The processing of positive and negative information

An affirmative statement which is known to be false and the complementary negative statement which is known to be true, provide the same information, i.e. that something is not the case. Similarly, an affirmative statement which is known to be true and the complementary negative statement which is known to be false, both imply that something is the case. (If P is false, not-P is true and if P is true, not-P is false.) Hence there are four kinds of statement (“conditions”): true affirmatives, false affirmatives, true negativee and false negatives, but only two kinds of information: positive and negative.

This experiment investigates the times taken to process information presented in these ways. The task was to select two alternative words which would make affirmative or negative conjunctive statements agree or conflict with given situations. The four conditions were presented six times in different serial orders, so that each occurred once in every block of four trials. The mean response times were: true affirmatives 8-99 sec, false affirmatives 11 19 sec., true negatives 12-58 sec, false negatives 15-17 sec. This order was the same at each of the six presentations of the conditions, the differences being significant at the 0 001 level in each case. There was a pronounced decline in errors (without knowledge of results) for three of the conditions. These results are discussed in relation to (i) the assumption of a positive set, established through a long learning process; (ii) the inferential nature of negative information in relation to experience; and (iii) the possible emotional effects of negative terms.     

Stability and change self-integration for negative events: the role of listener responsiveness and elaboration

Self-integration, critical to identity, is the process of connecting experiences to the self and often occurs as individuals narrate events. Elaboration (Fivush & Nelson, 2006; King & Raspin, 2004; Smyth & Pennebaker, 2008) and listener responsiveness (Pasupathi & Rich, 2005) correlate with better self-integration, but these variables are seldom disentangled. In this set of studies, we examine how individuals construct connections between the self and experience for negative events. In Study 1, 90 friendship pairs discussed a negative event. Stability self-integration, change self-integration, elaboration, and listener responsiveness were assessed independently of the narrative. Elaboration and listener responsiveness contributed independently and positively to change self-integration but were unrelated to stability self-integration. Study 2 manipulated listener responsiveness and added preconversation measures of self-integration. Study 1 results were replicated, except that elaboration failed to achieve significance, and a significant interaction between initial change self-integration and listener responsiveness was found. Implications are discussed.     

Mental rubbernecking to negative information depends on task context

We previously demonstratedmental rubbernecking during the simple cognitive act ofrefreshing a just activated representation. Participants saw two neutral and one negative word presented simultaneously and, 425 msec later, were cued to mentally refresh (i.e., think of) one of the no-longer-present words. They were slower to refresh a neutral word than the negative word (Johnson et al., 2005, Experiment 6A). The present experiments extended that work by showing mental rubbernecking when negative items were sometimes the target of refreshing, but not when negative items were present but never the target of refreshing, indicating that expectations influence mental rubbernecking. How expectations might modulate the impact of emotional distraction is discussed.     

Mood-congruent attentional bias in dysphoria: maintained attention to and impaired disengagement from negative information

Attentional bias to negative information has been proposed to be a cognitive vulnerability factor for the development of depression. In 2 experiments, the authors examined mood-congruent attentional bias in dysphoria. In both experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric participants performed an attentional task with negative, positive, and neutral word cues preceding a target. Targets appeared either at the same or at the opposite location of the cue. Overall, results indicate that dysphoric participants show maintained attention for negative words at longer stimulus presentations, which is probably caused by impaired attentional disengagement from negative words. Furthermore, nondysphoric participants maintain their attention more strongly to positive words. These results are discussed in relation to recent developments in the pathogenesis and treatment of depression.     

The relationship of positive and negative expressiveness to the processing of emotion information

The tendency to express emotions non-verbally is positively related to perception of emotions in oneself. This study examined its relationship to perception of emotions in others. In 40 healthy adults, EEG theta synchronization was used to indicate emotion processing following presentation of happy, angry, and neutral faces. Both positive and negative expressiveness were associated with higher emotional sensitivity, as shown by cortical responses to facial expressions during the early, unconscious processing stage. At the late, conscious processing stage, positive expressiveness was associated with higher sensitivity to happy faces but lower sensitivity to angry faces. Thus, positive expressiveness predisposes people to allocate fewer attentional resources for conscious perception of angry faces. In contrast, negative expressiveness was consistently associated with higher sensitivity. The effects of positive expressiveness occurred in cortical areas that deal with emotions, but the effects of negative expressiveness occurred in areas engaged in self-referential processes in the context of social relationships.     

