Sartre’s Absent God

Sartre’s memoir Words turns on his mid-life realisation that, although he had abandoned belief in God, he had hitherto based his work on a religious model. From this point God no longer appears as a primary reference in his writings. This is in sharp contrast with the pervasive presence of God in earlier works, especially in his ontology and related reflections on ethics. In ontology Sartre was particularly concerned with the Cartesian idea of the creator God as ens causa sui. Adapting this to his own system, he uses the idea of causa sui to mark the absolute (but non-substantial) existence of for-itself being (consciousness) as separate from the uncreated plenitude of in-itself being. He then argues that the idea of God as a consciousness that founds its own being is an impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself. The idea nonetheless remains fundamental for consciousness, for desire, which arises in response to lack, ultimately the lack of in-itself being, reflects an original choice that leads to constant striving towards the impossible goal of being God. This theme haunts the ontology from beginning to end. Sartre offers a system to rival Descartes or Leibniz, but adopts a quasi-religious framework of salvation in which, apart from the promise of a possible escape from ontological destiny, human beings are condemned to futility. In ethics he explores the idea of conversion from original choice to an authentic choice of freedom, but fails to break out of the closed framework set by the ontology.     

To the Nothingnesses Themselves: Husserl’s Influence on Sartre’s Notion of Nothingness

In this article I argue that Sartre’s notions of nothingness and “negatity” are not, as he presents it, primarily reactions to Hegel and Heidegger. Instead, they are a reaction to an ongoing struggle with Husserl’s notion of intentionality and related notions. I do this by comparing the criticism aimed at Husserl in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness to that presented in his earlier work, The Imagination, where he discusses Husserl more elaborately. Furthermore, I compare his criticism to Husserl’s own criticism of the “doctrine of immanent objects”, in order to show that Sartre’s notion of nothingness is a continuation of Husserl’s criticism, and that he turns Husserl’s own arguments against himself.     

Sartre’s Dessin,Literature and the Ambiguities of the Representing Word

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Seemingly a minor part of L’Imaginaire, Sartre’s literary examples therein are of great significance especially in the way they highlight the...     

The Interface Between Sartre’s Theory of Emotions and Depersonalization/Derealization

Human beings are emotional beings and emotions are one’s way of relating to the world. Sartre’s Emotions, An Outline of a Theory lies on the borderline between psychology and philosophy. In this paper I will attempt to present the interface of Sartre’s philosophical theory of emotions with the signs and symptoms of depersonalization/derealization syndrome as presented in the psychiatric/psychological literature. I will begin by concisely situating Sartre’s concept of emotions within the Sartrean doctrine of existentialism, and follow with a brief summary of Bernard Frechtman’s translation of Sartre’s “The Emotions, An Outline of a Theory”. I will focus on the Introduction and Chapter Three, where Sartre presents the findings of his phenomenological study that purport to reveal the “essence” of emotions. Next, I will introduce the diagnostic components of the depersonalization/derealization syndrome which is a subcategory of dissociative disorders as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (2013) as well as criteria of International Classification of Diseases—10th edition (1992) and highlight the similarities with Sartre’s characterization of emotional behavior. Finally, I will attempt a brief comparison between Sartre’s theory of emotions and depersonalization/derealization syndrome using literary and philosophical critiques of Sartre’s “Emotions” and theoretical as well as research papers from the psychiatric literature. The focus will be on the similarities and incongruities between Sartre’s characterization of emotions and psychiatric diagnoses of depersonalization/derealization syndrome.     

Humanity in Schillebeeckx’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology. Towards a Methodology

This paper offers an analysis of Edward Schillebeeckx’s insights on different perceptions of revelation as related to concepts like salvation, God, church, human experience and creation in the work Jesus in Our Western Culture. The incentive of Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutical method in nowadays Western phenomenology, upon which God “breathed his breath of life”, triggered our interest in meanings which Schillebeeckx ascribes to human history as the realm of God’s work for the benefit of men and women. This meaning is suggested in the very beginning of the book by its original Dutch title If Politics is not Everything. As stated in this work’s introduction, Schillebeeckx’s main theme is the origin of salvation in the humanum, from the Abba experience to nowadays revelatory events. Our attempt is to see how Schillebeeckx’s humanum, which is the embodiment of human experience of consciousness, becomes relevant for the Christian doctrines and why Schillebeeckx reckons that bringing them together would impact both his worldview and Western culture.     

The Crucial Importance of Nancey Murphy’s Deployment of Lakatos’s Methodology for Theology and Science

Russell's paper explores the astonishing fruitfulness of Nancey Murphy’s use of Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science in the field of “theology and science.” Murphy’s work can be used to choose between competing theologies according to the theologians’ willingness to engage with science, their ability to continue the engagement as scientific theories change, and their ability to make empirical predictions based on this engagement. Topics range from creation and cosmology, the “cosmic Christ”, and non-interventionist objective divine action in quantum mechanics and evolution. Russell has followed Murphy’s lead and used Lakatos to place theology and science into “creative mutual interaction” (CMI).     

