Children Show Selective Trust in Technological Informants

Although children are often exposed to technological devices early in life, little is known about how they evaluate these novel sources of information. In two experiments, children aged 3, 4, and 5 years old (n = 92) were presented with accurate and inaccurate computer informants, and they subsequently relied on information provided by the previously accurate computer to identify novel objects and answer questions about unfamiliar facts. In a third experiment, 4- and 5-year-olds also expressed a preference for using the accurate computer to find answers on their own and for explaining the inaccurate computer's errors as a function of problems with the device, rather than errors on the part of the human user. These results suggest that young children use prior history of accuracy as a domain-general means of evaluating informants and that children can apply this understanding outside of interactions with other people.     

儿童社会认识论:儿童对信息提供者的选择性信任

个体掌握的知识很多来自于他人的传授。从4岁起,儿童就意识到不同的信息提供者在可靠性上存在差异。他们根据与提供者间的熟悉程度、提供者过往陈词的准确性、以及来自他人的线索等策略对于信息提供者的可靠性进行评估,从而决定谁更值得信任。未来关于儿童对于信息提供者选择性信任的研究应从扩展探究的知识领域、对于信息提供者其他特征的操纵、以及潜在文化差异检验等方面进行。     

Children's Selective Use of Peer Informants: Criteria for Making Information-Seeking Decisions

Children from preschool, first-grade, and fourth-grade classrooms (N = 60) were randomly assigned to two different instructional conditions to assess (a) their recognition of the significance of knowledge versus physical (age or gender) criteria for making information-seeking decisions and (b) their reliance on these criteria in actual need-for-information situations. The results suggest that older children are more likely than younger children to recognize the salience of a peer's knowledge for making information-seeking decisions. Depending on the context, however, even young children may be able to view a peer's knowledge of a particular task as a dimension that takes precedence over such competing cues as gender or age. Age differences in children's tendencies to recognize and apply these criteria are also discussed.     

信息提供者的先前准确性对幼儿选择性信任的影响

作为社会学习的个体,幼儿从3岁起就能根据信息提供者先前准确性的差异对其可信程度进行评估。通过对以往研究效应量的整理分析发现,随年龄增长,幼儿对高先前准确性信息提供者的信任程度表现出增长趋势（3岁幼儿选择的效应量中值为d_询问=0.60,d_赞同=0.61;4岁幼儿的效应量中值为d_询问=0.80,d_赞同=0.96）。在运用先前准确性进行评估时,幼儿主要关注信息提供者是否犯错,灵活使用"整体印象"和"特质推测"两种认知策略对其未来行为进行推测。幼儿能够根据自身对材料的感知对信息提供者的可信程度进行动态调整,其心理理论发展水平和执行功能限制了他们的选择信任,而信息提供者同时具有的社会性因素对幼儿的选择也具有干扰作用（幼儿信任准确的信息提供者的效应量中值为d_询问=-0.03,d_赞同=-0.17）。未来研究可以改进实验范式,进一步探查先前准确性对幼儿选择性信任的影响,拓展信息提供者的呈现方式和其它多重特征,关注不同类别的信息提供者。     

Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

幼儿基于信息判断的选择性信任的发展——其持续性及与人际信任的关系

采用物品命名任务的模式, 对60名2岁、3岁、4岁幼儿的选择性信任进行研究。结果表明:(1)幼儿更信赖那些正确率高的信息传达者, 形成选择性的信任。这种选择性信任的认知能力在3岁左右出现, 并随着年龄的增长而增强, 4岁达到稳定。(2)选择性信任一旦形成, 就具有一定的稳定性和持续性, 即3岁以上的幼儿在不同时间不同地点再见到先前的信息传达者时, 依然能区分出他们。(3)基于信息判断的选择性信任可以迁移到人际信任的其他方面。     

Reliance,Trust, and Belief

Abstract

An adequate theory of the nature of belief should help us explain the most obvious features of belief as we find it. Among these features are: guiding action and reasoning non-inferentially; varying in strength in ways that are spontaneously experience-sensitive; ‘aiming at truth’ in some sense and being evaluable in terms of correctness and warrant; possessing inertia across time and constancy across contexts; sustaining expectations in a manner mediated by propositional content; shaping the formation and execution of plans; generalizing spontaneously projectively; and being independent of the will and resisting instrumentalization. Using the method of ‘creature construction’, I attempt to show how we can build an attitude with these features step-by-step from simpler components, thereby avoiding the problems of regress or circularity affecting a number of influential accounts of belief.     

