Alice-in-Wonderland terminological usage in, and communicational concerns about, that peculiarly American flight of technological fancy. The CQT polygraph

Alice-in-Wonderland (AW) terminological usage employs basic terms in a systematically misleading and taxonomically anarchic way. The so-called "control" question "test" (CQT) polygraph procedure, which enjoys a controversial but nevertheless scientific status in North America, involves such AW terminological usage. The basic concepts of "test," "control," and "quantification" are loosely employed. There is loose talk about the "detection of deception," which generates the paradox that in the CQT it is in the innocent that deception should be detected. Moreover, deception is not really assessed either in the CQT or in the more scientically-based Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Finally, there is loose practice in evaluating the CQT, which should not be primarily assessed in terms of its overall accuracy, but in terms of its specific effects in improving accuracy through the provision of physiological information to the examiner. Such as assessment has not been carried out even in laboratory analogues of polygraphy. The treatment of the CQT exemplifies most psychophysiologists' reluctance to treat basic definitional issues seriously, and also means that opponents of the CQT are unable to communicate clearly about it with non-psychophysiologist professionals and with the lay community.     

Effects of socialization on the physiological detection of deception

Effects of socialization on the physiological detection of deception using the control question test (CQT) were explored in three mock crime experiments. Subjects were 168 volunteers from criminal, community, and college student populations. Socialization was measured by the Socialization (So) scale of the California Psychological Inventory. All subjects were given a CQT using standard field techniques. The physiological data were blindly evaluated by a semiobjective field scoring technique and previously developed discriminant function. There were no effects of socialization on the accuracy of classification by the semiobjective field scoring or the discriminant function. A modest negative relationship was found between socialization scores and differential reactivity in the CQT as indicated by correlations with the semiobjective (r = −.22) and discriminant scores (r = −.17). It was concluded that socialization is not an important variable for field applications of the CQT.     

A social-cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: Activation-decision-construction-action theory

Little is known about the cognition of deception (Gombos, 2006). We propose a cognitive account of serious lying (i.e., deception involving high stakes) in response to a solicitation of a truth: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). Built on the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of answering questions deceptively (Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003), the theory elaborates on the roles of executive processes, theory of mind, emotions, motivation, specifies cognitive processing thoroughly, and considers the rehearsal of lies. ADCAT's four processing components are (a) activation of the truth, the (b) decision whether and how to alter deceptively the information shared, (c) construction of a deception, and (d) action [acting sincere while delivering a lie]. Core constructs are “theory of mind” and “cognitive resources”. Specifically, throughout serious deception, individuals are inferring the current or potential mental states of targets and taking steps to minimize the allocation of cognitive resources during delivery to appear honest and lie well.     

Trial by polygraph: Scientific and juridical issues in lie detection

The present article examines two methods of polygraph-assisted lie detection: the Control Question Technique (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Technique (GKT). It presents the rationale for both, arguing that only the latter is well grounded in psychological theory. It then surveys the empirical support for claims of the polygraph's ability to detect deception, arguing that such support often comes from studies that are methodologically flawed by contamination of various sorts—especially studies of the CQT. The article then explores the legal implications of introducing polygraph test results, as presently gathered, into the criminal courtroom.     

The effects of suspiciousness of deception and the perceived legitimacy of deception on task performance in an attitude change experiment1

Subjects participated in two immediately consecutive experiments In the first, they either experienced a deception and debriefing, learned about deception in the abstract, did not learn about deception In the second, they either did or did not hear a reference to the possibility of a deception in that experiment A measure of incidental learning of the message in the second experiment showed that experiencing deception and learning about it in the abstract were not functionally equivalent, that only experiencing deception tended to produce absolute bias, that this bias was probably caused by “vigilance” rather than by “negativism,” that the reference to deception before the second experiment did not itself cause bias, and that the reference eliminated the difference in performance due to experiencing a deception as opposed to only learning about it in the abstract Furthermore, suspiciousness and the reported legitimacy of deception were positively related to each other at the group mean level Separating out their contribution to experimental performance showed that they complexly interacted to determine performance. These results were discussed with reference to the fear that subjects who have heard about deception from friends might perform differently from subjects who have not, with reference to the necessity for deception in some attitude change research, with reference to one alternative to deception, and with reference to explanations of why some experiments have shown no relationship between suspiciousness and experimental performance while others have shown a negative relationship     

Sexualstrafrecht,Sexualmoral, Medienmoral

The law on sexual offences is a crystallization point of legal doctrine and criminal political dispute. It reflects in a special way the tendency and content of a “modernization”, which is characterized by an alienation of collectives and an orientation to a topus of being strictly personal and is defined as quasi-natural. The current hypertrophization of the legal protection of self-determination is closely coupled with the tendency towards socioeconomic dissolution of the western contemporary personhood. This article addresses terminological and systematic associations between “liberal” concepts of governmental restraint and “modern” concepts of a functional security strategy.     

