Self-validation and internalism in Velleman’s constitutivism

Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is (putatively) constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive aim of self-understanding structures an agent’s practical deliberation as Velleman describes, then some correctly deliberating agents will regard that aim as normatively arbitrary or unjustified. Moreover, I argue that the self-invalidation of the constitutive aim undermines or significantly qualifies Velleman’s claim that his constitutivism reconciles internalism with a kind of objectivity about reasons. Internalists typically hold that motives from which an agent is alienated do not generate reasons, but in cases of self-invalidation, agents are alienated from the aim of self-understanding in just this way. Thus, the larger cost of the constitutive aim’s possible self-invalidation is that Velleman’s constitutivism does not satisfy a plausible and widely accepted constraint on an internalist account of reasons.     

Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics

Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the details of Hume’s naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically have thought that Hume’s view that motivation is not produced by representations, coupled with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral (virtue and vice).     

A dilemma for internalism?

Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; given the weak construal, internalism is unmotivated; either way, internalism is in serious trouble. I argue for two claims in this article. First, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unmotivated: he’s given no good reason for accepting one of its crucial premises. And second, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unsound: the crucial premise in question is false.     

Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate

In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl‐research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of noema can be interpreted in a manner that makes his theory far more congenial to a certain type of externalism, but ultimately it is argued that his phenomenological analysis of intentionality entails such a fundamental rethinking of the very relation between subjectivity and world that it hardly makes sense to designate it as being either internalist or externalist.     

Mr. Magoo’s mistake

Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

G. A. Cohen’s Vision of Socialism

This essay is an attempt to piece together the elements of G. A. Cohen’s thought on the theory of socialism during his long intellectual voyage from Marxism to political philosophy. It begins from his theory of the maldistribution of freedom under capitalism, moves onto his critique of libertarian property rights, to his diagnosis of the “deep inegalitarian” structure of John Rawls’ theory and concludes with his rejection of the “cheap” fraternity promulgated by liberal egalitarianism. The paper’s exegetical contention is that Cohen’s work in political philosophy is best understood in the background of lifelong commitment to a form of democratic, non-market, socialism realizing the values of freedom, equality and community, as he conceived them. The first part of the essay is therefore an attempt to retrieve core socialism-related arguments by chronologically examining the development of Cohen’s views, using his books as thematic signposts. The second part brings these arguments together with an eye to reconstructing his vision of socialism. It turns out that Cohen’s political philosophy offers a rich conception of objective and subjective freedom, an original understanding of justice as satisfaction of genuine need, and a substantive ideal of fraternity as justificatory community with others. If properly united, these values can suggest a full-bloodied account of the just polity, and give us a glimpse into what it means, for Cohen, to treat people as equals.     

‘Any room won’t do.’ Clinical psychologists’ understanding of the consulting room. An interview study

In the social sciences, there is increasing interest in spatial practices and the meaning of places. The meaning of the psychotherapeutic room and its boundaries has traditionally been underlined in psychodynamic practice. In this study we investigated how clinical psychologists, working from different perspectives and with varying interventions and populations understand and use the consulting room. Five clinical psychologists were interviewed about how they perceive and use consulting rooms. The interviews were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. The participants understood the consulting room as a logistic unit but also as a welcoming place for relational encounters and sensed that spatial stability was important for their capacity to be fully attentive to their clients. Moreover, technological booking systems could hinder clinical work. The results were understood with respect to Winnicott’s theories of transitional space and holding. In sum, the importance of the room does not seem to be of concern exclusively to psychodynamic psychologists. On the contrary, it seems as if psychologists working with varying interventions and from different perspectives emphasise stable and personal consulting rooms that permit them to adapt to the needs of the clients, be attentive, and avoid disturbances.     

D. C. S. Oosthuizen on Husserl’s Doctrine of Constitution

The following is an English translation of the 1960 paper by the South African philosopher D. C. S. Oosthuizen entitled “Die Transendentaal-Frenomenologiese Idealisme: ‘n Aspek van die konstitusie-probleem in die filosofie van Edmund Husserl,” preceded by a few contextualizing remarks by the translator. The paper attempts to show that the phenomenological, eidetic and transcendental reductions, the problem of constitution and transcendental genesis are indispensable parts of the transcendental phenomenological method. It then demonstrates that this method and the results that are obtained by means of it cannot, strictly speaking, be said to decisively favour a metaphysical or epistemological idealism, specifically because the transcendental reductions cannot be undone.     

Sexualization in U.S. Latina and White Girls’ Preferred Children’s Television Programs

Master narratives, or prevailing cultural storylines, of motherhood provide a framework for new mothers to make sense of their experiences and to develop a coherent maternal identity. The present mixed methods study developed a theory-driven methodology to systematically identify a master narrative and examined whether one is present in 32 U.S. first-time mothers’ accounts of developing feelings for, and connection to, their newborns. In coding these mothers’ 95 episodes, we found that just over half of the mothers exclusively described positive feelings/connection toward their babies that were present in pregnancy or at birth (“At First Sight”; AFS), whereas 31 % exclusively described feelings/connection that took time to develop, or were negative, questioned, and/or tentative (“It Took Time”; ITT). To identify the presence of a master narrative, we compared these groups’ accounts on several theoretical indicators; the episodes of mothers who exclusively described ITT experiences were longer, more often contained talk of expectations, and were more likely to have a mismatch between expectation and experience than those of mothers who exclusively described AFS experiences. This suggests that ITT experience accounts countered a master narrative that mothers should have overwhelming, positive, and immediate feelings for/connection to their babies (AFS). Using discursive analysis, we then examined how the master narrative was actually invoked in the accounts of two mothers, one who positioned her experiences as aligned with, and one who positioned her experiences as counter to, the master narrative. Implications for supporting mothers in making meaning of their experiences, whether by aligning with the master narrative or co-constructing an empowering counter-narrative, are discussed.     

