决策与判断中的分解效应

分解效应是人类主观判断中的一种较稳固的行为偏差,并且判断结果会对随后的决策产生重要影响,因此,对该领域研究成果的全面梳理具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。本文主要介绍了支持理论中的分解效应,总结梳理了概率判断与时间判断中分解效应的研究,综述了其他社会判断中的分解效应研究成果,展望了决策与判断中的分解效应的未来研究方向。通过上述内容的阐述,希望能为该领域研究者提供新的思路,推动国内相关领域研究的发展。     

随机支持模型:青少年主观概率校准的特点

随机支持模型试图以假设支持为随机变量的方式描述主观概率的校准。采用随机配对的60个中国城市户籍人口的比较任务验证了该模型对初中、高中和大学生的适用性。研究还表明青少年主观概率校准的发展特点:青少年的正确率随年龄的增长而提高;主观概率判断(信心)不同年龄有显著差异,大学生信心最强,其次是初中生、再次是高中生;大学生主观概率判断的极端性最强,其次是初中生,再次是高中生;青少年的主观概率校准是过度自信的。     

汉语“主观词”的表征及其加工

本文提出了"主观词"的概念,并探讨主观词存在的心理现实性以及主观词的加工特征。包括3项研究:研究1考察了普通大学生对双字结构的词汇辨别情况,发现他们倾向于将短语和词主观判断为词,即他们按照个体对词的独特表征认知词,证实了主观词存在的心理现实性。研究2和研究3分别采用"词优效应"研究中使用的强迫选择作业和词汇判断任务考察主观词加工的特征。研究2发现,读者加工词和主观词(语法上是短语但主观评定为词)的正确率和反应时没有差异,但与非词条件相比,表现为正确率高,反应时短;研究3的反应时结果同研究2,而3种条件的正确率均在90%以上且不存在显著差异。在本研究条件下,得出以下结论:(1)主观词的存在具有心理现实性:读者对汉语词语的表征是主观的,不一定符合词的语法学规定;(2)在强迫选择作业下,与非词相比,表现出词优效应,主观词作为整体被识别。(3)在词汇判断任务下,主观词与词相同,与非词相比,表现出加工优势。     

概率估计的趋势效应及其对决策的影响机制——基于心理动量的视角

概率是反映风险与不确定性的重要指标, 概率估计具有趋势效应, 会对决策产生影响。文章描述了概率估计趋势效应的两种表现形式, 概率估计变化的趋势性(即不同时间点概率估计变化产生的趋势作用)与单边概率估计的趋势性(即高于或低于某个概率区间范畴的上界或下界的估计表述所产生的趋势作用), 揭示了概率估计趋势效应对于个体判断、决策行为和非理性决策偏差的影响; 基于心理动量的理论视角提出了一个整合模型, 阐述了概率估计趋势效应催生心理动量体验继而引发后续决策行为的内在机理。未来的研究可进一步关注：多方信息来源主体下概率估计的趋势效应; 动态趋势效应与静态概率估计的交互作用; 风险沟通中的概率估计变化趋势。     

心境对未来事件发生概率判断的影响

本研究采用短影片人为诱发心境的方法,用正性和负性两种情绪事件作为刺激材料,在控制人格变量的前提下,探讨了大学生在不同心境下对未来事件发生概率的判断中是否存在心境一致性效应。结果表明：（1）愉悦心境会增加做出积极判断的倾向,悲伤心境会增加做出消极判断的倾向;（2）无论是在愉悦心境还是在悲伤心境中,被试在对未来事件发生概率的判断上不存在性别差异。结果支持心境对未来事件发生概率判断有所影响,即诱发的心境与未来事件的效价存在一致性效应。     

得失框架下时间和风险对跨期选择的影响

本研究通过设置获得框架和损失框架下跨期选择情景,采用选择滴定法计算个体的主观值,分别探讨了跨期选择是否存在得损失框架效应,以及是否会受时间与风险的影响。结果发现:(1)跨期选择存在得损失框架效应,与损失框架相比,被试在获得框架下选择近期目标的概率更高、反应更快、主观值更小;(2)时间、风险会和得损失框架效应交互影响跨期选择。在获得框架下,随着时间点的延长,低风险时被试才更有可能做远期选择;在损失框架下,随着时间点的缩短,中高等风险时被试才更有可能做近期选择。结果表明框架效应、时间与风险可以影响跨期选择,支持了双系统评价理论。     

汉语多义单字词的识别优势效应

运用词汇判断、简单命名及辨别命名任务,考察汉语多义单字词的识别优势效应。结果显示,在三个任务中均发现了显著的多义词识别优势效应。在词汇判断和简单命名任务中,多义词识别的优势效应表现在低频词中;在辨别命名任务中,多义词识别优势效应同时表现在高、低频词中。实验结果支持了PDP模型,讨论了多义词识别优势效应产生的机制     

多媒体学习中线索原则是否存在经验逆转效应?——来自两项元分析的证据

经验逆转效应指出,对低先备知识者学习有积极作用的教学设计可能对高先备知识者无效,甚至有消极影响。本研究分别对高、低先备知识者进行关于线索对其学习过程中主观认知负荷及学习结果影响的元分析,检验线索原则是否存在经验逆转效应及认知负荷理论能否解释线索原则的经验逆转效应。结果表明,线索能降低低先备知识者学习过程中的主观认知负荷并促进其学习表现;但线索对高先备知识者认知负荷及学习成绩的总效应均不显著。结合元分析结果,本研究证明了在多媒体学习环境下线索原则存在部分经验逆转,且部分支持了线索原则经验逆转效应的认知负荷理论解释。     

面孔再认及学习程度判断中的同龄效应

同龄效应指个体对自己年龄段面孔的记忆成绩显著高于其他年龄面孔.实验采用3×3混合设计,考察不同年龄被试对面孔再认及学习程度判断中的同龄效应,探讨同龄效应的发展规律.结果显示,青年和老年人对同龄面孔的再认显著好于异龄面孔,儿童对同龄与异龄面孔的再认成绩差异不显著;各组被试对不同年龄的面孔学习程度判断准确性之间的差异没有区别.这表明:青年和老年人在面孔再认中出现了同龄效应,儿童没有表现出同龄效应;个体学习程度判断中不存在同龄效应,且这种特点与年龄无关.     

