Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

Intentional Objects,Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality

Abstract

Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in the 1874 edition of PES. The question is what Brentano might have meant by this, given that he rejects a relational account of intentionality. The present paper suggests an answer. It draws on recent work on pretence theory to provide a model of Brentano’s notion of the quasi-relational nature of mental phenomena, as well as of the notion of mental reference to an object, and argues that the model helps to explain why Brentano might have been able discern a clear continuity between the views of the 1874 and 1911 editions of PES, despite the differences.     

Lying on Job Applications: The Effects of Job Relevance,Commission, and Human Resource Management Experience

This research examined three factors related to misrepresentations on job applications: the job relevance of the information, the effects of overt misrepresentation compared to omission, and the impact of human resource (HR) management experience. Dependent measures included the extent to which misrepresentations were perceived as lies and influenced hiring intentions. In general, higher job relevance and overt misrepresentations increased the perception of misrepresentations as lies and decreased the hiring intentions. Further, persons with HR management experience were less likely to see misrepresentations as lies and more likely to hire applicants. Implications for future research and managerial practice are discussed.

Response to Comment by Carere-Comes

Carere-Comas is concerned that I have elevated the client as a hero. I point out that what I really am arguing for is a paradigm shift from therapy as treatment to therapy as mutual, intelligent collaboration. I also discuss what it means to say that the client knows what he or she wants and needs. Finally I discuss the idea that it is the client who makes therapy happen.     

Rightness,Parsimony, and Consequentialism: A Response to Peterson

This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the ‘standard view’ of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins (section 1) with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to ‘deontic leaps’. It goes on (section 2) to claim that greater conceptual parsimony would allow Peterson to avoid certain problems involving equality and related matters that arise out of his conception of moral value, and that Peterson should take the same instrumentalist attitude towards the norms of practical rationality as he does towards the norms of common-sense morality. The paper closes (section 3) with some doubts about Peterson’s programme of consequentialization and its alleged advantages.     

Literature,Culture and Understanding: A Response to Tan

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Reasons, Relevance and Salience: A Response to Hookway

This paper responds to Christopher Hookway’s article, “Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtue.”     

Philosophy, Criticism and Community: A Response to Duff

abstract   A critical discussion of R. A. Duff's account of 'internal' and 'external' criticism using two examples drawn from recent work on international justice — Pogge on global poverty and Duff on international criminal jurisdiction .     

Law, Strategy and Democracy: A Response to Duff

abstract   In this response to Antony Duff's paper, I raise doubts about the method of moving from internal to external critique, suggesting that external critique, focusing on more basic principles in moral and political philosophy, has primacy, and that internal critique, if it is done well, will very quickly turn external. I then suggest a different distinction: that between pure and strategic philosophical work, suggesting that more strategic work might be done in legal philosophy to improve the impact of philosophical work on those more concerned with policy. Finally, I suggest that more philosophically focused work on law and democracy has become increasingly important in the light of developments in criminal justice, something missing from Duff's account .     

Patriotic Education: A Response to Thompson,Rogach, and Sockett

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Of Sentiment,Caring and Anencephalics: A Response to Sytsma

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

Pain,Care, and the Body: A Response to de Vignemont

Frédérique de Vignemont argues on the basis of several empirical counterexamples that Bain and Klein are wrong about the relationship between pain and bodily care. I argue that the force of the putative counterexamples is weak. Properly understood, the association between pain and care is preserved in a way that is consistent with both de Vignemont's own views and the empirical facts.     

What,and Where,Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

In ‘What Luck Is Not’, Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.     

On Atheism,Pluralism and Science: A Response to Ted Peters

Abstract : In dialogue with Ted Peters this article argues that atheists can and do respect other religions; that the term “respect” itself is a slippery word that requires careful delineation; that what we call religious pluralism (“parity model”) is a form of religious relativism; and that much of the doctrine of the Trinity is not symbolic language but conceptual. These points are meant to forward the truth‐claims of Christian confession in a pluralistic world.     

Morally,We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky

In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.     

Men,Muscles and Zombies: A Partial Response to Michelangelo Signorile

Abstract

This article reflects upon the way in which religious paradigms are used to analyse the cult of masculinity in Michelangelo Signorile's ‘report’ on gay culture. Boisvert argues that the discourse used by Signorile reduces religion to cultic behaviour and confirms stereotypes of gay culture as unhealthy and hedonistic. The sort of gay self-critique employed by Signorile seeks to contain the religious impulses Boisvert believes are inherent within gay sexuality; an eroticism that in its defiance and excess opens gay men to the touch and kiss of the ‘ineffably holy’.     

Confusions and Conclusions: A Response to Doane

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate critically the logic and conclusions of Doane's article ( 14 ), and in so doing, to raise serious questions regarding her evaluation of the family interaction literature. In particular, we suggest that Doane's paper is characterized by (a) a confused and inaccurate presentation of previous reviews; (b) a vague and contradictory set of terms around which she attempts to recast previous findings; (c) an arbitrary and unsystematic selection of findings used to support suggestions regarding reliable group differences; (d) uncritical and erroneous interpretations of findings that ostensibly support suggested differences between groups; and (e) a superficial acceptance of recent family interaction data concerned with the relationship between communication deviance/clarity and psychopathology. We hope our detailed critique will stimulate other observers of family interaction research to contribute more accurate and significant perspectives to the field than those presented in Doane's review.