Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style?

Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by impaired social and communicative development, and restricted interests and activities. This article will argue that we can discover more about developmental disorders such as autism through demonstrations of task success than through examples of task failure. Even in exploring and explaining what people with autism find difficult, such as social interaction, demonstration of competence on contrasting tasks has been crucial to defining the nature of the specific deficit. Deficit accounts of autism cannot explain, however, the assets seen in this disorder; for example, savant skills in maths, music and drawing, and islets of ability in visuospatial tests and rote memory. An alternative account, reviewed here, suggests that autism is characterized by a cognitive style biased towards local rather than global information processing – termed ‘weak central coherence’. Evidence that weak coherence might also characterize the relatives of people with autism, and form part of the extended phenotype of this largely genetic disorder, is discussed. This review concludes by considering some outstanding questions concerning the specific cognitive mechanism for coherence and the neural basis of individual differences in this aspect of information processing.     

Does the cognitive reflection test measure cognitive reflection? A mathematical modeling approach

We used a mathematical modeling approach, based on a sample of 2,019 participants, to better understand what the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick In Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42, 2005) measures. This test, which is typically completed in less than 10 min, contains three problems and aims to measure the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind. However, since the test contains three mathematically based problems, it is possible that the test only measures mathematical abilities, and not cognitive reflection. We found that the models that included an inhibition parameter (i.e., the probability of inhibiting an intuitive response), as well as a mathematical parameter (i.e., the probability of using an adequate mathematical procedure), fitted the data better than a model that only included a mathematical parameter. We also found that the inhibition parameter in males is best explained by both rational thinking ability and the disposition toward actively open-minded thinking, whereas in females this parameter was better explained by rational thinking only. With these findings, this study contributes to the understanding of the processes involved in solving the CRT, and will be particularly useful for researchers who are considering using this test in their research.     

Reciprocal relations between cognitive neuroscience and formal cognitive models: opposites attract?

Cognitive neuroscientists study how the brain implements particular cognitive processes such as perception, learning, and decision-making. Traditional approaches in which experiments are designed to target a specific cognitive process have been supplemented by two recent innovations. First, formal cognitive models can decompose observed behavioral data into multiple latent cognitive processes, allowing brain measurements to be associated with a particular cognitive process more precisely and more confidently. Second, cognitive neuroscience can provide additional data to inform the development of formal cognitive models, providing greater constraint than behavioral data alone. We argue that these fields are mutually dependent; not only can models guide neuroscientific endeavors, but understanding neural mechanisms can provide key insights into formal models of cognition.     

An embodied cognitive science?

The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely physically embodied, environmentally embedded science of the mind is still unclear. In this article I will raise a number of critical questions concerning the nature and scope of this approach, drawing a distinction between two kinds of appeal to embodiment: (1) ‘Simple’ cases, in which bodily and environmental properties merely constrain accounts that retain the focus on inner organization and processing; and (2) More radical appeals, in which attention to bodily and environmental features is meant to transform both the subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science.     

When is a cognitive system embodied?

For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification.     

Does task-set reconfiguration create cognitive slack?

C. Oriet and P. Jolicoeur (2003) reported 2 experiments in which the perceptual contrast of stimuli was manipulated in a task-switching paradigm. They failed to observe an interaction in the reaction time data between task switching, perceptual contrast, and response-stimulus interval. Using the locus of slack logic, they concluded from these results that early perceptual processing of stimuli awaits the completion of a task-set reconfiguration stage, rather than proceeding in parallel with it. Here, an assumption necessary for this argument is questioned, and it is shown that an existing computational model of task switching, without successive stages for task-set reconfiguration and perceptual processing, produces a similar pattern of data. Thus, C. Oriet and P. Jolicoeur's data are compatible with models in which early perceptual processing and task-set reconfiguration take place in parallel.     

How does mindfulness-based cognitive therapy work?

Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) is an efficacious psychosocial intervention for recurrent depression ( [Kuyken et?al., 2008], [Ma and Teasdale, 2004] and [Teasdale et?al., 2000]). To date, no compelling research addresses MBCT’s mechanisms of change. This study determines whether MBCT’s treatment effects are mediated by enhancement of mindfulness and self-compassion across treatment, and/or by alterations in post-treatment cognitive reactivity. The study was embedded in a randomized controlled trial comparing MBCT with maintenance antidepressants (mADM) with 15-month follow-up (Kuyken et al., 2008). Mindfulness and self-compassion were assessed before and after MBCT treatment (or at equivalent time points in the mADM group). Post-treatment reactivity was assessed one month after the MBCT group sessions or at the equivalent time point in the mADM group. One hundred and twenty-three patients with ≥3 prior depressive episodes, and successfully treated with antidepressants, were randomized either to mADM or MBCT. The MBCT arm involved participation in MBCT, a group-based psychosocial intervention that teaches mindfulness skills, and discontinuation of ADM. The mADM arm involved maintenance on a therapeutic ADM dose for the duration of follow-up. Interviewer-administered outcome measures assessed depressive symptoms and relapse/recurrence across 15-month follow-up. Mindfulness and self-compassion were measured using self-report questionnaire. Cognitive reactivity was operationalized as change in depressive thinking during a laboratory mood induction.MBCT’s effects were mediated by enhancement of mindfulness and self-compassion across treatment. MBCT also changed the nature of the relationship between post-treatment cognitive reactivity and outcome. Greater reactivity predicted worse outcome for mADM participants but this relationship was not evident in the MBCT group.MBCT’s treatment effects are mediated by augmented self-compassion and mindfulness, along with a decoupling of the relationship between reactivity of depressive thinking and poor outcome. This decoupling is associated with the cultivation of self-compassion across treatment.     

Can synaesthesia research inform cognitive science?

The renaissance of synaesthesia research has produced many insights regarding the aetiology and mechanisms that might underlie this intriguing phenomenon, which abnormally binds features between and within modalities. Synaesthesia is interesting in its own right, but whether it contributes to our knowledge of neurocognitive systems that underlie non-synaesthete experience is an open question. In this review, we show that results from the field of synaesthesia can constrain cognitive theories in numerical cognition, automaticity, crossmodal interaction and awareness. Therefore, research of synaesthesia provides a unique window into other domains of cognitive neuroscience. We conclude that the study of synaesthesia could advance our understanding of the normal and abnormal human brain and cognition.     

Do traumatic events influence cognitive schemata?

Within the field of crisis psychology empirical research on the subject whether cognitive schemata are influenced by victimization, and whether possible changes in cognitive schemata are related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is somewhat sparse. In the present study cognitive processing of 602 parents, who had lost an infant, were examined. Among other things results showed a significant relationship between level of cognitive processing and symptoms of PTSD. When items selected to reflect fundamental assumptions about the self and the world were assessed, there were only few differences between parents who had lost an infant, and the control group. Furthermore, there were numerous significant relations between items selected to reflect fundamental assumptions and symptoms of PTSD. The results are discussed in relation to central theories within the cognitive area of crisis psychology and recommendations for future research are offered.     

How are cognitive and physical difficulty compared?

Tasks that require less physical effort are generally preferred over more physically demanding alternatives. Similarly, tasks that require less mental effort are generally preferred over more mentally demanding alternatives. But what happens when one must choose between tasks that entail different kinds of effort, one mainly physical (e.g., carrying buckets) and the other mainly mental (e.g., counting)? We asked participants to choose between a bucket-carrying task and a counting task. Our participants were less likely to choose the bucket task when it required a long reach rather than a short reach, and our participants were also less likely to choose the bucket task the smaller the final count value. We tested the hypothesis that subjective task durations provided a common currency for comparing the difficulties of the two kinds of tasks. We found that this hypothesis provided a better account of the task choice data than did an account that relied on objective task durations. Our study opens the door to a new problem in the study of attention, perception, and psychophysics—judging the difficulty of different kinds of tasks. The approach we took to this problem, which relies on two-alternative forced choice along with modeling the basis for the choice, may prove useful in future investigations.     

The influence of cognitive load on self-presentation: can cognitive busyness help as well as harm social performance?

Extra cognitive loads can hinder challenging self-presentations by usurping needed cognitive resources but also may sometimes improve them by shifting attention away from negative self-preoccupation. In Study 1, extraverts and introverts participated in an interview in which they presented themselves as either extraverted or introverted. Congruent self-presentations, which should be cognitively nondemanding, were unaffected by a cognitive busyness manipulation (rehearsing an 8-digit number). However, incongruent self-presentations were affected by busyness. Busyness decreased the effectiveness of extraverts who tried to appear introverted but increased the effectiveness of introverts who tried to appear extraverted. Study 2 found that introverts, who also tend to be socially anxious, reported less public self-consciousness and fewer negative self-focused thoughts when they were busy than when they were not busy.     

Why worry? The cognitive function of anxiety

The phenomenon of worry is considered to arise from cognitive processes involved in anxiety, that serve to maintain high levels of vigilance for personal danger. Rather than rely on self-report alone, the research described here draws on information processing methodology, to investigate this hypothesized cognitive function. Evidence is summarized to show that anxious subjects selectively attend to threatening information, and interpret ambiguous events in a relatively threatening way. However, the evidence on memory suggests that although such information may be easily activated, it is not necessarily more accessible. The allocation of attentional priority to threatening information is seen as a characteristic of anxious (rather than depressed) mood, while the ease with which this processing mode is adopted may underlie trait anxiety and vulnerability to anxiety disorders.     

Detecting drivers’ cognitive load from saccadic intrusion

In this paper, we have explored use of Saccadic Intrusion to detect drivers’ cognitive load and instantaneous perception of developing road hazards. Saccadic Intrusion is a type of eye gaze movement which was earlier found to be related to change in cognitive load. We have developed an algorithm to detect saccadic intrusion from a commercially available low-cost eye gaze tracker and conducted four user studies involving a driving simulator and cognitive and hazard perception tests. Our results show that average velocities of saccadic intrusion increases with increase in cognitive load and recording saccadic intrusion and eye blinks for 6 s duration can predict drivers’ instantaneous perception of developing road hazards.     

Human nature and cognitive–developmental niche construction

Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as a radical departure from the received view of cognition, their proponents have looked for support to similar extended views within (the philosophy of) biology, most notably the theory of niche construction. This paper argues that there is an even closer and more fruitful parallel with developmental systems theory and developmental niche construction. These ask not ‘what is inside the genes you inherited’, but ‘what the inherited genes are inside of’ and with which they form a wider whole—their internal and external ontogenetic niche, understood as the set of epigenetic, social, ecological, epistemic and symbolic legacies inherited by the organism as necessary developmental resources. To the cognizing agent, the epistemic niche presents itself not just as a partially self-engineered selective niche, as the niche construction paradigm will have it, but even more so as a partially self-engineered ontogenetic niche, a problem-solving resource and scaffold for individual development and learning. This move should be beneficial for coming to grips with our own (including cognitive) nature: what is most distinctive about humans is their developmentally plastic brains immersed into a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive–developmental niche.     

Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion

The last 15 years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this paper I investigate this question and argue that CSR does not show that belief in god is irrational.     

Social cognitive neuroscience: where are we heading?

Humans crave the company of others and suffer profoundly if temporarily isolated from society. Much of the brain must have evolved to deal with social communication and we are increasingly learning more about the neurophysiological basis of social cognition. Here, we explore some of the reasons why social cognitive neuroscience is captivating the interest of many researchers. We focus on its future, and what we believe are priority areas for further research.