Young Children's Trust in Overtly Misleading Advice

The ability of 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children to disregard advice from an overtly misleading informant was investigated across five studies (total n = 212). Previous studies have documented limitations in young children's ability to reject misleading advice. This study was designed to test the hypothesis that these limitations are primarily due to an inability to reject specific directions that are provided by others, rather than an inability to respond in a way that is opposite to what has been indicated by a cue. In Studies 1 through 4, a puppet identified as The Big Bad Wolf offered advice to participants about which of two boxes contained a hidden sticker. Regardless of the form the advice took, 3‐year olds performed poorly by failing to systematically reject it. However, when participants in Study 5 believed they were responding to a mechanical cue rather than the advice of the Wolf, they were better able to reject misleading advice, and individual differences in performance on the primary task were systematically correlated with measures of executive function. Results are interpreted as providing support for the communicative intent hypothesis, which posits that children find it especially difficult to reject deceptive information that they perceive as being intentionally communicated by others.     

Trust,Belief, and the Second-Personal

Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust.     

Selective Social Belief Revision in Young Children

ABSTRACT

Recent research has shown that from early in development, children selectively form new beliefs in response to information supplied by others. However, little is known about the development of selective revision of existing beliefs in response to socially conveyed information. Such selective social belief revision has been extensively studied by social psychologists in the context of advice-taking. Here, we adapted the methods of this research tradition for studying selective advice-taking in young children and adults. Participants solved a perceptual judgment task, received advice, and subsequently made final decisions. The informational access (perceptual quality) of participants and advisor were experimentally manipulated. Adults revised their judgments systematically as a function of both their own and the advisor’s informational access whereas children based their adjustments only on their own informational access. Two follow-up experiments suggest, however, that this pattern of results in children reflected performance rather than competence limitations: In suitably modified tasks, children did proficiently consider both their own informational situation and that of the advisor in their selective social belief revision.     

经济博弈中儿童信任的发展

利用信任游戏考察242位小学3～6年级儿童在经济活动中信任的发展状况。结果表明:(1)在游戏中,儿童信任的年级差异显著,三年级儿童信任水平显著高于四年级,而四五六年级儿童信任水平逐渐增高;(2)在代表群体做出决策的情境下,儿童表现出比个体情境下更高的信任水平;(3)经济活动中儿童的信任存在性别差异,男生的信任水平要高于女生。     

儿童在错误信念任务上的知识偏差

采用3种任务考查儿童在错误信念（FB）推理中是否存在知识偏差。被试为60名3—5岁幼儿,结果表明,对于3岁及4岁儿童来说,FB任务是存在知识偏差的。知识偏差的大小与年龄呈负相关关系,3岁与4岁、4岁与5岁儿童的知识偏差的大小均有显著差异。     

父母的经济人信念对自身信任及儿童信任的影响

经济人信念认为人是自私的与理性的,研究者发现,经济人信念会破坏人际信任。然而,以上研究均是以大学生为被试的启动研究,限制了结论的可推广性。本研究编制了经济人信念量表,测量了351名成年被试的经济人信念及他们在投资博弈中的信任水平,以及其子女的信任水平,以考察父母的经济人信念对自身信任和其子女信任的影响。结果发现:(1)研究所编制的经济人信念量表信效度良好;(2)父母和儿童在投资博弈中均表现出了一定水平的信任;(3)父母的经济人信念能够预测其在投资博弈中的信任水平;(4)父母的经济人信念能够预测男孩在投资博弈中的投资额,主要表现为父亲的经济人信念能够负向预测男孩的投资额。     

ASD儿童表征自我和他人错误信念

威廉斯(williams)和哈皮(Happ?的一项最新实验显示,传统实验中自闭症谱系障碍(ASD)儿童表征自我错误信念和他人错误信念难度相当是因为ASD儿童采用了陈述记忆策略所致,若排除该策略干扰,他们表征自我错误信念比表征他人错误信念更加困难.通过两项实验表明,ASD儿童表征自我错误信念的难度可能受自我动手行为的影响,而不是受陈述记忆策略的影响.     

