Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.     

Age Differences in Correction of Context-Induced Biases: Source Monitoring and Timing of Accountability

The present study tested strategies to help older adults correct their context-induced biases. Two hundred and seventy-two young and older adults participated in this study. Participants read vignettes about two target persons, with true statements printed in black and false statements (either positive or negative trait information) printed in red. Participants in the no-strategy condition were asked to rate the target persons on the relevant trait scales immediately after reading the vignettes. Participants in the feedback condition took a traditional source memory test and received feedback of correct sources of true and false statements. For the participants in the next two conditions, accountability was induced either before or after they encoded information about the target persons. It was found that the feedback manipulation helped older adults correct their context-induced biases. In addition, accountability induced before encoding helped older adults reduce their context-induced biases, whereas accountability induced after encoding did not help.     

False memories: young and older adults think of semantic associates at the same rate, but young adults are more successful at source monitoring

Two experiments explored whether the higher vulnerability to false memories in the DRM (J. Deese, 1959; H. L. Roediger & K. B. McDermott, 1995) paradigm in older compared to young adults reflects a deficit in source monitoring. In both experiments, adding together the number of falsely recalled critical lures and the number of critical lures produced on a post-recall test asking participants to report items that they had thought of but did not recall, indicated that the critical lures were activated during the experiment equally often in young and older adults. However, older adults were more likely than young adults to say that they had actually heard the lures. When strongly encouraged to examine the origin of memories (Experiment 2), the warning substantially reduced false recall in young but not older adults. These results are consistent with the idea that older adults have more difficulty later identifying the source of information that was activated as a consequence of intact semantic activation processes.     

A survey of people's attitudes and beliefs about false confessions

The attitudes and beliefs of jury eligible individuals regarding false confessions were investigated in order to uncover potential biases. Survey respondents provided perceptions of factors related to false confessions (e.g. their frequency and likely situational and dispositional risk variables). Results indicate that people possess an awareness that false confessions can occur and believe that a confession should not be taken as an absolute indicator of guilt. However, their understanding of predisposing and situational factors that contribute to false confessions was incomplete, as was their understanding of interrogation practices. Furthermore, respondents showed a marked bias against believing that they personally would ever falsely confess, which is discussed in the context of potential inconsistencies between people's self-report and their actual behaviors in naturalistic situations.     

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re‐evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account – an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.     

Distraction by competing speech in young and older adult listeners

In 2 experiments, young and older adults heard target speech presented in quiet or with a competing speaker in the background. The distractor consisted either of meaningful speech or nonmeaningful speech composed of randomly ordered word strings (Experiment 1) or speech in an unfamiliar language (Experiment 2). Tests of recall for the target speech showed that older adults, but not younger adults, were impaired more by meaningful distractors than by nonmeaningful distracters. However, on a surprise recognition test, young adults were more likely than older adults to recognize meaningful distractor items. These results suggest that reduced efficiency in attentional control is an important factor in older adults' difficulty in recalling target speech in the presence of a background of competing speech.     

Source monitoring and suggestibility to misinformation: adult age‐related differences

We compared young and older adults' source monitoring performance on an explicit source identification test using the misinformation paradigm. Several age‐related differences in source memory were demonstrated: (a) older adults were more likely than were young adults to say that they saw information that was actually only suggested to them; (b) older adults were more confident in their false memories than were young adults; (c) older adults were less confident in their accurate memory for the source of information than were young adults. Together, the data suggest that older adults either lacked or failed to use helpful diagnostic source information (e.g. perceptual details or temporal information), and that their confidence in their false memories reflected an over‐weighting of semantic information. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modifying memory for a museum tour in older adults: Reactivation-related updating that enhances and distorts memory is reduced in ageing

Memory reactivation, the activation of a latent memory trace when we are reminded of a past experience, strengthens memory but can also contribute to distortions if new information present during reactivation is integrated with existing memory. In a previous study in young adults we found that the quality of memory reactivation, manipulated using the principle of encoding specificity and indexed by recollection ratings, modulated subsequent true and false memories for events experienced during a museum tour. Here in this study, we examined age-related changes in the quality of memory reactivation on subsequent memory. Memories of museum stops in young and older adults were reactivated and then immediately followed by the presentation of a novel lure photo from an alternate tour version (i.e., reactivation plus new information). There was an increase in subsequent true memories for reactivated targets and for subsequent false memories for lures that followed reactivated targets, when compared to baseline target and lure photos. However, the influence of reactivation on subsequent memories was reduced in older adults. These data reveal that ageing alters reactivation-related updating processes that allow memories to be strengthened and updated with new information, consequently reducing memory distortions in older adults compared to young adults.     

Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons

We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy.     

Perceived Control Over Aging-Related Declines: Adaptive Beliefs and Behaviors

ABSTRACT— The belief that people are in control of desired outcomes, including those associated with aging, is a hallmark of American culture. Nevertheless, older adults are less likely than the young to believe there are things that can be done to control aging-related declines in areas such as memory. Within age groups, individual differences in control beliefs are related to cognitive performance, health, and well-being. Mechanisms linking perceived control and positive outcomes include adaptive behaviors such as strategy use and physical activity. There is some evidence that control beliefs can be modified in later life, as illustrated in an intervention for fear of falling. Further work is needed to examine the antecedents of perceived control in later life and the implications of control beliefs in other aging-related domains.     

Unwanted thought: age differences in the correction of social judgements

This study use a false information paradigm to study age differences in the correction of social judgments. Younger and older adults read 2 criminal reports, with true information printed in black and false information in red. Following the reports, all participants were asked to recommend prison terms among other ratings. Age differences in baseline measures were also assessed by corresponding control groups who read only true information. Compared with younger adults under full attention, older adults under full attention and younger adults under divided attention were reliably influenced by the nature of the false statements (either extenuating or exacerbating the severity of the crimes). When contrasted with their relevant control groups, older adults under full attention and younger adults under divided attention failed to correct their social judgments. This study lends support to a processing resource explanation for age differences in the correction process for social judgments.     

Are children’s memory illusions created differently from those of adults? Evidence from levels-of-processing and divided attention paradigms

In two experiments, we investigated the robustness and automaticity of adults’ and children’s generation of false memories by using a levels-of-processing paradigm (Experiment 1) and a divided attention paradigm (Experiment 2). The first experiment revealed that when information was encoded at a shallow level, true recognition rates decreased for all ages. For false recognition, when information was encoded on a shallow level, we found a different pattern for young children compared with that for older children and adults. False recognition rates were related to the overall amount of correctly remembered information for 7-year-olds, whereas no such association was found for the other age groups. In the second experiment, divided attention decreased true recognition for all ages. In contrast, children’s (7- and 11-year-olds) false recognition rates were again dependent on the overall amount of correctly remembered information, whereas adults’ false recognition was left unaffected. Overall, children’s false recognition rates changed when levels of processing or divided attention was manipulated in comparison with adults. Together, these results suggest that there may be both quantitative and qualitative changes in false memory rates with age.     

Familiarity and recognition of faces in old age

Elderly persons exceed young adults in false recognitions of new faces. One account claims there are age-related deficits in memory for context of encounter with faces. Because of these deficits, elderly persons frequently recognize faces on the basis of perceived familiarity (i.e., resemblance to face representations in memory), which is high for some new faces. To test this context-recollection hypothesis, we had young adult and elderly subjects judge whether faces: (1) had been seen previously in a test (though no face was repeated), and (2) were subjectively familiar (though no face was famous). The elderly exceeded the young subjects in seen-before judgements (false recognitions), and only the elderly showed a positive correlation between false recognitions and subjective familiarity. In Experiment 2, this finding was extended from false recognitions to correct recognitions, supporting the view that elderly persons, compared to young adults, rely more on resemblance in recognizing faces.     

Is knowing believing? The role of event plausibility and background knowledge in planting false beliefs about the personal past

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions of plausibility and background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event “received an enema,” a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from “barium enema administered in a hospital” to “home enema for constipation”; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual’s familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.     