Automatic vigilance: the attention-grabbing power of negative social information

One of the functions of automatic stimulus evaluation is to direct attention toward events that may have undesirable consequences for the perceiver's well-being. To test whether attentional resources are automatically directed away from an attended task to undesirable stimuli, Ss named the colors in which desirable and undesirable traits (e.g., honest, sadistic) appeared. Across 3 experiments, color-naming latencies were consistently longer for undesirable traits but did not differ within the desirable and undesirable categories. In Experiment 2, Ss also showed more incidental learning for undesirable traits, as predicted by the automatic vigilance (but not a perceptual defense) hypothesis. In Experiment 3, a diagnosticity (or base-rate) explanation of the vigilance effect was ruled out. The implications for deliberate processing in person perception and stereotyping are discussed.     

Inclusion-exclusion of positive and negative past selves: mood congruence as information

The current research challenges the widespread truism that recalling a positive self necessarily increases self-esteem, whereas recalling a negative self necessarily decreases self-esteem. Four experiments demonstrate that chronically happy people show a relative increase in self-esteem by recalling either a positive or a negative self. Chronically sad people, however, show a relative decrease in self-esteem by recalling either a positive or a negative self. These effects are due to divergent perceptions of mood congruence between the recalled self and the current self. Specifically, happy people perceive high mood congruence between a recalled positive self and the current self but low mood congruence between a recalled negative self and the current self. In contrast, sad people perceive high mood congruence between a recalled negative self and the current self but low mood congruence between a recalled positive self and the current self. Independent of chronic mood, mood congruence leads to perceptions of temporal recency, whereas mood incongruence leads to perceptions of temporal distance. In line with the inclusion-exclusion model of social judgment, perceived temporal recency elicits assimilation effects on self-esteem, whereas perceived temporal distance elicits contrast effects on self-esteem.     

From rarity to evaluative extremity: effects of prevalence information on evaluations of positive and negative characteristics

Experiments showed a scarcity principle in evaluative judgments such that the identical characteristic is evaluated more extremely the lower its perceived prevalence. In Study 1, Ss evaluated a fictitious medical condition that was described as either beneficial or detrimental to health and as occurring in either 30% or in one half of 1% of a test population. The condition was evaluated more extremely--as as a more positive health asset or a more negative health liability--in the low-prevalence than in the high-prevalence conditions. Study 2 demonstrated the same effect in self-evaluations and with a different manipulation of perceived prevalence. Ss were told that they actually had the fictitious medical condition, that it was either beneficial or detrimental to their health, and either that they were the only 1 of 5 Ss who had it or that 4 of the 5 did. Low-prevalence Ss exhibited more extreme evaluative, affective, and behavioral reactions to the medical condition than did high-prevalence Ss. The origins and validity of the scarcity principle are discussed, as are its implications for uniqueness theory, reactance theory, and social evaluation theories.     

Comparative optimism for severity of negative health outcomes

People tend to be comparatively optimistic (i.e., believe that negative outcomes are less likely for themselves than for typical others) regarding their susceptibility to negative health outcomes. The present study investigates the extent to which perceptions of the severity of these health outcomes show similar comparative optimism. A student sample (study 1; N = 200) and a healthy non-student adult sample (study 2; N = 257) completed self-report measures of susceptibility, severity, worry, control and experience in relation to negative health outcomes. Participants in both studies demonstrated significant levels of comparative optimism for both perceived likelihood and severity of health outcomes. Comparative optimism concerning severity was very strongly associated (r = 0.85 to 0.89) with comparative optimism concerning susceptibility. In addition to being comparatively optimistic over their chances of experiencing negative health outcomes, people are also comparatively optimistic regarding how severe the health outcomes will be.     

