Combining the representational and the relational view

Philosophical Studies - This paper tries to meet the three basic constraints in the metaphysics of perception—that, following Schellenberg (Philos Stud 149:19–48, 2010), I call here the...     

A biphasic relational approach to the evolution of human consciousness

Background/objectiveHuman consciousness is arguably unique, and its features are hard to explain. Continuous and discrete accounts of consciousness are commonly viewed as incompatible, but both have limitations. Continuous accounts cannot readily account for what appears to be unique about human consciousness; discrete accounts have a hard time explaining how human consciousness could have evolved. The present position paper shows how both continuous and discontinuously elements can be combined.MethodA biphasic model is constructed by unifying complex systems theory, the evolution of symbolic reasoning as a relational extension of human cooperation, and evolutionary science. The application of this approach to modern views of consciousness is then explored.ResultsOur analysis suggests that human consciousness may be viewed as a discontinuous event, that emerged from continuous foundations. This biphasic account contains processes that can be targeted clinically. For example, developmentally delayed children with problems in consciousness may be helped by targeting the processes the present account suggests are important at different levels of complexity.ConclusionsThis biphasic relational approach fits with the evolutionary record and with data on human cognitive development. It may be useful in guiding clinical intervention.     

Pursuing relational consciousness: thinking and antithinking in group

Although human beings are interpersonal and innately curious, at the same time an aspect of the self defends against mental relationships with self and other, because such relationships threaten to cause psychic pain. Bion's ideas on thinking and antithinking are applied to this topic of relational consciousness: A "psychotic part of the personality"--which refers also to the "basic assumptions" level of the group-prefers antithinking: forestalling, evading, and assaulting thinking and thinkers. Clinical examples illustrate how the group therapist may address and treat the pervasive resistances to relational consciousness in the group setting. These involve understanding the dynamics and clinical manifestations of hatred of thinking, excessive projective identification, anticipatory anxiety regarding thinking, and bizarre and hallucinatory thought transformations.     

Spirituality versus Individualism: Why we should nurture relational consciousness

This paper proposes an approach to spiritual education which transcends the religious-secular boundary by conceiving of spirituality as a natural human predisposition labelled 'relational consciousness'. Evidence drawn from recent research demonstrates that this predisposition is universally identifiable in young children and expresses itself in many forms apart from the religious. Nevertheless it is this which allows the possibility of religious belief. As a result of the cultural construction of an extreme individualism which is particularly evident in the Western world, there has been a 'forgetting' of relational consciousness/spirituality resulting in damaging effects to the texture of human community. Some major sources of individualism are identified as having particularly serious effects on relational consciousness. These are reflected upon in the light of empirical research on children as well as contemporary philosophical and political critiques. Spiritual education is seen as a major means of resistance to the damaging effects of possessive individualism.     

Brentano on the individuation of mental acts

This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no “thinkings,” but only “thinkers.” However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano.     

Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.     

Schema of the Brentano School intellectual progeny

This schema gives an overview of the main branches and key members of the school of the German philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917).     

Ordinary language semantics: the contribution of Brentano and Marty

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the account of ordinary language semantics developed by Franz Brentano and his pupil Anton Marty. Long before the interest in ordinary language in the analytic tradition, Brentanian philosophers were exploring our everyday use of words, as opposed to the scientific use of language. Brentano and Marty were especially interested in the semantics of (common) names in ordinary language. They claimed that these names are vague, and that this is due to the structure of the concepts that constitute their meaning: concepts expressed by such names are themselves vague, based on typicality, and have more or less similar items within their extension. After presenting the views of Brentano and Marty, this paper compares them to later accounts of meaning and concepts, notably Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances and the prototype theory of concepts, and emphasizes the originality of the Brentanian position.     

Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: the philosophical foundations for neuroethics

Daniel Kolak’s theory of synchronic consciousness according to which the entire range of dissociative phenomena, from pathologies such as MPD and schizophrenia to normal dream states, are best explained in terms of consciousness becoming simultaneously identified as many selves, has revolutionary therapeutic implications for neurology and psychiatry. All these selves, according to Kolak—even the purely imaginary ones that exist as such only in our dreams—are not just conscious but also self-conscious, with beliefs, intentions, living lives informed by memories (confabulatory, in the case of the fictional ones) and personal histories. Kolak’s derivation of psychiatrically relevant aspects of his theory—a neurological rendition of a Kantian transcendental argument—can be given a straightforward neurological, and therefore open to scientific scrutiny, interpretation that would then more easily lend itself to the clinical setting in which these perplexing phenomena, along with their purveyors, must live and cope. This will be the main focus of this paper.