应用伦理学的逻辑和历史

目前,应用伦理学已经成为伦理学界聚讼纷纭的主战场.争论的焦点集中在"什么是应用伦理学?"这个根本问题上.     

再论应用伦理学的学科性质——兼论伦理学的"伦理"基础

在关于应用伦理学学科性质的讨论中,那种"集‘基本价值观’和‘程序共识论’于一体"的应用伦理学观应是其中最为重要的成果,并且是我们进一步讨论的基础。它其实向人们展示了"一个平台"与"两个端点",但它并没有真正掌握具体领域具体问题这一"端点"的本质特征,因而没能真正理解应用伦理学的学科性质。广义伦理学应该是应用伦理学协商对话的共同基础。由此出发,应用伦理学的学科性质就学科而言,它不仅涉及伦理学,也要涉及其他领域的专门学科;就其任务而言,它既要确保具体行为符合伦理原则和道德规范,又要顾及其他具体领域的正当利益诉求;就其方法而言,它采取的是"程序共识"的方法;就其结果而言,它具有"伦理妥协"的特征。     

论亚里士多德"自然"德性伦理学对德性伦理学复兴的启示

亚氏德性伦理学是以"自然"为基础的,"自然"是本体用意与现象用意的内在统一,统一于"人生"之中.在亚氏德性伦理学语境中,人的生命历程与呈明"自然"的德性之美是内在统一的过程.当代德性伦理学复兴缺乏本体论承诺,致使德性伦理学复兴缺乏统一的解释力度.这需要从亚氏"自然"德性伦理学中获得启示.     

厘清伦理学的对象与定义

厘清伦理学的对象与定义是构建伦理学理论体系的首要问题。以往对伦理学研究对象的说法大致可以归并为德性、道德价值、道德行为、道德规范、道德语言、自由、幸福、人生问题和道德这九种。经逐一分析可知,前八种界说难以成立。第九种界说将伦理学的对象直接聚焦于道德是值得肯定的,可由此给出的伦理学定义还是不够准确与周延。虽然道德是伦理学的基本对象,但并不是伦理学的全部对象。能将伦理学全部对象一网打尽的概念只有道德问题,因而伦理学就是系统研究各种道德问题的学问。     

重思伦理学与形而上学之间的关系——以海德格尔哲学为"视阈"

如果以19世纪形而上学的衰落为"坐标",此前的伦理学以形而上学为基础,此后的伦理学则面临相对主义的难题.在古典哲学中,虽然形而上学为伦理学奠基,但形而上学的自由与伦理学的自由之间存在着矛盾.海德格尔试图把存在问题从形而上学中拯救出来,但就其对"人道主义"的批判而言,海德格尔哲学中有存在论而没有伦理学.虽然伦理学面临着绝对主义和相对主义的两难抉择,但我们这个时代对伦理学的需要却是前所未有的.在全球化的时代背景下,或许我们首要应该考虑的是人与人之间、国家之间乃至文化之间能够和平共存而作为"底线"的基本规则.     

"人造美女"的生命伦理学思考

"人造美女"是一个纯粹的市场炒作的概念,其背后隐匿着深刻的生命伦理难题,并直接面对现实的医学伦理学问题.其中,生命价值、技术对生命干涉限度、美容与健康的冲突、医疗商业化等生命伦理学难题格外突出,而医疗伤害、技术滥用等是更为现实的医学伦理学问题.     

论伦理学的性质——兼论理论伦理学与应用伦理学的关系

本文针对现行伦理学把伦理学理解为关于道德的学问的片面性和忽视应用伦理学研究的缺陷 ,正面阐述作者对伦理学的性质以及理论伦理学与应用伦理学的关系的看法。作者认为作为哲学分支之一的伦理学既是人生哲学 ,也是价值哲学 ,又是幸福哲学。伦理学的意义在于 ,它能促进个人反思和规划人生并为之指示路向和提供原则 ,从理论上为社会确立终极价值目标和构建价值体系 ,为各门自然科学、社会科学、人文科学提供理论观念、一般原则和活动规范。伦理学的研究方法是反思、批判、构建有机统一的思辨方法。作者主张把运用理论伦理学的观念和原则解决当代人类生活和实践中出现的实际问题的应用伦理学研究划分为领域伦理学研究、职业伦理学研究、人群伦理学研究 ,认为它们构成应用伦理学研究的三个基本领域。     

在"互镜"中寻求"合作"——现代性视域中的规范伦理学与德性伦理学之争

面对现代社会的各种道德危机,尤其是在解决现代人如何安身立命的重大生存论问题上,规范伦理学与德性伦理学究竟处于何种关系,亟待从理论层面加以澄明。对之把握,需要摒弃"二元对立"的抽象思维,立足现代道德生活的完满诠释与理解。现代道德生活既追求社会秩序,又崇尚道德理想,希冀幸福生活。由此,现代道德生活既需要能够守住道德底线的规范伦理学,也需要能够满足人们对美好生活热烈追求的德性伦理学。不管是规范伦理关于道德的外在约束,还是德性伦理从主体内在阐发的幸福期待,都旨在回应现代人道德生活的重大问题。     

全球生命伦理学

探讨生命伦理学的起源,并阐述了不同理论支持者的观点,发现无论准确的生命伦理学历史起源是什么,目前生命伦理学已经变成了一种真正的全球现象。它在全世界具有重要的意义,因为人类不仅仅是欧洲人或亚洲人,也是世界公民和一个全球道德共同体的成员。生命伦理学对任何地方、任何人都是重要的,并不是因为它是"拿来"的,而是因为它提供了一个普遍的框架去解释和管理正在经历的变化,这个变化包括了目前所有的国家和文化。然而,这个框架的解释和应用必须依据本土环境。因此,现代生命伦理学具有全球性和本土特征的特点。     

