The true and the false

A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the twentieth century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular, according to which some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be explained in terms of these fundamental dispositions. The supposed ability of fundamental dispositions to ground natural laws is one of the most attractive features of the dispositional essentialist position. In this paper, however, I cast doubt on the ability of dispositional essences to ground the laws of nature. In particular I argue that the dispositional essentialist position is not able to coherently respond—sympathetically or otherwise—to Cartwright's challenge that there are no true general laws of nature.     

The physician as fortune teller: a commentary on "The ethical justification for minimal paternalism

...I shall summarize my argument to this point. 1) A new technology -- medicalizing life choices -- introduces additional sources of uncertainty into the physician-patient relationship. The implications for the authority-autonomy tension of that relationship are not fully worked out, as is evidenced by differing views on professional obligations. 2) The warrants for paternalism are complex, ranging from a pragmatic response in the face of uncertainty to a proactive, highly directive determination of the patient's best interests. 3) Although some proponents of autonomy argue that it entails positive rights to intervention and information, the "strong sense" of autonomy is not the prevailing view. 4) The as yet unclear benefits of knowledge about one's genetic makeup are even less clear in the case of HD. Strong circumstantial evidence of risks of harm from disclosure of unfavorable test results have not been dispelled by early experience with use of the HD test. 5) A cautious approach in the use of HD test seems warranted, even at the cost of restricting autonomy. Legitimating that approach by reference to traditional ethical theory is a necessary element in the transfer of the new technology to the wider clinical setting. 6) While PMP [the principle of minimal paternalism] attempts to offer such an approach, some questions do not appear to have been resolved or fully addressed by this formulation.     

Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions

This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call ‘Actuality Constraint’. The third section of the paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian). This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show (1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting of negative stimuli: The role of emotional intensity

Repeatedly retrieving a subset of previously studied items can cause forgetting of related non-retrieved material. We examined whether such retrieval-induced forgetting holds also for negative material. Participants studied neutral and negative stimuli and then repeatedly retrieved a subset of the neutral material. Later, a recall test was conducted in which participants were asked to recall all previously studied items. On average, retrieval practice on the neutral items caused the same amount of forgetting for neutral and negative items, indicating that the emotionality of material does not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. More detailed analysis, however, revealed that the forgetting of negative items decreased with both the emotional intensity of a negative item and the dispositional negative affectivity of a participant. The decreases in retrieval-induced forgetting may have been driven by item-specific processing of material, which is known to be enhanced for highly negative stimuli and participants high in dispositional negative affectivity and to reduce or even eliminate retrieval-induced forgetting.     

Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction

The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground.     

A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties

This essay presents a model‐theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified framework.     

Dispositions,explanation, and behavior 1

According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non‐dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of ‘reduction sentences’. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering‐law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a potential explanation of the covering‐law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of’ rational’ explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory of dispositions is further evidence of its adequacy.     

Why logical pluralism?

This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The present paper aims to improve this situation by looking at a promising case study and drawing general lessons about the kind of evidence that would support logical pluralism. I argue that the best motivation for logical pluralism will ultimately be rooted in certain kinds of performative data.

     

The trajectory of psychoanalysis: A prognosticationy3

I present an overview of the development to this point of psychoanalysis as a discipline'both as a theory of the mind and a treatment of the disorders of the mind' and offer a prediction concerning evolving development over its (near) future. My focus is on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure, starting with Freud's strenuous endeavours to maintain the psychoanalysis that he had single‐handedly created as a unitary and unified theory, tracing then the breakdown of this effort, even in Freud's lifetime, into the burgeoning theoretical diversity or pluralism that characterises worldwide psychoanalysis today, and then going on to the beginning appearance of evidences' not yet widely remarked' of growing convergences from within very disparate and even seemingly very opposed theoretical perspectives, at least at the level of technical interventions and experience‐near clinical theory, with implications, however, even for the level of experience‐distant general (metapsychological) theory. Such a development, if sustained, as I anticipate, would strengthen the credibility of psychoanalysis as a science of the mind, amenable to growth through empirical research in accord with the canons of scientific method.     

