Book reviews

Baddeley, A. (1986). Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 289. ISBN 0-19-852116-2. £30.00

Knapp, T. J. & Robertson, L. C. (Eds.). (1986). Approaches to cognition: Contrasts and controversies. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. ISBN 0-89859-623-8. £21.00.

Shlecter, T. M. & Toglia, M. P. (Eds.). (1985) New directions in cognitive science. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publications. ISBN 0-89391-230-1. £38.00.     

Book reviews

Dewsbury, D.A. (Ed.). (1990). Contemporary issues in comparative psychology. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer. Pp. xiii + 509. ISBN 0-87893-137-6. £21.95 (paperback).

Goudie, A.J., & Emmett-Oglesby, M. W. (Eds.). (1989). Psychoactive drugs: tolerance and sensitization. Clifton, NJ: The Humana Press. Pp. 600. ISBN 0-89603-148-9. £46.00.

Edwards, G. & Lader, M. (1990). The nature of drug dependence. Society for the Study of Addiction Monograph No 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 240. ISBN 0-19-261772-9. £30 (hardback).

Lieberman, D.A. (1990). Learning, behavior and cognition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Inc. Pp. xx + 500. ISBN 0-534-12318-X. £16.95 (hardback).

Krasnegor, N.A. & Bridges, R. S. (Eds.). (1990). Mammalian parenting. Biochemical, neurobiological, and behavioral determinants. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 502. ISBN 0-19-505600-0. £60.00 (hardback)     

Book reviews

Gormenzano, I., & Wasserman, E.A. (Eds.) (1992). Learning and memory: The behavioral and biological substrates. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Pp. vii + 413. ISBN 0-8058-0888-4. £45.95 (Hbk).

Squire, L.R., Weinberger, N.M., Lynch, G., & McGaugh, J.L. (Eds.) (1991). Memory: Organization and locus of change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 438. ISBN 0-19-506921-8. £55.00.

Quiatt, D., & Reynolds, V. (1993). Primate behaviour: Information, social knowledge, and the evolution of culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 322. ISBN 0-521-35255-X. £42.50 (Hbk).

Dawkins, M.S. (1993). Through our eyes only? the search for animal consciousness. Oxford: W.H. Freeman/Spektrum. Pp. x + 192. ISBN 0-7167-4501-1. £14.99 (Hbk).     

Book reviews

Livesey, P. J. (1986). Learning and emotion: A biological synthesis. Volume 1: Evolutionary processes. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Pp. 312. ISBN 0-89859-552-5. £17.95

Fletcher, D. J. C. & Michener, C. D. (Eds.). Kin recognition in animals. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 1987. Pp. 465. ISBN 0-471-91199-2. £37.50.

Horn, G. Memory, imprinting, and the brain: An inquiry into mechanisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv + 315. Hardback, ISBN 0-19-8521 57-X, £25 ($45). Paperpack, 0-19-8521 56-1, £15 ($24.95).     

Reasoning with conditionals: a test of formal models of four theories

The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking &Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model.     

Book reviews

Wilson, B.A., & Moffat, N. (1992). Clinical management of memory problems (second edition). London. Chapman and Hall. Pp. 325. ISBN 0-412-32250-1. £15.95 (Pb.).

Campbell, R. (Ed.) (1992). Mental lives: Case studies in cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 292. ISBN 0-631-17504-0. £18.95 (Pb.).

Chen, H.-C., & Tzeng, O.J.L. (Eds.) (1992). Language processing in Chinese. Amsterdam: North-Holland. ISBN 0-444-89139-0.     

Now,Imagine an Actually Existing Unicorn: On Russellian Worries for Modal Meinongianism

Axiomathes - Modal Meinongianism provides the semantics of sentences involving intentional verbs Priest (Towards Nonbeing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). To that end, Modal Meinongianism...     

Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge

In a series of works Sosa (in: Knowledge in perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; ‘How Competence Matters in Epistemology’, Philos Perspect 24(1):465–475, 2010; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or ‘grades’ of knowledge, animal and reflective. One of the most persistent critics of Sosa’s attempts to bifurcate knowledge is Kornblith (in: Greco (ed) Ernest sosa and his critics, Wiley, Hoboken, 2004; ‘Sosa in Perspective’, Philos Stud 144(1):127–136, 2009; On reflection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012). Our aim in this paper is to outline and evaluate Kornblith’s criticisms. We will argue that, while they raise a range of difficult (exegetical and substantive) questions about Sosa’s ‘bi-level’ epistemology, Sosa has the resources to adequately respond to all of them. Thus, this paper is a (qualified) defence of Sosa’s bi-level epistemology.

     

Implicit learning,consciousness, and the psychology of thinking

Abstract

Berry, D., & Dienes, Z. (1993). Implicit learning: Theoretical and empirical issues. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. 197pp. ISBN 0-86377-223-4 £19.95 (hbk).

Reber A. S. (1993). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge: An essay on the cognitive unconscious. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 88pp. ISBN 0-19-505-9425 £30.00 (hbk).     

Book reviews

Byrne, R. W. and Whiten, A. (Eds.) (1988). Machiavellian intelligence: Social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans. Oxford: Clarendon press. Pp. xiv + 413. ISBN 0-19-852175-8, £25.00 (paperback).

Dudai, Y. (1989). The neurobiology of memory. Concepts, findings, trends. Oxford: Oxford University press. pp. xi + 340. ISBN 0-19-854261-5, £40.00 (hardback), ISBN 0-19-854229-1, £18.00 (paperback).

Richards, R. J. (1987). Darwin and the emergence of evolutionary theories of mind and behavior. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, Pp. xvii + 700. ISBN 0-226-71199-4. £23.95.

Archer, T. & Nilsson, L. (Eds.) (1989). Aversion, avoidance and anxiety: Perspectives on aversively motivated behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Pp. 491. ISBN 0-8058-0132-4. £29.95     

Metaphysical and absolute possibility

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility (Kripke in Naming and necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980; Lewis in On the plurality of worlds, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; van Inwagen in Philos Stud 92:68–84, 1997; Rosen, in: Gendler and Hawthorne (eds) Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker (ed) Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree” (1980, p. 99). Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib(le) without qualification (1997, p. 72).” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense (2003, p. 203).” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it.

     

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:
Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis (Rowman and Littlefield, 1980).
Joan Smith, Social Issues and the Social Order: The Contradictions of Capitalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, 1981).
J. R. Lucas, On Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
Rom Harre, Social Being (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980).     

Group virtue epistemology

Synthese - According to Sosa (A virtue epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Knowing full well, Princeton University...     

Book review

Weiskrantz, L. (Ed.) (1988). Thought without language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. 533. ISBN 0-19-852180-4. £60 (hardback); ISBN 0-19-852177-4. £30 (paperback).     

REVIEWS

T homas N agel . The Possibility of Altruism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 148 pp.
D avid L yons . In the Interest of the Governed: A Study in Bentham's Philosophy of Utility and Laic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. 150 pp. $8.     

Book reviews

Friedman, M.I., Tordoff, M.G., & Kare, M.R. (Eds.) (1991). Chemical senses, Volume 4: Appetite and Nutrition. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc. Pp. 491. ISBN 0-8247-8371-9. $150.

Smith, J.A., & Boyd, K.M. (1991). Lives in the balance: The ethics of using animals in biomedical research. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. xvi + 352. ISBN 0-19-8547447. £19.50.

Davis, H. and Balfour, D. (Eds.) (1992). The inevitable bond. Examining scientist-animal interactions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 399. ISBN 0-521-40510-6. £45.00.     

Book reviews

Abstract

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH-RELATED QUALITY OF LIFE: Theory, Translation, Measurement and Analysis. Sally A. Shumaker and Richard Berzon (eds). Oxford: Rapid Communications of Oxford, 1995. 275 + vi pages. Price £80/US$125. ISBN 1-86560-004-7.

UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (1996), MICHAEL OLIVER, BASINGSTOKE: Macmillan Press Ltd. UK £11.50 pbk. ISBN 0333599160.     

Proof-theoretic pluralism

Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall and Restall’s book.

     

The value of knowing how

Know-how has a distinctive, non-instrumental value that a mere reliable ability lacks. Some, including Bengson and Moffett (in: Bengson, Moffett (eds) Knowing how, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–195, 2011) and Carter and Pritchard (Australas J Philos 93(4):799–816, 2015b) have cited a close relation between knowhow and cognitive achievement, and it is tempting to think that the value of know-how rests in that relation. That’s not so, however. The value of know-how lies in its relation to the fundamental value of autonomy.

     

Taming the runabout imagination ticket

The ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.