Some theorems on structural entailment relations

The classesMatr( \( \subseteq \) ) of all matrices (models) for structural finitistic entailments \( \subseteq \) are investigated. The purpose of the paper is to prove three theorems: Theorem I.7, being the counterpart of the main theorem from Czelakowski [3], and Theorems II.2 and III.2 being the entailment counterparts of Bloom's results [1]. Theorem I.7 states that if a classK of matrices is adequate for \( \subseteq \) , thenMatr( \( \subseteq \) ) is the least class of matrices containingK and closed under the formation of ultraproducts, submatrices, strict homomorphisms and strict homomorphic pre-images. Theorem II.2 in Section II gives sufficient and necessary conditions for a structural entailment to be finitistic. Section III contains theorems which characterize finitely based entailments.     

The representation of Takeuti's\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} -operator

Gaisi Takeuti has recently proposed a new operation on orthomodular latticesL, \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} \) :P(L)»L. The properties of \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} \) suggest that the value of \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} \) (A) (A) \( \subseteq \) L) corresponds to the degree in which the elements ofA behave classically. To make this idea precise, we investigate the connection between structural properties of orthomodular latticesL and the existence of two-valued homomorphisms onL.     

The degrees of maximality of the intuitionistic propositional logic and of some of its fragments

Professor Ryszard Wójcicki once asked whether the degree of maximality of the consequence operationC determined by the theorems of the intuitionistic propositional logic and the detachment rule for the implication connective is equal to \(2^{2^\aleph 0} \) ? The aim of the present paper is to give the affirmative answer to the question. More exactly, it is proved here that the degree of maximality ofC _Ψ — theΨ — fragment ofC, is equal to \(2^{2^\aleph 0} \) , for every such that → εΨ.     

Completeness in Hybrid Type Theory

We show that basic hybridization (adding nominals and @ operators) makes it possible to give straightforward Henkin-style completeness proofs even when the modal logic being hybridized is higher-order. The key ideas are to add nominals as expressions of type t, and to extend to arbitrary types the way we interpret \(@_i\) in propositional and first-order hybrid logic. This means: interpret \(@_i\alpha _a\) , where \(\alpha _a\) is an expression of any type \(a\) , as an expression of type \(a\) that rigidly returns the value that \(\alpha_a\) receives at the i-world. The axiomatization and completeness proofs are generalizations of those found in propositional and first-order hybrid logic, and (as is usual inhybrid logic) we automatically obtain a wide range of completeness results for stronger logics and languages. Our approach is deliberately low-tech. We don’t, for example, make use of Montague’s intensional type s, or Fitting-style intensional models; we build, as simply as we can, hybrid logicover Henkin’s logic.     

Acquisition and decision in visual same-different search of letter displays

From 2 to 23 capital As, Bs, and Cs were positioned randomly over visual displays varying in sizefrom5 to 10deg square and in luminance from7 to 250cd/m², The task was to decide whether all letters were the same or one was different from the rest. Instructions stressed accuracy, and responses were 97% correct. Three experiments with 50 observers varied amount of practice, number of letters (N), and size and luminance of the display. All experiments produced a linear invariance between mean “same” \((\bar S)\) and mean “different” \((\bar D)\) response times in seconds with N as the parameter: \(\bar D\) ? \(\bar S\) /2+4. The data are consistent with Krueger’s same-different decision theory, and with the separation of acquisition from decision processes.     

The sampling distribution ofd′

The distribution of sample $\hat d's$ , although mathematically intractable, can be tabulated readily by computer. Such tabulations reveal a number of interesting properties of this distribution, including: (1) sample $\hat d's$ are biased, with an expected value that can be higher or lower than the true value, depending on the sample size, the true value itself, and the convention adopted for handling cases in which the sample $\hat d'$ is undefined; (2) the variance of $\hat d'$ also depends on the convention adopted for handling cases in which the sample $\hat d'$ is undefined and is in some cases poorly approximated by the standard approximation formula, (3) the standard formula for a confidence interval for $\hat d'$ is quite accurate with at least 50–100 trials per condition, but more accurate intervals can be obtained by direct computation with smaller samples.     

Disjunctions in closure spaces

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: a closure space X has an 〈α, δ, Q〉-regular base of the power \(\mathfrak{n}\) iff X is Q-embeddable in \(B_{\alpha ,\delta }^\mathfrak{n} \) It is a generalization of the following theorems:

1. Stone representation theorem for distributive lattices (α = 0, δ = ω, Q = ω),
2. universality of the Alexandroff's cube for T ₀-topological spaces (α = ω, δ = ∞, Q = 0),
3. universality of the closure space of filters in the lattice of all subsets for 〈α, δ〉-closure spaces (Q = 0).

