Perceiving causality after the fact: postdiction in the temporal dynamics of causal perception

In simple dynamic events we can easily perceive not only motion, but also higher-level properties such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another. Several researchers have suggested that such causal perception is an automatic and stimulus-driven process, sensitive only to particular sorts of visual information, and a major research project has been to uncover the nature of these visual cues. Here, rather than investigating what information affects causal perception, we instead explore the temporal dynamics of when certain types of information are used. Surprisingly, we find that certain visual events can determine whether we perceive a collision in an ambiguous situation even when those events occur after the moment of potential 'impact' in the putative collision has already passed. This illustrates a type of postdictive perception: our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information presented within short temporal windows, so that new information which is obtained can influence the immediate past in our conscious awareness. Such effects have been previously demonstrated for low-level motion phenomena, but the present results demonstrate that postdictive processes can influence higher-level event perception. These findings help to characterize not only the 'rules' of causal perception, but also the temporal dynamics of how and when those rules operate.     

Hearing what the body feels: auditory encoding of rhythmic movement

Phillips-Silver and Trainor (Phillips-Silver, J., Trainor, L.J., (2005). Feeling the beat: movement influences infants' rhythm perception. Science, 308, 1430) demonstrated an early cross-modal interaction between body movement and auditory encoding of musical rhythm in infants. Here we show that the way adults move their bodies to music influences their auditory perception of the rhythm structure. We trained adults, while listening to an ambiguous rhythm with no accented beats, to bounce by bending their knees to interpret the rhythm either as a march or as a waltz. At test, adults identified as similar an auditory version of the rhythm pattern with accented strong beats that matched their previous bouncing experience in comparison with a version whose accents did not match. In subsequent experiments we showed that this effect does not depend on visual information, but that movement of the body is critical. Parallel results from adults and infants suggest that the movement-sound interaction develops early and is fundamental to music processing throughout life.     

Apparent motion enhances visual rhythm discrimination in infancy

Many studies have demonstrated that infants exhibit robust auditory rhythm discrimination, but research on infants' perception of visual rhythm is limited. In particular, the role of motion in infants' perception of visual rhythm remains unknown, despite the prevalence of motion cues in naturally occurring visual rhythms. In the present study, we examined the role of motion in 7-month-old infants' discrimination of visual rhythms by comparing experimental conditions with apparent motion in the stimuli versus stationary rhythmic stimuli. Infants succeeded at discriminating visual rhythms only when the visual rhythm occurred with an apparent motion component. These results support the view that motion plays a role in infants' perception of visual temporal information, consistent with the manner in which natural rhythms appear in the visual world.     

Illusory causal crescents: misperceived spatial relations due to perceived causality

When an object A moves toward an object B until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts moving, we often see a collision--ie we see A as the cause of B's motion. The spatiotemporal parameters which mediate the perception of causality have been explored in many studies, but this work is seldom related to other aspects of perception. Here we report a novel illusion, wherein the perception of causality affects the perceived spatial relations among two objects involved in a collision event: observers systematically underestimate the amount of overlap between two items in an event which is seen as a causal collision. This occurs even when the causal nature of the event is induced by a surrounding context, such that estimates of the amount of overlap in the very same event are much improved when the event is displayed in isolation, without a 'causal' interpretation. This illusion implies that the perception of causality does not proceed completely independently of other visual processes, but can affect the perception of other spatial properties.     

SEEING CAUSINGS AND HEARING GESTURES

Can humans see causal interactions? Evidence on the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we can see some causal interactions in the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.     

Do infants reach for perceived objects? A reply to Stiles-Davis

Stiles-Davis proposes that the infants in our experiments (Hofsten & Spelke, 1985) did not reach for perceived objects in order to manipulate them, but rather touched perceived surfaces in order to explore their boundaries. Her commentary raises questions about infants' perception of the boundaries, the unity, and the manipulability of objects. More deeply, it raises the question of what an object is for an infant. We consider each of these questions in turn, in light of our own findings and those of other studies of object-directed reaching, object perception, and the object concept. We suggest that young infants organize the visual world into entities that are bounded, unitary, and manipulable and that infants endow those entities with the core properties of physical objects.     

Infants' Perception of Causal Chains

Three experiments examined infants' and adults' perception of causal sequences of events. In a causal-chain sequence, the first action causes a second action that then causes a final outcome; in a temporal-chain sequence, the first two actions are independent and the second action causes a final outcome. Infants and adults were shown the same event sequences; infants were tested using a visual habituation paradigm, whereas adults were given a questionnaire. Experiment 1 indicated that 15-month-old infants perceive the primary cause of the final outcome to be the first action in a causal chain but the second action in a temporal chain. Experiment 2 showed that adults interpret the causal sequences in a manner similar to that of 15-month-olds. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that 10-month-old infants do not yet perceive causal sequences in the same manner as 15-month-olds and adults. These results are interpreted in terms of both infants' developing knowledge of causal events and adults' attributions of causality in complex events.     

