Self-knowledge and commitments

In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states.     

Self-knowledge and scepticism

Donald Davidson has argued that most of our beliefs must be true and that global scepticism is therefore false. Davidson's arguments to this conclusion often seem to depend on externalist considerations. Davidson's position has been criticised, however, on the grounds that he does not defeat the sceptic, but rather already assumes the falsity of scepticism through his appeal to externalism. Indeed, it has been claimed that far from defeating the sceptic Davidson introduces an even more extreme version of scepticism according to which we cannot even know the contents of our own minds. This paper argues that these criticisms are mistaken and that Davidson does indeed have grounds to argue that scepticism is false. The externalism that figures in Davidson's antisceptical arguments is shown to be merely an element in Davidson's overall holism according to which the very possibility of having beliefs that could be true or false depends on most of those beliefs being true and their contents known.     

Self-knowledge defenses to self-threats

We examined whether people use both shifts in the spontaneous self-concept (self-knowledge content) and in self-concept clarity (self-knowledge structure) to defend against salient self-threats, and identified relevant moderators of this process. In Study 1, women emphasized relational self-aspects in response to mortality salience, compared to men. In Study 2, high self-esteem individuals showed more polarized self-knowledge after mortality salience, while in Study 3 they became faster in their self-categorizations when faced with uncertainty, and more consistent and faster in their self-categorizations when faced with isolation, relative to those with low self-esteem. In the discussion, we focus on how these outcomes can be interpreted as meaning maintenance, clarify the role of self-esteem, and offer directions for future research.     

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.     

Moral education: An act-utilitarian view1

In this essay, I distinguish two significant act-utilitarian theories of moral education: the traditional rule of thumb view and the Harian intuition view. I argue that there are problems with the traditional view and that an act-utilitarian ought to adopt a version of the Harian view. I then explain and respond to a major objection to the intuition view given by Bernard Williams. Williams argues that the system of moral thought which the Harian view advocates we teach is inherently unstable and is certain to undermine itself. I argue that there is reason to expect a great deal of stability in this system.I wish to thank Richard Brandt, William Frankena and R.M. Hare for their conversation on this and other topics and for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the Association for the Philosophy of Education and the Northwest Philosophy conference for the opportunity to read and discuss versions of the essay.     

Self-knowledge and social desirability of personality traits

Research into the self-concept has shown that self-knowledge is affected by factors such as trait desirability, trait vagueness, and self-variability. Among these, social desirability appears to play a prominent role. In a multidimensional view of the self, however, several studies indicate that in special conditions people show adequate self-knowledge in specific personality dimensions. The present study tests this with respect to extraversion and anxiety predisposition on a sample of 160 late adolescents. The main results confirm the prominent influence of social desirability, but they also provide support for the hypothesis of the specificity of self-perception. Despite a common pattern, the effects of desirability appeared, to some extent, to be less strong for anxiety than for extraversion. Several possible interpretations of this finding are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self-knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism: David OwensScepticisms: Descartes and Hume

Contemporary discussion of scepticism focuses on the possibility that most or all of our beliefs might be false. I argue that the hypothesis of massive falsity and the associated 'problem of the external world' are inessential to the scepticisms of Descartes and Hume. What drives Cartesian and Humean scepticism is the demand for certainty: any possibility of error, however local, must be ruled out before we can claim either justified belief or knowledge. Contemporary philosophers have ignored this form of scepticism because they doubt that the demand for certainty can be motivated. But Descartes provides a sound motivation for this demand in the Meditations.     

Self-knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism: Brian P. McLaughlin

In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptical hypothesis under assessment is true, and that the prospect of a sound strongly a priori argument of this sort seems dim.
'It still remains a scandal to philosophy... that the existence of things outside of us... must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.'
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason)     

Act-In: An integrated view of memory mechanisms

The present article proposes a new memory model called Act-In (Activation-Integration). Act-In extends the multiple trace memory models by placing them within the situated cognition perspective. Act-In considers that the activation and integration mechanisms play a key role in memory processes. These mechanisms are involved in both the construction of memory traces and the emergence of knowledge. The model is based on four main assumptions: (1) Memory traces reflect all the components of past experiences and, in particular, their sensory properties, actions performed on the objects in the environment and the emotional states of individuals. Memory traces are therefore distributed across multiple neuronal systems which code the multiple components of the experiences. (2) Knowledge is emergent and is the product of the coupling of the present experience with past experiences. (3) The brain is a categorisation system which develops by accumulating experiences and which, by default, produces categorical knowledge. (4) The emergence of specific knowledge (memories or episodic knowledge) requires very simple mechanisms which occur during learning and/or during retrieval. These assumptions are defended and discussed in the light of the work reported in the literature.