Young and older adults' beliefs about effective ways to mitigate age-related memory decline

This study investigated whether young and older adults vary in their beliefs about the impact of various mitigating factors on age-related memory decline. Eighty young (ages 18-23) and 80 older (ages 60-82) participants reported their beliefs about their own memory abilities and the strategies that they use in their everyday lives to attempt to control their memory. Participants also reported their beliefs about memory change with age for hypothetical target individuals who were described as using (or not using) various means to mitigate memory decline. There were no age differences in personal beliefs about control over current or future memory ability. However, the two age groups differed in the types of strategies they used in their everyday life to control their memory. Young adults were more likely to use internal memory strategies, whereas older adults were more likely to focus on cognitive exercise and maintaining physical health as ways to optimize their memory ability. There were no age differences in rated memory change across the life span in hypothetical individuals. Both young and older adults perceived strategies related to improving physical and cognitive health as effective means of mitigating memory loss with age, whereas internal memory strategies were perceived as less effective means for controlling age-related memory decline.     

Age, gender, and individual differences in memory failure appraisal

Young adults (22 men and 24 women) and older adults (24 men and 24 women) rated 12 gender-neutral vignettes describing short-term, long-term, and very-long-term memory failures. Vignette target persons were young (21-32) or older (65-75) men or women. Subjects of both age and gender groups used a double standard: Failures of older targets of both genders were rated as signifying greater mental difficulty than failures of young targets; failures of young targets were attributed to lack of effort and attention. Young subjects judged very-long-term failures more harshly than did older subjects. Subjects' objective memory performance, self-rated memory failure frequency, memory failure discomfort, and depression made little difference in their target person ratings.     

Religious Involvement, Conventional Christian, and Unconventional Nonmaterialist Beliefs

This article uses a Scottish national sample to examine the relationship between church involvement, religious socialization among nonattenders, orthodox Christian beliefs, and a variety of unconventional nonmaterialist beliefs. Greater conventional religious belief is strongly associated with supposed alternatives but nonetheless, nonattenders are more likely to believe in the unconventional over and above any enduring sympathy they may hold for Christian doctrine. One group in particular stands out: belief remains high among nonattenders who once went to services regularly and seriously contemplate reengaging with organized religion. The article discusses the importance of these findings for "believing but not belonging."     

Perceived self-efficacy and everyday problem solving among young and older adults

This research tested the hypothesis that age differences in both self-efficacy perceptions and problem-solving performance would vary as a function of the ecological relevance of problems to young and older adults. The authors developed novel everyday problem-solving stimuli that were ecologically representative of problems commonly confronted by young adults (young-adult problems), older adults (older adult problems), or both (common problems). Performance on an abstract problem solving task lacking in ecological representativeness (the Tower of Hanoi problem) also was examined. Although young persons had higher self-efficacy beliefs and performance levels on the Tower of Hanoi task problem and the young-adult problems, this pattern reversed in the domain of older adult problems, where the self-efficacy beliefs and performance of older persons exceeded those of the young.     

Recognition of familiar and unfamiliar melodies in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease

We tested normal young and elderly adults and elderly Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients on recognition memory for tunes. In Experiment 1, AD patients and age-matched controls received a study list and an old/new recognition test of highly familiar, traditional tunes, followed by a study list and test of novel tunes. The controls performed better than did the AD patients. The controls showed the “mirror effect” of increased hits and reduced false alarms for traditional versus novel tunes, whereas the patients false-alarmed as often to traditional tunes as to novel tunes. Experiment 2 compared young adults and healthy elderly persons using a similar design. Performance was lower in the elderly group, but both younger and older subjects showed the mirror effect. Experiment 3 produced confusion between preexperimental familiarity and intraexperimental familiarity by mixing traditional and novel tunes in the study lists and tests. Here, the subjects in both age groups resembled the patients of Experiment 1 in failing to show the mirror effect. Older subjects again performed more poorly, and they differed qualitatively from younger subjects in setting stricter criteria for more nameable tunes. Distinguishing different sources of global familiarity is a factor in tune recognition, and the data suggest that this type of source monitoring is impaired in AD and involves different strategies in younger and older adults.