Predictive and postdictive mechanisms jointly contribute to visual awareness

One of the fundamental issues in visual awareness is how we are able to perceive the scene in front of our eyes on time despite the delay in processing visual information. The prediction theory postulates that our visual system predicts the future to compensate for such delays. On the other hand, the postdiction theory postulates that our visual awareness is inevitably a delayed product. In the present study we used flash-lag paradigms in motion and color domains and examined how the perception of visual information at the time of flash is influenced by prior and subsequent visual events. We found that both types of event additively influence the perception of the present visual image, suggesting that our visual awareness results from joint contribution of predictive and postdictive mechanisms.     

Visual experience enhances infants' use of task-relevant information in an action task

Four experiments examined whether infants' use of task-relevant information in an action task could be facilitated by visual experience in the laboratory. Twelve- but not 9-month-old infants spontaneously used height information and chose an appropriate (taller) cover in search of a hidden tall toy. After watching examples of covering events in a teaching session, 9-month-old infants succeeded in an action task that involved the same event category; learning was not generalized to events from a different category. The present results demonstrate that learning through visual experience can be transferred to infants' subsequent actions. These findings shed light on the link between perception and action in infancy.     

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: Is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.     

Seeing the disappearance of unseen objects

Because of the massive amount of incoming visual information, perception is fundamentally selective. We are aware of only a small subset of our visual input at any given moment, and a great deal of activity can occur right in front of our eyes without reaching awareness. While previous work has shown that even salient visual objects can go unseen, here we demonstrate the opposite pattern, wherein observers perceive stimuli which are not physically present. In particular, we show in two motion-induced blindness experiments that unseen objects can momentarily reenter awareness when they physically disappear: in some situations, you can see the disappearance of something you can't see. Moreover, when a stimulus changes outside of awareness in this situation and then physically disappears, observers momentarily see the altered version--thus perceiving properties of an object that they had never seen before, after that object is already gone. This phenomenon of 'perceptual reentry' yields new insights into the relationship between visual memory and conscious awareness.     

Object recognition and object segregation in 4.5-month-old infants

Six experiments investigated how 4.5-month-old infants' perception of a display is affected by an immediate prior experience with an object similar to part of the test display. Prior research (A. Needham & R. Baillargeon, 1998) showed that when infants see an object alone and then see it next to a novel object, this prior experience allows them to determine the location of a boundary between the two objects. The present experiments investigated whether infants would also use an object similar, but not identical, to a test object in the same kind of task. The results indicate that infants' use of a prior experience is disrupted by changes in the features of the object, but not by a change in its spatial orientation. These findings suggest that, like adults, infants may expect that changes in the features of an object are associated with a change in the identity of the object, but do not have the same expectation for changes in spatial orientation.     

Perception of symmetry in infancy: the salience of vertical symmetry and the perception of pattern wholes

Four experiments were conducted to assess converging aspects of 4-month-old infants' perception of symmetry in visual patterns. Experiments 1 and 2 manipulated the structure and orientation of comparable patterns in order to evaluate the specialty of vertical symmetry. Infants showed no preference among vertically symmetrical, vertically repeated, and obliquely symmetrical patterns, but they processed vertically symmetrical patterns more efficiently than either vertically repeated patterns or obliquely symmetrical patterns. Experiment 3 manipulated the spatial separation of pattern components in order to determine the ability of young infants to integrate and coalesce information in visual patterns that is distributed in space. Infants processed vertically symmetrical patterns whose components were contiguous or nearly contiguous about the vertical axis (0 to 2.5 degrees separations) more efficiently than discontiguous patterns (5 and 10 degrees separations). Thus, extreme spatial separation about the vertical meridian caused infants to lose the advantage for vertical symmetry, and by inference their holistic perception of the visual pattern. Experiment 4 manipulated the organization of individual components of a vertical pattern in order to examine further infants' sensitivity to perceptual organization and synthesis of pattern form. Infants discriminated vertically symmetrical patterns from asymmetrical patterns with a vertical organization, thereby demonstrating sensitivity to the symmetrical organization of the pattern above their perception of components in the pattern. The results of these four experiments together corroborate and extend previous findings that vertical symmetry has a special status in early perceptual development and that infants can perceive pattern wholes.     

Self-experience as a mechanism for learning about others: a training study in social cognition

Using a gaze-following task, the authors assessed whether self-experience with the view-obstructing properties of blindfolds influenced infants' understanding of this effect in others. In Experiment 1, 12-month-olds provided with blindfold self-experience behaved as though they understood that a person wearing a blindfold cannot see. When a blindfolded adult turned to face an object, these infants gaze followed significantly less than control infants who had either (a) seen and felt the blindfold but whose view had not been obstructed by it or (b) experienced a windowed blindfold through which they could see. In Experiment 2, 18-month-olds experienced either (a) a trick blindfold that looked opaque but could be seen through, (b) an opaque blindfold, or (c) baseline familiarization. Infants receiving trick-blindfold experience now followed a blindfolded adult's gaze significantly more than controls. The authors propose 3 mechanisms underlying infants' capacity to use self-experience as a framework for understanding the visual perception of others.     

Infants' understanding of the link between visual perception and emotion: "If she can't see me doing it, she won't get angry."

