Monkey kings make havoc: iconoclasm and murder in the Chinese cultural revolution

This article explores the interplay between destruction of material icons and people during China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when authority figures—teachers, landlords, monks and nuns, bosses, intellectuals, doctors, Party leaders—were ‘struggled against’ by gangs of teenage revolutionaries called Red Guards. There is striking continuity in the rhetoric and the symbolic practices of the Red Guards as they destroyed statues and to a lesser extent, signs, buildings, and books, and as they killed people. Through techniques of demonisation—the affixing of negative iconic values—the rhetoric of destruction moved all too easily from image to body and from body to image. Yet just as iconoclasm is not always the utter annihilation of an iconic object but, more crucially, an attack on its iconicity, the violence against living people which tends to accompany iconoclastic movements often seems to be about stripping away the external signs of identity and then redefining the boundaries between categories of bodies. After a brief survey of four phases of Communist iconoclasm in China, I explore a number of aspects of Chinese iconoclasm which blur the distinctions between icons and bodies, related to conceptions of icons as living, the production of iconic bodies, and the ‘iconoclasm of the habitus.’ These themes are explored in commentary on two products of Cultural Revolution iconoclasm: Born Red, a memoir by Gao Yuan, and Qiao Dianyun's short story ‘The Blank Stele.’     

Winnicott's invitation to ‘further games of Jung‐analysis’

Winnicott signs off his celebrated review of Jung's (1963) autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections with the warning that translation of ‘erreichten’ as ‘attained’ (implying assimilation) rather than as ‘reached to’, could ‘queer the pitch for further games of Jung‐analysis’. This subtly underscores his view that Jung—who he described earlier as ‘mentally split’ and lacking ‘a self with which to know’—remained essentially dissociated. However, Winnicott, whilst immersed in this work on Jung, wrote a letter to Michael Fordham describing himself as suffering ‘a lifelong malady’ of ‘dissociation’. But this he now reported repaired through a ‘splitting headache’ dream of destruction, dreamt ‘for Jung, and for some of my patients, as well as for myself’ (Winnicott 1989, p. 228). Winnicott's recurrent concern during his last decade was with ‘reaching to’—that quintessential Winnicottian term—some reparative experience that could address such difficulties in constellating a ‘unit self’. This is correlated with his engagement with Jung and tracked through his contemporaneous clinical work, particularly ‘Fear of Breakdown’ (1963). Themes first introduced by Sedgwick (2008) and developed by the author's earlier ‘Winnicott on Jung; destruction, creativity and the unrepressed unconscious’ (2011) are given further consideration.     

Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico

Abstract

Cultural psychology is the new effort to overcome an old problem in psychology as a science — its irrational effort to imitate the so-called ‘hard’ sciences by reducing complex phenomena to elementary constituents and attempt to ‘measure’ imaginary properties of the mind through quantitative methods applied to summary indices accumulated across various contexts. In a revolutionary move, cultural psychology reverses these social practices to replace them with a focus on the study of complexity of human psychological phenomena in their open-systemic flow in irreversible time — at all levels of (a) societal history, (b) personal life course and (c) immediate setting-specific innovations (microgenesis). The units of analysis used in cultural psychology are complex signs that entail the unity of observable and hidden parts of affective hyper-generalization by goals-oriented, meaning-constructing persons with agency. The example of one of the current theoretical frameworks — Cultural Psychology of Semiotic Dynamics — is used to illustrate the nature of cultural psychology as a basic human science.     

Ontological deflationism in Madhyamaka

Between the years 1956 and 1962 the scholar-monk Nyanaponika Thera and the first Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion have exchanged eight long letters. These letters—published here for the first time—expose the extent of Ben-Gurion's interest in Buddhism and reveal the Buddhist rhetoric used by one of Sri Lanka's most influential scholars. This rhetoric, which was generally well received by Ben-Gurion, was an exemplar of ‘Protestant Buddhism’. It is suggested that Ben-Gurion could relate to this image of Buddhism because it reflected his own vision of Judaism that had ‘protestant’ characteristics. The letters contain autobiographical notes, unpublished comments on the Buddhist concepts of Suffering and Rebirth, and a curious plan to invite Nyanaponika to Israel.     

