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A well-established phenomenon in the judgment and decision-making tradition is the overconfidence one places in the amount of knowledge that one possesses. Overconfidence or probability judgment accuracy varies not only individually but also across cultures. However, research efforts to explain cross-cultural variations in the overconfidence phenomenon have seldom been made. In Study 1, the authors compared the probability judgment accuracy of U.S. Americans (N = 108) and Mexican participants (N = 100). In Study 2, they experimentally primed culture by randomly assigning English/Spanish bilingual Mexican Americans (N = 195) to response language. Results of both studies replicated the cross-cultural variation of probability judgment accuracy previously observed in other cultural groups. U.S. Americans displayed less overconfidence when compared to Mexicans. These results were then replicated in bilingual participants, when culture was experimentally manipulated with language priming. Holistic reasoning did not account for the cross-cultural variation of overconfidence. Suggestions for future studies are discussed. 相似文献
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主观概率判断的支持理论 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
支持理论是一个关于主观概率判断的非外延性理论,它有以下几个主要观点:1.主观概率判断受到描述的影响,具有描述的依赖性;2.主观概率判断的结果是判断者对中心假设的相对支持的反映;3.主观概率在二元判断中表现出二元互补性,在多元判断中表现出次可加性;4.主观概率判断存在分解效应和促进效应 相似文献
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Culture and Individual Judgment and Decision Making 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
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Michele J. Gelfand Sophia Christakopoulou 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》1999,79(3):62
In this paper, we argue that judgment biases in negotiation are perpetuated by underlying cultural values and ideals, and therefore, certain judgment biases will be more prevalent in certain cultural contexts. Based on theory in cultural psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), we considered the notion that fixed pie error, a judgment bias in which negotiators fail to accurately understand their counterparts' interests (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), would be more prevalent at the end of negotiations in the United States, an individualistic culture, than Greece, a collectivistic culture. The results of a 2-week computer-mediated intercultural negotiation experiment, which took place between American students in Illinois and Greek students in Athens, supported this view. Theoretical implications of culture and cognition in negotiation are also discussed. 相似文献
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KATHLEEN WALLACE 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》1993,8(3):61-83
A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments. 相似文献
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《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):570-571
Book Information Probability Theory and Probability Semantics. By P. Roeper and H. Leblanc. University of Toronto Press. Toronto. 1999. Pp. xii + 240. Hardback, US$65.00. 相似文献
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Jada Twedt Strabbing 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2016,92(3):736-760
I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View (JRV). According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability‐relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought. 相似文献
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Harvey Siegel 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(5):597-613
Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment. 相似文献
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Emotion and Moral Judgment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
LINDA ZAGZEBSKI 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2003,66(1):104-124
This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful , where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert that the intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is in this category. It has the form "That is A" (pitiful, contemptible, rude, etc.). Such judgments combine the features of cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism, an advantage that explains why we find moral weakness problematic in spite of its ubiquity. I then outline a process I call "thinning" the judgment, which explains how moral strength, weakness, and apathy arise. I argue that this process is necessary for moral reasoning and communication, in spite of its disadvantage in disengaging the agent's motivating emotion from the judgment. 相似文献
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Daniel C. Molden 《Social and Personality Psychology Compass》2012,6(2):156-169
Beyond motivations to achieve particular outcomes, people also have motivations to use particular strategies while pursuing these outcomes. This article integrates research on the latter strategic preferences and discusses the place of such research in the broader investigation of motivated thinking. A review of studies examining the strategic preferences stemming from both motivations for promotion versus prevention ( Higgins, 1997 ) and motivations for locomotion versus assessment ( Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003 ) illustrates that these preferences have unique effects on basic processes of judgment, including the evaluation of alternative hypotheses or counterfactuals, the prioritization of fast versus accurate information processing, and the recall and activation of knowledge from memory. Moreover, this review also demonstrates important interactions between strategic preferences and outcome preferences. Strategic preferences thus appear to make distinct and important contributions to understanding how motivation influences judgment and should feature prominently in general analyses of motivated thinking. 相似文献
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Hannah Ginsborg 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(5):403-437
I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience. 相似文献