A colorful walk, but is it on the mental number line? Reply to Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik

Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik [Cohen Kadosh, R., Tzelgov, J., and Henik, A. (2008). A synesthetic walk on the number line: The size effect. Cognition, 106, 548-557] present a new paradigm to probe properties of the mental number line. They describe two experiments which they argue to be inconsistent with the exact small number model proposed by Verguts, Fias, and Stevens [Verguts, T., Fias, W., Stevens, M. (2005). A model of exact small-number representation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12, 66-80]. We discuss the data, assumptions, and conclusions of Cohen Kadosh et al.'s paper in relation to existing models of numerical cognition.     

Unconscious semantic categorization and mask interactions: An elaborate response to Kunde et al. (2005)

In their original report [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] maintain that “unconscious stimuli [do not] owe their impact […] to automatic semantic categorization” (p.223), and instead propose the action-trigger theory of unconscious priming. In a reply to our paper [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2005). On the masking and disclosure of unconscious semantic processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, & Verguts (2005). Cognition], the authors adopt a reconcilist position, and propose that both theories may be valid depending on the experimental situation. We discuss the evidence in favor of this position. [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2005). On the masking and disclosure of unconscious semantic processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, & Verguts (2005). Cognition] also propose an alternative account of our mask-type blocking hypothesis. We report an experiment that distinguishes between our original and their alternative hypothesis.     

Dissecting the symbolic distance effect: Comparison and priming effects in numerical and nonnumerical orders

When participants are asked to compare two stimuli, responses are slower for stimuli close to each other on the relevant dimension than for stimuli further apart. Previously, it has been proposed that this comparison distance effect originates from overlap in the representation of the stimuli. This idea is generally accepted in numerical cognition, where it is assumed that representational overlap of numbers on a mental number line accounts for the effect (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005). In contrast, others have emphasized the role of response-related processes to explain the comparison distance effect (e.g., Banks, 1977). In the present study, numbers and letters are used to show that the comparison distance effect can be dissociated from a more direct behavioral signature of representational overlap, the priming distance effect. The implication is that a comparison distance effect does not imply representational overlap. An interpretation is given in terms of a recently proposed model of quantity comparison (Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, 2005).     

The laterality effect: myth or truth?

Tzelgov and colleagues [Tzelgov, J., Meyer, J., and Henik, A. (1992). Automatic and intentional processing of numerical information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 18, 166-179.], offered the existence of the laterality effect as a post-hoc explanation for their results. According to this effect, numbers are classified automatically as small/large versus a standard point under autonomous processing of numerical information. However, the genuinity of the laterality effect was never examined, or was confounded with the numerical distance effect. In the current study, I controlled the numerical distance effect and observed that the laterality effect does exist, and affects the processing of automatic numerical information. The current results suggest that the laterality effect should be taken into account when using paradigms that require automatic numerical processing such as Stroop-like or priming tasks.     

On the masking and disclosure of unconscious elaborate processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, and Verguts (2005)

We have recently argued that unconscious numerical stimuli might activate responses by a match with prespecified action trigger codes (action trigger account) rather than by semantic prime processing (elaborate processing account). [Van Opstal, F., Reynvoet, B., and Verguts, T. (2005). How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003). Cognition] replicate one piece of evidence for our inference—an inefficiency of primes not presented in target format (verbal or Arabic). But this was found only with letter masks and not with hash masks. The authors conclude that letter masks block unconscious prime processing, and that elaborate processing can account for unconscious priming effects if all its (sometimes subtle) side conditions are considered. We agree that the type of mask in general is an important factor in priming studies but we note that (i) the authors' mask-blocking hypothesis is not well supported by the data, (ii) clear evidence for semantic prime processing in their study is lacking and, (iii) differences in mask efficiency (rather than mask type) might account for the conflicting results. To corroborate this inference we replicate van Opstal et al.'s results with letter masks but reduced mask efficiency. Altogether their data do not challenge the action-trigger account nor do they strongly support the elaborate processing view.     

