The development of adaptive conformity in young children: effects of uncertainty and consensus

Human culture relies on extensive use of social transmission, which must be integrated with independently acquired (i.e. asocial) information for effective decision‐making. Formal evolutionary theory predicts that natural selection should favor adaptive learning strategies, including a bias to copy when uncertain, and a bias to disproportionately copy the majority (known as ‘conformist transmission’). Although the function and causation of these evolved strategies has been comparatively well studied, little is known of their development. We experimentally investigated the development of the bias to copy‐when‐uncertain and conformist transmission in children from the ages of 3 to 7, testing predictions derived from theoretical models. Children first attempted to solve a binary‐choice quantity discrimination task themselves using asocial information, but were then given the decisions of informants, and an opportunity to revise their answer. We investigated whether children's revised judgments were adaptively contingent on (i) the difficulty of the trial and (ii) the degree of consensus amongst informants. As predicted, older but not younger children copied others more on more difficult trials than on easier trials, even though older children also showed a tendency to stick with their initial, asocial decision. We also found that older children, like adults, were disproportionately receptive to non‐total majorities (i.e. were conformist) whereas younger children were receptive only to total (i.e. unanimous) majorities. We conclude that, whilst the mechanism for incorporating social information into decision‐making is initially very blunt, across the course of early childhood it converges on the adaptive learning mechanisms observed in adults and predicted by cultural evolutionary theory. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://youtu.be/Qb6JINGYqVk     

The influence of popular media characters on children's object choices

Children often prefer objects and food packaging bearing images of popular media characters. However, it is unclear what factors may influence this. This study investigated whether depictions of popular media characters on high-quality (brand new) and low-quality (dirty, broken) objects influenced 3- to 4-year-old children's (N = 84) object preferences, as well as which objects children selected to help them complete a functional task (e.g., using a bucket to transport several small items). We also investigated whether children's preferences were related to inhibitory control. We found children's preferences were influenced by images of popular characters, but not their choice of objects for functional use. Instead, children relied on object quality when selecting an object to complete a task. Inhibitory control was not related to children's object choices. These results suggest children may weigh object features differently when making decisions for different purposes.     

Mother-Child Conversation Styles and Children's Laboratory Memory for Narrative and Nonnarrative Materials

The study reported here was designed to examine influences of mothers' early conversational styles on children's episodic memory for events experienced outside of the mother-child relationship. Fifty-three 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children participated in picture-book interaction tasks with their mothers and with an unfamiliar investigator. Conversational messages were coded for their narrative and paradigmatic content. The children were also administered cued- and free-recall laboratory tasks for object names, object locations, animal facts, and story narratives. Reliable correlations were found between mothers' and children's levels of narrative talk in the mother-child picture-book task and between children's levels of narrative talk with mother and with an unfamiliar investigator. Recall analyses showed that the younger children's levels of narrative talk during picture-book tasks with mothers were positively related to the children's laboratory recall for story materials, unrelated to laboratory recall of object names and animal facts, and negatively related to laboratory recall for the spatial locations of objects. Connections between conversation styles and recall proficiency were less apparent and not reliable for the 5- and 6-year-old children in the sample. Differences between these age effects and those found in research on children's autobiographical memory are discussed.     

Children’s prior experiences of their successes and failures modulate belief alignment

ABSTRACT

An ability to flexibly learn from others while at other times relying upon one’s own judgements is an important adaptive human capacity. The present research investigated how others’ epistemic states and prior experience of their own independent ability in a given task modulate young children’s selective learning. In particular, we asked whether 4-year-old children’s judgement concerning the location of a hidden object is modulated both by an informant’s knowledge states and by the absence/presence of a prior experience with a particular task. We found that the children were more likely to align their judgement according to the informant’s verbal report when the informant was knowledgeable than when she was ignorant – but only when they had explicitly experienced their own incapability to accurately guess an object’s location. The findings suggest that 4-year-old children are able to combine their own experience with others’ input to make their judgement.     

