Grounding agency in depth: The implications of Merleau-Ponty's thought for the politics of feminism

While poststructuralist feminist theorists have clarified our understanding of the gendered subject as produced through a matrix of language, culture, and psycho-sexual affects, they have found agency difficult to ground. I argue that this is because in these theories the body has served primarily as an inscribed surface. In response to this surface body, particular to this age, I have turned to Merleau-Ponty's concept of depth which allows us to theorize the agency crucial to feminist politics. While the poststructuralists' rejection of depth is largely due to its roots in Cartesian rationality, depth is much more than this. Rather than allowing for the impossibility of political action, depth means that as bodily moving and acting subjects we are part of Being, and thus part of the questions raised in this age, even if it is a mark of this age that this tends to be forgotten.     

Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning

It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help to resolve some disagreements in which the difference between inferential and non-inferential reasoning plays a role.     

Reasons and Impossibility

Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it.     

Marion, Levinas, and Heidegger on the question concerning ontotheology

In this article, the differences between Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Heidegger’s approaches to ontotheology are discussed. Whereas Marion argues for a historical approach to this question, i.e., testing whether ontotheology can be detected in this or that thinker in this history of philosophy, this article aims, with Levinas and Heidegger, for an ontological approach to the question concerning ontotheology. In this regard, this text expresses wonder about Marion’s claim that Medieval theology would not have succumbed to ontotheology whereas ancient and modern did. It is shown that ontotheology, for Levinas as well as Heidegger, might not be overcome with a simple command but rather belongs to the very structure of thought. The article concludes with offering some corrections to the Levinasian ‘God outside of onto-theology’ by a more phenomenological account of being-in-the world.     

Motivated Reasoning With Stereotypes: Activation,Application, and Inhibition

In this article, we review evidence showing that both the activation and the application of stereotypes may be influenced by motivation. When an applicable stereotype supports their desired impression of an individual, motivation can lead people to activate this stereotype, if they have not already activated it spontaneously. Motivation can also lead people to apply this stereotype to individuals to whom they might not have applied it otherwise. On the other hand, when an applicable stereotype casts doubt over their desired impression of an individual, motivation can lead people to inhibit the activation of this stereotype. Even if people are unable to inhibit its activation, motivation may still lead them to inhibit its application to this individual. People pick and choose among the many stereotypes applicable to an individual, activating those that support their desired impression of this individual and inhibiting those that interfere with it.     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

On Heidegger's Root and Branch Reformulation of the Meaning of Transcendental Philosophy

Over the past decades there has been increasing interest in the idea that Heidegger was a “transcendental philosopher” during the late 1920s. Furthermore, a consensus has started to emerge around the idea that Heidegger must be thought of as a transcendental thinker during this time. For the most part this means to first experience how Heidegger's work inherits this term from Kant or Husserl so that one can then experience how Heidegger creatively adapts this inheritance. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach is unhelpful. The aim of this paper is instead to show that transcendental philosophy bears a wholly renewed meaning in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and that this meaning must be understood in an intrinsic connection with the fundamental-ontological problem of transcendence. Articulating this connection will show how Heidegger makes transcendental philosophy properly phenomenological.     

RISK AND SACRAMENT: BEING HUMAN IN A COVID-19 WORLD

In this article we examine the changing relationship to risk as revealed by the covid-19 pandemic and the ways this has, and may in future, alter sacramental practice, considering the radical effects this could have on traditional Christian practice. We consider the cultural trends that may lie behind this developing approach to risk, examining this in the context of an emergent transhuman identity that is technologically moderated and seeks to overcome risks of human mortality.     

The nature of information: a relevant approach

The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation (IBE), but doing so leads to the worry that it is viciously circular. Realists have responded to this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the former, if he adopts the latter then the Generality Problem arises again, but now at the level of scientific methodology. Answering this new version of the Generality Problem is impossible for the scientific realist without making the important further assumption that there exists the possibility of a unique rule of IBE. Doing this however would make the NMA viciously premise circular.     

Demarcating depression

How to draw the line between depression‐as‐disorder and non‐pathological depressive symptoms continues to be a contested issue in psychiatry. Relatively few philosophers have waded into this debate, but the tools of philosophical analysis are quite relevant to it. In this paper, I defend a particular answer to this question, the Contextual approach. On this view, depression is a disorder if and only if it is a disproportionate response to a justifying cause or else is unconnected to any justifying cause. I present four objections to this approach and then defend it from them. Along the way, I explain why it matters whether we get this question right.     

Socially relevant philosophy of science: an introduction

This paper provides an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS). Our aims in this paper are to characterize this body of work in philosophy of science, to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant opportunities for philosophy of science to engage with and support this type of research. The impetus of this project was a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy of science to have a broader social impact. We illustrate various ways in which SRPOS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself. Also, SRPOS is consistent with some historical and contemporary goals of philosophy of science. We’re calling for an expansion of philosophy of science to include more of this type of work. In order to support this expansion, we characterize philosophy of science as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of philosophy of science that can help or hinder research in this area.     

The Quantified Relationship

The growth of self-tracking and personal surveillance has given rise to the Quantified Self movement. Members of this movement seek to enhance their personal well-being, productivity, and self-actualization through the tracking and gamification of personal data. The technologies that make this possible can also track and gamify aspects of our interpersonal, romantic relationships. Several authors have begun to challenge the ethical and normative implications of this development. In this article, we build upon this work to provide a detailed ethical analysis of the Quantified Relationship (QR). We identify eight core objections to the QR and subject them to critical scrutiny. We argue that although critics raise legitimate concerns, there are ways in which tracking technologies can be used to support and facilitate good relationships. We thus adopt a stance of cautious openness toward this technology and advocate the development of a research agenda for the positive use of QR technologies.     

Keys to the development of the role of grandparents in current Spanish society / Claves para el desarrollo del rol de abuelo y abuela en la sociedad española actual

Abstract

Current demographic changes and work-family reconciliation difficulties in Spain have resulted in an increase in the arrangement of grandparents caring for their grandchildren. However, in order to ensure that the relationship between both generations is a privileged interaction that promotes successful ageing, furthering our knowledge of the challenges that this field of study faces is necessary. On this basis, the purpose of this article is to review the theories regarding this family relationship, which, together with the empirical research into this area, comprise the basis of a three-pronged proposal that includes the keys or challenges to studying the role of grandparents: (1) the heterogeneity and multidimensionality in the study of this role; (2) the complex interaction of positive and negative aspects that produce significant ambivalence in grandparents as a reaction to their experiences in this role; and (3) the influence of the baby boom generation grandparents’ new characteristics.     

A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms

ABSTRACT

According to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against this objection. I argue that we can deal with this problem along the lines of a coherentist account of justification.     

Considering methodological integrity in counselling and psychotherapy research

Within the field of counselling and psychotherapy research, qualitative methods have been a longstanding tradition of inquiry due to the mutual interest of therapists and researchers in both internal experiences and intersubjective processes. Methodological integrity is a conceptual framework that has been advanced to increase the rigor of these methods. In this paper, we consider the value of this concept for counselling and psychotherapy researchers and reviewers. This framework guides investigators and reviewers to consider how procedures can be adapted to meet the goals of specific studies, given their characteristics and approach to inquiry. In this brief article, we exemplify the relevance and application of this concept to this field by describing the decision‐making process within the designing of a qualitative research project to investigate clients' needs within rape crisis counselling. Through this exemplar, we also provide guidance to counselling and psychotherapy researchers on considerations during the process of research review and reporting.     

Emotion as Position-Taking

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something.     

ON THE ANALYST'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PATIENT: THE CASE OF J.‐B. PONTALIS AND G. PEREC

The writer Georges Perec was in psychoanalysis with Jean‐Bertrand Pontalis for four years in the early 1970s. In this essay, the author presents the exceptional interest this analyst took in this patient and the ways in which that interest manifested itself in his work, psychoanalytic and otherwise. Many correlative factors suggest that identificatory processes persisted beyond the treatment and were maintained into Pontalis's later life. While this paper is primarily intended to provide evidence to support this view of a specific case, the author closes by reflecting that this may be a more general phenomenon and the reasons for this.     

Theoretical functions in physical science

The aim of this paper is to give an account of theoreticity which captures the preanalytic conception of a theoretical function, which is precise and yet which expresses what is significant about theoretical functions. The point of departure for this account is a recent discussion of the topic by Balzer and Moulines. On the basis of criticism of this discussion and on the basis of an examination of laboratory measurement, an account of theoreticity is proposed.I am grateful to the members of the philosophy seminar at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, to Barbara Davidson and particularly to Wolfgang Balzer and this journal's referee for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Single-Assumption Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics

Proof-theoretic semantics is an inferentialist theory of meaning, usually developed in a multiple-assumption and single-conclusion framework. In that framework, this theory seems unable to justify classical logic, so some authors have proposed a multiple-conclusion reformulation to accomplish this goal. In the first part of this paper, the debate originated by this proposal is briefly exposed and used to defend the diverging opinion that proof-theoretic semantics should always endorse a single-assumption and single-conclusion framework. In order to adopt this approach some of its criteria of validity, especially separability, need to be weakened. This choice is evaluated and defended. The main argument in this direction is based on the circular dependences of meaning between multiple assumptions and conjunctions, and between multiple conclusions and disjunctions. In the second part of this paper, some systems that suit the new requirements are proposed for both intuitionistic and classical logic. A proof that they are valid, according to the weakened criteria, is sketched.