Absences as Latent Potentialities

Absences, i.e., agential omissions and forbearances, but also ‘natural’ negative states and events beyond the sphere of human agency, seem to be part and parcel of the real world. Yet, it is exactly the putative reality of absences that strikes many philosophers as utterly mysterious, if not entirely unintelligible. As a promising approach towards solving the problem of real absences, I wish to explore the idea that absences are latent potentialities. To this end, I shall investigate what potentialities are, what kinds of potentiality exist, and what it means for a potentiality to remain latent. I will also discuss whether the framework of latent potentiality is able to meet the extensional constraints imposed on the theory of absences by our intuitions about the reach of negative acts and events, i.e., whether latent potentialities can account for all real absences.     

IN DEFENCE OF FICTIONAL INCOMPETENCE

The claim that photographs are fictionally incompetent (i.e. that they can only depict those particulars they are appropriately causally related to) is argued by Noël Carroll, Gregory Currie, and Nigel Warburton to be falsified by cinematic works of fiction. In response I firstly argue that it does not follow from cinema's having a capacity for the representation of ficta that photography has a capacity for the representation of ficta. Secondly, and inspired by the work of Roger Scruton, I develop an account of how it is that cinema represents ficta on which this is fundamentally a matter of dramatic/theatrical representation. I argue that in cinematic fiction photography delivers a pre‐existent representation of ficta rather than creating or generating fictional content. With this being so, the claim that photography is fictionally incompetent is compatible with cinematic fiction. 1     

The Limits of Photography

Abstract

This paper is about what counts as a photograph and what does not. One way in which this question arises stems from new technologies that keep changing our way of producing photographs, such as digital photography, which not only has now widely replaced traditional film photography but also challenges the very limits of what we count as a photograph. I shall discuss below at some length different aspects of digital photography, but also want to focus here on a new striking type of photographic camera, announced in early 2012 by Lytro, Inc., namely, the so-called ‘Light Field Camera’, which is said to represent a revolution in the photographic world. Indeed, unlike in the case of any previously available cameras, the photographs produced by a Light Field Camera can be re-focused after the photograph has been taken, which harbours many interesting consequences with regard to the resulting image and the way we interact with it. But of course, the initial question also arises in the case of traditional film photography as well as ‘traditional’ digital photography. The question amounts to asking about what the essential features of photographs are – in short, what their nature is.     

ERP responses to images of abstract artworks,photographs of natural scenes,and artificially created uncomfortable images

The idea of efficient coding in the visual brain allows for predictions for the processing of various types of images, including certain artworks, natural images and uncomfortable images. Efficient processing is thought to result in lower responses compared to less efficient processing. The efficiency of the processing is suggested to depend on the architecture of the visual system and the properties of the input image. In this study, neural responses were estimated using EEG across the categories of a set of five images of abstract artworks, a set of five photographs of natural images and a set of five computer-generated uncomfortable images. EEG responses to contrast-matched images were found to be lower for the set of five abstract artworks used in the study compared to the set of photographs of natural images, lending preliminary support for the idea that certain abstract artworks, for example the work of Pollock, may be processed efficiently.     

Are Digital Images Allographic?

Nelson Goodman's distinction between autographic and allographic arts is appealing, we suggest, because it promises to resolve several prima facie puzzles. We consider and rebut a recent argument that alleges that digital images explode the autographic/allographic distinction. Regardless, there is another familiar problem with the distinction, especially as Goodman formulates it: it seems to entirely ignore an important sense in which all artworks are historical. We note in reply that some artworks can be considered both as historical products and as formal structures. Talk about such works is ambiguous between the two conceptions. This allows us to recover Goodman's distinction: art forms that are ambiguous in this way are allographic. With that formulation settled, we argue that digital images are allographic. We conclude by considering the objection that digital photographs, unlike other digital images, would count as autographic by our criterion; we reply that this points to the vexed nature of photography rather than any problem with the distinction.     