"本体论"与"伦理学"--形而上学的两个向度

形而上学有两个密切相关的内在向度,就是本体论向度与伦理学向度.在哲学史上,哲学家们之所以在"追求形而上学"的同时,又总是"反形而上学",并非是人们的形上本性出了问题,而是因为人们总是将形而上学视为单纯的"一维性",总是用一个向度来取代或遮蔽另一个向度.而所谓的"后形而上学思想",也并不是消解了形而上学,而是指形而上学从"本体论向度"转向了"伦理学向度".     

Feminist Ethics and Religious Ethics

This focus issue is a conversation at and about the interface of feminist ethics and religious ethics, in order to show what these multifaceted fields of intellectual endeavor and practical import have to say to each other, to teach and to learn. The seven essays approach that dialogue from a variety of angles and traditions, reflecting the fecundity of both fields and the wide‐ranging concerns of colleagues in religious ethics who share commitments and methods with feminist ethics.     

语言伦理与媒体伦理

语言与媒体的联系表明语言伦理与媒体伦理具有内在联系;语言与媒体的差异表明语言伦理与媒体伦理之间又存在着巨大区别,从而使得前者构成了自然语言的伦理问题,后者构成了媒体语言的伦理问题。不要说谎(即说真话)既是自然语言伦理也是媒体语言伦理的基本要求,但是,由于媒体语言与自然语言的不对称,以及媒体语言已经成为公共领域的主导语言,所以,媒体语言之不要说谎的重要性远非自然语言不要说谎的重要性所能比拟。应用伦理学应该通过政府主管部门、媒体自律协会和全体社会公众三条监督途径,来解决媒体伦理问题,确保媒体遵循不要说谎的基本道德要求。其中,利用现代网络技术把自然语言提升为媒体语言,完善全体社会公众的监督途径尤为重要。     

Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics

This essay focuses on the unity of several virtues in pre-Qin Confucians. Confucius maintains the proper application and coherence of such virtues as benevolence, wisdom, trustworthiness, straightforwardness, courage, and firmness. Further, Confucius takes benevolence and nobility as characteristic of human being. Particular attention is paid to the distinction and relationship between virtuous characters and virtuous actions.     

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向,一是基于研究重心由“应当”问题转换为“德行之所以然”的问题,二是基于研究范式上由目的论、德性论、义务论等转换为价值论。作为传统伦理学的集大成者,康德伦理学一方面因其浓烈的价值论色彩而成为舍勒和N．哈特曼价值伦理学的前奏,另一方面因其“实质”内容缺失而致的形式主义又为后者的拓展提供了空间。舍勒,尤其是N．哈特曼的实质价值伦理学正是在康德伦理学的理论平台上得以建立的。     

Between Christian Ethics and Religious Ethics

By focusing on questions concerning what kind of training graduate students in theology and ethics and religious ethics should receive, I try to initiate a conversation we need to have about the kind of work the JRE should foster.     

Ethics Talk; Talking Ethics: An Example of Clinical Ethics Consultation

This written account of a clinical encounter - depicting fragments of a more extensive array of events - attempts to exemplify many facets and associated complexities of clinical ethics consultation. Within the general telling, I provide more detailed portrayals of several key events. In secion 1, I document briefly my initial interactions at the beginning of the consultation, focusing on the information gained - in the context of those interactions - as I read the medical chart of Mrs. Rose. Next in section 2, I briefly describes my initial conversation with Mrs. Rose's three sons. Section 3 illustrates several questions raised in sections 1 and 2. Then section 4 presents my encounter with Paul, the youngest son, as he was carrying out his vigil at his mother's bedside in the hospital. Section 5 chronicles my interactions with several care providers involved in Mrs. Rose's situation, including two different meetings that occurred with Mrs. Rose's attending physician. I conclude in section 6 by telling about a conversation I had with Mrs. Rose's middle son, Russell, approximately one month after Mrs. Rose died.     

Recentering Christian Ethics as Comparative Religious Ethics

The filial relationship between Christian ethics and Comparative Religious Ethics (CRE) need not be perniciously distortive and can be salutary for comparative work. I suggest that the suspicions about CRE as a disguised form of a “Christian ethical enterprise” are overstated and that we can appreciate the value of the legacy of Christian ethics for comparative work in the focal themes of emancipatory criticism and common morality. Both of these themes, even if influenced by Christian ethics, reflect more universal social‐moral problems that can be discerned in cross‐cultural contexts.     

Christian Ethics,Religious Ethics,and Secular Ethics: A Contemporary Reappraisal

In this essay, I argue that Christian ethicists should not think of themselves as religious ethicists. I defend this claim by arguing that the concept of religious ethics, as it has come to be understood as a discipline that is distinct from secular ethics, is incoherent. In part one, I describe the fraught attempts by theologians in the 20th century to identify the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. In part two, I argue that certain accounts of natural law unwittingly reinforce a problematic conception of secular ethics. Part three examines some trends in religious studies and comparative religious ethics to highlight problematic conceptions of religion. Drawing together these strands of inquiry, I contend that that the secular-religious dichotomy in contemporary ethics should be rejected, but by the same token, I suggest that comparative ethics remains a worthwhile enterprise.