Exploring the origin of the number-size congruency effect: Sensitivity or response bias?

Physical size modulates the efficiency of digit comparison, depending on whether the relation of numerical magnitude and physical size is congruent or incongruent (Besner & Coltheart, Neuropsychologia, 17, 467–472, 1979), the number-size congruency effect (NSCE). In addition, Henik and Tzelgov (Memory & Cognition, 10, 389–395, 1982) first reported an NSCE for the reverse task of comparing the physical size of digits such that the numerical magnitude of digits modulated the time required to compare their physical sizes. Does the NSCE in physical comparisons simply reflect a number-mediated bias mechanism related to making decisions and selecting responses about the digit’s sizes? Alternatively, or in addition, the NSCE might indicate a true increase in the ability to discriminate small and large font sizes when these sizes are congruent with the digit’s symbolic numerical meaning, over and above response bias effects. We present a new research design that permits us to apply signal detection theory to a task that required observers to judge the physical size of digits. Our results clearly demonstrate that the NSCE cannot be reduced to mere response bias effects, and that genuine sensitivity gains for congruent number-size pairings contribute to the NSCE.     

On the relative speed account of number-size interference in comparative judgments of numerals

Humans show systematic congruency effects due to irrelevant variations of the numerical value or the physical size of digits in judgments about either of these 2 attributes alone. According to influential models (e.g., J. Tzelgov, J. Meyer, & A. Henik, 1992), these effects are characterized by genuine asymmetries of size and number processing not accounted for by simple relative speed considerations, whereas some recent work (e.g., A. Pansky & D. Algom, 1999) partly challenges this view. This article presents 2 qualitative gradient-based predictions made by relative speed models and a diffusion-based implementation of the relative speed view to quantitatively account for response times and error rates in comparative judgments of digits. The results of 2 experiments using a completely task-symmetric design are in accord with these detailed predictions; they are also consistent with the view that both number and size are converted into magnitude representations of similar structure.     

Limiting attentional resources influences performance and output monitoring of an event-based prospective memory task

One of the most frequently used markers in research on numerical cognition is the distance effect. Recently, we have suggested that a distance effect can have different origins depending on the experimental task. By dissociating the comparison distance effect from the priming distance effect we revealed the need to study the origin of this effect before drawing any conclusions from it (van Opstal, Gevers, de Moor, &; Verguts, 2008). Because a distance effect in a same–different task is also commonly used to study number representations (e.g., Dehaene &; Akhavein, 1995), the present study aimed at uncovering the origin of the effect in this task. Computational and empirical results indicate clearly that the distance effect in the same–different task originates from number representations rather than a decision process.     

Dissociation of the distance effect and size effect in one-digit numbers

Magnitude comparison of single digits is robustly characterized by a distance effect (close numbers are more difficult to compare than numbers further apart) and a size effect (for a given distance, comparison difficulty increases with increasing size). The distance effect indicates access to the mental number line (Dehaene, 1997), and the size effect is usually interpreted as indicating that the mental number line represents larger numbers more vaguely than smaller ones. In contrast, we have argued earlier (Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, 2005) that for symbolic numbers (Arabic or verbal notation), the size effect does not originate from the mental number line but, instead, originates from mappings to relevant output components that are specific for magnitude comparison. If the latter is true, it should be possible to dissociate the distance effect from the size effect in tasks other than magnitude comparison. In two experiments, we observed a robust distance effect insame/different judgments, which implies access to the mental number line. Yet the size effect was absent. Consistent with our prediction, this finding establishes a dissociation between the size effect and the distance effect.     

A generalization of the representational change theory from insight to non-insight problems: the case of arithmetic word problems

This paper provides evidence for a possible generalization of Knoblich and colleagues’ representational change theory [Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H., & Rhenius, D. (1999). Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25, 1534-1555; Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., & Raney, G. E. (2001). An eye movement study of insight problem. Memory and Cognition, 29, 1000-1009] outside its original scope of application. While this theory has been proposed to explain insight problem solving, we demonstrate here that its main concepts, namely, constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition, are applicable to incremental problem solving. In a first experiment, we confirm, as already shown by problem solving and reasoning researchers, that individuals avoid the construction of alternative representations of the problems when possible. In the second and third experiments, we show that alternative representations of arithmetic problems are easier to construct and maintain when they violate constraints of narrow rather than wide scope. The specificity of insight problem solving is discussed in the light of these new findings.     

Asking ‘why’ from a distance facilitates emotional processing: A reanalysis of Wimalaweera and Moulds (2008)

Wimalaweera and Moulds [Wimalaweera, S. W., & Moulds, M. L. (2008). Processing memories of anger-eliciting events: the effect of asking ‘why’ from a distance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 402–409] reported a failure to replicate previous findings demonstrating the effectiveness of analyzing anger-related experiences from a self-distanced perspective for reducing negative affect in the short-term (Ayduk, O., & Kross, E. (2008). [Enhancing the pace of recovery: self-distanced-analysis of negative experiences reduces blood pressure reactivity. Psychological Science, 9(3), 229–231; Kross, E., Ayduk, O., & Mischel, W. (2005). When asking “why” does not hurt. Psychological Science, 16, 709–715.] and facilitating adaptive emotional processing over time [Kross, E., & Ayduk, O. (2008). Facilitating adaptive emotional analysis: distinguishing distanced-analysis of depressive experiences from immersed-analysis and distraction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin]. A reanalysis of their data that takes into account effect sizes and participants' scores on the avoidance subscale of the Impact of Events Scale, which were not reported in the original write-up, contradict this and a number of other conclusions reported in their article. In this article, we review the key findings that emerged from this reanalysis.     

What we know about what we have never heard before: Beyond phonetics : Reply to Peperkamp

Berent, Steriade, Lennertz, and Vaknin (2007) [Berent, I., Steriade, D., Lennertz, T., & Vaknin, V. (2007). What we know about what we have never heard: evidence from perceptual illusions. Cognition, 104, 591-630] demonstrate that English speakers’ perception of onsets that are unattested in their language mirrors their typological markedness. We suggest that these findings might reflect the presence of universal grammatical constraints, a proposal challenged by Peperkamp’s commentary. Our reply exposes mischaracterizations of our claims and presents additional empirical arguments in their support.     

Probability matching in choice under uncertainty: Intuition versus deliberation

Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008) [Gaissmaier, W., & Schooler, L. J. (2008). The smart potential behind probability matching. Cognition, 109, 416-422] argue that probability matching, which has traditionally been viewed as a decision making error, may instead reflect an adaptive response to environments in which outcomes potentially follow predictable patterns. In choices involving monetary stakes, we find that probability matching persists even when it is not possible to identify or exploit outcome patterns and that many “probability matchers” rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior when it is described to them. Probability matching appears to reflect a mistaken intuition that can be, but often is not, overridden by deliberate consideration of alternative choice strategies.     

Repeating a strongly masked stimulus increases priming and awareness

Previous studies [Marcel, A. J. (1983). Conscious and unconscious perception: Experiments on visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15(2), 197–237; Wentura, D., & Frings, C. (2005). Repeated masked category primes interfere with related exemplars: New evidence for negative semantic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(1), 108–120] suggested that repeatedly presenting a masked stimulus improves priming without increasing perceptual awareness. However, neural theories of consciousness predict the opposite: Increasing bottom-up strength in such a paradigm should also result in increasing availability to awareness. Here, we tested this prediction by manipulating the number of repetitions of a strongly masked digit. Our results do not replicate the dissociation observed in previous studies and are instead suggestive that repeating an unconscious and attended masked stimulus enables the progressive emergence of perceptual awareness.     

A note on DeCaro, Thomas, and Beilock (2008): Further data demonstrate complexities in the assessment of information-integration category learning

DeCaro et al. [DeCaro, M. S., Thomas, R. D., & Beilock, S. L. (2008). Individual differences in category learning: Sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more. Cognition, 107(1), 284-294] explored how individual differences in working memory capacity differentially mediate the learning of distinct category structures. Specifically, their results showed that greater working memory capacity facilitates the learning of novel category structures that are verbalisable and discoverable through logical reasoning processes. Conversely, however, greater working memory was shown to impede the learning of novel category structures thought to be non-verbalisable, inaccessible to conscious reasoning and discoverable only through implicit (procedural) learning of appropriate stimulus-category responses. The present paper calls into question the specific nature of the category learning tasks used, in particular their ability to discriminate between different modes of category learning.     

A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between ‘up close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.     

Relations between multidimensional perfectionism and burnout in junior-elite male athletes

ObjectivesThe purpose of the present investigation was to examine the moderating influence of perceptions of goal progress and achievement goal orientations on the relationship between multidimensional perfectionism and athlete burnout.Methods201 junior-elite male athletes, ranging from 11 to 21 years of age (M = 15.64, SD = 1.92), were recruited from professional sport clubs in the UK and completed a multi-section inventory assessing self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism [Hewitt, P. L., & Flett, G. L. (1991). Perfectionism in the self and social contexts: conceptualization, assessment, and association with psychopathology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 456–470], achievement goal orientations [Roberts, G. C., Treasure, D. C., & Balague, G. (1998). Achievement goals in sport: the development and validation of the perception of success questionnaire. Journal of Sport Sciences, 16, 337–347], perceived goal progress [Hill, A. P., Hall, H. K., Appleton, P. R., & Kozub, S. A. (2008). Perfectionism and burnout in junior-elite soccer players: the mediating influence of unconditional self-acceptance. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 9, 630–644] and multidimensional athlete burnout [Raedeke, T. D., & Smith, A. L. (2001). Development and preliminary validation of an athlete burnout measure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 23, 281–306].ResultsRegression analyses revealed that socially prescribed perfectionism demonstrated a significant positive association, and self-oriented perfectionism a significant negative association with burnout dimensions. However, the hypotheses for moderation of the perfectionism–burnout relationship were not supported.ConclusionsOverall, while there was no evidence to support the hypothesised moderation of the perfectionism–burnout relationship, the results provide support for a growing body of literature which indicates that maladaptive forms of perfectionism may contribute to burnout in elite junior athletes [Chen, L. H., Kee, Y. H., Chen, M., & Tsaim, Y. (2008). Relation of perfectionism with athletes' burnout: further examination. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 106, 811–820; Gould, D., Tuffey, S., Udrey, E., & Loehr, J. (1996). Burnout in competitive junior tennis players: II. Qualitative analysis. The Sport Psychologist, 10, 341–366; Gould, D., Udry, E., Tuffey, S., & Loehr, J. (1996). Burnout in competitive junior tennis players: I. A quantitative psychological assessment. The Sport Psychologist, 10, 332–340; Hall, H. K. (2006). Perfectionism: a hallmark quality of world class performers, or a psychological impediment to athletic development? In D. Hackfort, & G. Tenenbaum (Eds.), Perspectives in sport and exercise psychology: Essential processes for attaining peak performance (Vol. 1, pp. 178–211). Oxford, UK: Meyer & Meyer Publishers; Hill et al., 2008; Lemyre, P. N., Hall, H. K., & Roberts, G. C. (2008). A social cognitive approach to burnout in elite athletes. Scandinavian Journal of Medicine & Science in Sports, 18, 221–224].     

When and how less is more: reply to Tharp and Pickering

In DeCaro et al. [DeCaro, M. S., Thomas, R. D., & Beilock, S. L. (2008). Individual differences in category learning: Sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more. Cognition, 107, 284-294] we demonstrated that sometimes less working memory (WM) has its advantages. The lower individuals’ WM, the faster they achieved success on an information-integration (II) category learning task adopted from Waldron and Ashby [Waldron, E. M., & Ashby, F. G. (2001). The effects of concurrent task interference on category learning: Evidence for multiple category learning systems. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 168-176]. We attributed this success to the inability of lower WM individuals to employ explicit learning strategies heavily reliant on executive control. This in turn, we hypothesized, might push lower WM individuals to readily adopt procedural-based strategies thought to lead to success on the II task. Tharp and Pickering [Tharp, I. J., & Pickering, A. D. (2009). A note on DeCaro, Thomas, and Beilock (2008): Further data demonstrate complexities in the assessment of information-integration category learning. Cognition] recently questioned whether the II category learning task DeCaro et al. used really reflects procedural learning. In an effort to investigate Tharp and Pickering’s assertions with respect to individual differences in WM, we replicate and extend our previous work, in part by modeling participants’ response strategies during learning. We once again reveal that lower WM individuals demonstrate earlier II learning than their higher WM counterparts. However, we also show that low WM individuals’ initial success is not because of procedural-based responding. Instead, individuals lower in WM capacity perseverate in using simple rule-based strategies that circumvent heavy demands on WM while producing above-chance accuracy.     

The female advantage in object location memory is robust to verbalizability and mode of presentation of test stimuli

This study extends Duff and Hampson's [Duff, S., & Hampson, E. (2001). A sex difference on a novel spatial working memory task in humans. Brain and Cognition,47, 470-493] finding of a sex-related difference in favor of females for an object location memory task. Twenty female and 20 male undergraduate students performed both manual and computer-generated versions of the task using stimuli that varied in degree of verbalizability. A 2x2x3 ANOVA with Sex as a between-subjects factor, and Presentation (manual or computer) and Stimuli (common objects, common shapes, and novel shapes) as within-subjects repeated measures revealed a significant main effect for Sex. Females made fewer errors than males regardless of presentation and across the three levels of verbalizability (i.e., stimulus types); moreover, the effect size was considered "large" [Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Berlin: Springer]. These findings are interpreted within the context of the current literature that demonstrates a female advantage for object location memory (e.g., [Voyer, D., Postma, A., Brake, B., & Imperato-McGinley, J. (2007). Gender differences in object location memory: A meta-analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 23-38]).     

Progressing measurement in sport motivation with the SMS-6: A response to Pelletier,Vallerand, and Sarrazin

Measurement in sport psychology is a major issue and attempts to progress measurement should be valued and encouraged. Construct validation is an ongoing process [Marsh, H. W., & Jackson, S. A. (1999). Flow experience in sport: Construct validation of multidimensional hierarchical state and trait responses. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 343–371] and the publication of the SMS-6 [Mallett, C. J., Kawabata, M., Newcombe, P., Otero-Ferero, A., & Jackson, S. A. (2007). Sports Motivation Scale-6 (SMS-6): A revised six-factor Sport Motivation Scale. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8, 600–614] was an attempt to progress measurement in contextual sport motivation using self-determination theory (SDT) [Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum Press]. Mallett et al. argued for the need to re-develop the Sport Motivation Scale (SMS) [Pelletier, L. G., Fortier, M. S., Vallerand, R. J., Tuson, K. M., Brière, N. M., & Blais, M. R. (1995). Toward a new measure of intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and amotivation in sports: The Sport Motivation Scale (SMS). Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 17, 35–53], primarily because the SMS did not measure integrated regulation, and secondly due to consistently reported problems with the lack of convergent and discriminant validity. Pelletier, Vallerand, and Sarrazin's [Pelletier, L. G., Vallerand, R. J., & Sarrazin, P. (2007b). Something old, something new, and something borrowed. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8, 615–621] commentary on the SMS-6, focused on two legitimate questions: “Does the SMS need to be revised?”, and “Is the revised 6-factor SMS a better scale?” In addressing the first question, this article provides strong evidence that supports the arguments that the SMS does need revision. In addressing the second question, we provided sound arguments for the development of the SMS-6. However, we concluded that the superiority of the SMS-6 in measuring contextual sport motivation across diverse age and cultural groups is a question for future and continuing research. Further examination of the SMS-6 is necessary before such claims can be endorsed.