Is it Safe to Disagree?

This paper offers a new account of the epistemic significance of disagreement which is grounded in two assumptions; (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief and, (ii) that the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. These assumptions motivate a modal definition of epistemic peerhood, which is much easier to operate on than the more traditional definitions of epistemic peerhood. The modal account of the epistemic significance of disagreement yields plausible results regarding cases of disagreement. Furthermore, it is able to tap into the intuitions that have motivated the conformist and the nonconformist positions and it locates a fruitful middle‐ground between these two conflicting positions. It will be shown that the conformist is correct in that cases of real peer disagreement force us to suspend our judgment. The reason for this is that in cases of real peer disagreement our beliefs fail to be safe. The nonconformist, on the other hand, is right in that disagreement in itself does not have any epistemic power. It is only by the grace of nature that we gain knowledge. The fact that someone disagrees with you does not mean that you do not have knowledge.     

Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar

Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar’s asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit—which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting—while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar’s reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.     

Does it matter whether investigators intend to benefit research subjects?

There has been long-standing, albeit largely implicit, debate over whether investigator intentions are relevant to the ethical appropriateness of clinical research. Some commentators argue that whether investigators intend to collect generalizable knowledge or to benefit subjects is central to the ethics of clinical research. Others do not even mention investigator intentions when evaluating what makes clinical research ethical. To shed light on this debate, the present paper considers the reasons why investigator intentions might be ethically relevant. This analysis reveals that investigator intentions are related to, but distinct from three ethical requirements: whether subjects understand that they are contributing to a project to help others, whether the included interventions have an appropriate risk/benefit ratio, and whether subjects' interests are adequately protected. Provided these three requirements are satisfied, the ethical appropriateness of clinical research does not depend on what intentions investigators have in conducting it.     

Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts?

Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers have held that there is a logical Is/Ought gap. According to the doctrine of the Is/Ought gap, there are no valid (i.e., non-fallacious) arguments from purely factual premises about whatis the case to moral or normative conclusions about whatought to be. Occasionally, this doctrine has been challenged, but frequently it has been accepted without argumentation. Charles Pigden has recently argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden's argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, and does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic. Moreover, my argument does not rely, as other alleged counter-examples do, on controversial assumptions from Aristotelian biology about natures or ends, or about institutions such as promise-making.     

Is it culture or is it language? Examination of language effects in cross-cultural research on categorization

Differences in reasoning styles between Chinese and European Americans held even when controlling for the language of testing. Bilingual Chinese organized objects in a more relational and less categorical way than European Americans, whether tested in English or in Chinese. Thus, culture affects categorization independent of the testing language. Nevertheless, language affected some Chinese bilinguals' categorization. The responses of Chinese from the Mainland and Taiwan were more relational when tested in Chinese than when tested in English. Responses of Chinese from Hong Kong and Singapore were equally relational when tested in Chinese and in English. Age and context of learning English are discussed to explain the differential language effects among different Chinese groups. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.     

Response to A Different Vantage Point Commentary: Psychotherapeutic Genetic Counseling,Is it?

Whether genetic counseling is a form of psychotherapy is open for debate. Early practicioners in genetic counseling described it as such, and this claim has been replicated in recent publications. This commentary is a rebuttal to the claim that genetic counseling is distinct from psychotherapty. We argue that it is a a form of psychoterapy that aims to help clients manage a health threat that affects their psychological wellbeing, paralleling the goals of psychotherapy.     

Patents and ethics: Is it possible to be balanced?

In this presentation, principles of ethics are confronted with the desire of the inventor to make a profit. To this end the presentation is focused on patent protection. Patents should guarantee the return of an inventor’s investment and profit and, on the other side, ensure availability — by patent disclosure — of the invention for the society when the patent terminates. Recent patent applications made by inventors are infringing this principle and societies are paying an unexpected price for these practices. Patent claims are too broad and disclosures too poor. Extreme examples will be discussed. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Is it okay to tell? Children's judgements about information disclosure

The present research investigates how young children evaluate and reason about the disclosure of private information. Using story vignettes, children aged 4–5 and 7–8 years were asked to evaluate an individual who passed on information from a peer revealing that he or she had broken a rule (e.g., stolen a cookie; rule type) or lacked a skill (e.g., could not ride a bicycle; competence type). These negative valence stories were compared with positive valence stories in which the peer had followed a rule or possessed a skill. Younger children approved the sharing of positive, but not negative, information, irrespective of type (rule vs. competence). Older children disapproved the disclosure of someone's incompetence, whereas they approved the disclosure of a rule violation. Children justified their evaluations by reference to social rules in the rule‐type vignettes and to an individual's feelings in the competence‐type vignettes. The findings suggest that young children are concerned about the disclosure of negative information about other people, but with age they become increasingly concerned about protecting the social order even at the cost of individual privacy.     

Is it possible to experimentally determine the extension of cognition?

Various analytical tools originally developed for theories of mechanistic explanation have recently been imported into the ongoing debate on the hypothesis of (extracerebrally) extended cognition (HEC). One such tool that appears particularly relevant to that debate is Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitution (MM), most of all because it promises to settle the debate on experimental grounds. This paper investigates whether it is possible to deliver on that promise. We first find that, far from grounding an experimental evaluation of HEC, MM is conceptually incompatible with both internalist and externalist accounts of cognition. Next, we propose a suitable modification of MM, MM*, but it turns out that MM* presupposes rather than produces clarity on the extension of cognition. Moreover, subject to MM* the inference to constitution is radically empirically underdetermined. Finally, we argue that our results can be generalized and conclude that, for principled reasons, it is impossible to experimentally determine whether cognitive processes have extracerebral constituents. Determining the extension of cognition is an inherently pragmatic matter.     

Homosexuality: Sin or sickness? A dialogue

The [ollozving discussion takes place in what Bernard Shaw, in the Preface to Candida, called an oasis in a desert of unattractiveness—the study of the Executive Secretary of The George W. Henry Foundation in the Parish House of a midtown Episcopal Church. The Foundation, chartered by the State of New York to help those who by reason of their sexual maladjustment are in trouble with themselves, the law or society, was organized in 1948; its staff, board members and officers come from a variety of religious persuasions to serve all who come or are sent to it without regard to race, creed, or color. The participants in the dialogue are Canon Rend Bozarth, the founder and head of the Society of St. Paul, an Anglican monastic community, located in Oregon, and Alfred A. Gross, the Executive Officer of the Foundation, associated with Dr. Henry for more than a quarter of a century.We publish this article particularly at this time because of our selection of an outstanding book by Dr. Gross,Strangers In Our Midst: Problems of the Homosexual in American Society, on this theme—a book in which Dr. Gross deals more thoroughly and more comprehensively with the entire problem of homosexuality. The article may also be seen as a continued discussion of the article on Pastoral Counseling for Homosexuals by Dr. George W. Henry, published inPastoral Psychology, November, 1951.     

Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga

We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga (Philos Sci, forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.     

Positive youth development as a guiding framework in sport research: Is it time to plan for a transition?

Positive youth development is a popular guiding framework for studying the psychosocial development of youth. In sport research, for more than two decades, this framework has enhanced our understanding of the mechanisms involved in successful shifts from youth to adulthood. Nonetheless, scholars have recently taken a more critical stance on the positive youth development framework by elucidating some of its shortcomings. To help determine whether it may be warranted to plan for a transition from the positive youth development framework in sport research, a critical commentary is offered. The purpose of this commentary lies in situating three ontologically distinct arguments that depict the shortcomings of the positive youth development framework, namely the operationalization argument, the social justice argument, and the posthumanist argument. This paper is offered as an open invitation to instigate dialogue on what may come next for youth development in sport research and whether planning for a transition is warranted.