Maternal Appraisal Styles,Family Risk Status and Anger Biases of Children

The present study investigated the relationship between maternal appraisal styles, family risk status, and anger biases in children. Participants included 90 mothers and their children between 3–6 years of age. Eighty families were followed up 1 year later. Maternal appraisal styles were assessed via a naturalistic story-reading method, and Time 1 and Time 2 emotion biases included teacher ratings of anger and aggression, peer ratings of anger, as well as classroom and playground observations of anger. While discussing ambiguous stories with their children, mothers with higher scores on the family risk index utilized more hostile appraisals and fewer prosocial appraisals in their explanations. A higher proportion of hostile-to-prosocial appraisals was also related to higher-risk family status. Prosocial appraisals by mothers were inversely correlated with childrens anger biases at school. When the appraisal balance in mothers talk favored hostile appraisals, children tended to show higher levels of anger biases evidenced at school. Finally, a hostile balance of maternal appraisals was found to predict change in childrens anger biases in the school with different effects in high- and low-risk families.     

The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem

This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments against the possibility of moral dilemmas, though apparently very different, turn out to be basically the same, as they are all based on the following concept of ought: if A ought to be done, doing B is impermissible and doing A itself is permissible. In Part Two I present an overview of several definitions of moral dilemmas that have been given by proponents of moral dilemmas: definitions that define moral dilemmas in terms of oughts and definitions that define them in terms of reasons. I conclude that, while reason is to weak, ought is too strong a concept to define moral dilemmas with. In this way, the arguments from Part One create a logical problem for proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas to define moral dilemmas.     

A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal

I argue that our acts of moral appraisal should be communicative. Praise and blame should communicate, to the appraised, information about their status and competences as moral agents; that they are recognised by the appraiser as a competent moral agent, and thus a legitimate candidate for appraisal. I argue for this thesis by drawing on empirical data about factors that can affect motivation. On the basis of such data, I formulate a constraint, and argue that two prominent models of moral appraisal – a consequentialist model and Wallace’s ‘evaluative response’ model – violate this constraint. The model that I propose – the communicative conception of appraisal – does not violate this constraint. This conception, I argue, can provide a fuller picture of the role of appraisals in deepening agents’ commitment to moral norms. On this model, praise and blame has not only an evaluative component, but also communicates to the agent competence affirming information.

Resolving the paradox of shame: Differentiating among specific appraisal-feeling combinations explains pro-social and self-defensive motivation

Research has shown that people can respond both self-defensively and pro-socially when they experience shame. We address this paradox by differentiating among specific appraisals (of specific self-defect and concern for condemnation) and feelings (of shame, inferiority, and rejection) often reported as part of shame. In two Experiments (Study 1: N = 85; Study 2: N = 112), manipulations that put participants’ social-image at risk increased their appraisal of concern for condemnation. In Study 2, a manipulation of moral failure increased participants’ appraisal that they suffered a specific self-defect. In both studies, mediation analyses showed that effects of the social-image at risk manipulation on self-defensive motivation were explained by appraisal of concern for condemnation and felt rejection. In contrast, the effect of the moral failure manipulation on pro-social motivation in Study 2 was explained by appraisal of a specific self-defect and felt shame. Thus, distinguishing among the appraisals and feelings tied to shame enabled clearer prediction of pro-social and self-defensive responses to moral failure with and without risk to social-image.     

Egocentrism in moral development: Gibbs, Piaget, Kohlberg

In Gibb’s theory of moral development Piagetian ideas concerning egocentrism play an important role. Based on these ideas Gibbs offers a detailed analysis of transitions in moral development. However, Gibbs still fails to utilize the full potential offered by Piaget’s equilibration theory, because he does not generalize the idea of overcoming egocentrism, as an important mechanism, to all stage transitions. Gibbs seeks a non-relativistic theoretical/ethical justification for his claims about moral development in a difficult to substantiate notion of an underlying reality. Moreover, such objectivist claims are difficult to reconcile with his endorsement of Piaget’s constructivism.Following Piaget’s equilibration theory development can be seen as the march to an ever widening perspective, possible through reflecting abstraction, and implying overcoming egocentric biases that recur at all levels of development. Assuming the widest level in the case of moral development is the moral point of view, an impartial procedure that should guarantee that everybody involved can freely agree as the result of considering arguments reflecting all viewpoints, fits in with a tradition in ethics from Kant, to Rawls, to Habermas which takes the moral point of view as the ultimate moral principle. These so called ‘Procedural Ethics’ theories are not relativistic, but not objectivist either, because they ultimately depend on the characteristics of the procedure.     

A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between ‘up close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.     

Investigating associations between empathy, morality and psychopathic personality traits in the general population

Although atypical moral and empathy processing are considered core features of psychopathic personality, little is known about how these constructs are associated with psychopathic traits in the general population. One-hundred and twenty-four adult males from the community were administered the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short Form, as well as a wide battery of affect, empathy and morality tasks and questionnaires. Our findings indicate that both core affective-interpersonal, as well as lifestyle-antisocial features of psychopathy are associated with weaker empathic responses to fearful faces. However, only the unique variance of the affective-interpersonal features is associated with weaker empathic response to happy stories, lower propensity to feel empathic concern and less difficulty in making decisions on moral dilemmas. In contrast, the unique variance of the lifestyle-antisocial features is associated with greater propensity to feel empathic concern. These preliminary findings extend previous research and suggest that, while the joint variance between affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial features might drive some ‘deficits’ associated with psychopathy, there also appears also to be unique ‘deficits’ associated with the core affective-interpersonal features, particularly in relation to affective aspects of moral processing.     

Users of different travel modes differ in journey satisfaction and habit strength but not environmental worldviews: A large-scale survey of drivers,walkers, bicyclists and bus users commuting to a UK university

People who travel to the same university workplace by bicycle, bus, car, and walking were compared in a survey (N = 1609). Data are presented on environmental worldviews, journey affective appraisals, and habit strength. Unexpectedly, findings showed comparable levels of environmental worldview across modes. This might reflect the role of attitudes on behaviour, or question the validity of the established environmental worldview scale used here. Results also replicated previous work on affective appraisal, and suggested that whilst walking, bicycling and bus use have distinctive affective appraisals associated with each mode, car driving was affectively neutral, generating no strong response on any dimension – a finding tentatively explained with reference to the normative status of driving. The survey also showed users of active travel modes reported stronger habit strength than car or public transport users, with possible links to the role of affect in formulating habit strength in line with habit theory.     

Stressors and Stressor Appraisals: the Moderating Effect of Task Efficacy

Employees’ cognitive appraisals play important roles in determining how they perceive and react to challenge and hindrance stressors. This study examined the stress process by studying employees’ cognitive appraisals using time-lagged data collected with a time interval of 4 months. There were three major findings. First, challenge appraisals mediated the relationship of job complexity with work motivation and task persistence. Hindrance appraisals mediated the relationship of role conflict with work motivation and task persistence. Second, task efficacy significantly moderated the relationship between job complexity and challenge appraisal, as well as the relationship between role conflict and hindrance appraisal. Employees high in task efficacy were more likely to report challenge appraisals of job complexity than employees low in task efficacy. Employees low in task efficacy were more likely to report hindrance appraisals of role conflict than employees high in task efficacy. Finally, data supported the moderated mediation model in which task efficacy moderated the indirect effect of job complexity on motivation via challenge appraisal. Our study provided important input to the development of stress management interventions.     

Pursuing moral outrage: Anger at torture

Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from anger at the harm caused by standard-violating behavior. Recent research that used experimental manipulation to disentangle these different forms of anger found evidence of personal and empathic anger, but not of moral outrage. We sought to extend this research by assessing anger at a more extreme moral violation: torture. If the person tortured is a member of one’s group (nationality), anger may not be over the moral violation but over the harm done to one of “us.” In an experiment designed to create the necessary appraisal conditions, we found clear evidence of identity-relevant personal anger (anger when a person from one’s nationality is tortured) but little evidence of moral outrage (anger even when a person from an identity-irrelevant nationality is tortured). Implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are discussed.     

Expanding the moral circle: Inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard

The human tendency to draw boundaries is pervasive. The ‘moral circle’ is the boundary drawn around those entities in the world deemed worthy of moral consideration. Three studies demonstrate that the size of the moral circle is influenced by a decision framing effect: the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy. Participants who decided which entities to exclude from the circle (exclusion mindset) generated larger moral circles than those who decided which to include (inclusion mindset). Further, people in an exclusion mindset showed “spill-over” effects into subsequent moral judgments, rating various outgroups as more worthy of moral treatment. The size of the moral circle mediated the effects of mindset on subsequent moral judgment. These studies offer an important first demonstration that decision framing effects have substantial consequences for the moral circle and related moral judgments.     

A Jensen effect on dysgenic fertility: An analysis involving the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth

In this study we attempt to determine whether dysgenic fertility is associated with the Jensen effect. This is investigated with respect to a US population representative sample of 8110 individuals from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for whom there exists complete data on IQ and fertility. In addition to the general sample, the sample was also broken out by race and sex so as to examine whether or not the Jensen effect manifested amongst different sub-populations. The method of correlated vectors revealed significant Jensen effects in five of the seven samples, and in all cases the effect was in a direction indicating that subtests with higher g-loadings were associated with larger dysgenic fertility gradients. The magnitude of the difference between Spearman’s ρ and Pearson’s r was non-significant in all cases, suggesting that biasing factors were minimally influencing the result. This finding suggests that dysgenesis occurs on the ‘genetic g’ at the heart of the Jensen effect nexus, unlike the Flynn effect, which is ‘hollow’ with respect to g. Finally, the finding is discussed in the context of two converging lines of evidence indicating that genotypic IQ or ‘genetic g’ really has been declining over the last century.     

Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-based Externalist Ethics

The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes.     

Defend or repair? Explaining responses to in-group moral failure by disentangling feelings of shame, rejection, and inferiority

Research on shame about in-group moral failure has yielded paradoxical results. In some studies, shame predicts self-defensive motivations to withdraw. In other studies, shame predicts pro-social motivations, such as restitution. We think that this paradox can be explained by disentangling the numerous appraisals and feelings subsumed under the label "shame." In 2 studies, we asked community samples of Norwegians about their in-group's discrimination against the Tater minority. Confirmatory factor analysis validated the measures of the appraisals and feelings used in Study 1 (N = 206) and Study 2 (N = 173). In both studies, an appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect best predicted felt shame, whereas an appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group best predicted felt rejection. In both studies, felt rejection best predicted self-defensive motivation, whereas felt shame best predicted pro-social motivation. Implications for conceptualizing and studying shame are discussed.     

Cognitive appraisal mediating relationship between social anxiety and internet communication in adolescents

Research suggests that people with high social anxiety trait may be more inclined to interact through computer-mediated communication (CMC). The psychological underpinnings of this inclination however remained unclear. The present research thus examines if cognitive appraisal bias (i.e. heighten estimation of social risk and deflated self-efficacy) would mediate the relationship between social anxiety and one’s perception of CMC attributes, contributing to a differential pattern of responses in CMC use. Four hundred and ten adolescents aged 12-18 years completed a set of self-reported measures tapping social anxiety trait, cognitive appraisals, perception of CMC attributes, and pattern of CMC social responses. Structural equation modeling lent support to the mediating role of the cognitive appraisal factors. Those with higher social anxiety trait would attach higher self-relevance to the CMC attributes, and engage in a more socially-involved pattern of interpersonal responses in CMC. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Parents' Appraisals,Reflected Appraisals,and Children's Self-Appraisals of Sport Competence: A Yearlong Study

This study investigated the contribution of the reflected appraisal process to the ontogeny of children's self-perceptions of physical competence. Emanating from symbolic interactionist thought, reflected appraisals refer to individuals' perceptions of others' evaluations of their abilities. The influence of parents' appraisals of their child's competence on the child's self-appraisals was hypothesized to be mediated by parents' reflected appraisals. Data were collected from a sample of 147 sixth graders and their parents in three waves over one school year. Structural equation modeling revealed that 1) parents' appraisals at Wave 1 influenced children's reflected appraisals of parents at Wave 2; 2) reflected appraisals at Wave 2 influenced children's self-appraisals at Wave 3, controlling for both the child's actual level in sport (as assessed by the child's grade in physical education) and the child's self-appraisals at Wave 1; and 3) the influence of parents' appraisals on their child's self-appraisals was nonsignificant when reflected appraisals were controlled for. This study supported the mediational role of the reflected appraisal process. The findings from this study provide a unique contribution to the sport socialization knowledge base by highlighting the role of the reflected appraisal process in the formation of children's self-appraisals of ability.     

感激情绪的认知评估体系

本文从情绪认知理论的角度出发, 通过3个研究探究与感激情绪有关的认知评价维度, 进而建立感激情绪的认知评价体系。研究1使用回忆不同类型的情绪性事件法初步探究了感激情绪的认知评估体系; 研究2使用操作认知评估维度法探究了认知评价的变化对感激体验的影响; 研究3使用故事情境法分别从个体特质和情境因素的角度, 探究个体特质与感激情绪之间的关系如何受到个体认知评价的影响, 进而为感激情绪的评价体系提供更多的证据支持。研究1发现感激情绪体验与受关怀感、符合道德规范和他人负责性3个维度之间存在正相关关系。研究2发现3个认知评估维度体验的有无均会导致个体在感激情绪体验上出现显著差异。研究3表明感激特质可以预测个体的认知评价和感激情绪体验; 同时, 受关怀感、道德规范、他人负责3个认知评价维度在感激特质与感激情绪关系间起到中介作用。结论：3个研究结果表明, 受关怀感、道德规范、他人负责性3个认知评价维度与感激密切相关, 并在区分开感激与自豪、亏欠感等情绪中起重要作用。因此, 这3个认识评估维度共同组成了感激情绪认知评价体系。     

DOING/ALLOWING AND THE DELIBERATIVE REQUIREMENT

Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required to be responsive to harmful consequences that have some feature that makes it easy for us to become aware of them. I show that, under Jonathan Bennett's analysis of the doing/allowing distinction, harm that is incidentally done has such a feature, which is not shared by harm that is incidentally allowed. Any plausible analysis of the doing/allowing distinction will entail a similar asymmetry. It follows that, prima facie, an agent who incidentally does harm has violated a moral requirement (the deliberative requirement) which an agent who incidentally allows harm has not violated. 1     

移情在道德强度对企业道德决策影响中的作用

摘 要 本研究将一种重要的道德情绪--移情引入问题权变模型中,以探讨移情因素在道德强度对企业道德决策影响中的作用。本研究基于情景研究法,随机选取256名MBA学生为被试,要求被试基于所提供情景中假想参与者的行为,回答随后测量道德决策(道德识别、道德判断和道德意图)、移情反应、主观道德强度及移情特质的问题。结果发现,1）移情反应在道德强度对企业道德决策的影响中具有中介作用;2）移情关怀特质会通过影响主观道德强度和移情反应而作用于企业道德决策;3)结果大小、社会舆论和效应可能性对道德判断和道德意图的影响机制各有特点。