Troublesome Sentiments: The Origins of Dewey’s Antipathy to Children’s Imaginative Activities

One of the interesting aspects of Dewey’s early educational thought is his apparent hostility toward children’s imaginative pursuits, yet the question of why this antipathy exists remains unanswered. As will become clear, Dewey’s hostility towards imaginative activities stemmed from a broad variety of concerns. In some of his earliest work, Dewey adopted a set of anti-Romantic criticisms and used these concerns to attack what one might call “runaway” imaginative and emotional tendencies. Then, in his early educational writings, these earlier concerns were augmented by several other factors, including problematic trends in progressive education, new developments in psychology, and Dewey’s own educational aims. This analysis explores the roots of these criticisms, and explains how they culminate in the stance on the imagination that Dewey eventually outlined in the early educational writings. Notably, these findings have some important implications for certain prominent contemporary critics of progressivism.     

Dissecting Intentionality in the Lab: Meinong’s Theory

Besides presenting a phenomenological-experimental analysis of consciousness, Meinong challenged one of the major indisputable axioms of current scientific research, i.e. that perception in awareness has to be veridical on the stimulus. Meinong’s analysis of consciousness, which he conducted through a kind of dissection of its structures from a systematic and an experimental viewpoint, offers relevant insights to contemporary consciousness studies.     

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism†

We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. The Abstraction Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these arguments are flawed and are not enough to rule out computationalism.     

Contextualizing the History of Yoga in Geoffrey Samuel’s The Origins of Yoga and Tantra: A Review Symposium

International Journal of Hindu Studies -     

Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account of Intentionality1

There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl’s early work the, Logical Investigations, and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned to objects which have an intrinsic property independently of any access or attitude we may have to them. Although not a methodological solipsist, there are nonetheless internalist elements to Husserl’s thought: He believes that we can think of non‐existent objects and his account of indexicals and demonstratives shows that there are two kinds of meaning: one is context independent and internally individuated, the other is partly determined by context and so externally individuated. The paper leaves it open whether this is sufficient to mark Husserl out as an internalist. However, even if he were considered as such, we can be sure of one thing, namely, that his internalism would not be a species of methodological solipsism.     

Beyond Intentionality: On the Non-dual Contemplative Practices of the Tibetan Buddhist Tradition ‘The Great Perfection’

The Buddhist vision of liberation is intimately related with an experiential state that transcends intentionality, temporality and causality, owing to its non-directed, unchanging and unconditioned nature. As such, this vision reveals a novel mode of non-dual awareness, which is not divided into perceiving subject and perceived objects. In order to directly recognise this mode, several Buddhist traditions utilised diverse contemplative instructions that were meant to dissolve the intending tendencies of consciousness. This paper discusses one of these traditions – ‘The Great Perfection’ (Tib. rDzogs pa chen po) – which affirms an inherent experiential state that is open, luminous and all-encompassing. For the sake of realising such a state, this tradition advocates a contemplative approach which emphasises relaxation, spaciousness and non-intending. Through its view and practices, ‘The Great Perfection’ introduces a vision of lived experience that goes beyond the structures of intentional consciousness and entails a reassessment of our basic assumptions about human awareness.     

The Primacy of the “Shoulds”: Where Is the Evidence?

A central tenet of rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) has always been that irrational beliefs which express demands through absolutistic shoulds, musts or oughts are the basic cause of emotional disturbance. This premise is characteristic of Ellis' theory but is not always supported by other REBT writers or other writers within the cognitive therapy field. This paper reviews a range of research findings which appear to call into question Ellis' tenet of the primacy of the shoulds and which, in turn, raise theoretical and methodological difficulties in the measurement of beliefs. This along with the current theoretical debate regarding irrational belief processes may preclude the possibility of testing the proposition that demandingness is the primary irrational or dysfunctional belief.     