Get by With a Little Help From a Word: Multimodal Input Facilitates 26-Month-Olds' Ability to Map and Generalize Arbitrary Gestural Labels

In the early stages of word learning, children demonstrate considerable flexibility in the type of symbols they will accept as object labels. However, around the 2nd year, as children continue to gain language experience, they become focused on more conventional symbols (e.g., words) as opposed to less conventional symbols (e.g., gestures). During this period of symbolic narrowing, the degree to which children are able to learn other types of labels, such as arbitrary gestures, remains a topic of debate. Thus, the purpose of the current set of experiments was to determine whether a multimodal label (word + gesture) could facilitate 26-month-olds' ability to learn an arbitrary gestural label. We hypothesized that the multimodal label would exploit children's focus on words thereby increasing their willingness to interpret the gestural label. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, 26-month-olds were trained with a multimodal label (word + gesture) and tested on their ability to map and generalize both the arbitrary gesture and the multimodal label to familiar and novel objects. In Experiment 2, 26-month-olds were trained and tested with only the gestural label. The findings revealed that 26-month-olds are able to map and generalize an arbitrary gesture when it is presented multimodally with a word, but not when it is presented in isolation. Furthermore, children's ability to learn the gestural labels was positively related to their reported productive vocabulary, providing additional evidence that children's focus on words actually helped, not hindered, their gesture learning.     

The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

My people,right or wrong? Minimal group membership disrupts preschoolers’ selective trust

When preschoolers decide to trust one speaker over another, how does group membership influence their tracking of speaker reliability? In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were assigned to arbitrary groups of no social significance (0055 and 0170) and asked to endorse novel object labels provided by two ingroup members, one of whom was reliable and the second of whom was unreliable. Children selectively trusted the more reliable informant. In Experiment 2, we asked whether ingroup status or reliability would determine children's choices and found that 4-year-olds failed to trust reliable outgroup members over unreliable ingroup members (or vice versa). Experiment 3 showed that the failure of trust in Experiment 2 was not due to the mere inclusion of both ingroup and outgroup members: children presented with a control paradigm in which the ingroup members were reliable trusted reliable ingroup members over unreliable outgroup members. Children's use of reliability as an indicator of future credibility therefore appears disrupted when outgroup status and reliability are in conflict, even when group membership is arbitrary.     

The Effect of Culture on a Visual-Spatial Memory Task

The visual-spatial memory ability of 25 Zairian elementary school children was compared with that of 23 Scottish children, using a variation of Kearins's (1976) object placement task. The Scottish children demonstrated significantly better visual-spatial memory than the Zairian children when the easiest (small household objects) of three arrays was presented. The Scottish and Zairian children demonstrated a similar level of visual-spatial ability when the other two arrays (geometric shapes and a variety of natural pieces of wood) were presented, and there were no significant gender differences. Although the Australian Aboriginal children's performance on the visual-spatial task in Drinkwater's (1976) study was superior to the White children's performance (Kearins, 1976, 1981), the Zairian children's performance in this study was not. Perhaps the Aboriginal groups, over countless generations navigating the trackless desert of western Australia, were forced by their environment to develop an aptitude for direction finding that Zairians (whose ecological situation more closely resembles that of Europeans) have not.     

Young children's understanding of violations of property rights

The present work investigated young children’s normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party’s object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights.     

The role of gaze direction and mutual exclusivity in guiding 24‐month‐olds' word mappings

In these studies, we examined how a default assumption about word meaning, the mutual exclusivity assumption and an intentional cue, gaze direction, interacted to guide 24‐month‐olds' object‐word mappings. In Expt 1, when the experimenter's gaze was consistent with the mutual exclusivity assumption, novel word mappings were facilitated. When the experimenter's eye‐gaze was in conflict with the mutual exclusivity cue, children demonstrated a tendency to rely on the mutual exclusivity assumption rather than follow the experimenter's gaze to map the label to the object. In Expt 2, children relied on the experimenter's gaze direction to successfully map both a first label to a novel object and a second label to a familiar object. Moreover, infants mapped second labels to familiar objects to the same degree that they mapped first labels to novel objects. These findings are discussed with regard to children's use of convergent and divergent cues in indirect word mapping contexts.     

