共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Andrew Moon 《Synthese》2012,184(3):287-297
Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current
debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only
if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this
paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows.
Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge
and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true. I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on
Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second
part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible
cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief.
Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show
that this argument fails. 相似文献
6.
7.
8.
Ludger Jansen 《Topoi》2007,26(1):153-158
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.