An In-Depth Look at Dispositional Reasoning and Interviewer Accuracy

Dispositional reasoning is defined as general reasoning about traits, behaviors, and situations. Although earlier accuracy studies found that it predicted interview judgment accuracy, they did not distinguish between its underlying components (i.e., trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait contextualization). This drawback has hampered insight into the nature of the dispositional reasoning construct. Therefore, we use a componential approach to test if dispositional reasoning adheres to classical criteria for an intelligence. Results from 146 managerial interviewers who observed videotaped interviewees showed that the dispositional reasoning components had positive manifold and predicted interview accuracy. Moreover, they demonstrated discriminant validity with personality and incremental validity over cognitive ability in predicting interview accuracy. Together, findings suggest that dispositional reasoning broadly adheres to the classical criteria for an intelligence.     

Dispositional mindfulness moderates the relation between neuroticism and depressive symptoms

Negative emotional reactivity as measured by neuroticism has been shown to be an important risk factor for the development of depressive symptoms. This study investigated whether the ability to be mindful can protect against the negative effects of this temperamental vulnerability. An English community sample of N = 144 individuals who had completed a neuroticism questionnaire six years previously were assessed for current depressive symptoms and dispositional levels of mindfulness at points of assessment approximately one year apart. Dispositional mindfulness moderated the relation between neuroticism and current depressive symptoms: Neuroticism was significantly related to depression in those with low to medium levels of dispositional mindfulness but not in those with relatively high levels of mindfulness. Further analyzes focusing on particular mindfulness skills indicated that this effect was carried mostly by the ability to describe inner experience. The results suggest that dispositional mindfulness and particularly the ability to describe inner experience are helpful in dealing with negative emotional reactivity in a way that reduces the likelihood of depressive symptoms to develop.     

彼彻姆和查瑞斯的原则主义进路及其改进

在全球化、多元化背景下,彼彻姆和查瑞斯通过寻找普世原则来容纳道德多元主义和避免道德相对主义,进而为医学伦理学提供一系列清晰、明确、有效的道德规范的努力无疑是可贵的,但其原则主义存在的突出问题是反思平衡方法在实践中不能有效解决根本性的道德冲突。针对这一不足,我们尝试提出解决道德冲突的更有希望的思路。     

What logical pluralism cannot be

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.     

认知闭合需要研究评述

认知闭合需要是个体稳定的认知特征,描述了个体在面对模糊情境时是否愿意系统处理信息的动机。已有研究表明,认知闭合需要对个体的信息处理过程和决策结果有显著的预测能力。总体上说,高认知闭合需要的个体更容易利用启发式进行思考,因此此类个体更容易受到过度归因、首因效应等的影响。虽然大多数的研究表明认知闭合需要是个体稳定的认知特质,但也有研究者发现环境因素如噪音等可以在一定程度上、在短时期内改变个体的认知闭合需要的水平。因此,在相关研究中,认知闭合需要既可以通过量表测量,也可以通过在实验中改变环境噪音和时间压力等方法来操纵。已有的关于认知闭合需要的研究也有不足之处。首先,如何引导高认知闭合者克服匆忙做出决策的动机并采用分析式的方式处理信息和进行决策,目前的相关研究还很少;其次,已有的关于认知闭合的研究大都为实验室研究,因此这些研究的外部效度较低;第三,认知闭合需要在冲突研究领域的应用被忽略了。未来有必要针对这些不足之处进行相应研究     

A multilevel analysis of the self-presentation theory of social anxiety: Contextualized, dispositional, and interactive perspectives

According to self-presentation theory, social anxiety is determined by impression motivation and impression efficacy. However, researchers have not evaluated the theory’s applicability from contextual and dispositional perspectives in an integrated manner, nor have they examined a fundamental interactive facet of the theory. In three studies, we examined these issues using hypothetical situations and experience sampling methodology. Results demonstrated the theory’s applicability at the contextual and dispositional level, providing insight into people’s general tendencies to experience social anxiety and their momentary experiences of social anxiety. Results also revealed the predicted interaction between impression motivation and impression efficacy - high impression efficacy weakens the association between impression motivation and social anxiety. These studies expand understanding of the personological and situational factors that drive social anxiety.     