By this theorem we obtain some characterizations of the closure space \(F_\mathfrak{m} \) given by the consequence operator for the classical propositional calculus over a formalized language of the zero order with the set of propositional variables of the power \(\mathfrak{m}\) . In particular we prove that a countable closure space X is embeddable with finite disjunctions preserved into F _ω iff X is a consistent closure space satisfying the compactness theorem and X contains a 〈0, ω〉-base consisting of ω-prime sets. This paper is a continuation of [7], [2] and [3].     

A generalization of Kristof's theorem on the trace of certain matrix products

Kristof has derived a theorem on the maximum and minimum of the trace of matrix products of the form \(X_1 \hat \Gamma _1 X_2 \hat \Gamma _2 \cdots X_n \hat \Gamma _n\) where the matrices \(\hat \Gamma _i\) are diagonal and fixed and theX _i vary unrestrictedly and independently over the set of orthonormal matrices. The theorem is a useful tool in deriving maxima and minima of matrix trace functions subject to orthogonality constraints. The present paper contains a generalization of Kristof's theorem to the case where theX _i are merely required to be submatrices of orthonormal matrices and to have a specified maximum rank. The generalized theorem contains the Schwarz inequality as a special case. Various examples from the psychometric literature, illustrating the practical use of the generalized theorem, are discussed.     

What is Nominalistic Mereology?

Hybrid languages are introduced in order to evaluate the strength of “minimal” mereologies with relatively strong frame definability properties. Appealing to a robust form of nominalism, I claim that one investigated language $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {m}}$ is maximally acceptable for nominalistic mereology. In an extension $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {gem}}$ of $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {m}}$ , a modal analog for the classical systems of Leonard and Goodman (J Symb Log 5:45–55, 1940) and Le?niewski (1916) is introduced and shown to be complete with respect to 0-deleted Boolean algebras. We characterize the formulas of first-order logic invariant for $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {gem}}$ -bisimulations.     

Aspects of analytic deduction

Let ? be the ordinary deduction relation of classical first-order logic. We provide an “analytic” subrelation ?³ of ? which for propositional logic is defined by the usual “containment” criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq Atom(\Gamma ),$$ whereas for predicate logic, ?^a is defined by the extended criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq ' Atom(\Gamma ),$$ where Atom(?) $ \subseteq '$ Atom(Γ) means that every atomic formula occurring in ? “essentially occurs” also in Γ. If Γ, ? are quantifier-free, then the notions “occurs” and “essentially occurs” for atoms between Γ and ? coincide. If ? is formalized by Gentzen's calculus of sequents, then we show that ?^a is axiomatizable by a proper fragment of analytic inference rules. This is mainly due to cut elimination. By “analytic inference rule” we understand here a rule r such that, if the sequent over the line is analytic, then so is the sequent under the line. We also discuss the notion of semantic relevance as contrasted to the previous syntactic one. We show that when introducing semantic sequents as axioms, i.e. when extending the pure logical axioms and rules by mathematical ones, the property of syntactic relevance is lost, since cut elimination no longer holds. We conclude that no purely syntactic notion of analytic deduction can ever replace successfully the complex semantico-syntactic deduction we already possess.     

On the axiomatization of finiteK-frames

We find a short way to construct a formula which axiomatizes a given finite frame of the modal logicK, in the sense that for each finite frameA, we construct a formula ωA which holds in those and only those frames in which every formula true inA holds. To obtain this result we find, for each finite model \(\mathfrak{A}\) and each natural numbern, a formula ω \(\mathfrak{A}\) which holds in those and only those models in which every formula true in \(\mathfrak{A}\) , and involving the firstn propositional letters, holds.     

Information closure and the sceptical objection

In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ” among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ” should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ”, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.     

Reconstructing an Open Order from Its Closure, with Applications to Space-Time Physics and to Logic

In his logical papers, Leo Esakia studied corresponding ordered topological spaces and order-preserving mappings. Similar spaces and mappings appear in many other application areas such the analysis of causality in space-time. It is known that under reasonable conditions, both the topology and the original order relation ${\preccurlyeq}$ can be uniquely reconstructed if we know the “interior” ${\prec}$ of the order relation. It is also known that in some cases, we can uniquely reconstruct ${\prec}$ (and hence, topology) from ${\preccurlyeq}$ . In this paper, we show that, in general, under reasonable conditions, the open order ${\prec}$ (and hence, the corresponding topology) can be uniquely determined from its closure ${\preccurlyeq}$ .     

Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logics

In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view \(O\) and wants to interpret a formal language \(L\) , a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for \(L\) in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with \(O\) . Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification. I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism. From those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, showing thus that we can perfectly quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and thus why endorsing an ontological view should have an impact on the kind of logic one should use.     

The dispersions of estimates of sensitivity obtained from four psychophysical procedures: Implications for experimental design

The dispersions of estimates of sensitivity obtained from the yes-no, two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC), matching-to-sample, and same-different tasks were examined to determine which task would be more appropriate to use in a given experimental context. Consideration was given to the effects of corrections for extreme sampled proportions. These corrections result in biased estimators, and hence the mean-square deviation of the sampled values about the population mean [MSD $(\hat d')$ ], rather than that about the mean of the estimates [VAR16 $(\hat d')$ ]> indicates more completely the extent of the error in the estimator. For barely discriminable events (d′ ? 0.5), the yes-no and 2AFC tasks had the lowest values of MSD $(\hat d')$ . However, for very discriminable events (d′ > 3), the same-different and matching-to-sample tasks had lower values of MSD $(\hat d')$ .     

Generalization of Scott's formula for retractions from generalized Alexandroff's cube

In the paper [2] the following theorem is shown: Theorem (Th. 3,5, [2]), If α=0 or δ=∞ or α?δ, then a closure space X is an absolute extensor for the category of 〈α, δ〉 -closure spaces iff a contraction of X is the closure space of all 〈α, δ〉-filters in an 〈α, δ〉-semidistributive lattice. In the case when α=ω and δ=∞, this theorem becomes Scott's theorem: Theorem ([7]). A topological space X is an absolute extensor for the category of all topological spaces iff a contraction of X is a topological space of “Scott's open sets” in a continuous lattice. On the other hand, when α=0 and δ=ω, this theorem becomes Jankowski's theorem: Theorem ([4]). A closure space X is an absolute extensor for the category of all closure spaces satisfying the compactness theorem iff a contraction of X is a closure space of all filters in a complete Heyting lattice. But for separate cases of α and δ, the Theorem 3.5 from [2] is proved using essentialy different methods. In this paper it is shown that this theorem can be proved using, for retraction, one uniform formula. Namely it is proved that if α= 0 or δ= ∞ or α ? δ and \(F_{\alpha ,\delta } \left( L \right) \subseteq B_{\alpha ,\delta }^\mathfrak{n} \) and if L is an 〈α, δ〉-semidistributive lattice, then the function $$r:{\text{ }}B_{\alpha ,\delta }^\mathfrak{n} \to F_{\alpha ,\delta } \left( L \right)$$ such that for x ε ? ( \(\mathfrak{n}\) ): (*) $$r\left( x \right) = inf_L \left\{ {l \in L|\left( {\forall A \subseteq L} \right)x \in C\left( A \right) \Rightarrow l \in C\left( A \right)} \right\}$$ defines retraction, where C is a proper closure operator for \(B_{\alpha ,\delta }^\mathfrak{n} \) . It is also proved that the formula (*) defines retraction for all 〈α, δ〉, whenever L is an 〈α, δ〉 -pseudodistributive lattice. Moreover it is proved that when α=ω and δ=∞, the formula (*) defines identical retraction to the formula given in [7], and when α = 0 and δ=ω, the formula (*) defines identical retraction to the formula given in [4].     

New foundations for counterfactuals

Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that the counterfactual distance in a given context to the closest \(A\) -worlds equals \(n\) , and no further information that is not admissible in this context, should equal \(n\) . Under the two assumptions that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.     

Necessary and sufficient factors in classical conditioning

The issue of necessary and sufficient factors (pairing-contiguity vs. contingency-correlation) in classical (Pavlovian) excitatory conditioning is examined: first, in terms of definitional (logical) and manipulational requirements of “necessary” and “sufficient”; second, in terms of Boolean logic test models indicating experimental and control manipulations in tests of pairing and contingency as necessary and sufficient factors; and, third, by a selective review of reference experiments showing appropriate experimental and control manipulations of pairing and contingency indicated in the Boolean logic test models. Results of examination show pairing-contiguity as the sole necessary and sufficient factor for excitatory conditioning, while contingency-correlation is conceptualized as a modulating factor controlling minimal-maximal effects of pairingcontiguity. Reservations and diagnostic experiments are indicated to assess effects of uncontrolled conditioned stimulus—unconditioned stimulus \((\overline {CS} - US)\) probability characteristics (e.g., p (CS ∩ US)/p \((\overline {CS} \cap US)\) in truly random (TR) schedule manipulations). Similar analysis of conditioned inhibition reveals insufficient evidence to support a choice among current alternatives.     

Dependence and Independence

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have.