Choice both affects and reflects preferences

The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1–Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.     

选择、自我表达与选择扩散效应

自我表达会影响西方人的态度, 产生选择扩散效应。国外相关的跨文化研究发现东方人不存在该效应。通过4个实验研究中国文化下自我表达对选择态度的影响, 发现选择方式(主动、被动)和自我表达形式(直接、间接)对选择态度产生影响。无论是自己的主动选择还是强加的被动选择, 直接的自我表达会增加对所获对象的喜爱程度, 表现为对获得性的肯定。研究者认为, 两种选择方式下不同的心理加工过程导致了这种获得性：直接表达使个人态度暴露在外, 进行主动选择时要对他人的给予做出肯定回应; 而进行被动选择时, 人们要减缓因利益受损可能导致的失调, 同时中国文化下的面子策略也使人们增加对所获对象的喜爱程度。不过, 间接的自我表达对选择态度的影响不明显。研究者认为, 多个影响因素的相互消长使选择态度得以维持。     

Is there any "free" choice? Self and dissonance in two cultures

Four experiments provided support for the hypothesis that upon making a choice, individuals justify their choice in order to eliminate doubts about culturally sanctioned aspects of the self, namely, competence and efficacy in North America and positive appraisal by other people in Japan. Japanese participants justified their choice (by increasing liking for chosen items and decreasing liking for rejected items) in the standard free-choice dissonance paradigm only when self-relevant others were primed, either by questionnaires (Studies 1-3) or by incidental exposure to schematic faces (Study 4). In the absence of these social cues, Japanese participants showed no dissonance effect. In contrast, European Americans justified their choices regardless of the social-cue manipulations. Implications for cognitive dissonance theory are discussed.     

In pursuit of the proper null: Reply to

Chen argued that the proper null hypothesis for free-choice studies examining shifts in choice was 66.7%. Sagarin and Skowronki (2009) questioned the appropriateness of this value, noting that it was based on an unwarranted assumption that subjects always choose preferred options over less preferred options. In this paper, we respond to the points raised by Chen and Risen (2009), noting that: (a) violations of an additional unwarranted assumption (perfect transitivity) also move the proper null hypothesis towards 50%; (b) the validation of pretest measures would enable researchers to estimate an upper bound on the proper null; (c) the “blind” choice methodology proposed by Sagarin and Skowronski places the null unambiguously at 50%; and (d) Sagarin and Skowronski correctly call for null-hypothesis tests where needed. In the end, we again endorse the idea that this debate is best resolved empirically, but we believe the empirical avenues available are wider than those endorsed by Chen and Risen.     

An Experimental Test of Cognitive Dissonance Theory in the Domain of Physical Exercise

The present study examined cognitive dissonance-related attitude change in the domain of exercise. Experimental participants made a decision to perform a boring exercise task (stepping on a bench/chair) under three different conditions: a free-choice condition (n = 33, Male = 17 female = 16, Age = 14.57), under a no-choice/control condition (n = 28, Male = 15, Female = 13, Age = 14.50), and under a condition that compelled participants to practice bench/chair stepping (forced-choice condition) (n = 31, Male = 15, Female = 16, Age = 14.61). Results showed that participants in the free-choice condition reported more positive attitudes than participants in the control condition and participants in the forced-choice condition. Ancillary analysis indicated that cognitive dissonance is experienced as an aversive state, and that the amount of frustration that participants experienced immediately after the free-choice paradigm predicted attitudes.     

Is choice a reliable predictor of choice? A comment on Sagarin and Skowronski

In a recent working paper, Chen (2008) argues that a methodology central to the cognitive dissonance literature (the free-choice paradigm) has suffered from an inability to separately measure how much choices affect people’s preferences, and how much they simply reflect those preferences, by failing to fully control for the fact that subjects tend to choose goods they prefer. Although Sagarin and Skowronski concede this, they discount Chen’s argument, claiming that for revealed preferences to completely account for observed choice-effects the relationship between choice and preference would have to be unrealistically high. In this comment, we argue that their critique both misses the crux of Chen’s analysis, and is incorrect. Specifically, to properly test whether choices affect preferences, it is essential that researchers experimentally control for revealed preferences rather than speculate how much of a role they may play. Moreover, Sagarin and Skowronski’s critique rests on two fundamental errors—a misunderstanding of the function of the null-hypothesis and a misunderstanding of preference-measurement psychometrics. These errors leads Sagarin and Skowronski to suggest alternative experimental designs which while a good first step, do not address the problems identified in Chen (2008).     

Dissonance-induced false memories: Evidence from a free-choice paradigm

People often misremember the past as consistent with the present. Recent research using an induced-compliance paradigm has revealed that cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that can underlie this memory distortion. We sought to replicate and extend this finding using a free-choice paradigm: Participants made either an easy or a difficult choice between two smartphones and, either immediately or two days later, reported their memories for their decision experience. Participants who made a difficult decision produced the spread-of-alternatives effect expected by dissonance theory, and they were also more likely than those in the easy conditions to misremember their initial decision more favourably than they had initially rated it. Overall, our findings replicate the effect of dissonance on memory distortion and, further, show that the effect generalises to other dissonance-inducing situations.     

Vicarious dissonance: attitude change from the inconsistency of others

Three studies support the vicarious dissonance hypothesis that individuals change their attitudes when witnessing members of important groups engage in inconsistent behavior. Study 1, in which participants observed an actor in an induced-compliance paradigm, documented that students who identified with their college supported an issue more after hearing an ingroup member make a counterattitudinal speech in favor of that issue. In Study 2, vicarious dissonance occurred even when participants did not hear a speech, and attitude change was highest when the speaker was known to disagree with the issue. Study 3 showed that speaker choice and aversive consequences moderated vicarious dissonance, and demonstrated that vicarious discomfort--the discomfort observers imagine feeling if in an actor's place--was attenuated after participants expressed their revised attitudes.     

Some Theoretical Considerations on Attitude,Arousal and Affect during Cognitive Dissonance

This article provides a general overview of cognitive dissonance research with the induced compliance paradigm. We begin by describiang how dissonance affects individuals' attitude change and address issues related to measurement of attitude. Next, we describe the arousal component of dissonance, how it has been measured and the issues that have been raised about its nature. Finally, we explore the emotional component of dissonance and review different ways for measuring and identifying the negative affect associated to dissonance. We conclude by claiming that a more intensive study of the process of dissonance, and particularly of its arousal and emotional components, will allow a more in‐depth understanding of the mental processes involved in cognitive dissonance.     

Mind the gap: Misdirection, inattentional blindness and the relationship between overt and covert attention

The present commentary addresses two issues arising from Memmert’s (2010) paper. First, can the ‘misdirection’ and ‘inattentional blindness’ paradigms provide important insights into the relationship between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ attentional processes? Second, what are the most fruitful directions for research that seeks to combine these attentional paradigms in ecologically valid settings? We argue that although Memmert’s (2010) paper postulates several important differences between the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms, it may not emphasise sufficiently strongly the significant insights into attention that have been yielded by the former approach. To illustrate, we discuss the utility of the misdirection paradigm in providing an ecologically valid method to investigate the relationship between overt and covert attentional processes. Such naturalistic methods are required to ensure optimal integration of the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms within a general theory of attention.     

Choice and dissonance in a European cultural context: The case of Western and Eastern Europeans

Prior research demonstrates that members of collectivistic cultures are less likely to reduce cognitive dissonance after making a choice, compared to members of individualistic cultures. This difference has been attributed to different conceptualizations of choice that derive from different self‐construals across cultures. In individualistic cultures, choice leads to stronger commitment to the chosen option compared to collectivistic cultures, because it implicates core aspects of the independent self, such as personal preferences. However, this cultural variation in postchoice dissonance has thus far been studied exclusively by comparing East Asians and North Americans. Building on the assumption that this difference is due to different construals of the self, we conducted an experiment with movie choices using the classic free‐choice paradigm to examine differences in dissonance reduction between Western and Eastern Europeans, two populations known to differ with respect to interdependence. The results show that Eastern Europeans are less likely than Western Europeans to reduce postchoice dissonance by spreading their alternatives. Our findings speak to the generalizability of the hypothesis that in cultures differing in independence or interdependence people also differ in the way they construe choice, as well as in the way the act of choosing affects their self‐concept.     

Past decisions do affect future choices: An experimental demonstration

This paper demonstrates experimentally that the mere fact that an alternative was chosen in the past increases the likelihood that it will be re-chosen in the future, when new alternatives are being offered. The experimental design consists of a new variation of the free-choice paradigm that is immune to Chen and Risen’s (2010) criticism of how results have been interpreted in previous studies of post-decision effects. An additional experiment indicates that once participants have chosen a particular alternative they view its characteristics more positively. I suggest that the new design can be used to study various aspects of the effect of past decisions on future ones. In the present paper, I apply it to show that the allocation of limited resources among various uses may be biased in favor of a particular use if it was preferred to another in a previous situation.     

The experience of cognitive dissonance in important and trivial domains: A Construal-Level Theory approach

Although the role of issue-importance has been central to theorizing about dissonance, its impact on dissonance-related shifts in attitude is not clear. Drawing on recent distinctions between high-level construals, which capture an object's gist and lead people to focus on their more‐important concerns, and low-level construals, which emphasize secondary issues, the current paper explores the role of construal-level in moderating the effect of importance on dissonance-induced attitude change. Adopting a widely used induced‐compliance paradigm, participants in a high or low-level construal mindset wrote counter‐attitudinal essays about instituting a senior comprehensive exam under conditions of high or low choice. As expected, participants in a high-level construal mindset more strongly favored comprehensive exams under high choice than low‐choice conditions, but only when the issue was personally important. Participants in a low-level construal mindset showed a choice effect when the issue was unimportant. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

II. A reply to Siegel on Kuhnian relativism

Siegel argues that the Kuhnian relativism presented in ‘Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism’ fails because it neglects the possibility of rational choice in science between rival paradigms’ own incommensurable standards on the basis of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’. In reply, it is argued (1) that Siegel has given no reason to believe that there are such external standards in science, (2) that the mere ‘possibility’ of such standards in scientific debate is not sufficient to vitiate Kuhn's relativism, (3) that the actual existence of rational debate concerning the internal standards of rival paradigms does not entail (as Siegel claims) the existence of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’, and finally (4) that Kuhn's relativism concerning standards in science does not lead (as Siegel claims) to a ‘reductio’ which undermines the philosophical standards implicit in Kuhn's argument.     