实际亲密度对恋人参照效应的影响

为考察实际亲密度对恋人参照效应的影响,采用自我参照研究中的R/K判断范式和实际亲密度与应有亲密度量表对68名（35名男性,33名女性）处于恋爱关系中的被试施测。结果发现：在R反应上,实际亲密度与参照条件交互作用显著,高实际亲密度组表现出恋人参照效应,而低实际亲密度组未表现出恋人参照效应;性别与参照条件交互作用显著,女性整体上表现出恋人参照效应,而男性整体上未表现出恋人参照效应;应有亲密度与参照条件交互作用不显著;在K反应上,所有效应均不显著。研究证明了在自我参照范式中,自我是否呈现出恋人参照效应可能受实际亲密度的影响,并存在性别差异。结果提示,在他人参照效应的研究中,需将实际亲密度和性别变量考虑进来     

时间分解效应及其对跨期决策的影响

本文基于经典的分解效应, 提出并证实了一种影响人们判断与决策中时间知觉的新因素--时间分解效应。共包括两个研究, 分别在“时间够用”判断与跨期决策中检验了该效应的存在性与稳固性。实验结果表明：(1)相比未分解条件, 分解条件下的被试判断给定时间内完成某项任务的时间更够用, 即时间知觉更长。该效应受到任务难度的调节, 在较简单的任务中时间分解效应更显著; (2)在跨期决策中, 分解操纵增大了人们对较大较远的收益(larger & later, LL)选项中时间延迟的知觉, 证实了时间分解效应。此外, 还发现时间分解效应会导致人们在跨期决策中更偏好较小较近的收益(smaller & sooner, SS)选项, 对时间延迟的知觉中介了这一过程。总之, 本研究不仅在理论上提出了一种新的分解效应, 同时对现实生活中的决策(如计划制定等)有重要的应用价值。     

A random support model of the calibration of subjective probabilities

A stochastic model of the calibration of subjective probabilities based on support theory (Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997, Tversky and Koehler, 1994) is presented. This model extends support theory—a general representation of probability judgment—to the domain of calibration, the analysis of the correspondence between subjective and objective probability. The random support model can account for the common finding of overconfidence, and also predicts the form of the relationship between overconfidence and item difficulty (the “hard–easy effect”). The parameters of the model have natural psychological interpretations, such as discriminability between correct and incorrect hypotheses, and extremity of judgment. The random support model can be distinguished from other stochastic models of calibration by: (a) using fewer parameters, (b) eliminating the use of variable cutoffs by mapping underlying support directly into judged probability, (c) allowing validation of model parameters with independent assessments of support, and (d) applying to a wide variety of tasks by framing probability judgment in the integrative context of support theory.     

概率判断中的合取谬误

概率判断中的合取谬误是指违反事件发生概率的合取规则而认为包含多个独立事件的复合事件的发生可能性大于其中某些事件的发生可能性的一种概率判断偏差现象。合取谬误的界定存在一定争议, 相关的解释机制有因果模型理论、确认理论、惊奇理论等, 影响合取谬误的因素有频率效应、训练效应以及个体差异等等。未来研究应联系逆转合取谬误的心理机制来完善已有的理论, 同时注意应用研究以及其非理性的探讨。     

The alternative explanation to the alternative‐outcome effect and the detection of the focal outcome effect

Abstract: Previous studies on subjective probability judgment indicate that pair‐wise comparison between the focal and the strongest alternative outcome plays an important role in probability judgment. This study, however, found that the randomness of alternative outcomes affected probability judgment for focal outcome. In the present study, 182 participants provided probability estimates for winning on hypothetical slot machines where both successes and losses were composed of multiple outcomes. The randomness of both the focal and alternative outcomes were defined by the expression used in Rappoport and Budescu (1997 ). The analysis indicated that the more random the distributions of both focal and alternative outcomes, the higher the estimated probability for focal outcome. Some theoretical suggestions are discussed.     

Violations of coherence in subjective probability: a representational and assessment processes account

Coherent judgment is a cardinal feature of rational cognition. Six experiments revealed systematic violations of coherence in probability judgment in which participants assigned different probabilities to mathematically equiprobable events. Experiments 1-5 revealed a strict refocusing effect: Compared to an occurrence frame, a non-occurrence frame resulted in higher estimates if base-rate evidence favored occurrence, lower estimates if evidence favored non-occurrence, and similar estimates if evidence supported indifference. Moreover, Experiments 5 and 6 revealed a pessimistic bias in which the less favorable of two equiprobable events was assigned greater probability. The findings support a Representational and Assessment Processes account (RAP) in which subjective probability is influenced by the perceived compatibility between representations of focal events and representations of evidence.     

Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats

Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on “variable substitution”: the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples’ probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.