Three decades of lay epistemics: The why,how, and who of knowledge formation

A conceptual integration and review are presented of three separate research programmes informed by the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989 Kruglanski, A. W. 1989. Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational bases, New York: Plenum. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). They respectively address the “why”, “how”, and “who” questions about human knowledge formation. The “why” question is treated in work on the need for cognitive closure that propels epistemic behaviour and affects individual, interpersonal, and group phenomena. The “how” question is addressed in work on the unimodel (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, & Chun, 2007 Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Erb, H. P. and Chun, W. Y. 2007. “On the parameters of social judgement”. In Advances in experimental social psychology, Edited by: Zanna, M. P. Vol. 39, 255–296. New York: Academic Press.  [Google Scholar]) depicting the process of drawing conclusions from the “information given”. The “who” question is addressed in work on “epistemic authority” highlighting the centrality of source effects (including oneself as a source) in human epistemic behaviour. These separate research paradigms explore facets of epistemic behaviour that jointly produce human knowledge, of essential significance to people's’ individual and social functioning.     

Inducing Knowledgeability From Niceness: Children Use Social Features for Making Epistemic Inferences

In many ways, evaluating informants based on their features is a problem of induction: Children rely on the assumption that observable informant characteristics (e.g., traits, behaviors, social categories) will predict unobservable characteristics (e.g., future behavior, knowledge states, intentions). Yet to make sensible inferences, children must recognize what informant features are relevant for what types of inferences. The current research investigated whether preschoolers use social features (e.g., niceness) for making epistemic inferences and, conversely, whether they use intellectual features (e.g., expertise) for making social inferences. In the study, 96 preschoolers (M_age = 4.96 years) were asked to attribute knowledge and behaviors to a mean informant, a nice informant, and a neutral informant. Between subjects, we varied which informant had expertise. We found that when attributing knowledge, children used both features: attributing more knowledge to nicer informants, but also attributing more knowledge to an informant when he had expertise. In contrast, when making social inferences, children relied primarily on social features.     

Teachers' Epistemic Authority: Perceptions of Students and Teachers

The present study examines students' perception of the teacher's role as epistemic authorities, that is, a source of determinative influence on the formation of individuals' knowledge, from three perspectives. First, it examines 7th and 10th graders' perception of their teachers as epistemic authorities. The results showed that a teacher's subject matter, as well as students' age and gender, influence perception of him/her as an epistemic authority. In addition, interest in the subject matter was found to be an important predictor of students' perception. The second part focuses on teachers' self-perceptions as epistemic authorities. The results indicated that teachers' personal efficacy is the most powerful predictor of their self-perception. Finally, the study compares students' perceptions of teachers as epistemic authorities, teachers' self-perceptions in these terms and teachers' perceptions of how their students perceive them. Two main findings showed the following: (a) teachers perceive themselves as being more of an epistemic authority than their students consider them; (b) teachers believe that students perceive them as being more of an epistemic authority than the students actually think.     

THE EPISTEMIC APPROACH IN COGNITIVE THERAPY

A theory of epistemic behavior is applied to the problem of cognitive therapy. The theory addresses the process whereby all knowledge is acquired and modified. The task of cognitive therapy is to modify some types of knowledge, those with aversive consequences to the individual. Any knowledge is assumed to be inevitably biased, selective and tentative. It is assumed to be affected by three epistemically relevant motivations: the need of structure, the fear of invalidity and the need of conclusional contents. Such motivations can be appropriately enlisted in the aid of uprooting the patient's dysfunctional beliefs or “frustrative hypotheses” concerning his/her failures to attain important goals. Unlike major alternative approaches, the present one: (1) disputes the dysfunctional misconception hypothesis whereby neurotic inferences are distorted or biased as compared to normal inferences, (2) questions the value of constructing a priori lists, or taxonomies of dysfunctional beliefs, and (3) qualifies the suggestion that own behavior or personal experience is a superior vehicle of belief-induction. Instead, the persuasive value of behavior or experience is assumed to be restricted to cases in which the individual trusts his own ability to interpret the events at hand.     

Believing on trust

The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig’s writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the ‘system knows’, social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.     

Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic

Knowledge requires both freedom and friction. Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of foundationalism as a solution to the problem of friction, an alternative solution in the form of a neo-Quinean model, and the possibility of solving the problem of friction as it applies to logic and the philosophy of logic within that model.     

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion,Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account , all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.     

Group Peer Disagreement

A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain just as confident vis‐a‐vis p as she initially was. This ‘conciliatory’ insight has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to the extent that (non‐summativist) groups are candidates for group knowledge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to carve out and explore an extension of the conciliatory insight from individual peer disagreement to group peer disagreement; in doing so, I'll raise and address three key problems that face any plausible defence of such a constraint.     

Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me,is it the group or are we all to blame?

According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally, perhaps morally, and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration.     

Coverage-Reliability, Epistemic Dependence, and the Problem of Rumor-Based Belief

Rumors, for better or worse, are an important element of public discourse. The present paper focuses on rumors as an epistemic phenomenon rather than as a social or political problem. In particular, it investigates the relation between the mode of transmission and the reliability, if any, of rumors as a source of knowledge. It does so by comparing rumor with two forms of epistemic dependence that have recently received attention in the philosophical literature: our dependence on the testimony of others, and our dependence on what has been called the ‘coverage-reliability’ of our social environment (Goldberg 2010). According to the latter, an environment is ‘coverage-reliable’ if, across a wide range of beliefs and given certain conditions, it supports the following conditional: If ~p were true I would have heard about it by now. However, in information-deprived social environments with little coverage-reliability, rumors may transmit information that could not otherwise be had. This suggests that a trade-off exists between levels of trust in the coverage-reliability of official sources and (warranted) trust in rumor as a source of information.     

Theory of mind selectively predicts preschoolers’ knowledge‐based selective word learning

Children can selectively attend to various attributes of a model, such as past accuracy or physical strength, to guide their social learning. There is a debate regarding whether a relation exists between theory‐of‐mind skills and selective learning. We hypothesized that high performance on theory‐of‐mind tasks would predict preference for learning new words from accurate informants (an epistemic attribute), but not from physically strong informants (a non‐epistemic attribute). Three‐ and 4‐year‐olds (N = 65) completed two selective learning tasks, and their theory‐of‐mind abilities were assessed. As expected, performance on a theory‐of‐mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants. Results thus suggest that preschoolers with more advanced theory of mind have a better understanding of knowledge and apply that understanding to guide their selection of informants. This work has important implications for research on children's developing social cognition and early learning.     

Scepticism,epistemic luck,and epistemic angst

A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as a quandary directed at our possession of knowledge simpliciter, but rather as concerned with a specific kind of knowledge that is epistemically desirable. On this view, the source of scepticism lies in a peculiarly epistemic form of angst.

It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.     

Strategy and the pursuit of truth

Science is a social epistemic enterprise. The complexity of research requires the division of cognitive labor. As a consequence, scientists have to present results and incorporate the results of others into their body of knowledge. This creates the possibility of strategic behavior, leading to phenomena such as publication bias. To analyze the dynamics of strategic behavior in epistemic communities, agent-based modeling suggests itself as a method. The phenomena generated by the developed agent-based simulation model reveal a diverse set of possible dynamics in strategically heterogeneous groups and support the claim that there is a trade-off between a behavioral rule’s efficacy to generate accurate beliefs under optimal conditions and its robustness to variation in the composition of the epistemic environment.

     

Narrative as a Resource for Feminist Practices of Socially Engaged Inquiry: Mayra Montero's In the Palm of Darkness

Against the view that the physical sciences should be the privileged source of reliable knowledge within the academy in general, and in philosophy in particular, this essay argues that an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge‐production, one that includes social and psychological assessment as well as narrative analysis, can better capture the diverse range of human epistemic activities as they occur in their natural settings. Postpositivist epistemologies, including Lorraine Code's social naturalism, Satya Mohanty's and Paula Moya's postpositivist literary and pedagogical projects, and Linda Alcoff's dialogical template for knowledge form the basis of a revised naturalized epistemology that is more accountable to a socially engaged inquiry. This revised naturalism shifts orientation from the idealized setting of the laboratory and its a priori conditions for knowledge to localized settings, where knowledge emerges out of diverse contextualized interpretations of the natural and social world that interlocutors produce as they dialogue with one another. Mayra Montero's neocolonial narrative thematizes the spatial shift of scientific activity, showing how epistemic authority, aligned with North American interests and regional identity, is established, withheld from others, and contested.     

Using Adult Learning Theory Concepts to Address Barriers to Cancer Genetic Risk Assessment in the African American Community

Utilization of cancer genetic risk assessment can be profoundly influenced by an individuals’ knowledge of risk assessment, attitudes regarding illness and healthcare, and affective reactions derived from social norms. Race and ethnicity play a powerful role in the development of an individual's attitudes and should be considered when attempting to understand a person's openness to cancer genetic risk assessment (Lannin et al., 1998). Until recently, however, cancer screening and prevention programs have been primarily based on data from studies conducted with the Caucasian population, yielding data that are not fully applicable to the African American community. In the last several years, research findings regarding African American's knowledge, attitudes, and feelings about genetic counseling and testing have grown (Matthews et al., 2000; Singer et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2003). However, to the authors’ knowledge, these data have yet to be presented in a manner that both summarizes the barriers that African Americans have reported regarding cancer genetic risk assessment, while at the same time suggesting methods individual genetic counselors can utilize during community presentations to help address these barriers. This article will first summarize previous empirical findings regarding African Americans’ knowledge, attitudes, and feelings about cancer genetic risk assessment. The article will then apply adult learning theory to those findings to provide genetic counselors with practical, theory based techniques to apply toward community based educational programs with African American groups.     

Motivated contextualism

The concept of knowledge is used to certify epistemic agents as good sources (on a certain point or subject matter) for an understood audience. Attributions of knowledge and denials of knowledge are used in a kind of epistemic gate keeping for (epistemic or practical) communities with which the attributor and interlocutors are associated. When combined with reflection on kinds of practical and epistemic communities, and their situated epistemic needs for gate keeping, this simple observation regarding the point and purpose of the concept of knowledge has rich implications. First, it gives one general reason to prefer contextualism over various forms of sensitive invariantism. Second, when gate keeping for a select community of experts or authorities, with an associated body of results on which folk generally might then draw (when gate keeping for a general source community) the contextual demands approximate those with which insensitive invariantists would be comfortable.

Epistemic Entitlement and Luck

The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not epistemically entitled (in a sense to be made clear below). The burden of the argument is to show that there is a plausible construal of the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation on which the resulting characterization of epistemic luck, though admittedly programmatic, has several important virtues. It avoids difficulties which plague modal accounts of epistemic luck; it can explain the conflicting temptations one can feel in certain alleged cases of epistemic luck; it offers a novel account of the value of knowledge, without committing itself to any particular analysis of knowledge; and it illuminates the significance for epistemology of the phenomenon of epistemic luck itself.     

Benchmarking the “Question,Persuade, Refer” Program Against Evaluations of Established Suicide Prevention Gatekeeper Trainings

Gatekeeper training is a common approach for aiding suicidal youth. This study utilizes comparative effectiveness “benchmarks” from established programs to evaluate the Question, Persuade, Refer (QPR) program. The QPR program was implemented with adults (N = 2,389) working in youth‐serving community agencies. Questionnaires assessed suicide prevention knowledge, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and behaviors. Consistent with benchmarked studies, participants in QPR demonstrated knowledge and suicide prevention behavior gains compared with control groups. Future research should utilize benchmarking methods as a measure of effectiveness, and more thoroughly assess mechanisms that promote behavior change.     

Persistence of attitude change and attitude–behavior correspondence based on extensive processing of source information

A three‐phase longitudinal study (spread over a month's time) was carried out to investigate attitude's persistence and linkage to behavior as it may be affected by the processing of information about the communication source. The following three independent variables were manipulated: (i) contents of the source of information (implying the communicator to be expert or inexpert on the topic of the communication); (ii) length of the source information (brief versus lengthy); and (iii) message recipients' involvement in the issue at hand (high versus low). Replicating prior research when the source information was brief, it exerted greater persuasive impact under low versus high involvement, and when it was lengthy, it exerted greater persuasive impact under high versus low involvement. Of greater importance, the newly acquired attitudes were more persistent and were linked more strongly to actual behavior when the source information was lengthy (versus brief) provided the recipients had high (versus low) involvement in the issue. These findings were interpreted to mean that just like with the message/issue information in prior research, when processed extensively, source information, too, may contribute to the formation of persistent and behavior‐driving attitudes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.