Team Science,Justice, and the Co‐Production of Knowledge

Science increasingly consists of interdisciplinary team‐based research to address complex social, biomedical, public health, and global challenges through a practice known as team science. In this article, I discuss the added value of team science, including participatory team science, for generating scientific knowledge. Participatory team science involves the inclusion of public stakeholders on science teams as co‐producers of knowledge. I also discuss how constructivism offers a common philosophical foundation for both community psychology and team science, and how this foundation aligns well with contemporary developments in science that emphasize the co‐production of knowledge. I conclude with a discussion of how the co‐production of knowledge in team science can promote justice.     

Stance,feeling and phenomenology

This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique.     

New Philosophies of Science in North America – Twenty Years Later

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Twenty-First Century Science as a Relational Process: From Eureka! To Team Science and a Place for Community Psychology

In this paper we maintain that twenty-first century science is, fundamentally, a relational process in which knowledge is produced (or co-produced) through transactions among researchers or among researchers and public stakeholders. We offer an expanded perspective on the practice of twenty-first century science, the production of scientific knowledge, and what community psychology can contribute to these developments. We argue that: (1) trends in science show that research is increasingly being conducted in teams; (2) scientific teams, such as transdisciplinary teams of researchers or of researchers collaborating with various public stakeholders, are better able to address complex challenges; (3) transdisciplinary scientific teams are part of the larger, twenty-first century transformation in science; (4) the concept of heterarchy is a heuristic for team science aligned with this transformation; (5) a contemporary philosophy of science known as perspectivism provides an essential foundation to advance twenty-first century science; and (6) community psychology, through its core principles and practice competencies, offers theoretical and practical expertise for advancing team science and the transformation in science currently underway. We discuss the implications of these points and illustrate them briefly with two examples of transdisciplinary team science from our own work. We conclude that a new narrative is emerging for science in the twenty-first century that draws on interpersonal transactions in teams, and active engagement by researchers with the public to address critical accountabilities. Because of its core organizing principles and unique blend of expertise on the intersection of research and practice, community psychologists are well-prepared to help advance these developments, and thus have much to offer twenty-first century science.     

Critical rationalism and engineering: ontology

Engineering is often said to be ‘scientific’, but the nature of knowledge in engineering is different to science. Engineering has a different ontological basis—its theories address different entities and are judged by different criteria. In this paper I use Popper’s three worlds ontological framework to propose a model of engineering theories, and provide an abstract logical view of engineering theories analogous to the deductive-nomological view of scientific theories. These models frame three key elements from definitions of engineering: requirements, designs of artefacts, and theories for reasoning about how artefacts will meet requirements. In a subsequent paper I use this ontological basis to explore methodological issues in the growth of engineering knowledge from the perspective of critical rationalism.     

All the World Is Not a Stage: Emerging Contextualist Themes in Counseling and Development

Classical stage-based theories of human development, drawn from organismic worldviews, possess many shortcomings when extended to counseling applications. In attempting to reduce development to linear, hierarchical sequences, these theories fail to account for the interactional nature of change processes and implicitly pathologize developmental diversity. Responding to these shortcomings, counselors are turning to contextualist models of development that emphasize process over outcome. In this article I review key assumptions of contextualism, as embodied in social role theory and the life-span developmental tradition, highlighting relevant theory and research. I propose that two vital forces within current counseling—constructivism and interactional counseling—are animated by contextualist notions of development. Specific implications of contextualism for future counseling research and practice are outlined.     

Getting the Big Picture in Community Science: Methods That Capture Context

Community science has a rich tradition of using theories and research designs that are consistent with its core value of contextualism. However, a survey of empirical articles published in the American Journal of Community Psychology shows that community scientists utilize a narrow range of statistical tools that are not well suited to assess contextual data. Multilevel modeling, geographic information systems (GIS), social network analysis, and cluster analysis are recommended as useful tools to address contextual questions in community science. An argument for increased methodological consilience is presented, where community scientists are encouraged to adopt statistical methodology that is capable of modeling a greater proportion of the data than is typical with traditional methods.     