Erikson’s Schedule of Human Strengths and the Childhood Origins of the Resourceful Self

This article focuses on Erik H. Erikson’s schedule of human strengths presented in his essay, “Human Strength and the Cycle of Generations” (1964). It discusses his assignment of human strengths to the eight stages of the life cycle, his view that the word “virtue” expresses their animated and spirited quality, and his view that these strengths are integral to the epigenetic developmental process. On the basis of his understanding of the human strengths as integral to the epigenetic developmental process, it proposes that the four human strengths developed in childhood are critically important to the development of the resourceful self. The article also suggests that we gain new insights into the eight human strengths when we view them as interrelated pairs, i.e., hope/will, purpose/competence, fidelity/love and care/wisdom.     

The form of the soul ― on the body in Freud’s psychoanalysis

To formulate the problem of the relation between body and soul in terms of how one should understand the relation between consciousness and the brain, or in terms of explaining how mind can arise out of matter, is a modern and far from innocent tendency that has instigated the whole spectrum of theories and answers suggested by the philosophy of mind of the so-called Analytic tradition during the 20th century. During the last 5 decades, we have seen a number of attempts at incorporating Freud into this discussion about the relation between body and soul. In this article, the author develops an argument according to which the philosophy of mind of the Analytic tradition is not really an appropriate intellectual environment for Freud´s theory of the body and its constitutive rôle. Rather, we should turn to phenomenology and transcendental philosophy where the body is thematized, not in terms of matter taken to give rise to consciousness in an empirical sense, but rather in terms of the “lived body” that is taken, in a transcendental sense, to constitute the organization of meaning in our conscious and our unconscious psychological life. On the basis of an outline of this phenomenological theory, the author argues that Freud, most of all in his theory of psychosexual development, thematizes the body as the form of the soul.     

The fate of the forgotten: Chamberlain’s work reconsidered

This article discusses the early psychological traditions developed at Clark University under the guidance of G. Stanley Hall. Anthropology and cultural psychology are both rooted in the notion that humans are social beings. That idea constituted a brief moment of theoretical unity between psychology and anthropology in the study of human language in its psychological functions. In that context, the work of Alexander Chamberlain is explored as a major contribution. Chamberlain—if viewed in the jargon of our contemporary social scientists—was deeply “interdisciplinary” in his work. Despite the positive meaning of the term “interdisciplinary” in contemporary discourse about the social sciences, the realities of social organization of any science entail separation rather than integration. Chamberlain’s work took place in parallel in anthropology and in developmental psychology under the interdisciplinary emphasis of “child study” as set up by G. Stanley Hall. Hall made child study the distinctive feature of the “Clark tradition” of psychology. Chamberlain’s work constituted both the beginning and the end of the (miniscule) “Clark tradition” in anthropology.     

The culture of justice: reflections on punishment in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot

The article investigates Dostoevsky’s juridical discourse and demonstrates that the apologist of the Russian soul had a genuinely European mind. In his novel The Idiot in particular, in which the death penalty and imprisonment are explored, Dostoevsky unmasks—more radically even than Victor Hugo—the supposedly civilised and lenient forms of modern criminal justice. Dostoevsky’s criticism is ahead of its time; his arguments resemble those subsequently put forward by Foucault. A comparison with Anatoly Pristavkin’s report on post-Communist crime and jurisdiction underscores the topicality of these reflections.     

The poet’s school and the parrot’s cage: the educational spirituality of Rabindranath Tagore

Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), Asia’s first Nobel laureate, was a man of myriad gifts, but he sought to articulate a single global vision. He believed that for our flourishing we must strive towards ‘the other and the beyond’. In so doing we discover that, as we seek, we are ourselves being sought. Tagore believed that we find our meaning and fulfilment relationally; in our relationships one with another, to be sure, but fundamentally in our kinship with all that is. We must be liberated, Tagore believed, from the bounds of our separateness and so discover a wholeness larger than our individual well‐being. That wholeness is ultimately realised in our union with the eternal Divine Spirit. In the establishment of his ‘poet’s school’ at Shantiniketan Tagore sought to make his ideals come true. This paper will focus on Tagore’s understanding of childhood and on the pattern of education by which, he believed, the spirit of the child may be nurtured. It will also enter a plea that we return to someone whose neglect in the West has been much to its loss.