Between the imaginary and the real: photographic portraits of mourning and of melancholia in Argentina

During Argentina's 'Dirty War' (1976-83), the military regime attempted to erase an entire population; today the photographs of the dead/missing stand in defiance, contradicting that attempted erasure of the desaparecidos. In this essay, I explain the connection between photography and loss, and how photography fits within Lacan's understanding of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, the Real, and the 'gaze'. I discuss complicated mourning (circumstances which inhibit/delay mourning) and the difficulties created by political disappearances: as long as the family members maintain the belief that their loved one(s) might still be alive, they cannot begin the process of mourning the permanently lost object. Beginning with the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and, using the web-based art exhibits of Marcelo Brodsky and Inés Ulanovsky, I analyze the role of the photograph in Argentina, how it serves as a linking object, how it is used to symbolize the dead/missing, and how it can function to facilitate mourning, or to serve as proof of pathological melancholia. I argue that such artistic representations of loss function to reinscribe healthy mourning rituals within the Argentine society.     

The Sociocultural Forms of Mobile Personal Photographs in a Cross-Media Ecology: Reflections Starting from the Young Italian Experience

Increasingly, snapshots taken with mobile phone are ever more involved in intense processes of circulation and cross-media mobility. While camera phones are a well-established means for the production and display of pictures in contexts of physical copresence, the archival and exchange functions appear to have been absorbed by online communicative and social practices. This research studies three main issues: (a) the effects of the new Internet/photography merge (particularly, the new opportunities for transmission and sharing) on the social uses of personal photographs; (b) the changes in the status of mobile photography and of its audience due to the online relocation of image collections; and (c) the implications for mobile communication studies. Drawing on empirical qualitative data, I will first give an overall picture of these practices in the context of young Italians’ digital cross-media consumptions. My discussion is then contextualized in light of other recent contributions on the topic. I argue that the social uses and meanings of personal mobile photographs were already well established in the “pre-Web 2.0” Italian camera phone culture. I interpret this as underscoring both the intrinsically relational nature of these practices and their basic orientation towards microcommunity maintenance.     

The psychometrics of photographic cropping: the influence of colour, meaning, and expertise

Cropping is the central act of photography, the viewfinder of a camera being used to crop a portion of the visual world which is then surrounded with a frame. Six studies are described which show that the act of cropping is carried out reliably and confidently by both expert and non-expert participants. Two studies confirm that some croppers are better croppers than others, their cropped images being preferred aesthetically over the croppings of less-good croppers. Colour had little impact on cropping decisions, whereas thresholded monochrome images ('Mooney images') dramatically altered crop positions. That suggests that cropping can be driven top-down, by the meaning of objects in photographs, but the fact that the Mooneyised images are still cropped consistently, suggests that image structure, perhaps in the form of low-level image properties, may still be important. Experts crop pictures differently from non-experts, and they take longer, viewing a wider range of possible crops, pausing longer to assess crops, and using more formal terminology when reflecting on their cropping decisions. Experts' crops are not, however, preferred more, either by non-expert viewers or by expert viewers. Cropping, it is suggested, is an ideal paradigm for experimental aesthetics, allowing precise experimental control with Fechner's Method of Production, a technique which normally is not easy to use.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

Photo-Elicitation Interviews with Vulnerable Populations: Practical and Ethical Considerations

Photo-elicitation is a qualitative interview technique where researchers solicit responses, reactions, and insights from participants by using photographs or other images as stimuli. Images can be researcher-generated or participant-generated and each has particular benefits and challenges. Though not new, the use of images within criminology is an underused technique. In this paper we advocate the use of photo-elicitation techniques suggesting that they offer a powerful addition to standard data collection and presentation techniques. In making our case, we draw on our experiences from an 18-month long photo-ethnography of people living in rural Alabama who use methamphetamine. The ethnography consisted of formal interviews and informal observations with 52 participants and photography of 29 of them. While we draw on our overall experiences from the project we focus specifically on the photographs generated by, and taken of, one key participant—Alice. We demonstrate the benefits and challenges of using photo elicitation interviews with vulnerable individuals such as Alice, by considering themes such as representation, empowerment and emotionality. Additionally, we highlight the practical and ethical issues that confront researchers who incorporate the visual into their research.     