Should the behavioral sciences become more pragmatic? The case for functional contextualism in research on human behavior

Although societal need for behavioral science research is enormous, current research practices seem to be inefficient vehicles for producing knowledge that guides practical action. Many of our most popular theories provide little direct guidance for application. They focus on the development of models of the relationships among organismic events such as attitudes, self-efficacy expectations, and behavior, but pay little or no attention to the contextual influences on behavior. Such research is in keeping with a long-standing mechanistic tradition in psychology. We propose a version of contextualism as an alternative paradigm for the behavioral sciences. According to this paradigm, theories and research are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the prediction and influence of behavior. Basic research organized to pursue this goal has a direct bearing on how behavioral phenomena can be changed for practical purposes. Conversely, applied research contributes to basic understanding of the determinants of psychological phenomena.     

Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science

What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.     

Constructs,inferences, and mental measurement

The ‘construct’ concept occupies a significant place in psychology and, yet its role is misunderstood. Psychologists think that theorising in the area of psychological testing involves conjuring constructs, which are operationally defined and measured via psychometric tests. However, the ‘construct’ concept is unworkable and laden with confused philosophical baggage accrued under the hegemony of logical empiricism, and its real function in psychology is obscured. Via an analysis of its history and logic, I expose its flawed conception of the relation between theoretical and observable concepts and the way in which it serves the myth of mental measurement. Finally, it is shown how the actual logic of theorising in science, which entails that theories are best inferred from relevant phenomena, not imaginatively constructed, oppugns this myth and promises to coordinate theoretical concepts with the phenomena to be explained.     

什么是好的理论？基于理论心理学的视角

文章在Hong, Chao, Yang & Rosner (2010)的基础上, 从理论心理学的视角继续探讨了“什么是好的理论”。文章认为, 在传统经验主义的视野中, 好的理论必须根源于经验, 从经验观察中进行提炼和抽象, 并最终由经验事实来进行证实或证伪。它认为：(1)理论是对事实的归纳和抽象; (2)理论是对事实的解释; (3)理论是实验假设的来源; (4)理论的发展是一个知识可累加的过程。但是, 随着哲学、心理学的发展, 当代人们关于理论的看法正在逐渐进入后经验主义时代。它主要持以下观点：(1)理论不只是经验事实的归纳与概括, 非经验的理论思辨本身也可能提出创新性的理论; (2)理论具有解释、预测的功能, 但更重要的是具有批判与反思的功能; (3)理论不一定是经验事实中的“发现”, 还可能是心理学家联盟的一种“发明”或“共识”; (4)理论的发展不一定是知识累积式的, 还可能是不可通约的不同范式之间的转换。在这种理论观下, 与经验证据的相符不再是判断“好的理论”的唯一或关键的标准, 人们可以在概念与逻辑、价值观与意识形态、修辞与叙事、应用与实践等不同的层次和水平上对理论展开评价。     

Feminist Approaches to Social Science: Epistemological and Methodological Tenets

This paper is a primer for community psychologists on feminist research. Much like the field of community psychology, feminist scholarship is defined by its values and process. Informed by the political ideologies of the 1970s women's movement (liberal, radical, socialist feminism, and womanism), feminist scholars reinterpreted classic concepts in philosophy of science to create feminist epistemologies and methodologies. Feminist epistemologies, such as feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, and postmodernism, recognize women's lived experiences as legitimate sources of knowledge. Feminist methodologies attempt to eradicate sexist bias in research and find ways to capture women's voices that are consistent with feminist ideals. Practically, the process of feminist research is characterized by four primary features: (1) expanding methodologies to include both quantitative and qualitative methods, (2) connecting women for group-level data collection, (3) reducing the hierarchical relationship between researchers and their participants to facilitate trust and disclosure, and (4) recognizing and reflecting upon the emotionality of women's lives. Recommendations for how community psychologists can integrate feminist scholarship into their practice are discussed.     

Empiricism,judgment, and argument; Toward an informal logic of science

In an attempt to explore the role of argumentation in scientific inquiry, I explore the conception of argument that appears fruitful in the light of the recent trends in the philosophy of science, away from logical empiricism, and toward a greater emphasis on change, disagreement, and history. I begin by contrasting typical instances philosopers theories of both empiricism and apriorism, with typical instances of scientists uses of these two attitudes, suggesting that such practice shows a judiciousness lacking in epistemological theory. Then I examine at some length three important version of scientific judgement, namely Einstein's opportunism, Boltzmann's pluralism, and Huygens's eclecticism. I go on to discuss some recent work in the philosophy of science, exploring connections between the notion of judgment and Feyerabend's anarchism, Harold Brown's view of rationality, and Dudley Shapere's analysis of scientific change. All of this suggests a notion of argument in the sense of informallogic, and I examine some aspects of Galileo's work in its terms.     