Dispositional implementation solves the superfluous structure problem

Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of implementing material. As extraneous structure is not required for computation, a system can implement a program running on some but not all possible inputs. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The SSP cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.     

Videotape reconstruction of emotions and cognitions related to shyness

This study tested predictions of the self-presentational approach to situational and dispositional shyness within a broader perspective. Forty subjects who were high in self-rated dispositional shyness and 30 subjects who were low in self-rated dispositional shyness watched videotapes of their interaction with a confederate of the experimenter in various situations, including apprehension of evaluation and positive feedback provided by the confederate. The subjects' free verbal responses to particular events during these situations were content-analyzed. Compared with the group lower in shyness, the shy subjects (a) recalled more fear of social evaluation (including fear of positive evaluation) but did not more often report other kinds of fear, (b) had more negatively biased thoughts about the impression made on their partner but not more impression-related thoughts in general, and (c) showed more negatively biased reactions to the positive feedback of their partner. These results support the self-presentational view that fear of being socially evaluated is pivotal to dispositional shyness. However, some unexpected findings suggest that social evaluative situations also arouse fears of having to evaluate others; this would limit self-presentational explanations of situational shyness in these situations.     

The ungrounded argument is unfounded: a response to Mumford

Arguing against the claim that every dispositional property is grounded in some property other than itself, Stephen Mumford presents what he calls the ‘Ungrounded Argument’. If successful, the Ungrounded Argument would represent a major victory for anti-Humean metaphysics over its Humean rivals, as it would allow for the existence of primitive modality. Unfortunately, Humeans need not yet be worried, as the Ungrounded Argument is itself lacking in grounding. I indicate where Mumford’s argument falls down, claiming that even the dispositions of the simplest particles can have categorical bases.     

Dispositional accounts of evil personhood

It is intuitively plausible that not every evildoer is an evil person. In order to make sense of this intuition we need to construct an account of evil personhood in addition to an account of evil action. Some philosophers have offered aggregative accounts of evil personhood, but these do not fit well with common intuitions about the explanatory power of evil personhood, the possibility of moral reform, and the relationship between evil and luck. In contrast, a dispositional account of evil personhood can allow that evil is explanatory, that an evil person can become good, and that luck might prevent evil persons from doing evil or cause non-evil persons to do evil. Yet the dispositional account of evil personhood implies that some evil persons are blameless, which seems to clash with the intuition that evil persons deserve our strongest moral condemnation. Moreover, since it is likely that a large proportion of us are disposed to perform evil actions in some environments, the dispositional account threatens to label a large proportion of people evil. In this paper I consider a range of possible modifications to the dispositional account that might bring it more closely into alignment with our intuitions about moral condemnation and the rarity of evil persons. According to the most plausible of these theories, S is an evil person if S is strongly disposed to perform evil actions when in conditions that favour S’s autonomy.     

Embracing Change: Examination of a “Capabilities and Benevolence” Beliefs Model in a Sample of Military Cadets

This research used a capabilities and benevolence framework to examine 2 characteristics (learning orientation and propensity to trust) potentially associated with a cadet's attitudes and responses to organizational change. The research hypothesized that cadets with a high learning orientation and a high propensity to trust others will hold a significantly more positive attitude toward change than other individuals, even when controlling for the cadet's general dispositional resistance to change. Findings confirmed the hypothesis regarding learning orientation but not trust. Discussion focused on how organizations, by identifying the factors associated with a person's dispositional orientation, may ultimately develop better interventions to influence responses to change and increase the overall effectiveness of change initiatives.