The Living Human Web: A Twenty-five Year Retrospective

This article traces developments in the 25-year history of a metaphor that has shaped the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century discipline of pastoral theology in the United States. It looks back at the ‘living human document’ as a pivotal image and then identifies three trends behind the appearance of the ‘living human web,’ its key attributes, four divergent ways the metaphor has been used, and tasks ahead. The article argues that while the living human document addressed the challenge of irrelevant theology, the living human web responded to the challenge of social injustice. But both metaphors share a common aim endemic to the discipline—to expand empathy, whether for the individual or the wider context, in order to respond to people in need.     

Marxist‐Leninist scientific atheism 1

The main object of Marxist‐Leninist ‘scientific atheism’ consists in the discovery and assimilation of ‘scientific’ data and its use in the ‘atheistic’ destruction of religion and all its appurtenances. The first task is to show — using the data mainly of the natural sciences — the non‐existence of the object of religion, i.e. God. Second, it is necessary to explain how a theory without an object came to be and continues to show signs of vitality, i.e. to find the causes or ‘roots’ of religion: and this in terms of historical materialism.     

Imagining ‘human Bodhisattva’ via televisual discourse: media platform of the Tzu-Chi organisation

Seeing the limitation of the thesis of ‘mediatisation of religion’ (Hjarvard 2008; 2011), I would like to present a case study of Buddhist organisational usage of televisual discourse in Taiwan in this article. The example of one of the most watched prime-time docudramas—Da-Ai Drama (produced by an iconic Taiwanese Buddhist organisation, Tzu-Chi)—challenges the limited scope of ‘mediatisation of religion’ and encourages a critical review of the terms ‘religions’ and ‘secularisation’. The article also explicates the way in which Tzu-Chi utilizes multimedia approach to transfer the ideal of celestial Bodhisattva into a discourse of ‘human Bodhisattva’, which encourages the laity to participate in Tzu-Chi's voluntary programmes. A sect of acting philosophy is reinforced through multimedia approach and a wide range of voluntary programmes in the organisation.     

Domestic dogs comprehend human communication with iconic signs

A key skill in early human development is the ability to comprehend communicative intentions as expressed in both nonlinguistic gestures and language. In the current studies, we confronted domestic dogs (some of whom knew many human ‘words’) with a task in which they had to infer the intended referent of a human's communicative act via iconic signs – specifically, replicas and photographs. Both trained and untrained dogs successfully used iconic replicas to fetch the desired item, with many doing so from the first trial. Dogs’ ability to use photographs in this same situation was less consistent. Because simple matching to sample in experimental contexts typically takes hundreds of trials (and because similarity between iconic sign and target item did not predict success), we propose that dogs’ skillful performance in the current task reflects important aspects of the comprehension of human communicative intentions.     

The Cultural Revolution and the Emergence of Pentecostal-style Protestantism in China

This article seeks to locate the manifested Pentecostal characteristics of Chinese Protestantism in the context of an individualistic and feminised religious arena during China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Life-story interview data collected in south-eastern China reveal that the unavailability of religious authorities during the Cultural Revolution brought about a decentralised and experiential Protestant religious form, demonstrating a cultural pattern similar to that of Pentecostalism. This religious form was particularly successful in attracting women and communicating across cultural frontiers, thus contributing to Protestant breakthroughs in rural areas. Nevertheless, without institutionalising a Pentecostal doctrine and practice, this Pentecostal-like religiosity would be subject to further change with the return of religious authorities after the 1980s. I propose an analytical tool that I call ‘practice-led Pentecostalism’ for grasping this fluid religious dynamic.     

Was Merleau-Ponty a ‘transcendental’ phenomenologist?

Whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology should be considered a form of ‘transcendental’ philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one, many of its features—such as its exploitation of empirical science—might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper considers whether Merleau-Ponty meets what I call the ‘transcendentalist challenge’ of defining and grounding claims of a distinctive transcendental kind. It begins by highlighting three features—the absolute ego, the pure phenomenal field, and the reduction—that Husserl had used to justify claims of a specifically transcendental kind within a phenomenological framework. It then examines how Merleau-Ponty modifies each of these features to focus on the lived body and a factically conditioned phenomenal field, while remaining ambivalent about the reduction. Finally, it assesses whether Merleau-Ponty’s modified position can still legitimately be considered transcendental. I argue that—despite his own rhetoric—this modified position shapes the modality of Merleau-Ponty’s claims in such a way that his phenomenology cannot meet the transcendentalist challenge and therefore should not be considered ‘transcendental.’     

Reductivism, Fatalism and Sociobiology

ABSTRACT When does ‘reduction’ in the harmless sense of relating one science to another involve a sinister devaluing of the valuable? Only when the ‘reductive’ explanation is (1) treated as excluding others, and (2) so chosen as to make a moral point by illicit means. (1) is never legitimate; different kinds of explanation all have their place and do not compete. It is made to look plausible by (2), which can occur in many situations, but is usually called reduction only when it involves the physical sciences. Two different dangers follow—reduction to the unknown entities of physics is chilling, but fortunately seems to have no particular moral consequences. Biological reductions often sound less remote; e.g. when sociobiologists talk of people as ‘survival machines’ for genes. The trouble here is not ‘biological determinism’ but fatalism, with apparent moral consequences, namely, the endorsement of universal competition. This idea is bad biology, compounded by illicit rhetoric. Biology itself cannot be a threat. The biological causes of human behaviour, including those found by sociobiologists in their calmer moments, are perfectly proper material for the social sciences.     

WE ARE ALL VINCENT NAVROZE BALBIR

The shooting at Oak Creek, WI, where six people were killed and four wounded in a Sikh temple, is the result of certain exclusionary policies and rhetoric in American society. The language of exclusion and creating an internal ‘Other’ has been applied to various minority groups in the USA. With an increase in Islamophobia after 9/11, and broad categorization of brown bodies as suspect, there is an intense antipathy to those of West and South Asian ancestry. The tragedy of Oak Creek is the culmination of multiple, intersecting dehumanizing trajectories in American history, and is an American tragedy on multiple levels.     

Meaning of Social Inclusion to Young People Not in Employment,Education or Training

The ‘social inclusion’ of young people, particularly those who are ‘not in education, employment or training’, is a contemporary concern in policy discourses. However, it has been argued that the term ‘social inclusion’ is defined by adults and imposed on young people, and there is little understanding of what ‘social inclusion’ means to young people themselves. Using a participatory methodology, this study investigated what ‘being included’ meant to young people. A qualitative approach with a thematic analysis was used to explore the accounts of 11 participants and yielded three main themes. ‘“Acceptance”—the building blocks of inclusion’ reflected the power of interpersonal acceptance in determining young people's sense of inclusion. ‘“Learning why I don't matter”—when power and discourse shape inclusion’ illustrated how social discourses and power dynamics influenced young people's experience of inclusion. ‘“Keeping up or falling behind”—internalising the discourse of inclusion’ reflected how young people internalised some of these societal definitions of inclusion and responded to them. Those who felt ‘accepted’ or ‘included’ in a ‘mainstream’ sense articulated a sense of agency and hope. For those who did not, it appeared that agency dissolved as did a sense of hope for the future. Although the participants negotiated their ‘inclusion’ through close, trusting relationships with others, the application of the societal discourses of inclusion such as productivity, independence and career mindedness had the potential to leave them feeling excluded, isolated and distressed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Persons as dialogical-hermeneutical-relational beings – New circumstances ‘call out’ new responses from us