欺骗识别的准确率：影响因素与提高途径

欺骗是一种常见的社会现象,通过观察他人的行为表现识别欺骗则是人们的一项重要能力。研究表明,人们的欺骗识别能力仅仅略微高于随机水平。本文关注基于行为线索的欺骗识别研究。首先,介绍欺骗识别的准确率;然后,结合Brunswik的透镜模型从欺骗线索的有效性和欺骗线索的利用两方面分析识别准确率的影响因素;并在此基础上探讨了提高识别准确率的途径。最后,对未来可能的研究方向进行展望。     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

Time,quantum mechanics,and tense

The relational approach to tense holds that “the now”, “passage”, and “becoming” are to be understood in terms of relations between events. The debate over the adequacy of this framework is illustrated by a comparative study of the sense in which physical theories, (in)deterministic and (non)relativistic, can lend expression to the metaphysics at issue. The objective is not to settle the matter, but to clarify the nature of this metaphysics and to establish that the same issues are at stake in the relational approach to value-definiteness and probability in quantum mechanics. They concern the existence of a unique present, respectively actuality, and a notion of identity over time that cannot be paraphrased in terms of relations.     

The privileging of ‘Support-From-Below’ in early spatial language acquisition

Spatial terms that encode support (e.g., “on”, in English) are among the first to be understood by children across languages (e.g., Bloom, 1973; Johnston & Slobin, 1979). Such terms apply to a wide variety of support configurations, including Support-From-Below (SFB; cup on table) and Mechanical Support, such as stamps on envelopes, coats on hooks, etc. Research has yet to delineate infants’ semantic space for the term “on” when considering its full range of usage. Do infants initially map “on” to a very broad, highly abstract category – one including cups on tables, stamps on envelopes, etc.? Or do infants begin with a much more restricted interpretation - mapping “on” to certain configurations over others? Much infant cognition research suggests that SFB is an event category that infants learn about early - by five months of age (Baillargeon & DeJong, 2017) - raising the possibility that they may also begin by interpreting the word “on” as referring to configurations like cups on tables, rather than stamps on envelopes. Further, studies examining language production suggests that children and adults map the basic locative expression (BE on, in English) to SFB over Mechanical Support (Landau et al., 2016). We tested the hypothesis that this ‘privileging’ of SFB in early infant cognition and child and adult language also characterizes infants’ language comprehension. Using the Intermodal-Preferential-Looking-Paradigm in combination with infant eye-tracking, 20-month-olds were presented with two support configurations: SFB and Mechanical, Support-Via-Adhesion (henceforth, SVA). Infants preferentially mapped “is on” to SFB (rather than SVA) suggesting that infants differentiate between two quite different kinds of support configurations when mapping spatial language to these two configurations and more so, that SFB is privileged in early language understanding of the English spatial term “on”.     

Examining different types of comparison questions in a field study of CQT polygraph technique: Theoretical and practical implications

Two types of questions are most important in the CQT polygraph examination, relevant questions that deal directly with the case under query and comparison questions, which usually deal with past probable misdeeds of the examinees that they choose to deny. The simplistic core reasoning behind the CQT is that the risk of being detected for lying is a threatening situation and like any kind of threat, it automatically triggers the autonomic nervous system to respond with the “fight or flight” type of reaction. For the deceptive examinee, the relevant questions pose the main threat, whereas the truthful examinee, knowing that he is telling the truth on the relevant issue while probably lying to the comparison questions, perceives the latter as more threatening, considering his goal to appear truthful on the test. Accordingly, the deceptive examinee reactions are focused on the relevant questions, whereas the truthful focuses them on the comparison ones. Results of the current field study suggest that at least with truthful examinees, comparison questions, which do not incorporate any lies to be afraid of their exposure, or any lies at all, might function similarly to probable lie questions, by just increasing their salience in a manner that presumably creates some concerns about them. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in line with the RIG strength notion (Ginton, 2009 ).     

It's not what you are,it's what you know: experience,beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews

This study investigated the ability of more or less experienced employment interviewers and laypersons to detect deception in employment interviews. Although correct beliefs about indicators of deception led to higher deception detection accuracy, more experienced employment interviewers did not show more accurate beliefs about indicators of deception and did not perform better at detecting deception than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. Furthermore, more experienced interviewers showed a less‐pronounced tendency of judging messages as true irrespective of their actual truthfulness (truth bias) than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. It is suggested that experience in employment interviewing does not automatically lead to higher deception detection abilities in employment interviews, but that correcting people's beliefs about indicators of deception can do so.     

Effectiveness of debriefing after a stress-producing deception

This experiment was carried out to determine if after deceiving Ss an E had sufficient credibility to effectively debrief the Ss. Ss in two stress groups were given false information indicating that when a signal light came on they would receive painful electric shocks. Ss in a no-stress group were not told about shocks. After being given the threatening instructions, Ss in one of the stress groups were debriefed concerning the deception (but the “shock electrodes” were not removed) while Ss in the other group were not debriefed. After this the signal light came on for all groups. Arousal was measured by pulse rates and self-reports. The results revealed that (a) the instructions about electric shocks increased the arousal levels of the two stress groups relative to the no-stress group, thus indicating that the deception was effective, and (b) after the signal light came on the stress group which had not been debriefed continued to show a high degree of arousal while the stress group which had been debriefed showed a reduction of arousal to the same low level of arousal as the no-stress group, thus indicating that the process of debriefing had been effective.     

“真实无妄”和“真诚不欺”——程颐关于“诚”的本体理论建构

“诚”在程颐易学中是与“天理”等同的本体范畴,即“诚者,实理也”。程颐释“诚”为无妄和不欺两个方面。天道之“诚”为真实无妄,天地流转、化育万物的过程是无妄的,无妄则必然不欺;人道之“诚”为“真诚不欺”,不欺于天地鬼神,不欺人也不自欺,是人伦最基本的道德规范,也是君道感通天下而治天下的惟一途径,做到绝对不欺亦是无妄。程颐基于《周易》从天道、人道两方面对“诚”进行了全方位解读,并将天人合一的最高境界描述为“诚”,由此建构了关于“诚”的本体理论。     

“Do I really need it?”: An explorative study of acceptance and usage of in-vehicle technology

The vehicle is increasingly equipped with additional technology assisting and entertaining the driver. To improve the systems and increase their usage, it is important to understand what influences the acceptance of technology in the vehicle. An online survey was conducted assessing which systems drivers own and use in their vehicles today. For the equipped systems, the reasons why N = 304 drivers do not use their in-vehicle technology were qualitatively explored. An inductive content analysis revealed 13 categories in total. The three categories “Need”, “Context and Task”, and “Reliability” were associated with Perceived Usefulness while “Increased Effort” and “Aversion” were associated with Perceived Ease of Use (Venkatesh, 2000). In addition, the influencing factors are further extended with the “Preference for Own Action”, “Distrust”, “Safety”, “Knowledge”, and “Habit”. The findings reveal subjectively important antecedents of the acceptance of in-vehicle technology and provide new insights, especially on usage barriers. An Integrated Acceptance Model (IAM) is derived from the identified categories to inform future research and facilitate a holistic view on factors influencing technology acceptance.     

Apparent movement and metacontrast suppression: A decisional analysis

Three test and three mask energies were varied orthogonally and randomly over trials. The stimulus onset asynchrony (ISOA) separating test and mask was varied between trial blocks within each of two display conditions, apparent movement (two-object) and metacontrast (threeobject). Subjects were required to makebrightness judgments of both test and mask energies by responding “bright,” “medium,” or “dim” with respect to the apparent intensity of each stimulus. The accuracy and the coherence lconsistencyt of test judgments were U-shaped functions of SOA for both apparent movement and metacontrast situations. However, the accuracy and the coherence of mask judgments did not vary with SOA for either apparent movement or metacontrast. It was noted that substantially the same results have been reported previously when subjects were required to makecontour judgments. Hence, it is argued that apparent movement and metacontrast suppression are intimately related.     

How to be a type-C physicalist

This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the “a priori entailment thesis” (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, “cosmic hermeneutics” is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent “epistemic gaps” between phenomenal and physical truths. The two are generally seen as incompatible, since the demon’s deductions seem to presuppose analytic connections between physical and phenomenal terms. I begin by arguing, in support of the APET, that implications from the complete truths of physics to phenomenal truths cannot be a posteriori. Such implications are (according to the physicalist) necessarily true. But they cannot be Kripke-style a posteriori necessities, since (according to the physicalist) the complete truths of physics fix any relevant a posteriori facts about the reference of terms. I then show how the physicalist can turn the tables: the demon can exploit the physical fixing of reference to bridge the gap between the vocabularies, by deducing when phenomenal and physical terms co-refer. This opens the way for a “type-C” physicalism, which accepts in-principle deducibility while still appealing to analytic independence to explain why we (who are not demons) find it impossible to see phenomenal-physical connections a priori.     