Of beasties and butterflies: Evidence for the stability and domain-specificity of individual differences in categorization

Previous research has failed to demonstrate unambiguously the relative stability across time and consistency across tasks of individual differences in categorization, or categorization breadth The present study of categorizing behavior in college students assesses breadth at each of four points in time over a six-week period Results are consistent with an interpretation of breadth as a highly stable individual difference variable, but one that is constrained by the nature of the stimulus sets employed High stability coefficients were observed for each of two redundant tasks In contrast, cross-task consistency indices were generally low Personality correlates of breadth were similarly weak and inconsistent Several variables are suggested that may attenuate the generality of categorization breadth The existence of multiple styles of categorization is discussed     

Neuroticism and the recall of positive and negative personality information

Recent investigations have shown that high-N scorers preferentially process negative information about themselves. The present experiment investigated: (1) whether this effect is related to, or independent of, the well-established effects of depressed mood on information processing; (2) whether the effect is specific to self-referent information or extends also to information about others; and (3) the mechanism by which the effect occurs. High-N scorers, compared to low-N scorers, recalled more negative information about themselves but not about others, and this effect was independent of depression. In addition, the positive self-referent, but not other-referent, personality information recalled by high-N scorers was more extremely positive than that recalled by low-N scorers. Detailed examination of the data provided evidence that the idiosyncracy in information processing associated with high neuroticism is one of selective attention. The findings are discussed in relation to cognitive vulnerability to depression, certain cognitive-therapy procedures and the effects that a therapeutically-induced change in neuroticism is likely to have on an individual's memory for past emotional experiences.     

Order information in short-term memory and time estimation

In previous experiments, the amount of interference between time production and visual or memory search tasks was shown not to be related to the level of difficulty of the search task per se, but instead to the amount of processing in short-term memory required in the search task. The first experiment of the present study verified whether the amount of interference between time production and a short-term memory task may be related to the level of difficulty of the short-term memory task. Two versions of a memory task, with and without processing of order information, were combined with a temporal interval production task in a concurrent processing condition. As is shown in a control reaction time task, processing order information increased the level of difficulty of the memory search task. In the concurrent processing condition, the interference between short-term memory processing and time production was stronger when the level of difficulty of the short-term memory search task was increased by requiring that order information be processed. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the amount of interference between a similar short-term memory task and time production seems not to be related to the amount of order information that must be maintained during the time production task. This dissociation between the effects of processing and the maintenance of order information is compatible with a similar dissociation, observed in previous experiments, between the effects of processing and those of maintaining item information in short-term memory on concurrent time production.     

Visual information and skill level in time-to-collision estimation

Previous studies on the visual origin of time-to-collision (Tc) information have demonstrated that Tc estimates can be based solely on the processing of target expansion rate (optic variable tau). But in the simulated situations used (film clips), there was little reliable information on speed (owing to reduced peripheral vision) and distance (owing to the absence of binocular distance cues) available. In order to determine whether these kinds of information are also taken into account, it is necessary to take an approach where the subject receives a more complete visual input. Thus, an experiment conducted on a circuit under actual driving conditions is reported. Experienced drivers and beginners, who were passengers in a car, had to indicate the moment they expected a collision with a stationary obstacle to take place. Subjects were blindfolded after a viewing time of 3 s. The conditions for speed evaluation (normal versus restricted visual field) and distance evaluation (binocular versus monocular vision) by subjects were varied. The approach speed (30 and 90 km h-1) and actual Tc (3 and 6 s) were also varied. The results show that accuracy of Tc estimation increased with (i) normal visual field, (ii) binocular vision, (iii) higher speeds, and (iv) driving experience. These findings have been interpreted as indicating that both speed and distance information are taken into account in Tc estimation. They suggest furthermore that these two kinds of information may be used differently depending on the skill level of the subject. The results are discussed in terms of the complementarity of the various potentially usable visual means of obtaining Tc information.     

Controllability and hindsight components: Understanding opposite hindsight biases for self-relevant negative event outcomes

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment (N=210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.     

Regret and the negative evaluation of decision outcomes in major depression

Disruption of normal emotional experience is central to the phenomenology of depression. Twenty-three depressed outpatients and 23 control subjects performed a computerized decision-making task, during which affective ratings were assessed online to identify various dimensions of emotional experience. We sought to contrast regret (the comparison of the outcomes of selected and nonselected options) with the general negative appraisal of task events. The experience of regret was reduced in depressed patients, an effect that was particularly related to self-reported apathy scores. In an exploratory analysis, we observed that females had a general downward shift in their ratings, as compared with males, but disappointment and regret effects were of similar magnitude. The possible contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex to the phenomenology of regret is discussed. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/ supplemental.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.