Effects of Motivation on Young Children's Object Recall and Strategy Use

The study was designed to examine the effects of motivation on young children's recall for object names and early-emerging mnemonic activities. Seventy-two 4-year-old children were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 instructional conditions: incidental, intentional, or motivational. Each child was shown 10 small toy objects and provided a 90 s study period prior to recall. The children's mnemonic behaviors were videotaped for subsequent coding. The children in the incidental condition were instructed to simply look at the toys while children in the intentional and motivational condition were given explicit instructions to remember. The motivational group was also told that they could keep whichever toys they remembered. A recognition memory task was employed to examine the extent to which the stimuli were encoded during the study period. The children's recall memory did not vary as a function of instructional condition. Children's use of singular versus multiple strategies was calculated, along with a weighted summary score giving most weight to the participant's use of mature mnemonic strategies. Significant differences in strategy use were found, favoring the motivational condition. Significant positive correlations were found between the weighted summary scores and object recall, and the teacher ratings of mastery motivation and object recall. Mastery motivation was found to be unrelated to the strategic summary scores, failing to mediate strategic behaviors. The results suggest that when providing incentives to remember, children apparently engaged in more effortful mnemonic processing in order to remember the items, even though a greater number of items were not recalled.     

What's new? Children prefer novelty in referent selection

Determining the referent of a novel name is a critical task for young language learners. The majority of studies on children’s referent selection focus on manipulating the sources of information (linguistic, contextual and pragmatic) that children can use to solve the referent mapping problem. Here, we take a step back and explore how children’s endogenous biases towards novelty and their own familiarity with novel objects influence their performance in such a task. We familiarized 2-year-old children with previously novel objects. Then, on novel name referent selection trials children were asked to select the referent from three novel objects: two previously seen and one completely novel object. Children demonstrated a clear bias to select the most novel object. A second experiment controls for pragmatic responding and replicates this finding. We conclude, therefore, that children’s referent selection is biased by previous exposure and children’s endogenous bias to novelty.     

Function and the Origins of the Design Stance

We report 2 experiments addressing children's developing understanding of design. Experiment 1 showed that although 5-year-old children judged an object's function according to its original design rather than a subsequent accidental activity, design was not preferred over a subsequent intentional use. Adults select the design function in both cases, suggesting that children's initial assignment of function is based on any intended goals for which the object is used. Experiment 2 compared assignment of function with object categorization, demonstrating that although 5-year-old children's assignment of object function is based on any goals associated with the object, their categorization is adult-like and based on the category intended by the object's creator (over a category assigned by another agent). We conclude that preschoolers appreciate the link between creators and categories before constructing a design stance supporting reasoning about artifact functions.     

Modulation of the leniency bias in the discursive dilemma

We experimentally approach the discursive dilemma to gain insight into people's procedural appropriateness judgments. We relied on a vignette in which three people had formed opinions about two skills (premises) of a candidate to decide whether to hire her/him (conclusion). The dilemma arises when different outcomes (hire vs. not hire) are achieved depending on whether the majority opinion is independently considered for each premise or for the global conclusion of each judge. Participants were asked to choose the procedure they thought to be more appropriate to reach a decision. In Experiment 1, we found a leniency effect (a bias to prefer the aggregation procedure that led to hiring the candidate), which was reduced by introducing the participant as a juror with an exogenously provided negative opinion about the candidate's skills. In Experiment 2, we replicated the opinion effect, even when subjects did not participate as jury members. In Experiment 3, we found that the leniency bias was only reduced when participants' negative opinion was aligned with a majority of negative premises, but not with a majority of negative conclusions. We discuss present findings in terms of the identification of empirical regularities that may affect people's procedural legitimacy judgments.     

