction has lost much of its topicality in modern science, and certainly with respect to psychology. In this sense “applied psychology” is an outmoded notion. Secondly, it could refer to the question whether psychology is utilised enough in dealing with the great many pressing problems in modern society. And it is shown that this question cannot be answered in the affirmative. Too often psychological aspects of problems escape notice and too often potential psychological contributions are neglected in governmental and organisational decision‐making, also in cases where such a contribution would prove valuable indeed. A number of reasons for such a neglect are discussed and some ways of improvement are suggested. La question de savoir si la psychologie est suffisamment appliquée peut être abordée de deux façons. Elle peut d’abord renvoyer à la distinction entre science fondamentale et science appliquée et à la critique selon laquelle la psychologie expérimentale moderne a peu à offrir au praticien. Nous pensons que cette distinction a perdu beaucoup de son actualité, surtout en psychologie. Dans ces conditions, la « psychologie appliquée » est une notion désuète. Ensuite, cette question peut faire référence au fait de savoir si la psychologie est suffisamment exploitée dans le traitement des nombreux problèmes sociaux qu’il est urgent de résoudre. Il apparaît qu’il n’est pas possible de répondre par l’affirmative. Trop souvent, les dimensions psychologiques des problèmes passent inaperçues et les contributions potentielles de la psychologie sont négligées dans les décisions gouvernementales et organisationnelles, même quand cet apport serait manifestement précieux. On analyse les raisons de cette négligence et l’on suggère quelques pistes en vue d’une amélioration.     

Synthesis: Or Is It Distillation?

The 17 articles that constitute this special issue have been analyzed for important recurrent themes that may be common to all of the 16 countries covered, or to only some.     

Love: What Is It, Why Does It Matter, and How Does It Operate?

ABSTRACT— Love is a perennial topic of fascination for scholars and laypersons alike. Whereas psychological science was slow to develop active interest in love, the past few decades have seen considerable growth in research on the subject, to the point where a uniquely psychological perspective on love can be identified. This article describes some of the more central and well-established findings from psychologically informed research on love and its influence in adult human relationships. We discuss research on how love is defined, the significance of love for human activity and well-being, and evidence about the mechanisms by which love is believed to operate. We conclude by describing several key questions and potentially important new directions for the next wave of psychological science.     

Is teaching Jung within university possible?: a response to David Tacey

Until recently, Jungian psychology has been suspicious of academia and remained almost exclusively connected with analytical practice. Attempts by analytical psychologists towards a rapprochement have, by and large, failed because they were based either on inappropriate efforts to fit Jung within an unsuitable paradigm of science or on omnipotent expectations that academics accept the Jungian 'wisdom' unquestionably. By distinguishing two different Jungian epistemologies (an open and closed one) it is argued that the emergence of the new paradigm in social and human sciences (based on constructivist and non-essentialist ideas) offers now a unique opportunity to connect the epistemologically open Jung with these new developments in the academy. Thus, Jungians should now face the challenge of open dialogue with academics which can result in mutual benefit.     

What Is It Like to Be an Alien?

This brief article is concerned with an aspect of Jonathan Glover's book, Alien Landscapes?. After reflecting a little on the book as a whole, the question that is taken up is, ‘Why might a book that seeks to help those without mental disorders understand what they are like “from the inside” be of interest to laymen and practitioners in the criminal law?’. One answer lies in part in the way that ‘what it is like from the inside’ might interact with judgements of criminal responsibility. Taking its cue from examples used by Glover the article considers, and puts pressure on, the ‘dual view’ he proposes: that when dealing with those with mental disorders we should treat them as responsible agents in the sense of not withholding from them Strawson's ‘reactive attitudes’, while nevertheless accepting that their personalities and behaviours are the results of large doses of ‘bad luck’.     

The Automatic and Controlled Information-Processing Dissociation: Is It Still Relevant?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dual-process information-processing model of Schneider and Shiffrin (Schneider, W., and Shiffrin, R. M., Psychol. Rev. 84: 1–66, 1977; see also Shiffrin, R. M., and Schneider, W. Psychol. Rev. 84: 127–190, 1977) in light of the research data that have accumulated since the model was introduced more than 20 years ago. First, a brief introduction of the basic model of automatic and controlled information processing will be given. Second, some alternatives to the basic model that were developed over the last two decades will be reviewed. Third, data from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience that have a bearing upon this framework will be considered. Finally, some comments on the current usefulness of the dual-process framework for neuropsychological research will be offered.     

Antidepressant Medication: Is It a Viable and Valuable Adjunct to Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for School Refusal?

Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is an evidence-based treatment for school refusal. However, some youth do not respond to CBT. The serious risks associated with school nonattendance call for novel approaches to help those who do not respond to CBT. Because school refusal is commonly associated with anxiety disorders, and the combination of CBT and antidepressant medication enhances outcomes in the treatment of anxiety disorders, combined treatment may be effective for school refusal. This narrative review evaluates the current evidence base for adding antidepressant treatment to CBT for school refusal. Six randomized controlled trials (RCTs), two open trials, six case studies/series, and one observational study were identified and reviewed. There is support for combined CBT and imipramine, but this medication is not typically used due to the risk of concerning side effects. Two recent RCTs failed to provide evidence for the superiority of combined CBT and fluoxetine. Further research in this area is required because the extant studies have a number of methodological limitations. Recommendations are provided for clinicians who consider prescribing antidepressant medication or referring for adjunctive antidepressant treatment for school refusal.     

Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?

The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so‐called principle of ‘adversarial’ litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally permissible to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong.