Know thy sound: Perceiving self and others in musical contexts

This review article provides a summary of the findings from empirical studies that investigated recognition of an action's agent by using music and/or other auditory information. Embodied cognition accounts ground higher cognitive functions in lower level sensorimotor functioning. Action simulation, the recruitment of an observer's motor system and its neural substrates when observing actions, has been proposed to be particularly potent for actions that are self-produced. This review examines evidence for such claims from the music domain. It covers studies in which trained or untrained individuals generated and/or perceived (musical) sounds, and were subsequently asked to identify who was the author of the sounds (e.g., the self or another individual) in immediate (online) or delayed (offline) research designs. The review is structured according to the complexity of auditory–motor information available and includes sections on: 1) simple auditory information (e.g., clapping, piano, drum sounds), 2) complex instrumental sound sequences (e.g., piano/organ performances), and 3) musical information embedded within audiovisual performance contexts, when action sequences are both viewed as movements and/or listened to in synchrony with sounds (e.g., conductors' gestures, dance). This work has proven to be informative in unraveling the links between perceptual–motor processes, supporting embodied accounts of human cognition that address action observation. The reported findings are examined in relation to cues that contribute to agency judgments, and their implications for research concerning action understanding and applied musical practice.     

Conflict in the kitchen: Contextual modulation of responsiveness to affordances

Recently, human behavior has been considered the product of continuous interactions between perception, cognition and action in which “affordances” (action possibilities the environment has to offer) play an important role. Converging evidence suggests that multiple action possibilities simultaneously compete for further processing, while external and internal factors (e.g., incoming sensory information, predictions) bias this competition. In the present study we used a stop-task to investigate whether context is able to modulate the strength of the responsiveness to affordances. We therefore placed participants in an actual kitchen and workshop during electroencephalographic recordings. A faster response to context congruent objects demonstrated that the direct surrounding is able to affect responsiveness to affordances. In addition, when responses needed to be withheld, context congruent objects evoked greater response conflict as indicated by an enhanced N2 Event Related Potential (ERP) component.     

Rotating With Rotated Text: A Natural Behavior Approach to Investigating Cognitive Offloading

Determining how we use our body to support cognition represents an important part of understanding the embodied and embedded nature of cognition. In the present investigation, we pursue this question in the context of a common perceptual task. Specifically, we report a series of experiments investigating head tilt (i.e., external normalization) as a strategy in letter naming and reading stimuli that are upright or rotated. We demonstrate that the frequency of this natural behavior is modulated by the cost of stimulus rotation on performance. In addition, we demonstrate that external normalization can benefit performance. All of the results are consistent with the notion that external normalization represents a form of cognitive offloading and that effort is an important factor in the decision to adopt an internal or external strategy.     

Towards a common processing architecture underlying Simon and SNARC effects

It has been shown repeatedly that relatively small numbers are responded to faster with the left hand and relatively large numbers are responded to faster with the right hand. This so-called SNARC effect (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993) is thought to arise through activation of irrelevant spatial codes associated with the magnitude of the number. This conflict between irrelevant magnitude information and the response is conceptually similar to the well-known Simon effect. Recently, both Mapelli, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2003) and Keus and Schwarz (in press) directly compared both effects in a single task within the framework of the additive factor method (Sternberg, 1969). While Mapelli et al. found additive effects of SNARC and Simon levels, suggesting different processing stages, Keus and Schwarz found that the SNARC effect depended on the compatibility level of the Simon task leading them to propose a common origin at the response selection stage. In the present study we demonstrate in 2 experiments that the relationship between Simon and SNARC depends on the relevance of the magnitude code, thereby violating one of the core assumptions of the AFM. Instead we propose a temporal overlap model to interpret the relationship between these effects which allows to commensurate apparently divergent outcomes.     

Individual differences in athletes' perception of expressive body movements

ObjectivesUnderstanding others' actions depends on the observer's individual characteristics and sensorimotor experience. Motor performance domains, such as sports and the performing arts, provide optimal situations to investigate the determinants of action perception. We investigated athletes' perceptual identification of expression intensity in body movements.DesignA within-subjects design was used.MethodParticipants watched point-light displays (1000 ms long) depicting expressive and inexpressive dance movements. The task was to identify the dancer's intended expression intensity.ResultsThe results indicate that expressive body movements can be reliably identified, with judgement accuracy correlating with self-report empathy indices, intuitive/deliberate decision-making preferences, and indices of sports training. Only years of sports training could predict perceptual identification accuracy.ConclusionsWe discuss the findings in relation to motor and cognitive–emotional contributions to action simulation. The potential of cross-domain transfer of motor expertise for boosting perceptual judgements and a hierarchical role of factors eliciting action simulation are also outlined.     

