Transient covert attention does alter appearance: a reply to Schneider (2006)

We recently demonstrated that transient covert attention increases the apparent contrast of a stimulus (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004). Schneider (2006) proposes that the observed increase in apparent contrast is largely due to sensory interactions occurring between the precue a nd stimulus,rather than to attention. Specifically, hereports that cuing effects only occur at contrasts ne ar detection threshold, and that there a re confounding sensoryinteractions between the cue and stimulus at suprathreshold detection contrasts. Our response is twofold. First, we outline the key methodological differences between our original study and Schneider's that are likely to account for the different results, and explain how we had ruled out the sensory interaction explanation of the cue. Second, we directly test the prediction put forth by Schneider. If the effects were due to sensory interactions, reversing the luminance polarity of the precue in our paradigm should lead to differential cuing effects. We replicate one of the experiments of our original study and add a condition in which the cue luminance is either black or white. Our results replicated our previous findings-they showed an increase in apparent contrast to a high-contrast stimulus when it was precued. Moreover, we found that the black cue and the white cue had the same effect, thus ruling out the alternative explanation proposed by Schneider. Transient attention does alter contrast appearance.     

Illusory conjunctions die hard: a reply to Prinzmetal, Diedrichsen, and Ivry (2001).

M. Donk (1999) showed that various data patterns that have been considered as evidence for the existence of illusory conjunctions may be due to errors of target-nontarget confusion, an account that challenges the mere existence of illusory conjunction. In a reply, W. Prinzmetal, J. Diedrichsen, and R. B. Ivry (2001) argued against this conclusion, claiming that some earlier findings can be explained only when one assumes that illusory conjunctions exist. The current article shows that Prinzmetal et al.'s claims cannot refute any of Donk's earlier conclusions, suggesting indeed that one can only conclude that "illusory conjunctions are an illusion."     

The lengthening effect revisited: A reply to Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999)

In the present study, the lengthening phenomenon (Tsal & Shalev, 1996), namely, the increase in perceived length of unattended lines, was reexamined in light of criticisms by Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999). Prinzmetal and Wilson suggested that the effect was not due to attentional factors but to the spatial interaction between the attended line and the cue used to direct attention. We have replicated the lengthening effect when both attended and unattended lines are preceded by cues at a nearby location, showing that the effect is not caused by spatial cues per se, but instead reflects an inherent property of the attentional system. Masin argued that the lengthening effect is not robust, because it occurs for some but not for all participants. In the present study, the lengthening effect was highly reliable, occurring for each participant for a variety of line lengths.     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: reply to Saiki (2000)

J. Saiki (2000) argued that, because the stimuli used by M. Behrmann, R. S. Zemel, and M. C. Mozer (1998) were confounded by symmetry, conclusions about whether amodally completed objects can benefit from object-based attention are unwarranted. Here, the authors examine J. Saiki's claim further and expand on their view of the mechanisms underlying object-based attention, suggesting that perceptual organization is the process whereby features from a single object are selectively attended. In light of this, they claim that heuristics such as symmetry and collinearity play an important role in the facilitation of features from a single object. In support of this claim, they present data from a further experiment using displays that exploit common fate, another grouping heuristic, and show that, under these conditions, the hallmark of object-based attention, a single-object advantage, is obtained for the occluded (amodally completed) shapes.     

Risky choice with heuristics: reply to Birnbaum (2008), Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen (2008), and Rieger and Wang (2008)

E. Brandst?tter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006) showed that the priority heuristic matches or outperforms modifications of expected utility theory in predicting choice in 4 diverse problem sets. M. H. Birnbaum (2008) argued that sets exist in which the opposite is true. The authors agree--but stress that all choice strategies have regions of good and bad performance. The accuracy of various strategies systematically depends on choice difficulty, which the authors consider a triggering variable underlying strategy selection. Agreeing with E. J. Johnson, M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and M. C. Willemsen (2008) that process (not "as-if") models need to be formulated, the authors show how quantitative predictions can be derived and test them. Finally, they demonstrate that many of Birnbaum's and M. O. Rieger and M. Wang's (2008) case studies championing their preferred models involved biased tests in which the priority heuristic predicted data, whereas the parameterized models were fitted to the same data. The authors propose an adaptive toolbox approach of risky choice, according to which people first seek a no-conflict solution before resorting to conflict-resolving strategies such as the priority heuristic.     

The rank hypothesis and lexical decision: a reply to Adelman and Brown (2008)

J. S. Adelman and G. D. A. Brown (2008) provided an extensive analysis of the form of word frequency and contextual diversity effects on lexical decision time. In this reply, the current authors suggest that their analysis provides a valuable tool for the evaluation of models of lexical access and that the results they report are broadly supportive of the rank hypothesis suggested by W. S. Murray and K. I. Forster (2004)--more supportive, in fact, than the originally reported data. However, Adelman and Brown's conclusion that the results of these analyses can be taken as evidence against rank (and thereby serial models of lexical access) and for instance models is rejected. It is shown that at least one instance model makes the wrong predictions and that Adelman and Brown's conclusions rest on the assumption that lexical decision time presents a pure measure of the time involved in lexical access. Results from eye tracking are reported, which also support a rank account, as do results from analyses that show that a log frequency account is clearly inadequate. Finally, it is demonstrated that, unlike other models, the rank account continues to make accurate predictions regarding the form of both reaction time and error rate effects.     

Letter: Square wave stimuli and neonatal auditory behavior: reply to Bench (1973)

The author is in agreement with Bench 1973 that without specific analysis one cannot be certain that the auditory output from a given loudspeaker matches the input to that speaker. However, issue is taken with Bench concerning the results obtained by Ashton 1971.     

Ambiguous figures, attention, and perceptual content: reply to Jagnow

I argued in Nanay 2010 that we cannot characterize perceptual content without reference to attention. Here, I defend this account from three objections raised by Jagnow 2011. This mainly takes the form of clarifying some details not sufficiently elaborated in the original article and dispelling some potential misunderstandings.     

On the conjunction fallacy and the meaning of and, yet again: a reply to Hertwig, Benz, and Krauss (2008)

In this paper we question the theoretical tenability of Hertwig, Benz, and Krauss's (2008) (HBK) argument that responses commonly taken as manifestations of the conjunction fallacy should be instead considered as reflecting "reasonable pragmatic and semantic inferences" because the meaning of and does not always coincide with that of the logical operator ∧. We also question the relevance of the experimental evidence that HBK provide in support of their argument as well as their account of the pertinent literature. Finally, we report two novel experiments in which we employed HBK's procedure to control for the interpretation of and. The results obtained overtly contradict HBK's data and claims. We conclude with a discussion on the alleged feebleness of the conjunction fallacy, and suggest directions that future research on this topic might pursue.     

Fast and frugal heuristics are plausible models of cognition: reply to Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008)

M. R. Dougherty, A. M. Franco-Watkins, and R. Thomas (2008) conjectured that fast and frugal heuristics need an automatic frequency counter for ordering cues. In fact, only a few heuristics order cues, and these orderings can arise from evolutionary, social, or individual learning, none of which requires automatic frequency counting. The idea that cue validities cannot be computed because memory does not encode missing information is misinformed; it implies that measures of co-occurrence are incomputable and would invalidate most theories of cue learning. They also questioned the recognition heuristic's psychological plausibility on the basis of their belief that it has not been implemented in a memory model, although it actually has been implemented in ACT-R (L. J. Schooler & R. Hertwig, 2005). On the positive side, M. R. Dougherty et al. discovered a new mechanism for a less-is-more effect. The authors of the present article specify minimal criteria for psychological plausibility, describe some genuine challenges in the study of heuristics, and conclude that fast and frugal heuristics are psychologically plausible: They use limited search and are tractable and robust.     

Psychopathy and Event-Related Brain Potentials (ERPs) associated with attention to speech stimuli

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were used to determine whether low left-hemisphere arousal or unusual cortical responses to speech stimuli might be associated with anomalies in language function that reportedly occur when psychopaths perform lateralized information-processing tasks. ERPs to phonemic stimuli were recorded while 11 psychopathic (P) and 13 nonpsychopathic (NP) male prison inmates performed a Single-Task and a Dual-Task. In the Single-Task, a speech discrimination ‘oddball’ paradigm, the subject was required to respond whenever a target stimulus (the less frequent of two phonemes) occured. In the Dual-Task, he had to respond to target stimuli while simultaneously performing a perceptual-motor (distractor) task. There were no group differences in ERP measures of central arousal (N100) during performance of the Single- and Dual-Tasks. For both groups, the P300 component of the ERP to the target stimulus was smaller and had longer latency during the Dual-Task than during the Single-Task, indicating that in the Dual-Task phonemic discrimination and the perceptual-motor task completed for similar perceptual resources. Overlapping Group P's P300 responses to the target stimulus during the Dual-Task was a vertex and asymmetric (left-hemisphere) positive slow wave (SW), suggesting unusual speech processing in psychopaths under conditions of distraction, perhaps related to reduced sensitivity to the sequential probabilities associated with events presented in an auditory channel. The results were consistent with the hypothesis that psychopaths have limited left-hemisphere resources for processing linguistic stimuli.     

The effects of stimulus numerosity,retinal location,and rod contrast on perceived duration of brief visual stimuli

The effects of manipulating three stimulus parameters were determined on a standard perceived duration task using 40- and 70-msec visual stimuli. In Experiment 1, it was found that perceived duration increased with increasing number of target dots but decreased as the area that contained the dots also increased. Experiment 2 examined the effect of varying the retinal location (0, 2, or 4 deg from fovea) of the target dot and found perceived target duration to increase with increasing eccentricity. In Experiment 3, the background luminance for a constant red target was varied so as to alter the scotopic contrast of the target. Perceived duration was minimal for the scotopically matched target and background conditions. The results of all three experiments were discussed in terms of important retinal—and even rod—contributions to tasks of perceived duration.     

The dynamic events that capture visual attention: A reply to Abrams and Christ (2005)

We recently demonstrated that, contrary to previous findings, some types of irrelevant motion are capable of capturing our attention (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). Strikingly, whereas sitmulated looming (a dynamic increase in object size) captured attention, simulated receding (a decrease in object size) did not. Abrams and Christ (2003, 2005) have provided a different interpretation of this evidence, arguing that in each case attention was captured by the onset of motion rather than by motion per se. They argued that the only published finding inconsistent with their motion onset account is our evidence that simulated receding motion failed to capture attention. Abrams and Christ (2005) presented a receding object stereoscopically and found that it did capture attention, leading them to conclude that the motion onset account explains existing data more parsimoniously than our account does. Our reply has three parts. First, we argue that evidence of capture by receding motion is interesting but irrelevant to the debate over whether capture by motion requires a motion onset. Second, we show that the original empirical evidence in support of the motion onset claim (Abrams & Christ, 2003) put the motion-only condition at a critical disadvantage. We present a new experiment that demonstrates strong capture by motion in the absence of a motion onset, showing that motion onsets are not necessary for attention capture by dynamic events. Finally, we outline what is known about the set of dynamic events that capture attention.     

Ease of predication does not account for imageability effects in performance: a reply to Jones (2002)

In this paper we defend our views against claim that the criticism of the ease of predication hypothesis (Jones, 1985) made by de Mornay Davies and Funnell (2000) is "fundamentally flawed." Jones raises five issues concerning the content of the text, the reliability of effects of ease of predication, the generation of predicates, semantic features, and memory retrieval. We address each of these issues in turn and show that either a critical point raised is not made, or the point is mistaken. More importantly we show that our empirical findings, which are entirely overlooked by Jones, unequivocally support the view that ease of predication does not account for imageability effects in performance.