Influencing Republicans’ and Democrats’ attitudes toward Obamacare: Effects of imagined vicarious cognitive dissonance on political attitudes

The field of experimental social psychology is appropriately interested in using novel theoretical approaches to implement change in the social world. In the current study, we extended cognitive dissonance theory by creating a new framework of social influence: imagined vicarious dissonance. We used the framework to influence attitudes on an important and controversial political attitude: U.S. citizens’ support for the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 36 Republicans and 84 Democrats were asked to imagine fellow Republicans and Democrats, respectively, making attitude discrepant statements under high and low choice conditions about support for the ACA. The data showed that vicarious dissonance, established by imagining a group member make a counterattitudinal speech under high-choice conditions (as compared to low-choice conditions), resulted in greater support for the Act by Republicans and marginally diminished support by Democrats. The results suggest a promising role for the application of vicarious dissonance theory to relevant societal issues and for further understanding the relationship of dissonance and people’s identification with their social groups.     

Choices and preferences: Evidence from implicit choices and response times

We present a new experimental paradigm where choice-induced preference change is measured for alternatives which are never compared directly, but rather confronted with other alternatives in a way which keeps choices predictable without exogenously manipulating them. This implicit-choice design improves on the free-choice paradigm, avoiding the recently criticized selection bias. Rating and ranking spreads in two experiments show that preference-based choices feed back into and alter preferences even if choices are not directly among similarly evaluated alternatives. In agreement with recent brain-imaging evidence, response time measurements for direct choice pairs in our experiments indicate that reappraisal processes are already triggered during decision making, with larger post-choice spreads (sharper attitude change) being associated to quicker decisions.     

Double Forced Compliance and Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Abstract

Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) experiment has been reexamined by means of the paradigm of double forced compliance. In this paradigm, the dissonance reduction process was observed after the performance of two behaviors instead of only one as in the classical paradigms of this theory. In this experiment, French students first performed a boring task (button-turning) and then described it negatively to their peers. Because these two behaviors were related to dissonance, the total dissonance was expected to be higher among those who performed both behaviors than among those who performed only the first. The hypothesis was confirmed. The participants who described the task negatively after performing it rated it more positively than those who only performed it.     

The Impact of the Antitobacco Norm on the Selected Mode of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that when behavior violates an antismoking injunctive norm, dissonance is aroused, but the injunctive norm constrains how people reduce their discomfort. In Experiment 1, participants with positive or negative attitudes toward public smoking wrote an essay for or against a ban on public smoking. Whereas attitude change occurred for those whose counter‐attitudinal essay supported the antismoking norm, those whose counter‐attitudinal essay violated the antismoking norm did not change their attitudes to reduce dissonance. In Experiment 2, participants who wrote against the ban on public smoking eschewed attitude change in favor of reducing dissonance through trivialization and act rationalization. The discussion focuses on how maintaining social connections makes cognitions resistant to change when dissonance is aroused.     

Do amnesics exhibit cognitive dissonance reduction? The role of explicit memory and attention in attitude change

In two studies, we investigated the roles of explicit memory and attentional resources in the process of behavior-induced attitude change. Although most theories of attitude change (cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories) assume an important role for both mechanisms, we propose that behavior-induced attitude change can be a relatively automatic process that does not require explicit memory for, or consciously controlled processing of, the discrepancy between attitude and behavior. Using a free-choice paradigm, we found that both amnesics and normal participants under cognitive load showed as much attitude change as did control participants.     

The reinstatement of dissonance and psychological discomfort following failed affirmations

The research in this article examined the consequences of a failed attempt to reduce dissonance through a self‐affirmation strategy. It was hypothesized that disconfirming participants' affirmations would reinstate psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. In Experiment 1, high‐dissonance participants who affirmed on a self‐relevant value scale and received disconforming feedback about their affirmations expressed greater psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994) than either affirmation‐only participants or low‐dissonance/affirmation disconformed participants. In Experiment 2, disconfirmation of an affirmation resulted in increased attitude change. The results of both experiments suggested that a failed attempt to reduce dissonance reinstates psychological discomfort and dissonance motivation. We discuss how the reduction of psychological discomfort may play a role in the success of affirmations in reducing dissonance‐produced attitude change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.