Executive functioning by 18‐24‐month‐old children: effects of inhibition,working memory demands and narrative in a novel detour‐reaching task

Infants can inhibit a prepotent but wrong action towards a goal in order to perform a causal means‐action. It is not clear, however, whether infants can perform an arbitrary means‐action while inhibiting a prepotent response. In four experiments, we explore this executive functioning in 18–24‐month‐old children. The working memory and inhibition demands in a novel means‐end problem were systematically varied in terms of the type and combination of means‐action(s) (causal or arbitrary) contained within the task, the number of means‐actions (1 or 2), the goal visual availability and whether the task was accompanied by a narrative. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that children performed tasks that contained causal as opposed to arbitrary information more accurately; accuracy was also higher in tasks containing only one step. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that performance in the arbitrary task improved significantly when all sources of prepotency were removed. In Experiment 3, task performance improved when the two means‐actions were intelligibly linked to the task goal. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the use of a narrative that provided a meaningful (non‐causal) link between the two means‐actions also improved children's performance by assisting their working memory in the generation of a rationale. Findings provide an initial account of executive functioning in the months that bring the end of infancy. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's strategies in producing three-dimensional relationships on a two-dimensional surface

It is a common task to give children a picture containing implicit depth cues and to require them to extract depth information from it. The cues are always selected from the adult repertoire; little is known about children's production of their own cues. In this experiment, 5- to 10-year-old children were required to draw one object behind another in a situation in which adults invariably produce the further object partially occluded by the nearer. The results were an age-related decline in the tendency to segregate the objects and an increase in the tendency to group the objects using partial occlusion, with a cross-over at 8 years. At all ages some children drew one object inside the boundary of the other. It is argued that the results are composed of two tendencies, a gradual mastery of discrete scaling phenomena (e.g., “up” on the page means “further”) within a given style, and a set of decisions to be made between incompatible styles.     

Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: Just two words for the same thing?

Three- to 5-year-old children were tested on a traditional False Belief task, in which children have to predict where a protagonist will look for an unexpectedly moved object, and a new metalinguistic task. In this task children named an item (e.g., “rabbit”) and they had to monitor that another person used a synonym for naming the same item (e.g., “bunny”). Both tasks were mastered about the age of 4 years with a strong correlation between the two tasks that remained above .70 even after partialling out control measures and verbal intelligence. Moreover, younger children's difficulties with the metalinguistic task did not extend to a control task of equivalent logical structure and complexity. A simplified version of the task in which children had to produce synonyms themselves yielded very similar results. The findings confirm that metalinguistic awareness can be demonstrated around 4 years and they support the theory that the ability to understand belief relates to the development of understanding representations.     

Trick or treat: Children's understanding of surprise

This study examines the hypothesis that an understanding of false belief would lead to a radical change in young children's understanding of surprise. In Experiment 1, children aged 3 to 8 years were asked to assess the knowledge state of another person and to then choose an object that would surprise that person. The results showed that whereas the 3-year-olds' choice of surprising object varied with the object, the 5-year-olds' choice of object varied with their assessment of the other's knowledge state. Hence, understanding surprise depends on an understanding of false belief. In Experiment 2, the number of questions was reduced and children were required to match a schematized facial expression to the object judged to be surprising. Again, older children, unlike their younger counterparts, pointed out that surprised faces are made when another's expectations are violated. Once children begin to ascribe belief states to others they begin to understand that surprise depends upon the unexpected. The results help resolve the differences in the findings of Wellman and Banerjee (1991) and Hadwin and Perner (1991) on children's understanding of surprise. In natural judgements, young children employ a principle of desirability; older children employ principles of belief violation.