学习不良儿童的策略信念与理解水平

使用结构访谈法对120名儿童(其中学习不良儿童60名)的策略信念与策略理解水平进行了研究。结果显示:学习不良儿童组与一般儿童组的差异更多体现在对具体策略的元认知因果解释水平上,他们更多持有较低水平的“信息获得”解释,而对照组儿童则更多持有较高水平的“信息加工”解释,提示对策略理解水平的差异可能是导致学习不良儿童难以将新学到的策略主动应用到其它情景中去的一个重要原因。     

Mothers' Ideal Positive Affect Predicts their Socialization of Children's Positive Affect

Parents generally want their children to be happy, but little is known about particular types of positive affect (PA) that parents want their children to experience. Tsai's (2007) affect valuation theory offers a useful framework to understand how parents' emotional goals may shape the socialization of particular types of PA (e.g., excitement vs. relaxation). Participants were 96 mothers and their 7- to 12-year-old children. Results indicated that mothers endorsed similar levels of ideal PA (IPA) for low-, moderate-, and high-arousal PA for both themselves and for their child, suggesting that mothers desire the same type of PA for their children as they want for themselves. In support of the study's main hypothesis, mothers' IPA for their children predicted specific socialization responses that would encourage that type of PA (e.g., mothers' high-arousal IPA predicted greater encouragement of their child to celebrate, whereas mothers' low-arousal IPA predicted encouragement of affection). The findings extend affect valuation theory and emotion socialization research by indicating that parents' emotional goals (i.e., IPA) for their children may contribute to their socialization of children's PA.     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

试论以巫啸、符法为中心的岭南民间信仰

岭南俗信是一种独具特质的民间文化，这一特质深受岭南特殊的环境、气候、物产、族属等因素的影响，使之有别于内地较为混一的俗信。早在唐宋之际，人们就已认识到岭南俗信所具有的特异性，而将其称之为“南法”。本文通过对岭南巫啸、符法两种不同类型俗信的考察，以观原生俗信是如何保有其地域特质，而移植俗信由域外植入后又怎样被赋以本地化特征的。     

Investor's Pessimistic and False Belief About Trustworthiness and Stake Size in Trust Decision1

Trust is a vital element of any society. Previous studies using trust games have provided insight into understandings of trusting behavior. However, investors' behaviors can be confounded by their risk preferences in the game, and little is known about the relationship between stake size and beliefs of others' good intentions underlying trust. We thus used a variant of the trust game and conducted two experiments to examine how stake size affects investors' beliefs about receivers' trustworthiness, with model-based analyses. We showed that, when holding all else equal, investors trusted more, but their expectations of reciprocation declined as stake size increased. However, actual receivers' reciprocation rates showed the opposite trend to investors' pessimistic beliefs. Furthermore, following previous studies in social psychology, we hypothesized that investors' social preferences (social value orientation) moderated the beliefs underlying trust, but they had no explanatory powers in investors' expectations of reciprocation. These results suggest that peoples' naive beliefs about stake size play a more important role in trust decisions than expected.     

Belief in a just world and organisational loyalty: Trust as an underlying mechanism

This research examined whether employees' personal belief in a just world (BJW) is associated with their organisational loyalty and whether this relationship is statistically mediated by organisational trust. To test these hypotheses, we conducted two studies with employees from China (study 1, N = 314) and Germany (study 2, N = 189). The results from both studies supported the proposed model. In addition, study 2 revealed that the relationship between BJW and organisational loyalty persisted when controlling for global personality traits. These suggest that managers and organisations may increase employees' loyalty by providing an environment that fosters their sense of justice and trust.