Life-Prolonging Killings and their Relevance to Ethics

What makes killing morally wrong? And what makes killing morally worse than letting die? Standard answers to these two questions presuppose that killing someone involves shortening that person's life. Yet, as I argue in the first two sections of this article, this presupposition is false: Life-prolonging killings are conceivable. In the last two sections of the article, I explore the significance of the conceivability of such killings for various discussions of the two questions just mentioned. In particular, I show why the conceivability of life-prolonging killings renders Frances M. Kamm's attempt to provide an answer to the second question problematic.     

Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance

Abstract: A common view is that relativism requires tolerance. We argue that there is no deductive relation between relativism and tolerance, but also that relativism is not incompatible with tolerance. Next we note that there is no standard inductive relation between relativism and tolerance—no inductive enumeration, argument to the best explanation, or causal argument links the two. Two inductive arguments of a different sort that link them are then exposed and criticized at length. The first considers relativism from the objective point of view ‘of the universe’, the second from the subjective point of view of the relativist herself. Both arguments fail. There is similarly no deductive relation between absolutism and tolerance—neither entails the other—and no inductive connection of any sort links the two. We conclude that tolerance, whether unlimited or restricted, is independent of both relativism and absolutism. A metaethical theory that says only that there is one true or valid ethical code, or that there is a plurality of equally true or valid ethical codes, tells us nothing about whether we should be tolerant, much less how tolerant we should be.     

Factor Indeterminacy as Metrological Uncertainty: Implications for Advancing Psychological Measurement

Researchers have long been aware of the mathematics of factor indeterminacy. Yet, while occasionally discussed, the phenomenon is mostly ignored. In metrology, the measurement discipline of the physical sciences, uncertainty – distinct from both random error (but encompassing it) and systematic error – is a crucial characteristic of any measurement. This research argues that factor indeterminacy is uncertainty. Factor indeterminacy fundamentally threatens the validity of psychometric measurement, because it blurs the linkage between a common factor and the conceptual variable that the factor represents. Acknowledging and quantifying factor indeterminacy is important for progress in reducing this component of uncertainty in measurement, and thus improving psychological measurement over time. Based on our elaborations, we offer a range of recommendations toward achieving this goal.     

Interacting Constraints and the Emergence of Postural Behavior in ACL-Deficient Subjects

In this study, the authors examined how task, informational, and sensorimotor system constraints influence postural control. Postural behavior of subjects with (n = 15) and without (n = 15) a key sensorimotor system constraint, anterior cruciate ligaments (ACLs) in 1 knee, was examined during 1 - and 2-legged stance with and without vision. Postural control was assessed on a commonly used postural sway meter and on a dynamic stabilometer. Data on postural sway characteristics were obtained for 30 s under 6 different conditions: standing, with eyes open and closed, on both legs, on the injured leg, and on the noninjured leg. The interaction of task, informational, and sensorimotor constraints was observed only on the dynamic stabilometer and not the postural sway meter. Vision was the most important informational constraint on postural control for subjects on the dynamic stabilometer, particularly for the ACL-deficient group standing on the injured leg. Under more static task constraints, ACL deficiency did not prove a significant disadvantage, because vision was confirmed as a significant source of exproprioceptive information. The results support the functionality of using dynamic tasks such as a stabilometer in assessing postural behavior of subjects with sensorimotor system constraints.     

Future Contingents,Indeterminacy and Context

In Facing the Future, Belnap et al. reject bivalence and propose double time reference semantics to give a pragmatic response to the following assertion problem: how can we make sense of assertions about future events made at a time when the outcomes of those events are not yet determined? John MacFarlane employs the same semantics, now bolstered with a relative‐truth predicate, to accommodate the following apparently conflicting intuitions regarding the truth‐value of an uttered future contingent: at the moment of utterance, if asked to evaluate the truth‐value of the asserted future contingent one has the intuition that the assertion is neither true nor false, yet later, at the moment of the predicted event, one has the intuition that the assertion was, already, either true or false. Both MacFarlane and Belnap assume that assertions of future contingents have complete propositional content – the traditional propositional contents that, according to him ‘are the contents of assertions and beliefs’. This assumption is challenged.     