POLITICAL LIBERALISM,BASIC LIBERTIES,AND LEGAL PATERNALISM

This essay argues that neutral paternalism (NP) is problematic for antiperfectionist liberal theories. Section 2 raises textual evidence that Rawlsian liberalism does not oppose and may even support NP. In section 3, I cast doubt on whether NP should have a place in political liberalism by defending a partially comprehensive conception of the good I call “moral capacity at each moment,” or MCEM, that is inconsistent with NP. I then explain why MCEM is a reasonable conception on Rawls's account of reasonableness. In section 4, I handle concerns that showing NP fails the test of Rawlsian public justification is a nonstarter since NP does not threaten any of our basic liberties. I sketch an argument that, if this is so, the burden is on political liberalism to defend its particular account of basic liberties, since MCEM is reasonable on Rawlsian grounds. More precisely, MCEM is a conception that challenges the way Rawls characterizes basic liberties; that is, his list of basic liberties should be more inclusive by political liberalism's own structural commitments, including Rawls's “liberal principle of legitimacy.” On this revised account, political liberalism can mount a strong opposition to hard legal paternalism.     

GITAI GO: The Art of Deepening Everyday Life Through Exceeding Codes

The present commentary is focused on exploring holistic ways to approach sense-making processes by following the usage of specific Japanese mimic words, Gitai go, and describing how its functioning cannot be disengaged from an embodied lens to approach language-in-use. In fact, according to Komatsu’s (2010) discussion about the extension of meaning derived from Gitai go and its intrinsic flexible characteristics, it is possible—in terms of semiotics—to inquire into vaguely coded systems of mutual understanding, trying to make sense of the general functioning of signs through their peculiar ambiguity as well as their potential to evoke a vivid negotiation of meaning. This seems to show the openness of meaning highlighted by Gitai go, as it is to be referred to the logic of multiplicity deeply linked with the actors’ feelings in the setting that could in general terms be labeled as the carnal knowledge. Furthermore, it has been arguing about the complexity of daily life experience and its close relation to a concept of “ordinary art”, as the active involvement people show in imagining, changing and creating their personal experience of the world is always performed in their day-by-day frameworks, deeply suggesting a unique strive for appropriating-negotiating-contesting networks of meanings. And this is to be approached as an artistic mode of experiencing, since art too is just embedded in this ever-emerging ambivalence coming from the complex we call “ordinary life” and relating to our deep feelings of facing our futures. Along these lines I suggest that a particular role exists in communicative messages for what is labeled as “redundant” or “superfluous”—since the ambivalence of those messages explicates the dialogical frame of sense-making, in everyday life as a concept of art.     

Post-iconic visual storage: chunking in the reproduction of briefly displayed visual patterns

Two experiments are reported which investigate the organization of visuospatial information in post-iconic storage. In both experiments, stimuli consisting of 10 disks randomly placed in a four-by-five array were tachistoscopically presented to subjects whose task was to recreate the pattern. In Experiment 2, reproduction was constrained (on a row-by-row basis) while in Experiment 1 it was unconstrained. The results of Experiment 1 showed that subjects recalled in terms of “chunks” of spatially adjacent disks, with most “chunks” consisting of about three of four disks. Within each sequence of 10 responses the probability of correctly recalling a chunk decreased with its serial position but was relatively independent of chunk size per se (for chunks containing seven or less disks). In addition, clear topographical variations in accuracy were found, which tended to covary strongly with order of recall. In Experiment 2, the order of reproduction was prespecified (either top row down to bottom row, or bottom row up to top row) in order to induce chunking by rows. The direction of reproduction was either pre- or post-cued. The results of this study showed that subjects encode the stimulus, wherever possible, in a form which is compatible with the constraints imposed on recall order. The results for the postcued conditions provide strong support for the argument that topographical variations in accuracy are a function of variations in accuracy of encoding, and not simply a function of order of report. The results are discussed in terms of an attentional model. It is proposed that a general “anticipatory schema” (cf. Neisser, Cognition and Reality 1976) presets the distribution of attention in the visual field, preselects a set of coding heuristics, and subsequently interacts with the present stimulus pattern. Spatial discontinuities in the distribution of attention resulting from this interaction are regarded as “defining” chunks of stimulus elements.