共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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看了由《中国科学院》主办, 《中国工程院》、《国家自然科学基金委员会》共办的《科学时报》在今年8月8日发表的“科普新见”栏目中田松所写的文章——《科学的迷信与迷信的科学》 (下称 相似文献
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Ben Almassi 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2019,34(4):858-868
Bruno Latour is not the only scholar to reflect on his earlier contributions to science studies with some regret and resolve over climate skepticism and science denialism. Given the ascendency of merchants of doubt, should those who share Latour’s concerns join the scientists they study in circling the wagons, or is there a productive role still for science studies to question and critique scientists and scientific institutions? I argue for the latter, looking to postpositivist feminist philosophy as exemplified by Alison Wylie and Lynn Nelson, among others, as a guide. Feminist philosophers of science who ground their analysis in a detailed understanding of scientific practice are not science’s champions nor its antagonists, but they do stand in a distinct relationship to science. If not merchants of doubt, are they scientific gadflies or perhaps in scientific loyal opposition? Though these notions can underwrite useful approaches to science studies, neither captures the distinctive interdependency and interestedness of feminist philosophers and science. I suggest that we would be better served by the notion of trustworthy science criticism, building on the analyses of trust and trustworthiness by Annette Baier, among others, attendant to the dynamics of interdependency in trust relationships. 相似文献
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《学海》2018,(5):59-66
潘光旦提倡的"人的科学",既是对西方自然科学过于重视知识与技术、忽视对于人生价值的反思,也是对五四运动以来唯科学主义思潮、"科玄论战"的回应。在潘光旦看来,科学是一门学问而非技术,强调理性与客观事实。只有用这样的科学研究作为社会基本单位的人,了解并合理地解决人的心理与情感等问题,才能从根本上发挥科学对于人类社会的价值。潘光旦对于优生学与性科学的研究,正是他试图推动"人的科学"的努力。这一努力在其学术生涯的后期被整合进他的"新人文思想"理论体系中,这既接续了中国传统儒学思想中的人本主义,又借鉴了西方生物学理论中重视"人"的文明资源,并在根本上构成了潘光旦反思现代科学发展、重塑科学与人文互动的重要成果。 相似文献
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生命科学的发展对医学的发展产生了巨大的影响.从医学模式的演进、诊断技术和仪器的不断创新、基因技术与全新的药物在各种复杂疾病诊断与治疗中的应用以及外科治疗的不断演进等方面分析了生命科学与高新技术发展对医学的影响. 相似文献
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Alex Rosenberg 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2017,48(3):341-369
The social sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of one particular biological species. 相似文献
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Ahti-Veikko J. Pietarinen 《Axiomathes》2015,25(2):149-166
Are knowledge and belief pivotal in science, as contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science nearly universally take them to be? I defend the view that scientists are not primarily concerned with knowing and that the methods of arriving at scientific hypotheses, models and scenarios do not commit us having stable beliefs about them. Instead, what drives scientific discovery is ignorance that scientists can cleverly exploit. Not an absence or negation of knowledge, ignorance concerns fundamental uncertainty, and is brought out by retroductive (abductive) inferences, which are roughly characterised as reasoning from effects to causes. I argue that recent discoveries in sciences that coped with under-structured problem spaces testify the prevalence of retroductive logic in scientific discovery and its progress. This puts paid to the need of finding epistemic justification or confirmation to retroductive methodologies. A scientist, never frightened of unknown unknowns, strives to advance the forefront of uncertainty, not that of belief or knowledge. Far from rendering science irrational, I conclude that catering well for the right conditions in which to cultivate ignorance is a key to how fertile retroductive inferences (true guesses) arise. 相似文献
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Kristin Shrader-Frechette 《Axiomathes》2018,28(6):679-693
This article shows why it is important to do normative or practical philosophy of science, especially philosophy of science that criticizes and evaluates contemporary use of scientific methods to analyze welfare-affecting societal problems. The article (1) introduces the scientific, ethical, and social problem of environmental injustice—disproportionate environmental and pollution threats that are responsible for roughly 40% of all preventable disease and death. Next it (2) explains that many deadly threats (like pollution) continue in part because of “special-interest science”, methodologically flawed science that is done to promote corporate profits, rather than truth, then (3) argues that philosophers of science should use normative or practical philosophy of science to critique and expose special-interest science. To illustrate special-interest science, the article (4) provides two case studies, on diesel-particulate-matter pollution and on organophophate-pesticide pollution, and (5) shows how diesel and pesticide polluters use special-interest science. For instance, they often ignore observational data, illegitimately demand statistically significant evidence of harm from observational data, use small sample sizes, do the wrong tests, or demand certainty—rather than a preponderance of evidence—to justify a conclusion about pollution harm. They also use flawed normative arguments to defend both diesel and pesticide pollution. The article (6) concludes that, given the epistemic, scientific, human-welfare toll of special-interest science, philosophers of science need to do normative or practical philosophy of science that exposes these scientific flaws. 相似文献
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坦率的讲,作为一名受过高等教育、从事教育工作的共产党员,我对于科学与迷信的本质区别并没有深刻的认识,一切从想当然出发.鬼神之说自然不相信,但对一些诸如特异功能之类则并没有完全排斥.我想,和我有着同样思想的人并不少见,同事中赶在羊年之前生孩子的不在少数.刚接触<科学与无神论>杂志,我颇有些不以为然:科学与迷信,明摆着的事,有必要专门出一本杂志吗?看了几篇文章后,受到很大的震动."科学要尊重实践"、"科学是能够实践的"……这些并不陌生的话现在听来却如醍醐灌顶,原来科学与迷信的区别就在这里.带着浓厚的兴趣,我趁兴翻阅了一些相关的文章,终于对科学与迷信的本质区别有了清醒的认识. 相似文献
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神经经济学:迈向脑科学的决策科学 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
神经经济学是一门应用神经科学技术来确定经济决策的神经机制的新兴学科。文章首先概述了神经经济学这一学科,说明了经济学、心理学和神经科学与神经经济学之间的关系并主要介绍决策与奖惩系统和情绪在神经经济学中的研究发现及相关理论。文章最后评价了神经经济学在发展中的问题。 相似文献
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Nathan J. Hallanger 《Dialog》2007,46(3):208-214
Abstract : The conversation between theology and science has accomplished much, yet the question of how to determine the limits of such dialogue—and whether there are limits at all—remains open. Key questions involve the degree to which science should constrain theology and the manner in which theology can influence science. Arthur Peacocke and Robert J. Russell provide sample methods by which theology can engage science. Peacocke's method emphasizes the influence of science on theology, while Russell's focuses on theology's influence on science. Both emphases will be required for theology's continued engagement with science. 相似文献
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Deepanwita Dasgupta 《国际科学哲学研究》2017,31(1):108-110
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信息生命科学不是生物学计算机化,不是生命科学,也不是生命信息科学,而是信息生命科学。 相似文献
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