Shifting from a world of already-made-things to a world of things-continually-in-the-making changes everything. Psychology, like all other sciences, tries to proceed by analysis, by breaking down a living, unique, always developing organic whole into a set of general, already-existing, nameable elements. But as Bakhtin makes clear, in discussing how Dostoevsky portrays the inner dynamics of people worrying over how to act for the best in living their lives, such an itemization of merely observed behavioural characteristics leads to a degrading reification of a person's unfinalizability, of their still-developing nature. Below, I first examine the Cartesianism that still seems present in much of our thinking in social inquiry today. I then turn attention to the primacy of our living movements out in the world and their responsiveness to events occurring around us. While finally turning to the fact that, as living beings, what ‘goes on inside us’, is not so important as ‘what we go on inside of’. Although Dostoevsky portrays this indivisible, flowing reality, in terms of a set of discontinuous fragments —because that is the nature of our experience in everyday life — as hermeneutical-dialogical-relational beings, we have a basic capability of organizing them into unitary wholes which sit in the background to everything we think and do.     

The Dialogical Nature of our Inner Lives

Abstract

Classically, we have treated talk of such things as meaning, understanding, and thinking, etc., as raising problems about mental states assumed to exist inside people's heads. And in our philosophical inquiries, we have sought determinate in-principle solutions to these problems. In the dialogical, relational-responsive view of language use presented here — influenced by Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, and Voloshinov — a very different view of such talk is presented. Our ‘inner lives’ are not hidden ‘inside’ us, but are ‘displayed’ out ‘in’ the unfolding, living encounters spontaneously occurring between us and the others around us as we live out our lives     

Blasphemous Thoughts

Abstract

The sacred, from the Latin sacer, originally meant both blessed and accursed. This article begins by remembering the intolerable qualities of the sacred as it is imagined, figured and mythed in Western culture. It is then argued that within Western culture there is a significant difference and unresolvable tension between ‘the sacred’ and ‘religion’ — a tension/difference strangely akin to that between the semiotic and the symbolic as theorized by Julia Kristeva. It seems that one of the functions of religions-as-institutions is precisely to control, tame, and make more manageable the sacred. In practice this means controlling sexual, sensual bodies — especially those bodies most closely associated with messy physicality and bloody corporeality.     

Is Iconic Memory Iconic?

Short-term memory in vision is typically thought to divide into at least two memory stores: a short, fragile, high-capacity store known as iconic memory, and a longer, durable, capacity-limited store known as visual working memory (VWM). This paper argues that iconic memory stores icons, i.e., image-like perceptual representations. The iconicity of iconic memory has significant consequences for understanding consciousness, nonconceptual content, and the perception–cognition border. Steven Gross and Jonathan Flombaum have recently challenged the division between iconic memory and VWM by arguing against the idea of capacity limits in favor of a flexible resource-based model of short-term memory. I argue that, while VWM capacity is probably governed by flexible resources rather than a sharp limit, the two memory stores should still be distinguished by their representational formats. Iconic memory stores icons, while VWM stores discursive (i.e., language-like) representations. I conclude by arguing that this format-based distinction between memory stores entails that prominent views about consciousness and the perception–cognition border will likely have to be revised.     

Foundations of Representation: Where Might Graphical Symbol Systems Come From?

It has been suggested that iconic graphical signs evolve into symbolic graphical signs through repeated usage. This article reports a series of interactive graphical communication experiments using a 'pictionary' task to establish the conditions under which the evolution might occur. Experiment 1 rules out a simple repetition based account in favor of an account that requires feedback and interaction between communicators. Experiment 2 shows how the degree of interaction affects the evolution of signs according to a process of grounding. Experiment 3 confirms the prediction that those not involved directly in the interaction have trouble interpreting the graphical signs produced in Experiment 1. On the basis of these results, this article argues that icons evolve into symbols as a consequence of the systematic shift in the locus of information from the sign to the users' memory of the sign's usage supported by an interactive grounding process.