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) and a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) match features in familiar and unfamiliar individuals

Great apes can perceive images as representative of corresponding real-life objects. Coupled with the potential advantages of identifying specific members of one’s species and mounting evidence for individual recognition in other non-humans, it seems likely that great apes would have the ability to identify conspecifics in photographs. The ability of four orangutans and a gorilla to match images of individuals of their own and a closely related but unfamiliar species was examined here for the first time. First, the subjects matched photographs of familiar conspecifics taken at various time points in a delayed matching-to-sample procedure (Experiment 1). Second, they matched different photographs of unfamiliar individuals of a different species (Experiment 2) at above chance levels. These results suggest that the subjects matched photographs by matching physical features, not necessarily by recognizing the identity of the individuals depicted. However, they also quickly learned to select photographs of familiar individuals when these photographs were paired with photographs of unfamiliar individuals of their own species (Experiment 3), and three subjects showed transfer to novel images of familiar and unfamiliar individuals. Thus, the findings support the idea that subjects attended to physical features to identify individuals that they could categorize on the basis of familiarity.     

A new theory of absence experience

Ordering your morning coffee and then realising that your wallet is missing from your bag triggers an experience of the absence of your wallet. Familiar cases like this one provide good evidence for the idea that we frequently experience absences. According to one popular view, we experience absences by perceiving them. I argue that there are a number of problems with the perceptual view, and propose an alternative, cognitive account. Now, a cognitive account of absence experience has already been widely discussed and unequivocally rejected by participants in the debate. However, arguments against it depend upon the important, yet mistaken assumption that cognitive accounts must appeal to beliefs or judgements. I argue that the phenomenology involved in absence experience is not that associated with belief or judgement, but is instead an intellectual seeming. This renders my account immune to the objections that have been made against the existing cognitive view.     

Still Photography Provides Data for Community-Based Initiatives

We use community psychology's accent on methodological pluralism and giving voice to the marginalised as a platform to critically examine the utility and outcome of photography as a data collection and community engagement method. Accordingly we focus on two community projects that used still photographs to identify environmental and household childhood injury risks respectively. The first project involved the visual documentation, examination and analysis of environmental threats in an informal settlement. The second project focused on the documentation and identification of selected childhood injury risks in and outside homes in an informal settlement. This study provided visual images that are detailed and complex and that allowed the researchers to acquire greater understandings than would have been possible from written texts alone. These photographs may be used to create injury risk awareness in the respective communities and among other relevant stakeholders.     

Freedom,Firearms, and Civil Resistance

The claim that guns can safeguard freedom is common in US political discourse. In light of a broadly republican understanding of freedom, I evaluate this claim and its implications. The idea is usually that firearms would enable citizens to engage in revolutionary violence against a tyrannical government. I argue that some of the most common objections to this argument fail, but that the argument is fairly weak in light of other objections. I then defend a different argument for the claim that guns can safeguard freedom. I claim that firearm ownership among members of oppressed groups can hinder the use of systematic violence aimed at preventing them from exercising their basic liberties. I show how a commitment to armed self-defense is compatible with non-violent civil resistance as a tool of political change, and show how the former facilitated the latter during the Civil Rights Movement. Finally, I consider the policy implications of my argument. I don’t think it vindicates lax gun control policies. However, it may vindicate some individuals acquiring guns and learning how to use them, and some organizations aiding them in doing so.

     

Locke,Arnauld, and abstract ideas

A great deal of the criticism directed at Locke’s theory of abstract ideas assumes that a Lockean abstract idea is a special kind of idea which by its very nature either represents many diverse particulars or represents separately things that cannot exist in separation. This interpretation of Locke has been challenged by scholars such as Kenneth Winkler and Michael Ayers who regard it as uncharitable in light of the obvious problems faced by this theory of abstraction. Winkler and Ayers argue that Locke instead held that to have an abstract idea is to attend selectively to some portion of the content of a particular idea. On this view, to have an abstract idea is not to have a special kind of idea but to have an ordinary idea in a special way. Ayers argues that Locke inherited this theory from Arnauld. I argue that the case made by Ayers for the attribution of the extrinsic theory to Locke rests on a misinterpretation of Arnauld. In fact, both Locke and Arnauld regard selective attention as part of a process whereby a new kind of idea is constructed.     

