Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy in Human Behavior and Evolution

The Psychological Record - This article presents 7 simple models of the relationship between cognitive empathy (mental perspective taking) and emotional empathy (the vicarious sharing of emotion)....     

从人类共情走向智能体共情

随着机器人在人类生活中重要性的增强,人们开始关注其传统智能以外的其它能力,如共情。基于共情的经典理论,本文以新兴的智能体共情（artificial empathy）为主题,同时结合人工智能领域的最新研究,系统地阐述了现有与智能体共情有关的理论模型和实证研究,并结合文献计量学分析,对该领域研究宏观现状进行可视化呈现。指出在未来研究中,借鉴心理学、认知神经科学和计算机科学等学科的研究成果,注重机器人理论模型的建构和研究方法的创新,对机器人共情系统的建构有着重要作用,而其间涉及到的伦理问题同样不容忽视。     

Reading and Empathy

The relationship between reading and empathy was explored. Controlling for GPA and gender, reading variables were hypothesized as related to empathy; the relationship was expected to differ for males and females. For the complete sample, affective components were related to GPA but not reading. Perspective taking was related to reading appreciation but not GPA. For females, reading appreciation was related to perspective taking and empathic concern. For males, GPA and non-fiction reading were positively related, but both were negatively related to empathic concern. Results suggest reading may promote both academic achievement and social development. Findings and social implications are discussed.     

作为体验实践的同感与同情——现象学分析与佛教教义之比较

众所周知，胡塞尔对交互主体性的分析是以同感为基础的。现在，这样一种同感经验在胡塞尔那里被描述为，它既涉及我们身体所特有的空间性，也涉及两个身体的一种时间结对、以及从我们的心理状态向他人心理状态的一种独特想象的转化。我想把对他人的这样一种多层次的经验，与大乘佛教传统中的一些教义(首先出现于印度，而后传到西藏)对同情经验的描述方式作一个比较。实际上，在这种教义体系中被非常具体地加以描述的“tonglen”实践(西藏人这样称呼)，就其植根于身体中并使时间同步而言，尤其是就想象被考虑的方式而言，都以多种形式回应着胡塞尔的同感经验。在生活空间、时间和想象等方面，通过比较这两者的实践与理论，我们将能估价它们的亲和性、它们的差异，进而最终说明它们如何才能相互启发，甚至相互促进。     

认知共情和情绪共情的发展差异:元分析初探

共情的毕生发展模型表明认知共情和情绪共情两维度可能存在发展差异,本研究借助元分析技术考察个体认知共情和情绪共情的毕生发展特点。通过文献检索和筛查,获取了136项研究和178个独立效应量,共计50606名被试。发表偏差检验表明文献选取不存在发表偏差,异质性检验表明应选取随机效应模型进行分析。随机效应模型分析的结果表明,总体而言个体的共情反应以认知共情为主（Z=5.39,p<0.001）。进一步的调节效应分析表明,不同发展阶段个体的共情反应受认知共情和情绪共情的影响存在差异（Q_b=73.99,p<0.001）。具体而言,学前期儿童主要以情绪共情为主,儿童中期至成年早期主要以认知共情为主,成年中期至成年晚期主要以情绪共情为主。     

When Empathy Matters: The Role of Sex and Empathy in Close Friendships

Based on prior theory and research (Ciarrochi & Heaven, 2009; Eagly & Wood, 1999), we hypothesized that the link between empathy and friendship would be moderated by sex: Girls will nominate empathic boys as friends, whereas boys will not tend to nominate empathic girls. We collected measures of empathy, friendship social support, and close friendship nominations in grade 10 across 1,970 students in 16 schools (M_age = 15.70, SD = .44; males = 993, females = 977). Multilevel models revealed that boys high in cognitive empathy attracted an average of 1.8 more girl friendship nominations than did their low empathy counterparts, whereas empathic girls did not attract a greater number of opposite‐sex friends. In addition, the more friendship nominations a boy received from either boys or girls, the more they felt supported by their friends; the number of friendship nominations received by girls, in contrast, had no effect on their felt support by friends. Regardless of the quantity of friendship nominations, empathy was linked to more supportive friendships for both males and females. These results inform a contextual understanding of the role of empathy in selecting and maintaining friendships.     

认知共情和情绪共情的发展差异:元分析初探

共情的毕生发展模型表明认知共情和情绪共情两维度可能存在发展差异,本研究借助元分析技术考察个体认知共情和情绪共情的毕生发展特点。通过文献检索和筛查,获取了136项研究和178个独立效应量,共计50606名被试。发表偏差检验表明文献选取不存在发表偏差,异质性检验表明应选取随机效应模型进行分析。随机效应模型分析的结果表明,总体而言个体的共情反应以认知共情为主（Z=5.39,p<0.001）。进一步的调节效应分析表明,不同发展阶段个体的共情反应受认知共情和情绪共情的影响存在差异（Q_b=73.99,p<0.001）。具体而言,学前期儿童主要以情绪共情为主,儿童中期至成年早期主要以认知共情为主,成年中期至成年晚期主要以情绪共情为主。     

Empathy and Its Role in Morality

In this paper, I will argue, contra Prinz, that empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives. In particular, I argue that empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action; that empathy is sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right action; and that empathy is sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for an action. I begin by explaining what I take empathy to be. I then discuss some alleged problems for empathy and explain why some argue that empathy is unnecessary and sometimes even problematic in the moral domain. Next, I criticize a prominent alternative to an empathy‐based morality. Finally, I argue that that empathy is sometimes epistemologically and psychologically necessary for doing the right thing and is sometimes necessary for moral worth. I conclude with a discussion of the important role of empathy in our everyday lives.     

Empathy and justice motivation

Empathic distress is defined as an aversive feeling contingent on another's physical, emotional, or economic distress. The paper (1) summarizes a developmental scheme consisting of four stages of empathic distress; (2) suggests that causal attributions may partly transform empathic distress into sympathy, empathic anger, feeling of injustice, and guilt feeling; (3) notes the evidence that these empathic affects often serve to motivate moral behavior, and therefore that they qualify as moral motives; (4) points up limitations of these affects/motives and the need to embed them in justice principles; (5) discusses links between empathic affects/motives and principles of distributive justice/ (6) argues that Rawls' theory of justice, which excludes empathy, may nevertheless require it for the difference principle to influence behavior in real life; (7) hypothesizes a functional equivalence between empathy and the veil of ignorance; and (8) speculates that the conjunction of empathic affect and justice-principle thinking — in life and in abstract didactic contexts like Rawls' original position — may produce a principle having the motivational and stabilizing properties of a hot cognition.     

Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality

The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.     

Empathy present and future

The empathy concept has central significance for social and personality psychology and in many other domains, including neuroscience, clinical/abnormal psychology, and the health professions. However, the current diversity in conceptual and operational definitions, and the promiscuous use of the term “empathy,” threaten the ability of researchers to advance the field. The present article provides a quantitative review and conceptual analysis of empathy definitions and usages by examining 393 studies published between 2001 and 2013, and 96 studies published in 2017. We document the prevalence and diversity of definitions, as well as inconsistencies between conceptual definitions and measurements employed. We discuss ways to refine the conceptualization and operationalization of the empathy construct, including for many purposes, bypassing the term empathy in favor of lower-level construct labels that more precisely describe what is actually being measured. In many cases we see no added theoretical or empirical value in applying the term empathy.     

Empathy and the unconscious

The author examines the complex relationship between the concepts of empathy and unconscious, including exploration of topical, structural, and dynamic aspects; and the risk of oversimplification of empathy is discussed. Two clinical examples are then presented to demonstrate some of the complex factors that may contribute to or hinder the development and utilization of empathy by the analyst, many of which lie outside the analyst's conscious awareness.