Expert athletes activate somatosensory and motor planning regions of the brain when passively listening to familiar sports sounds

The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural response to familiar and unfamiliar, sport and non-sport environmental sounds in expert and novice athletes. Results revealed differential neural responses dependent on sports expertise. Experts had greater neural activation than novices in focal sensorimotor areas such as the supplementary motor area, and pre- and postcentral gyri. Novices showed greater activation than experts in widespread areas involved in perception (i.e. supramarginal, middle occipital, and calcarine gyri; precuneus; inferior and superior parietal lobules), and motor planning and processing (i.e. inferior frontal, middle frontal, and middle temporal gyri). These between-group neural differences also appeared as an expertise effect within specific conditions. Experts showed greater activation than novices during the sport familiar condition in regions responsible for auditory and motor planning, including the inferior frontal gyrus and the parietal operculum. Novices only showed greater activation than experts in the supramarginal gyrus and pons during the non-sport unfamiliar condition, and in the middle frontal gyrus during the sport unfamiliar condition. These results are consistent with the view that expert athletes are attuned to only the most familiar, highly relevant sounds and tune out unfamiliar, irrelevant sounds. Furthermore, these findings that athletes show activation in areas known to be involved in action planning when passively listening to sounds suggests that auditory perception of action can lead to the re-instantiation of neural areas involved in producing these actions, especially if someone has expertise performing the actions.     

Empathy framework for embodied conversational agents

Empathy is a complex socio-emotional behavior that results from the interaction between affective and cognitive mechanisms. Equipping embodied conversational agents (ECAs) with empathic capacity can benefit from the integration and evaluation of these low and high level capabilities in a hierarchical manner. Following the theoretical background on empathic behavior in humans, this paper presents a framework to equip ECAs with real time multi-modal empathic interaction capabilities. We present the implementation of this framework, which includes basic dialogue capabilities as well as three levels of empathic behavior in a conversational scenario. Our approach is an inclusive stand on modeling levels of empathy and provides a baseline behavior for empathic interaction.     

Altered attention for stimuli on the hands

Attention operates in the space near the hands with unique, action-related priorities. Here, we examined how attention treats objects on the hands themselves. We tested two hypotheses. First, attention may treat stimuli on the hands like stimuli near the hands, as though the surface of the hands were the proximal case of near-hand space. Alternatively, we proposed that the surface of the hands may be attentionally distinct from the surrounding space. Specifically, we predicted that attention should be slow to orient toward the hands in order to remain entrained to near-hand space, where the targets of actions are usually located. In four experiments, we observed delayed orienting of attention on the hands compared to orienting attention near or far from the hands. Similar delayed orienting was also found for tools connected to the body compared to tools disconnected from the body. These results support our second hypothesis: attention operates differently on the functional surfaces of the hand. We suggest this effect serves a functional role in the execution of manual actions.     

Neural evidence for the interplay between language, gesture, and action: a review

Co-speech gestures embody a form of manual action that is tightly coupled to the language system. As such, the co-occurrence of speech and co-speech gestures is an excellent example of the interplay between language and action. There are, however, other ways in which language and action can be thought of as closely related. In this paper we will give an overview of studies in cognitive neuroscience that examine the neural underpinnings of links between language and action. Topics include neurocognitive studies of motor representations of speech sounds, action-related language, sign language and co-speech gestures. It will be concluded that there is strong evidence on the interaction between speech and gestures in the brain. This interaction however shares general properties with other domains in which there is interplay between language and action.     

Empathy,Respect, and Vulnerability

ABSTRACT

This paper reconsiders Heather Battaly’s argument that empathy is not a virtue. Like Battaly, I argue that empathy is a disposition that includes elements of virtue acquisition, but is not in itself a virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Unlike Battaly, however, I propose a distinction between care and respect. Drawing on Darwall’s view of recognition respect as well as on phenomenologically inspired views of empathy, I argue that respect can be regarded as the moral feeling that is distinctive of empathy. In my view, the feeling of respect towards another’s situated experience grants epistemic dignity, which is the recognition of the intrinsic significance of subjective experience. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the relation between empathy and respect can be relevant for an account of vulnerability that is not opposed to autonomy.     

Unintended embodiment of concepts into percepts: Sensory activation boosts attention for same-modality concepts in the attentional blink paradigm

This study shows that sensory priming facilitates reports of same-modality concepts in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants had to detect and report two target words (T1 and T2) presented for 53 ms each among a series of nonwords distractors at a frequency of up to 19 items per second. SOA between target words was set to 53 ms or 213 ms, with reduced attention expected for T2 under the longer SOA (attentional blink) and for T1 under the shorter SOA (lag-1 sparing). These effects were found but reduced when the sensory modality of the concepts matched that of a sensory stimulation occurring prior to the detection trial. Hence, sensory activation increased report for same-modality concepts. This finding reveals that grounded cognition effects (1) are involved in conceptual processing as soon as a word has reached the point of lexical identification and (2) occur independent of intentional access to sensory properties of concepts.     