Triangulating Creativity: Examining Discrepancies Across Self-Rated,Quasi-Expert-Rated and Verbalized Creativity in Arts-based Learning

This convergent mixed methods study examined the triangulation of self-rated, quasi-expert-rated and verbalized creativity in students enrolled in a year-long photography program. The quantitative data included self-report scales in creativity, and ratings of creativity in students’ photography. The qualitative data included student interviews reflecting on their photographs and verbalizing their beliefs about creativity. The data were first analyzed separately and then merged for analysis to determine possible relationships between these three data sources. Merging quantitative and qualitative data highlighted two key discrepancies between students’ actual creative performance and their perceptions as creative individuals. Possible explanations of these disceprancies are discussed in light of research on creative self-efficacy and creative mindsets.     

Photography as unconcealment: revisiting the idea of photographic transparency

What distinguishes photography from other visual mediums? This deceptively simple but fundamental question has been at the centre of both past and current debates on the aesthetics of photography for quite some time. In this article, I will first address the premise that this question is intrinsically ontological and unfolded in pioneering debates as a sequence of implications about photographic indexicality. I will then argue that the ontological implications of photographic indexicality have been largely overlooked in subsequent research due to scholars’ concerns with how photography appears to us rather than what photography is in itself. To this end, I will specifically examine Kendall Walton's highly contested transparency thesis and some of its rebuttals, which have exerted a sprawling influence on debates on the aesthetics of photography. I will also argue that, having been exceedingly implicit in his account, what appears as indexicality to Walton and the implications thereof with respect to the transparency argument has operated on a phenomenological level; thus, the thesis itself has failed in instances in which the problem of representation and the very existence of the medium come into play. Finally, I will suggest that indexicality can be regarded as a distinctive feature of photography only when it is considered a predicate of transparency as an interstice of ‘unconcealment’ in the Heideggerian sense that would call into question the very existence of the representation and the photographic medium.     

What ugly and beautiful photographs reveal about COVID-19 lockdown experiences,everyday aesthetics and photography aesthetics

Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which restricted our daily (visual) experiences, we asked people to take an ugly and beautiful photograph from within their homes. In total, 284 photographs (142 ugly and 142 beautiful) and accompanying statements were submitted and brought to light an intimate portrait of how participants were experiencing their (lockdown) home environment. Results revealed an aesthetic preference for (living) nature. Beauty and ugliness were also connected to good versus bad views, mess versus cosiness, unflattering versus flattering portraits and positive versus negative (COVID-19) emotions. In terms of photography strategies, editing and colour were important for beautiful photographs, whereas a lack of effort and sharpness showed up relatively more in ugly photographs. A follow-up study revealed that other viewers' (n = 86) aesthetic judgements of the photographs were largely in line with the original submissions, and confirmed several of the themes. Overall, our study provides a unique photographic window on our everyday aesthetic experiences at home during the COVID-19 lockdown.     

Seeing absence

Intuitively, we often see absences. For example, if someone steals your laptop at a café, you may see its absence from your table. However, absence perception presents a paradox. On prevailing models of perception, we see only present objects and scenes (Marr, Gibson, Dretske). So, we cannot literally see something that is not present. This suggests that we never literally perceive absences; instead, we come to believe that something is absent cognitively on the basis of what we perceive. But this cognitive explanation does not do justice to the phenomenology. Many experiences of absence possess immediate, perceptual qualities. One may further argue that the ability to detect certain absences confers strong adaptive advantage and therefore must be as primitive and fundamental to humans as seeing positive things. I argue that we can literally see absences; in addition to representing objects, perception represents absences of objects. I present a model of seeing absence based on visual expectations and a visual matching process. The phenomenon of seeing absence can thus serve as an adequacy-test for a theory of perceptual content. If experiences of absence are possible, then we have another reason (following Siegel) to reject the view that perceptual content is restricted to colors and shapes. Furthermore, if the proposed account is correct, then we have grounds for dissociating seeing absence from other imagery-based phenomena termed “perceptual presence-in-absence” (Noë, Macpherson).