Kant’s,Hegel’s and Cousin’s Perceptions of China and Non-European Cultures: Racialism,Historicism and Universalism,and the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to discuss some assumptions of comparative philosophy by providing a critical analysis of Hegel’s perception of China and other non-European cultures in relation to Kant’s anthropological works. The main assumption of comparative philosophy is that the temporal-cognitive distance between Plato and Diderot is irrelevant compared to the geographic-cultural distance between Plato and Confucius or Diderot and Dai Zhen. This paper will demonstrate that this culturalist assumption is also a legacy of Hegel’s history of philosophy, whose anthropological basis and historicist framework needs to be deconstructed. Finally, this paper will make reference to Victor Cousin, the French philosopher who introduced German philosophy in France, to show how this thinker’s adaptation of Hegel’s history of philosophy allows us to propose a more inclusive conception of the value of non-European cultures’ intellectual productions and to elaborate, on this basis, a radically non-culturalist framework for comparative philosophy.     

Effects of Devil′s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry on Individuals versus Groups

There is a long history of research that has investigated the effects of cognitive conflict on group and individual decision making. No study has simultaneously compared the effects of two techniques, devil′s advocacy and dialectical inquiry, on the performance of individuals versus groups. In this paper, we report the results of a laboratory experiment that makes this comparison. Artificial groups (groups formed by pooling individuals working independently) obtained an overall lower-quality solution for a case analysis problem than intact groups. However, there were no performance differences between intact groups and the performance of the best member of artificial groups. When artificial and intact groups were examined together, those given the devil′s advocacy treatment produced higher-quality solutions than those given the dialectical inquiry treatment and a simpler expert-based approach involving no conflict. Intact groups given the devil′s advocacy treatment produced higher-quality solutions than those given the expert treatment. Artificial groups given devil′s advocacy produced higher-quality solutions than those given the expert or dialectical inquiry treatment. Overall, the results suggest that the devil′s advocacy treatment has a slightly greater advantage over the dialectical inquiry with individuals than with groups.     

Sartre,The Condemned of Altona and the Critique of Dialectical Reason-to-come: Insanity or Bad Faith Running Away with Itself?

What for Sartre happens when bad faith goes so deep that one is no longer master of it? In The Condemned of Altona, Franz Gerlach, after an initial show of resistance, joins the Nazi cause and tortures prisoners of war in his charge. Fleeing home from Russia at the war’s end, he sequesters himself in the attic of the family mansion and attempts to absorb the guilt of the twentieth century by frantically arguing his case before a tribunal of scuttling crabs.

What does Sartre’s portrayal of hallucination tell us about the human condition and is it the result of insanity? As a harbinger for the Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR), Sartre’s ontology has shifted away from an emphasis on human isolation and absolute freedom to a concern with how behaviour, even of an irrational kind, is a profound reflection of one’s place in a social hierarchy. Also a reflection of a CDR-type approach, Sartre’s views change regarding the status of truth and interpersonal relations. For while someone like Nausea’s Roquentin exhibits a redemptive value through introspection, fantasy and private experience, Franz’s behaviour points to a repeated failure to deal with social reality and the associated attempt to redeem his own existence by acting authentically towards others.     

The Phenomenology of Falling Ill: An Explication,Critique and Improvement of Sartre’s Theory of Embodiment and Alienation

In this paper I develop a phenomenology of falling ill by presenting, interpreting and developing the basic model we find in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1956). The three steps identified by Sartre in this process are analysed, developed further and brought to a five-step model: (1) pre-reflective experience of discomfort, (2) lived, bodily discomfort, (3) suffered illness, (4) disease pondering, and (5) disease state. To fall ill is to fall victim to a gradual process of alienation, and with each step this alienating process is taken to a new qualitative level. Consequently, the five steps of falling ill have not only a contingent chronological order but also a kind of logical order, in that they typically presuppose each other. I adopt Sartre’s focus on embodiment as the core ground of the alienation process, but point out that the alienation of the body in illness is not only the experience of a psychic object, but an experience of the independent life of one’s own body. This facticity of the body is the result neither of the gaze of the other person, nor of a reflection adopting the outer perspective of the other in an indirect way, but is a result of the very otherness of one’s own body, which addresses and plagues us when we fall ill. I use examples of falling ill and being a patient to show how a phenomenology of falling ill can be helpful in educating health-care personnel (and perhaps also patients) about the ways of the lived body.     

McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism

In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.     

Wallace’s and Darwin’s natural selection theories

Synthese - This work takes a stand on whether Wallace should be regarded as co-author of the theory of natural selection alongside Darwin as he is usually considered on behalf of his alleged...