Two experiments investigated 18-month-olds' understanding of the link between visual perception and emotion. Infants watched an adult perform actions on objects. An emoter then expressed neutral affect or anger toward the adult in response to the adult's actions. Subsequently, infants were given 20 s to interact with each object. In Experiment 1, the emoter faced infants with a neutral expression during each 20-s response period but looked at either a magazine or the infant. In Experiment 2, the emoter faced infants with a neutral expression, and her eyes were either open or closed. When the emoter visually monitored infants' actions, the infants regulated their object-directed behavior on the basis of their memory of the emoter's affect. However, if the previously angry emoter read a magazine (Experiment 1) or closed her eyes (Experiment 2), infants were not governed by her prior emotion. Infants behaved as if they expected the emoter to get angry only if she could see them performing the actions. These findings suggest that infants appreciate how people's visual experiences influence their emotions and use this information to regulate their own behavior.     

Infant object segregation implies information integration

Researchers, including Needham (2001, this issue), have found that infants as young as 4.5 months of age have the ability to use featural information to segregate objects. However, considerable research on infants' perception of color, shape, size, orientation, and so on has shown that infants younger than 4.5 months are capable of using these featural cues to discriminate between objects or other test items. Infants as young as 2 months of age also can perceive a moving object as unified. In this article, we argue for an information processing explanation of these results, which centers on the development of infants' ability to integrate both featural and object information. The proposed explanation is based upon L. B. Cohen's (1991, 1998) information processing propositions and is consistent with the evidence on object segregation as well as evidence from our laboratory and others' on infant perception and cognition.     

Visual experience influences 12-month-old infants' perception of goal-directed actions of others

In the present study, we investigated whether infants' own visual experiences affected their perception of the visual status of others engaging in goal-directed actions. In Experiment 1, infants viewed video clips of successful and failed goal-directed actions performed by a blindfolded adult, with half the infants having previously experienced being blindfolded. The results showed that 12-month-old infants who were previously blindfolded preferred to look longer at the demonstrator's successful actions, whereas no such preference was observed in 8-month-old infants. In Experiment 2, infants watched the same 2 actions when the adult demonstrator was not blindfolded. The responses of 12-month-old infants were the opposite of those observed in Experiment 1: they showed a preference for the failed actions. These findings suggest that previous experience influenced the subsequent perception of others' goal-directed actions in the 12-month-old infants. We favor the interpretation that the preference for the successful actions in the 12-months-old infants provided with blindfolded experience demonstrates the influence of perceptual experience on considering the visual status of others engaging in goal-directed actions.     

Infants' ability to use luminance information to individuate objects

Recent research indicates that infants first use form and then surface features as the basis for individuating objects. However, very little is known about the underlying basis for infants' differential sensitivity to form than surface features. The present research assessed infants' sensitivity to luminance differences. Like other surface properties, luminance information typically reveals little about an object. Unlike other surface properties (e.g. pattern, color), the visual system can detect luminance differences at birth. The outcome of two experiments indicated that 11.5-month-olds, but not 7.5-month-olds, used luminance differences to individuate objects. These results suggest that it is not the age at which infants can detect a feature, but the nature of the information carried by the feature, that determines infants' capacity to individuate objects.     

Cohesion as a constraint on object persistence in infancy

A critical challenge for visual perception is to represent objects as the same persisting individuals over time and motion. Across several areas of cognitive science, researchers have identified cohesion as among the most important theoretical principles of object persistence: An object must maintain a single bounded contour over time. Drawing inspiration from recent work in adult visual cognition, the present study tested the power of cohesion as a constraint as it operates early in development. In particular, we tested whether the most minimal cohesion violation - a single object splitting into two - would destroy infants' ability to represent a quantity of objects over occlusion. In a forced-choice crawling paradigm, 10- and 12-month-old infants witnessed crackers being sequentially placed into containers, and typically crawled toward the container with the greater cracker quantity. When one of the crackers was visibly split in half, however, infants failed to represent the relative quantities, despite controls for the overall quantities and the motions involved. This result helps to characterize the fidelity and specificity of cohesion as a fundamental principle of object persistence, suggesting that even the simplest possible cohesion violation can dramatically impair infants' object representations and influence their overt behavior.     

Motion and edge sensitivity in perception of object unity

Although much evidence indicates that young infants perceive unitary objects by analyzing patterns of motion, infants' abilities to perceive object unity by analyzing Gestalt properties and by integrating distinct views of an object over time are in dispute. To address these controversies, four experiments investigated adults' and infants' perception of the unity of a center-occluded, moving rod with misaligned visible edges. Both alignment information and depth information affected adults' and infants' perception of object unity in similar ways, and infants perceived object unity by integrating information about object features over time. However, infants perceived a moving, misaligned, three-dimensional object as indeterminate in its connectedness, whereas adults perceived it as connected behind the occluder. These findings indicate that the effectiveness of common motion in specifying unified surfaces across an occluder is reduced by misalignment of edges. Alignment information enhances perception of object unity either by serving directly as information for unity or by optimizing the detectability of motion-carried information for unity. In addition, young infants are able to retain information about edge orientation over short intervals in determining connectedness via a process of spatiotemporal integration.