儿童移情与道德发展关系研究综述

移情是人际交往中情感的相互作用,是对他人情绪的觉察而导致自己情绪唤起的一种情感体验。培养儿童的移情对儿童的道德发展具有重要作用。本文从移情的概念入手,介绍和探讨儿童移情与道德发展的关系研究状况,并对儿童的移情培养提出建议。     

Empathy present and future

The empathy concept has central significance for social and personality psychology and in many other domains, including neuroscience, clinical/abnormal psychology, and the health professions. However, the current diversity in conceptual and operational definitions, and the promiscuous use of the term “empathy,” threaten the ability of researchers to advance the field. The present article provides a quantitative review and conceptual analysis of empathy definitions and usages by examining 393 studies published between 2001 and 2013, and 96 studies published in 2017. We document the prevalence and diversity of definitions, as well as inconsistencies between conceptual definitions and measurements employed. We discuss ways to refine the conceptualization and operationalization of the empathy construct, including for many purposes, bypassing the term empathy in favor of lower-level construct labels that more precisely describe what is actually being measured. In many cases we see no added theoretical or empirical value in applying the term empathy.     

Being (un)moved by mental time travel

Mental imagery of events in the past or future, and of unpleasant or pleasant events, has been found to lead to spontaneous backward/forward bodily motions. Both time and emotion are represented along a spatial continuum, and activation of these representations seems to be simulated in spontaneous changes in body posture. We performed a conceptual replication and extension of an earlier study by Miles, Nind, and Macrae (2010) who reported clear postural effects when thinking of the past and the future. We additionally tested whether changes in posture appear when thinking of an emotional event. Volunteers engaged in mental imagery, involving combinations of time intervals and emotions. We simultaneously recorded center-of-pressure (COP) changes. Results revealed neither an effect of imagery of time nor of emotion on body posture. We conclude that embodied effects of imagery of abstract items on body posture may be less robust than suggested by previous literature.     

Tone‐affect compatibility with affective stimuli and affective responses

Three experiments examine multimodal integration of tone pitch (high/low), facial expression stimuli (happy/angry), and responses (happy/angry) in a compatibility paradigm. When the participants' task is to imitate facial expressions (Experiment 1), smiles are facilitated by high tones whereas frowns are facilitated by low tones. Experiments 2 and 3 further analyse this effect and show that there is both integration between the tone stimulus and the facial stimulus and between the tone stimulus and the facial response. Results suggest that pitch height is associated with emotion. An interpretation in terms of an embodied cognition approach that emphasizes an interweavement of perception and action is discussed.     

Putting action in perspective

Embodied approaches to cognition propose that our own actions influence our understanding of the world. Do other people's actions also have this influence? The present studies show that perceiving another person's actions changes the way people think about objects in a scene. In Study 1, participants viewed a photograph and answered a question about the location of one object relative to another. The question either did or did not call attention to an action being performed in the scene. Studies 2 and 3 focused on whether depicting an action in a scene influenced perspective choice. Across all studies, drawing attention to action, whether verbally or pictorially, led observers to encode object locations from the actor's spatial perspective. Study 4 demonstrated that the tendency to adopt the actor's perspective might be mediated by motor experience.     

Switching between sensory and affective systems incurs processing costs

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition to non-emotional concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans.     

Embodiment of motor skills when observing expert and novice athletes

If people are shown a dynamic movie of an action such as kicking a soccer ball or hitting a tennis ball, they will respond to it faster if it requires the same effector. This standard congruency effect was reported to reverse when participants viewed static images of famous athletes not actually performing an action. It was suggested that the congruent response was inhibited because of a social contrast effect, based on an implied action, whereby responders viewed themselves as comparatively worse than the professional athlete. The present study recorded hand and foot responses when identifying static images of both famous and novice athletes in soccer and tennis. The action was either explicit or implied. In Experiment 1, a standard congruency effect was found for all images. In Experiment 2, when a response was based on the identity of the athlete rather than their expertise, the standard congruency effect was enhanced for images of novice athletes, but was eliminated for experts, suggesting a social contrast effect. Our study is the first to show that embodiment effects can be seen for implied and explicit action images of both novices and experts, and that static images are capable of eliciting priming effects associated with sport-relevant effector pairings.     

Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim the prospective structural continuity from early and simple actions to later complex projects of serially-ordered actions confirms the existence of an ontogenetically primary form of content–directedness that is a driver for learning and development. Its implications for understanding autism are discussed.     

Perceptual processing affects conceptual processing

According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition ( Barsalou, 1999 ), modality-specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property-verification task in alternation. Responses on the property-verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This finding of a modality-switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems.