Seeing what they read and hearing what they say: Readers’ representation of the story characters’ world

Do readers “see” the words that story characters read and “hear” the words that they hear? Just as priming effects are reduced when stimuli are presented cross-modally on two different occasions, we found reduced transfer effects when story characters were described as experiencing stimuli cross-modally. In Experiment 1, a repeated phrase was described as being part of a spoken message in both Story A and Story B, and transfer effects were found. In Experiment 2, in contrast, when the phrase was described as a written note in one story and a spoken message in the other, reading-time results indicated that readers did not retrieve the meaning of the repeated phrase. The results are consistent with findings indicating that visual imagery simulates visual processing and that auditory imagery simulates auditory processing. We conclude that readers mentally simulate the perceptual details involved in story characters’ linguistic exchanges.     

Bocheński on authority

Józef Maria Bocheński introduced an important distinction between deontic and epistemic authority. A typical example of epistemic authority is the relation of a teacher to his students; a typical example of deontic authority is the relation between an employer and his employee. The difference between the two lies in domains of authority: declarative sentences make up the domain in the case of epistemic authority, orders—in the domain of deontic authority. In the article, I analyze in detail the concepts of the two kinds of authority and propose some new explications. The concept of epistemic authority is distinguished from the concept of infallibility and expertise; and the concept of deontic authority is distinguished from the concept of sovereign. I interpret various kinds of deontic authority in the light of the theory of imperative sentences. The concepts of gradation and de-gradation of authority are introduced and explicated.     

Value seeking and prediction-decision inconsistency: Why don’t people take what they predict they’ll like the most?

In this research, it is proposed that, when making a choice between consumption goods, people do not just think about which option will deliver the highest consumption utility but also think about which choice is most consistent with rationales—beliefs about how they should make decisions. The present article examines a specific rationale, value seeking. The value-seeking rationale refers to the belief that one should choose the option in a choice set that has the highest monetary value. Studies 1 and 2 show that value seeking could lead to a prediction-decision inconsistency, predicting a high consumption utility from one option but choosing another option. Study 3 shows that the prediction-decision inconsistency could be created even by “illusory” (as opposed to truly monetary) values and that the inconsistency could be turned on or off through empirical manipulation.     

Bocheński on divine ineffability

Section 11 of Józef Bocheński’s The Logic of religion (1965), is devoted to the question of divine ineffability: Is it possible to speak of God? Bocheński shows that even if the assertion of God’s ineffability is not contradictory, it can be contested. Bocheński seems to think ineffabilism is based primarily on a confusion, viz., on the claim that faith is dependent on an extraordinary experience, and it is this extraordinary experience which is supposed to be ineffable. The ineffabilist is unable to say who he is addressing in his prayers and praises so long as he maintains that nothing can be said of Him to whom they are addressed. Any meaningful language is minimally referential, whether the ineffabilist likes it or not. This could be the basis for a critique of Jean-Luc Marion’s account of apophatism. This criticism shows the fecundity of Bocheński’s account of ineffability.     

Kotarbiński As A Scientific Realist

Tadeusz Kotarbiski is widely recognized as a major philosopher of theLvov–Warsaw school. His reism, which is a contribution to semantics andontology, is still discussed and debated, and his most original creation, praxiology,has grown into an entire research field. However, Kotarbiski's philosophy ofscience has not received much attention by later commentators. This paper attemptsto correct this situation by considering the hypothesis that Kotarbiski succeededalready in 1929 in formulating a position that can be regarded as an early version ofscientific realism. Unlike most other ``scientific philosophers' before the mid-thirties,he was able to combine ontological realism (by defending a form of physicalism andnominalism) and semantical realism (by defending the classical correspondence theoryof truth). He was also a critical epistemological realist. Further, in spite of theinstrumentalist flavour of his reductionist programme in eliminating terms apparentlyreferring to abstract entities, Kotarbiski accepted theories as statements with truth values and theoretical entities as long as they can be understood as physical bodies.     

J.M. Bocheński’s method of philosophical analysis and contemporary applied ontology

The aim of this article is to reconstruct Bocheński’s method of philosophical analysis as well as to clarify the purpose of that method and its basic elements. In the second part of the paper I will compare Bocheński’s method with the methods of modern applied ontology.     

Bocheński on Morality and Ethics

Studies in East European Thought - What are the main results of Bocheńskiinvestigations in ethics and moral philosophy?In his own view, he contributed to threematters: his treatise on miltary...     

Vocal signals only impact speakers’ own emotions when they are self-attributed

Emotions are often accompanied by vocalizations whose acoustic features provide information about the physiological state of the speaker. Here, we ask if perceiving these affective signals in one’s own voice has an impact on one’s own emotional state, and if it is necessary to identify these signals as self-originated for the emotional effect to occur. Participants had to deliberate out loud about how they would feel in various familiar emotional scenarios, while we covertly manipulated their voices in order to make them sound happy or sad. Perceiving the artificial affective signals in their own voice altered participants’ judgements about how they would feel in these situations. Crucially, this effect disappeared when participants detected the vocal manipulation, either explicitly or implicitly. The original valence of the scenarios also modulated the vocal feedback effect. These results highlight the role of the exteroception of self-attributed affective signals in the emergence of emotional feelings.     

Dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists (nor should they be)

Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view also hold the second. In fact, many philosophers just assume that substance dualists ought to, or perhaps even have to, accept anti-criterialism. But I aim to show that this assumption is baseless. Substance dualism doesn’t entail, suggest, support, or in any way motivate anti-criterialism, and anti-criterialism confers no benefit on dualism. Substance dualists have no special reason—and, indeed, no good reason at all—to accept anti-criterialism. Or so I shall argue. My aim isn’t to defend substance dualism, nor is it to attack anti-criterialism. My aim is to show that, contrary to a long-standing trend, dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists. Nor, as it will turn out, should they be.     

Patriotism: from Twardowski to Bocheński

In my paper, I show three concepts of patriotism present in the Lvov-Warsaw School, and try to indicate how these concepts differed and what norms they were involved in, as well as to evaluate the justifications indicated for these norms.

     

Bocheński on divine providence and human freedom

Prior to his ‘naturalistic turn’, Bocheński was a Thomist and defended the Thomist doctrine as a logically consistent and attractive philosophical system. Some opponents of Thomism interpreted this doctrine, Aquinas’s conception of divine providence included, as a kind of theological fatalism (or theological determinism) incompatible with human freedom. Bocheński dismissed such interpretations as based on “a superficial misunderstanding.” I will try to demonstrate that his criticism of deterministic interpretations of Thomism was not quite justified. The article will present, first, Bocheński’s account of the Thomist doctrine of divine providence, next, the arguments for theological fatalism leading to the conclusion that there is no freedom if Aquinas’s conception of divine nature is assumed. Finally, I will try to show how the dispute between Thomism and its opponents is rooted in some fundamental differences concerning the very concept of human freedom.     

Józef Bocheński and static religion

One of the most interesting aspects of Józef Bocheński’s philosophy was its relation to Henri Bergson’s thought, particularly to his philosophy of religion. Unlike the majority of the Catholic philosophers at that time, Bocheński did not stress the significance of dynamic religion, but rather focused on the role of static religion in human life. In his view, what was of particular interest within this religion was its fabulation function. This direction of the philosopher’s research stemmed from the realism and empiricism proper to the analytic philosophy developed by Bocheński and became increasingly visible as the years passed. In this text the author shows how Bocheński’s analyses of religion, referring to both daily human experiences and logic, moved towards Bergsonian static religion, while diverging from dynamic religion and its key notion of mysticism.     

Challenging ‘the they’: an Heideggerian reflection on the impact of power figures in children’s spiritual lives

Through the lens of Heideggerian’s Being and Time, this paper examines the world of ‘the they’ for twenty-first century children, highlighting perceived power figures in their lives. Exploring philosophically how the falling of a child’s Dasein from its primordial state into ‘the they’ culminates in an inauthentic presentation of self, it will then describe how spiritual educators might encourage a turning of the tide, allowing children to be critically aware of contingent influencers and to act upon them from a position of authenticity.     

Damned if they do,Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religion from Attack

The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to cases of religiously offensive expression is inconsistent and unsatisfactory. A critical analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on blasphemy, religious insult and religious hatred identifies three problems with its approach in this field. These are: the embellishment and over-emphasis of freedom of religion, the use of the margin of appreciation and the devaluing of some forms of offensive speech. Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a more coherent approach to the limitation of freedom of expression under the European Convention of Human Rights, designed to protect religious liberty in a narrower category of cases.     

‘Torturing things until they confess’: Günther Anders' critique of technology

ELSI (Ethical, Legal and Social Implications) initiatives are frequently attached to major science programmes. The expectation is that ELSI research will produce a practical advanced assessment of the impacts of technological development. Williams' overview of the field demonstrates that this encourages a mechanistic understanding of technological development leading to compressed foresight, i.e. the notion that the future is imminent in the present. The development of the ELSI domain in Canada has been characterised by an affinity between the types of knowledge valorised by the field and modes of legal reasoning, suggesting a legal variant of compressed foresight. The concept of juridification and an analysis of two related modes of legal reasoning (analogy and reflective equilibrium) shed light on the connection between legal reasoning and the ELSI field in Canada. The deployment of the aforementioned modes of legal reasoning enables law to define and operationalise difficult questions by drawing on currently existing principles and precedents. Thus, when legal modes of reasoning are brought to bear on ELSI questions, the future is made a calculable and manageable extension of the present, dovetailing with the ELSI field's requirement of pragmatic, advanced assessment.     

Why won’t they participate? Barriers to participation in worksite health promotion programmes

Research suggests that worksite health promotion (WHP) programmes, and specifically health risk assessment (HRA) surveys and health education workshops, can be effective in enhancing employees’ health. However, 50–75% of employees choose not to participate when offered the opportunity to do so. The reasons for nonparticipation and the characteristics of nonparticipants have largely been overlooked. Building on premises of Conservation of Resources (COR) theory, we hypothesize that nonparticipation results from lack or loss of resources, or from the perceived low value of resources. These barriers to participation are expected to be related to employees’ characteristics and beliefs (termed implicit barriers) and reflected in employees’ self-reported reasons for nonparticipation (termed explicit barriers). We surveyed a large random sample of participants and nonparticipants in a WHP programme (n = 1926 employees), which included two steps: a HRA survey and a health education workshop. Participants completed an anonymous web-based questionnaire. Implicit and explicit barriers that reflect resource availability (e.g., age, health status) and valuation (e.g., low value of making a lifestyle change) were identified. The magnitude and nature of these barriers differed between the HRA survey and the workshop. We discuss how future research on WHP programmes can build on these findings and propose practical implications for reducing nonparticipation.     

Parents’ self-efficacy and the quality of supervised driving practice they provide for their children

Learner drivers must gain supervised driving practice in a wide variety of driving situations to prepare them for independent driving. This study investigated the way that sociodemographic factors, parental self-efficacy and driving self-efficacy of parents are associated with the quality of supervised driving practice they provide to their learner driver children. An online survey was completed by 293 fully licensed parents (female = 86%) of learner (52%) and provisional (intermediate; 48%) drivers from Queensland, Australia. A variable indicating quality of supervised practice was defined based on the understanding that higher frequency and greater variety of driving situations and environments represents higher quality supervised practice. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to analyse parent responses. As predicted, driving self-efficacy was significantly and positively associated with quality of supervised practice. However, no significant association was found between parental self-efficacy and quality of supervised practice. Parent gender and perceived level of involvement were also important predictors of supervised practice quality. The association between previous experience with providing supervised practice and supervised practice quality was unclear. A key implication of this research is that devising methods to improve the driving self-efficacy of parents may contribute to provision of more frequent and varied supervised practice.     

Children’s cross-ethnic friendships: Why are they less stable than same-ethnic friendships?

Previous findings suggest that children’s cross-ethnic friendships are less stable than same-ethnic friendships. However, it is not clear why this is. This study examined stability of same- and cross-ethnic friendships among 10-year-old children over the course of five months. Analyses focused on both individual-level data (comparing 82 German and 37 Turkish children) and social network data (comparing 125 German and 172 non-German children). We predicted that children high in empathy and who perceived peer norms about cross-ethnic friendships to be positive would have more stable cross-ethnic friendships. Results showed that cross-ethnic friendships were indeed less stable than same-ethnic friendships. Empathy marginally predicted stability of cross-ethnic friendships while peer norms only predicted German but not Turkish children’s cross-ethnic friendship stability. Further, children high in empathy were less likely to be deselected by their cross-ethnic friends and similarity in empathy between cross-ethnic friends increased the longevity of their friendship.