Approach motivation and cognitive resources combine to influence memory for positive emotional stimuli

Inspired by the elaborated intrusion theory of desire, the current research tested the hypothesis that persons higher in trait approach motivation process positive stimuli deeply, which enhances memory for them. Ninety-four undergraduates completed a measure of trait approach motivation, viewed positive or negative image slideshows in the presence or absence of a cognitive load, and one week later completed an image memory test. Higher trait approach motivation predicted better memory for the positive slideshow, but this memory boost disappeared under cognitive load. Approach motivation did not influence memory for the negative slideshow. The current findings support the idea that individuals higher in approach motivation spontaneously devote limited resources to processing positive stimuli.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Stereotyping and attitudinal effects under time pressure

This paper reports an experiment in which the influence of time pressure, the social category of the target person, and emotional responses on impression formation and recognition memory was studied. It was hypothesized that under time pressure, subjects using their stereotype would process information about an outgroup target more easily than information about an ingroup target, would judge these targets more differentially, and would base their judgments of the outgroup target more on their attitudes than in a condition without time pressure. These hypotheses were to a large extent sustained. Results are discussed in terms of current models of impression formation and attitude functioning.     

Accounting for occurrences: An explanation for some novel tendencies in causal judgment from contingency information

Contingency information is information about empirical associations between possible causes and outcomes. In the present research, it is shown that, under some circumstances, there is a tendency for negative contingencies to lead to positive causal judgments and for positive contingencies to lead to negative causal judgments. If there is a high proportion of instances in which a candidate cause (CC) being judged is present, these tendencies are predicted by weighted averaging models of causal judgment. If the proportion of such instances is low, the predictions of weighted averaging models break down. It is argued that one of the main aims of causal judgment is to account for occurrences of the outcome. Thus, a CC is not given a high causal judgment if there are few or no occurrences of it, regardless of the objective contingency. This argument predicts that, if there is a low proportion of instances in which a CC is present, causal judgments are determined mainly by the number of Cell A instances (i.e., CC present, outcome occurs), and that this explains why weighted averaging models fail to predict judgmental tendencies under these circumstances. Experimental results support this argument.     

Perceiving individuals and groups: expectancies, dispositional inferences, and causal attributions

Two experiments investigated differences in forming impressions of individual and group targets. Experiment 1 showed that when forming an impression of an individual, perceivers made more extreme trait judgments, made those judgments more quickly and with greater confidence, and recalled more information than when the impression target was a group. Experiment 2 showed that when participants were forming an impression of an individual, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency; this was not the case when the impression target was a group. Results are interpreted as reflecting perceivers' a priori assumptions of unity and coherence in individual versus group targets.     

Perceived entitativity,stereotype formation,and the interchangeability of group members

The authors investigated the effects of perceived entitativity of a group on the processing of behavioral information about individual group members and the extent to which such information was transferred to other group members. The results of 3 experiments using a savings-in-relearning paradigm showed that trait inferences about a group member, based on that member's behavior, were stronger for low entitative groups and for collections of individuals. However, the transference of traits from 1 group member to other members of the group was stronger for high entitative groups. These results provide strong evidence that the perception of high entitativity involves the abstraction of a stereotype of the group and the transfer of that stereotype across all group members. Implications for group impression formation and stereotyping are discussed.     

The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical events

Having subjects explain a hypothetical future event biases their subjective likelihood estimates for that event. However, Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, and Hirt (1983, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143) found that the biasing effects of an explanation task were reduced when subjects formed an initial impression based on the information (prior to the explanation task). Nonetheless, there are no doubt many factors that may influence subjects' ability to form strong initial impressions. The present studies address two of these factors. Experiment 1 used both subjects who were knowledgeable and unknowledgeable (naive) about a stimulus domain (football). Experiment 2 used only knowledgeable subjects, but gave these subjects information about unfamiliar teams and players. Subjects first read information about teams in an upcoming game and were then asked to explain a hypothetical victory by one team. They then made judgments about the actual future game and recalled the information. Only knowledgeable subjects given an initial impression set and given information that was easily integrated with past knowledge were able to resist the explanation bias. All other subjects demonstrated judgments that were strongly biased in the direction of the outcome explained. An examination of the relation between judgment and recall implied that knowledgeable and naive individuals differed in the ways they made judgments.     

Group entitativity and group perception: associations between physical features and psychological judgment

Two experiments tested whether the perceived entitativity of groups (i.e., cohesiveness) influences judgments about those groups, in terms of both their observable physical properties and underlying psychological traits. Entitativity was manipulated with groups whose members were similar or dissimilar in skin color. Experiment 1 demonstrated that beliefs about entitativity elicited more accurate judgments of skin color for entitative than nonentitative social groups, although memory for individual members of entitative groups was relatively impoverished. Experiment 2 revealed that entitative groups were viewed as not only physically similar but also psychologically homogeneous and elicited strong negative trait and behavioral judgments. Together, these findings suggest that physical properties (e.g., similarity) can create perceptions of psychological "groupness" that have important consequences for group perception.     

Availability and category-frequency estimation

Individuals judged how often examples of taxonomic categories had occurred in a study list. An availability hypothesis was tested--that frequency estimates are based on the retrieval of instances. Cued (by category names) recall of the examples served as an index of availability. The hypothesis was confirmed--there were strong positive correlations between frequency judgments and recall (with the influence of actual frequency removed)--given one or more of the following conditions: List instances were not categorized aloud as they were presented; frequency estimation was preceded by cued recall; frequency estimation was delayed by a week. Limitations on availability occurred under other conditions--notably, when individuals, during list presentation, named the categories to which items belonged and received feedback about their categorizations. Under these circumstances, correlations of frequency estimation and recall were often not significantly different from zero, and frequency judgments and recall sometimes reacted differently to changes in independent variables (e.g., frequency judgments of young and elderly subjects did not differ reliably, even though cued recall of young persons markedly exceeded that of elderly subjects).     

Depression and processing information about others

We investigated differences between mildly depressed subjects and normal controls in their memory for, and judgments of, another person. All subjects read a story (containing either predominately positive or predominately negative items) under instructions to form an impression of the story target. Subjects later made several judgments about the target and attempted to recall the story. For both the positive and the negative story, depressed subjects produced significantly more negative intrusions (i.e., recalled nonpresented negative items) than did the normal subjects, but they did not recall more negative items correctly than did the normal subjects. Depressed subjects also perceived themselves as more similar to the negative story target than did the normal controls and indicated greater liking for the negative story target than did the normal controls.     

On the relation between spontaneous trait inferences and intentional inferences: An inference monitoring hypothesis

More than twenty five years after the beginning of research on spontaneous trait inferences (Winter & Uleman, 1984) an intriguing paradox in the impression formation literature remains: if traits are spontaneously inferred, why aren't they used to organize behavioral information and thereby facilitate recall under memory instructions (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980)? We hypothesized that organization by traits is more evident under impression formation goals because only in that case then are inferences sufficiently monitored to permit their use in organizing impressions. As a consequence, such monitored traits can then be used strategically as retrieval cues. Merging the main features of the Winter and Uleman and the Hamilton et al. experimental paradigms, Experiment 1 simultaneously replicated the main results of both studies. Using a new recognition paradigm, Experiments 2 and 3 further tested this inference monitoring hypothesis by showing that monitoring of trait inferences only occurs under particular processing goals, and is dependent on the availability of cognitive resources.     

Multidimensional scaling study of visual memory of 5-year olds and adults.

Nonmetric multidimensional scaling is expounded as a methodology for investigating memory development. Judgements of similarities between complex objects were obtained from 5-year-olds and adults under two conditions: (1) when objects were simultaneously present at the time of comparison, and (2) when the objects were not simultaneously present and had to be compared on the basis of short-term memory. Scaling solutions for similarity judgments by each age group in the two conditions were obtained. Comparison within each age group of the configurations from the memory condition with the simultaneous condition indicated that the internal representations of both children and adults contained much of the information the subjects extracted from the stimuli during “direct” perception. The scaling techniques, which could be widely applied in developmental studies of memory and perception, are explained and critically discussed.     

Effects of purpose on the organization and recall of information in person perception1

The first study investigated how the purpose for which information about a person is to be used affects the way a perceiver organizes the information. Subjects were asked to categorize and label episodes which described the behavior of a fictional person “Jill” in 64 different situations, and to summarize what each category meant to them. Half of the episodes were easily categorized according to the traits that Jill manifested, half according to features of the situations. One group (personality impression) expected later to describe Jill's personality, a second group (prediction) expected to make predictions about Jill's behavior, and a third group (recall) expected to be tested on their recall of the episodes. The results indicated that subjects in the behavior prediction group categorized the episodes primarily in terms of the personality characteristics Jill portrayed, just as the personality impression group did. In contrast, only the categories formed by the recall group paralleled the built-in structure of the episodes, i.e., they were as often based on features of the situation as on Jill's personality characteristics. A second study showed that the categorization strategies of the recall subjects actually did produce higher recall than those of the personality impression and behavior prediction subjects. The results were interpreted as suggesting that when making behavioral predictions, just as when forming impressions, the layman, like the traditional trait psychologist, prefers to organize information in terms of personality constructs rather than in a way that facilitates retrieval of everything that happened in specific situations. The cognitive costs as well as the gains produced by this strategy merit further scrutiny.