TRUTH, RELATIVISM, AND CROSSWORD PUZZLES

Abstract. Neither the correspondence nor the coherence theory of truth does justice to the truth claims made in science and theology. I propose a new definition that relates truth to solving puzzles. I claim that this definition is more adequate than either of the traditional theories and that it offers two additional benefits: first, it provides grounds for a theory regarding the relations between theology and science that may stand up better to philosophical scrutiny than does critical realism; and second, it blocks the move to relativism based on recognition of the plurality of perspectives and the historical and social conditioning of knowledge.     

VIRTUES, SOCIAL ROLES, AND CONTEXTUALISM

Abstract: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts.     

Enthusiasm Versus Self-Possession: The Art of Psychological Science

In this article, I propose that psychology is an art, and that it can be so without forfeiting its identity as a developing science. In support of this proposal, I outline the ways in which art and science unnecessarily have become dichotomized, and I suggest a framework for integrating art and science. This integration is based on reframing the art versus science tension as a vehicle through which the basic human dynamic of "enthusiasm versus self-possession" is expressed. I apply this new framework to the field of psychology and outline ways in which research and practice in psychology can be unified to produce an integrated, dynamic, and creative field.     

Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge

Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both "high standard" and "low standard" invariantist theories are better than the pragmatists contend. I also provide a limited defense of the "high standard" approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments against it lose their force.     

Ontology,Ontologies, and Science

Philosophers frequently struggle with the relation of metaphysics to the everyday world, with its practical value, and with its relation to empirical science. This paper distinguishes several different models of the relation between philosophical ontology and applied (scientific) ontology that have been advanced in the history of philosopy. Adoption of a strong participation model for the philosophical ontologist in science is urged, and requirements and consequences of the participation model are explored. This approach provides both a principled view and justification of the role of the philosophical ontologist in contemporary empirical science as well as guidelines for integrating philosophers and philosophical contributions into the practice of science.     

Perspectival Realism and Incompatible Models

I discuss the prospects of perspectival realism for resolving the problem of incompatible models or theories in scientific practice. My diagnosis is that the perspectivist can secure the ‘realism’ in her position only by employing suitable relations between the models. It is such relations that do the work, not the general philosophical claim about the perspectival nature of knowledge claims. But appeal to such relations has also been the preferred strategy of scientific realist approaches to the problem. With respect to the problem of incompatible models, then, it is not clear that perspectivism has a clear advantage—even though the issue was among the motivating problems for proposing this view. I suggest, however, that the required inter-model relations (typically limit relations) embody a narrower notion of perspective, a notion that is explicitly part of the models themselves and that is essential in maintaining a realist view.     

A code of ethics for the life sciences

The activities of the life sciences are essential to provide solutions for the future, for both individuals and society. Society has demanded growing accountability from the scientific community as implications of life science research rise in influence and there are concerns about the credibility, integrity and motives of science. While the scientific community has responded to concerns about its integrity in part by initiating training in research integrity and the responsible conduct of research, this approach is minimal. The scientific community justifies itself by appealing to the ethos of science, claiming academic freedom, self-direction, and self-regulation, but no comprehensive codification of this foundational ethos has been forthcoming. A review of the professional norms of science and a prototype code of ethics for the life sciences provide a framework to spur discussions within the scientific community to define scientific professionalism. A formalization of implicit principles can provide guidance for recognizing divergence from the norms, place these norms within a context that would enhance education of trainees, and provide a framework for discussing externally and internally applied pressures that are influencing the practice of science. The prototype code articulates the goal for life sciences research and the responsibilities associated with the freedom of exploration, the principles for the practice of science, and the virtues of the scientists themselves. The time is ripe for scientific communities to reinvigorate professionalism and define the basis of their social contract. Codifying the basis of the social contract between science and society will sustain public trust in the scientific enterprise.