Abstract-concept learning in Black-billed magpies (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pica hudsonia</Emphasis>)

Abstract relational concepts depend upon relationships between stimuli (e.g., same vs. different) and transcend features of the training stimuli. Recent evidence shows that learning abstract concepts is shared across a variety species including birds. Our recent work with a highly-skilled food-storing bird, Clark’s nutcracker, revealed superior same/different abstract-concept learning compared to rhesus monkeys, capuchin monkeys, and pigeons. Here we test a more social, but less reliant on food-storing, corvid species, the Black-billed magpie (Pica hudsonia). We used the same procedures and training exemplars (eight pairs of the same rule, and 56 pairs of the different rule) as were used to test the other species. Magpies (n = 10) showed a level of abstract-concept learning that was equivalent to nutcrackers and greater than the primates and pigeons tested with these same exemplars. These findings suggest that superior initial abstract-concept learning abilities may be shared across corvids generally, rather than confined to those strongly reliant on spatial memory.     

Combinations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stit</Emphasis> with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ought</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Know</Emphasis>

This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ziran</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Wuwei</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Daodejing</Emphasis>: An Ethical Assessment

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ceteris</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Paribus</Emphasis> Qualifiers

Antecedent-strengthening, a trivially valid inference of classical logic of the form: P → Q ? (P & R) → Q, has a counterpart in everyday reasoning that often fails. A plausible solution to the problem involves assuming an implicit ceteris paribus (CP) qualifier that can be explicated as an additional conjunct in the antecedent of the premise. The qualifier can be explicated as ‘everything else relevant remains unchanged’ or alternatively as ‘nothing interferes’. The qualifier appears most prominently in the context of the discussion of laws in the sciences, where these laws are often expressed with a CP qualifier. From an analysis of the qualifier’s role in the problem of antecedent-strengthening, we can learn more about CP qualifiers in general and in their application to the laws used in the sciences.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> as a Korean Culture-Bound Narcissism: Dealing with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> Through <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong</Emphasis>-Dynamics

This article explores a Korean culture-bound emotion called jeong-han, which shares similarities with narcissism and depression in terms of causes, formation processes, emotions, cognitions, and neurotic sufferings. This article has three main goals: 1) to report and describe the presence and experience of jeong-han among contemporary Koreans; 2) to compare jeong-han with narcissism and depression; and 3) to suggest an effective way of dealing with jeong-han through jeong-dynamics. In order to effectively help people with jeong-han both in counseling and ministry settings, providing jeong and facilitating jeong-dynamics in a small group or community setting can be helpful.     

Deontological evidentialism and <Emphasis Type="Italic">ought</Emphasis> implies <Emphasis Type="Italic">can</Emphasis>

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.     

Revalidation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sat</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Chit</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ananda</Emphasis> Scale

Sat-Chit-Ananda is an indigenous construct that refers to absolute bliss and consciousness. The present study aimed to strengthen the psychometric properties of the newly developed Sat-Chit-Ananda scale (Singh et al. in Int J Vedic Found Manag 1(2):54–74, 2014). A total of 398 students aged 17–36 years (mean age = 21.33 years, SD = 2.2, 70% males) participated in this study. An exploratory as well as confirmatory factor analysis was computed for the 17-item scale. Its’ concurrent validity was established by assessing its correlation with other well-being measures, namely Flourishing (Diener et al. in Soc Indic Res 97:143–156 2010) and Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (Diener et al. 2010). Satisfactory results were obtained from both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Sat-Chit-Ananda and its factors were found to be significantly positively correlated with Flourishing and Positive Experiences and were negatively correlated with Negative Experiences. Thus, the validity of the Sat-Chit-Ananda (Singh et al. 2014) scale stands further substantiated—offering this scale as a promising new assessment tool.     

The exemplarities of artworks: Heidegger, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Shoes</Emphasis>, and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pixar</Emphasis>

Heidegger’s essays “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Question Concerning Technology” provide a revealing insight into the importance of exemplarity to artworks. Originally the notion that exemplarity is essential to art is Kantian: As Kant puts it, since originality can produce “original nonsense, [beautiful art’s] products must be models, i.e. exemplary.” However, what Heidegger recognizes is that even if exemplarity allows us to take art seriously in spite of its excesses, it exposes the artwork to new dangers: on the one hand, to the “world withdrawal of the work” as occurs in consignment to the museum shelf, and on the other, to the conditions of Enframing as “challenging-forth,” under which art is taken as a means to an end—dangers which point to the division of artworks between “fine” art and “popular” art. Since Heidegger’s approach favors the former, we will try to gain new critical insight by considering his arguments in the light of a “popular” work that allows us to formulate an exemplarity of popular art as the necessary complement to that of traditional art. By means of an understanding of the exemplarities (in the plural) of artworks, we will be able to reconsider the significance of Heidegger’s notions of reliability, Enframing, and poiesis for our current technological conditions.

The codification of intersubjectivity in the diachronic change <Emphasis Type="Italic">AD locative</Emphasis> &gt; <Emphasis Type="Italic">A</Emphasis>(<Emphasis Type="Italic">D</Emphasis>) <Emphasis Type="Italic">indirect object</Emphasis> in Spanish

The principal aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between intersubjectivity and grammar. We argue that intersubjectivity represents, on the one hand, a prerequisite for the development of language as a symbolic system, and therefore also for the development of grammar. Furthermore, we attempt to show that language, and especially grammar, codify intersubjectivity. That is to say, grammatical constructions represent the intersubjective interactions that situated agents maintain in different pragmatic contects. We call this phenomenon the meta-representational capacity of language. Our main object of analysis is the development of the ditransitive construction (give something to someone - dar algo a alguien) in the Spanish language. The evolution of this construction makes it clear that there is an important correlation between the degree of complexity of the codified intersubjective interaction and grammatically obligatory nature and the prominence of the grammatical construction that codifies it: the greater the complexity, the greater its obligatoriness, and vice versa.     

Plural <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grundgesetze</Emphasis>

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which a formulation of the infamous Basic Law V. It is shown that second-order Peano arithmetic can be derived in PG. I also investigate the philosophical issue of predicativism connected to PG. In particular, as predicativism about concepts seems rather un-Fregean, I analyse whether there is a way to make predicativism compatible with Frege’s logicism.     

That <Emphasis Type="Italic">F</Emphasis>

Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.

Precis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophy and Neuroscience</Emphasis>: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Ruthlessly Reductive Account</Emphasis>

This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core.     

Carnap,Kuhn, and revisionism: on the publication of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Structure</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Encyclopedia</Emphasis>

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science.