N. A. Vasil’ev’s Logic and the Problem of Future Random Events

The solution of the problem of the future random events truth is considered in Vasil’ev’s logic. N. A. Vasil’ev graded the logic according to two levels—the level of facts, i.e. time fixed events, and the level of notions or rules, governing these facts. The mathematical construction previously suggested for imaginary Vasil’ev’s logic, extends to the early variant of his logic—a logic of notions. In the paper, we investigate the meaning of problematic and uncertain assertions introduced by Vasil’ev. As a result, we developed a model of Vasil’ev’s logic of facts that resolves also the truth problem of future random events. The imaginary logic has also been extended to the level of notions, and the law of the excluded eighth is gotten in it. The correspondence between Vasil’ev’s terms “some” and “all” and modern quantifiers is discussed.     

D. Z. Phillips’ contemplations on religion and literature

This paper critically discusses D. Z. Phillips’ use of literary works as a resource for philosophical reflection on religion. Beginning by noting Phillips’ suggestion, made in relation to Waiting for Godot, that the possibilities of meaning that we see in a literary work can reveal something of our own religious sensibility, I then proceed to show what we learn about Phillips from his readings of certain works by Larkin, Tennyson, and Wharton. Through exploring alternative possible readings, I argue that, although Phillips’ discussions are of considerable philosophical interest, they undermine his claim to be deploying a purely contemplative hermeneutical method.     

V. Bibikhin’s practical phenomenology

This article is devoted to understanding the worldview expressed in Vladimir Bibikhin’s Leo Tolstoy’s Diaries. The most important feature of this worldview is its practical nature: Bibikhin focuses on changing one’s view of things instead of trying to develop a doctrine. Practical phenomenology is extremely vulnerable to criticism because of its pre-philosophical nature. Therefore, at this stage, I try to explicate some of the features of this peculiar thought while avoiding trying to find its faults. I draw a connection between Bibikhin’s ontological interpretation of the phenomenon with Heidegger’s concept of detachment (Gelassenheit) as a form of behavior, and illustrate that practical phenomenology turns out to be an ontology of contact. It thematizes the philosopher’s own being and focuses on the problems of the contact made in the “change of view,” in which thought, word, and deed converge. Bibikhin’s practical phenomenology is on the outskirts of modern academic philosophy, gravitating towards understanding philosophy as a way of life, in which the contemplative attitude takes the leading place, paradoxically combining experiment with their perception of “first things,” trust in them, and the ability to describe the indescribable, the “change of view.” This makes practical phenomenology related to the experimental phenomenology of Michel Henry.

     

I’m Happy, Hope You’re Happy Too.

While most empirical studies show stable and high levels of subjective well-being in Western societies, other studies have documented an apparently contradictory feeling of a loss of sense of community and high levels of discontent with the way society functions. Based on an analysis of the Social Cohesion Indicators survey (SCIF, Belgium), we demonstrate that subjective well-being and one’s view on society are two distinct concepts. Both measurements are related, however, with some spill-over effects from individual well-being toward the assessment of society. Most notably, ethnocentrism does not have an impact on subjective well-being, but it has a strong negative impact on the view on society. Ethnocentrism has a strong effect on the distribution of discontent with society. We hypothesize that ethnocentric actors might still be satisfied with their own living conditions, but that they feel increasingly alienated from the culturally diverse society they live in.     

C. S. Peirce’s Dialogical Conception of Sign Processes

This article examines the contention that the central concepts of C. S. Peirce’s semeiotic are inherently communicational. It is argued that the Peircean approach avoids the pitfalls of objectivism and constructivism, rendering the sign-user neither a passive recipient nor an omnipotent creator of meaning. Consequently, semeiotic may serve as a useful general framework for studies of learning processes.     

D. Z. Phillips’ problems with evil and with God

It is widely held that the logical problem of evil, which alleges an inconsistency between the existence of evil and that of an omnipotent and morally perfect God, has been solved. D. Z. Phillips thinks this is a mistake. In The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, he argues that, within the generally assumed framework, “neither the proposition ’God is omnipotent’ nor the proposition ‘God is perfectly good’ can get off the ground.” Thus, the problem of evil leads to the problem of God. Phillips goes on to provide an alternative response to the problem of evil, expounded by means of his Wittgensteinian analyses of various concepts drawn from the Christian tradition. I argue that his criticisms of the traditional conception of God either fail outright or are at best inconclusive. I also point out that the religious concepts analyzed by Phillips are not and cannot be the same concepts as those employed in the Christian tradition from which they are supposedly drawn. For the concepts as traditionally employed presuppose the actual existence and activity of precisely the sort of being that, according to Phillips, “God cannot be.”     

T. V. Moore’s (1939)Cognitive Psychology

Thomas Verner Moore published a book calledCognitive Psychology in 1939, almost 30 years before Neisser’s (1967) more familiar and far more influential work. Although it covers most of the standard topics found in current cognitive psychology textbooks, and even anticipated several current trends, Moore’s text is not cited by any of the major histories of the “cognitive revolution” or any current cognitive textbook. We provide a brief sketch of Moore’s academic life and summarize several of his papers that are still cited. After describing the psychologies prevalent in 1939, we compare Moore’s text with two contemporary works, Woodworth (1938) and McGeoch (1942). We conclude by comparing the older text with Neisser’s and by offering several reasons why the book is virtually unknown.