Justified Judging

Traditional approaches to epistemology have sought, unsuccessfully, to define knowledge in terms of justification. I follow Timothy Williamson in arguing that this is misconceived and that we should take knowledge as our fundamental epistemological notion. We can then characterise justification as a certain sort of approximation to knowledge. A judgement is justified if and only if the reason (if there is one) for a failure to know is to be found outside the subject's mental states; that is, justified judging is possible knowing (where one world accessible from another if and only if they are identical with regard to a subject's antecedent mental states and judgement forming processes). This view is explained and defended.     

判断权威

我们经常被要求去承认某人的话,但是我们如何无误地判断这个人是否是真正的权威呢?过好日子要求我们能够理性地评价外界,像过马路、购物、吃饭、听医生建议等这样简单事,无     

Judging Covers

Cover versions form a loose but identifiable category of tracks and performances. We distinguish four kinds of covers and argue that they mark important differences in the modes of evaluation that are possible or appropriate for each: mimic covers, which aim merely to echo the canonical track; rendition covers, which change the sound of the canonical track; transformative covers, which diverge so much as to instantiate a distinct, albeit derivative song; and referential covers, which not only instantiate a distinct song, but for which the new song is in part about the original song. In order to allow for the very possibility of transformative and referential covers, we argue that a cover is characterized by relation to a canonical track rather than merely by being a new instance of a song that had been recorded previously.     

Judging multi-minute intervals retrospectively

A total of 50 participants were asked to perform five different cognitive tasks lasting 120, 210, 300, 390 and 480 s, respectively. After completing the series of tasks, they were asked to estimate retrospectively the duration of each one. Psychophysical analyses linking psychological time to physical time revealed that the value of the power law exponent was about .47, but was .79 when the estimate of the total duration of the session was taken into account—a value lower than unity, indicating that shorter durations have been overestimated, and longer durations underestimated. The Weber fraction, or the ratio of variability to time, ranged from .59 (at 120 s) to .21 (at 480 s). Overall, the study shows that it is possible to make certain changes in the traditional retrospective timing method and thus adapt it for further investigations of the mechanisms involved in memory for the duration of past events.     

Judging Faces in Context

Previous judgment studies of facial expressions of emotion in context have provided mixed results. These contradictory findings arise, in part, because of a lack of consideration of the different aspects of context with which facial expressions of emotion can be combined, and different meanings of face-context pairings vis-à-vis real-life phenomena. In this paper, we provide a framework of how faces and contexts combine and describe possible meanings of consistent and inconsistent face-context pairings. We also discuss methodological caveats that should be considered in the conduct of such judgment studies. We argue that future research in this area will benefit not from more studies of different combinations of stimuli created merely because we have the technological ability to create them, but instead from careful consideration of the ecological validity of the various types of combinations that can be produced, and their meaning.     

Judging Cumulative Risk1

The accuracy of young adults' perceptions of how cumulative risks to life, health, and property change over time was tested by asking subjects to judge the long-term probabilities associated with different periods of exposure to risks that are very small in the short term. Process analyses revealed evidence that strategy choice and associated accuracy depended on context and framing variables. Subjects asked to judge conjunctive probabilities adopted a variety of strategies, all of which failed to yield consistently accurate long-term probability judgments. However, subjects asked to judge disjunctive probabilities often reframed the probability questions into questions about the expected number of times the hazard would strike, which they could answer more accurately. Implications of the research for promoting public understanding of the long-term implications of cumulative risks are discussed.     

Judging multi-minute intervals retrospectively

A total of 50 participants were asked to perform five different cognitive tasks lasting 120, 210, 300, 390 and 480 s, respectively. After completing the series of tasks, they were asked to estimate retrospectively the duration of each one. Psychophysical analyses linking psychological time to physical time revealed that the value of the power law exponent was about .47, but was .79 when the estimate of the total duration of the session was taken into account—a value lower than unity, indicating that shorter durations have been overestimated, and longer durations underestimated. The Weber fraction, or the ratio of variability to time, ranged from .59 (at 120 s) to .21 (at 480 s). Overall, the study shows that it is possible to make certain changes in the traditional retrospective timing method and thus adapt it for further investigations of the mechanisms involved in memory for the duration of past events.     

Judging up and down.

In Experiment I subjects were asked to judge whether an arrow was pointing up or pointing down at various heights inside a surrounding rectangle. They were faster on an arrow pointing up the higher it was in the rectangle, and they were faster on an arrow pointing down the lower it was in the rectangle. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were designed to test sources for this"congruity effect." The intrusive height information for each arrow was assumed to facilitate or interfere with (a) the activation of the correct motor response; (b) the maintenance of the implicit instruction "Is it pointing up, or is it pointing down?"; or (c) the selection of the criterial perceptual information as a basis for the response. All three experiments were consistent with c, but not with a or b. Indeed, the results contrasted with previous demonstrations of the Stroop effect in certain critical features.     

An Experiment in Judging Personalities

Use of the semantic differential technique has largely been restricted to “paper and pencil” settings and student populations. In this study, adult respondents in an interview setting were asked to evaluate two concepts—use of lake (a) as a source of electric power and (b) as a recreational area—by means of eight seven-point scales. Results indicated considerable conceptscale interaction, suggesting that Osgood's interpretation of the semantic differential may be restricted by both technique of data collection and subpopulation. Respondent hostility might be an intervening variable. The semantic differential technique appeared to yield a preliminary evaluation of the two concepts, suggesting its use as an indicator of orientation.     

Judging distance across texture discontinuities

Sinai et al (1998 Nature 395 497-500) showed that less distance is perceived along a ground surface that spans two differently textured regions than along a surface that is uniformly textured. We examined the effect of texture continuity on judged distance using computer-generated displays of simulated surfaces in five experiments. Discontinuities were produced by using different textures, the same texture reversed in contrast, or the same texture shifted horizontally. The simulated surface was either a ground plane or a frontoparallel plane. For all textures and both orientations, less distance was judged in the discontinuous conditions than in continuous conditions. We propose that when a surface contains a texture discontinuity, a small area adjacent to the perceived boundary is excluded from judged distances.     

Judging as a non-voluntary action

Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.