An Examination of Rapid Positioning Movements with Spatiotemporal Constraints

Unidirectional positioning movements with spatiotemporal-constraints were examined as a test of impulse-timing theory (Schmidt, 1976; 1980; Wallace, 1981). Movements were examined at the kinematic, kinetic, and neuromuscular levels in three experiments. In the first experiment, displacement was held constant while five different movement times were examined. Both amplitudes and durations of the EMG and the kinetic variables were related to movement time. The results generally support the impulse-timing model. In the second experiment, movements were performed to a target at each of four distances in a constant movement time. EMG and force amplitudes and, unexpectedly, accelerative-force duration were modulated to achieve changes in displacement when movement time was constant. In the third experiment, movement time and displacement were simultaneously varied resulting in four conditions with equal average velocities. The results of this experiment were not as clear and exhibited individual differences. EMG duration did not always vary with changes in movement time. The results of all three experiments could not be adequately accounted for by the impulse-timing model.     

Interlimb Coordination: Real Constraints and False Dichotomies

Despite the recent advances in the field of coordination dynamics addressing the interplay of constraints of different natures in the emergence of human coordination, F. Mechsner (2004) invites us to revive hierarchical and dichotomous thinking by offering again his exclusive position that coordinated movements are (purely) perceptual-cognitive/psychological in nature. In this comment, the authors address a number of theoretical and methodological issues that might potentially puzzle the readers of Mechsner's article. They contend that the dichotomy proposed by Mechsner (i.e., perceptual-cognitive vs. motor) constitutes a restrictive framework for understanding human coordination.     

Indeterminacy,empirical evidence,and methodological pluralism

Roth (1987) effectively distinguishes Quinean indeterminacy of translation from the more general underdetermination of theories by showing how indeterminacy follows directly from holism and the role of a shared environment in language learning. However, Roth is mistaken in three further consequences he draws from his interpretation of indeterminacy. Contra Roth, natural science and social science are not differentiated as offering theories about the shared environment and theories about meanings respectively; the role of the environment in language learning does not justify an empiricist sense of objective evidence; and his advocacy of methodological pluralism does not appropriately sustain the project of social scientific methodology in response to holism and indeterminacy.This paper has benefited from comments by Paul Roth and Terry Winant on an earlier draft, and by the two anonymous referees for Synthese.     

Three-valued Logic,Indeterminacy and Quantum Mechanics

The paper consists of two parts. The first part begins with the problem of whether the original three-valued calculus, invented by J. ukasiewicz, really conforms to his philosophical and semantic intuitions. I claim that one of the basic semantic assumptions underlying ukasiewicz's three-valued logic should be that if under any possible circumstances a sentence of the form X will be the case at time t is true (resp. false) at time t, then this sentence must be already true (resp. false) at present. However, it is easy to see that this principle is violated in ukasiewicz's original calculus (as the cases of the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction show). Nevertheless it is possible to construct (either with the help of the notion of supervaluation, or purely algebraically) a different three-valued, semi-classical sentential calculus, which would properly incorporate ukasiewicz's initial intuitions. Algebraically, this calculus has the ordinary Boolean structure, and therefore it retains all classically valid formulas. Yet because possible valuations are no longer represented by ultrafilters, but by filters (not necessarily maximal), the new calculus displays certain non-classical metalogical features (like, for example, non-extensionality and the lack of the metalogical rule enabling one to derive p is true or q is true from pqq is true).The second part analyses whether the proposed calculus could be useful in formalizing inferences in situations, when for some reason (epistemological or ontological) our knowledge of certain facts is subject to limitation. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of employing this calculus to the case of quantum mechanics. I am going to compare it with standard non-Boolean quantum logic (in the Jauch–Piron approach), and to show that certain shortcomings of the latter can be avoided in the former. For example, I will argue that in order to properly account for quantum features of microphysics, we do not need to drop the law of distributivity. Also the idea of reading off the logical structure of propositions from the structure of Hilbert space leads to some conceptual troubles, which I am going to point out. The thesis of the paper is that all we need to speak about quantum reality can be acquired by dropping the principle of bivalence and extensionality, while accepting all classically valid formulas.     

Examining the Effects of Postural Constraints on Estimating Reach

The tendency to overestimate has consistently been reported in studies of reachability estimation. According to one of the more prominent explanations, the postural stability hypothesis, the perceived reaching limit depends on the individual's perceived postural constraints. To test that proposition, the authors compared estimates of reachability of 38 adults (a) in the seated posture (P1) and (b) in the more demanding posture of standing on one foot and leaning forward (P2). Although there was no difference between conditions for total error, results for the distribution and direction of error indicated that participants overestimated in the P1 condition and underestimated in the P2 condition. It therefore appears that perceived postural constraints could be a factor in judgments of reachability. When participants in the present study perceived greater postural demands, they may have elected to program a more conservative strategy that resulted in underestimation.     

Indeterminacy,identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered

In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.     

Moral foundations,worldviews, moral absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories

In the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super‐individual relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns pertaining to group‐ and community‐concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well‐being (i.e., individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.