Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function

Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).     

Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-knowing: Knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know

Feeling-of-knowing judgement is traditionally regarded as a unitary cognitive process. However, recent research suggests that knowing that you know (positive feeling-of-knowing) and knowing that you do not know (negative feeling-of-knowing) have different neural substrates (Luo, Niki, Ying, & Luo, 2004 Luo, J., Niki, K., Ying, X. P. and Luo, Y. J. 2004. Knowing that you know and knowing that you don't know: A fMRI study on feeling of knowing (FOK). Acta Psychologica Sinica, 36: 426–443.  [Google Scholar]). In the present study, we used a paradigm adapted from Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) Koriat, A. and Levy-Sadot, R. 2001. The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity and accessibility heuristics to feelings of knowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27: 34–53. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] to examine whether positive feeling-of-knowing and negative feeling-of-knowing were mediated by distinct cognitive processes. We found that positive and negative feeling-of-knowing were dissociated during immediate feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., preliminary feeling-of-knowing) and delayed feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., postretrieval feeling-of-knowing). At the judgement intervals, positive feeling-of-knowing was based on partial recovery of the nonrecalled targets, whereas negative feeling-of-knowing was determined by familiarity with the retrieval cues. Our results suggest that feeling-of-knowing is a heterogeneous process.     

Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-knowing: knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know

Feeling-of-knowing judgement is traditionally regarded as a unitary cognitive process. However, recent research suggests that knowing that you know (positive feeling-of-knowing) and knowing that you do not know (negative feeling-of-knowing) have different neural substrates (Luo, Niki, Ying, & Luo, 2004). In the present study, we used a paradigm adapted from Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) to examine whether positive feeling-of-knowing and negative feeling-of-knowing were mediated by distinct cognitive processes. We found that positive and negative feeling-of-knowing were dissociated during immediate feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., preliminary feeling-of-knowing) and delayed feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., postretrieval feeling-of-knowing). At the judgement intervals, positive feeling-of-knowing was based on partial recovery of the nonrecalled targets, whereas negative feeling-of-knowing was determined by familiarity with the retrieval cues. Our results suggest that feeling-of-knowing is a heterogeneous process.     

Young children are more likely to cheat after overhearing that a classmate is smart

Research on moral socialization has largely focused on the role of direct communication and has almost completely ignored a potentially rich source of social influence: evaluative comments that children overhear. We examined for the first time whether overheard comments can shape children's moral behavior. Three‐ and 5‐year‐old children (N = 200) participated in a guessing game in which they were instructed not to cheat by peeking. We randomly assigned children to a condition in which they overheard an experimenter tell another adult that a classmate who was no longer present is smart, or to a control condition in which the overheard conversation consisted of non‐social information. We found that 5‐year‐olds, but not 3‐year‐olds, cheated significantly more often if they overheard the classmate praised for being smart. These findings show that the effects of ability praise can spread far beyond the intended recipient to influence the behavior of children who are mere observers, and they suggest that overheard evaluative comments can be an important force in shaping moral development.     

When trying is not enough: Emotion regulation and the effort-success gap in bipolar disorder

Bipolar disorder (BD) is presumed to involve difficulties in emotion regulation. Little is known, however, about the specific emotion regulation profile associated with this disorder. The present study examined the use of specific emotion regulation strategies among individuals with BD (n = 37) and healthy controls (n = 38). Participants' spontaneous use of reappraisal and suppression, as well as their associated effort and success at regulating their emotions, was measured in the context of three emotionally evocative films (neutral, happy, sad). Results indicated that the BD participants made greater use of spontaneous suppression and reappraisal across all films compared to the control group. BD participants also reported greater effort, but less success, when spontaneously regulating emotions. These findings suggest that bipolar disorder is associated with less success when regulating emotions despite a widespread engagement of regulatory efforts. Discussion focuses on the disjunction between troubled emotion functioning in bipolar disorder and sustained efforts to modify intense emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Young children's use of functional information to categorize artifacts: three factors that matter

Three experiments addressed factors that might influence whether or not young children take into account function, as opposed to overall appearance or shape, when they extend the names of novel artifacts. Experiment 1 showed that 4-year-olds more often extend a name on the basis of a demonstrated function when that function provides a plausible causal account of perceptible object structure. Experiment 2 showed that they more often extend a name by function when they respond slowly, and hence thoughtfully. Experiment 3 demonstrated that they are more likely to take function into account when they extend names than when they judge similarities. Comparisons of lexical and non-lexical conditions in younger children failed to show any differences. Overall, the findings suggest that by 4 years of age, children may learn names as labels for novel artifact kinds rather than perceptual classes, and that the processes by which they categorize may be mindful and reflective, as in adults.     

Knowledge is not everything: analysis of children's performance on a haptic comparison task

The relative effects of developmental level and domain-specific knowledge on children's ability to identify and make similarity decisions about object concepts based only on haptic (touch) information were investigated. Children aged 4-9 years with varying levels of dinosaur knowledge completed a cross-comparison task in which they haptically explored pairs of familiar (dinosaur) and unfamiliar (sea creature) models that varied in terms of their degree of differentiability. Older children explored models more exhaustively, found more differentiating features and consequently made fewer errors than younger children did. High knowledge enabled children to identify models correctly, but was also associated with the use of a hypothesis testing strategy, which led children to make greater numbers of "miss" errors on the cross-comparison task. Performance in the control domain illustrated that the hypothesis testing strategy was specific to the high knowledge domain. Potential explanations for the role of knowledge and development in haptic exploration are considered.     

Testing a word is not a test of word learning

Although vocabulary acquisition requires children learn names for multiple things, many investigations of word learning mechanisms teach children the name for only one of the objects presented. This is problematic because it is unclear whether children's performance reflects recall of the correct name–object association or simply selection of the only object that was singled out by being the only object named. Children introduced to one novel name may perform at ceiling as they are not required to discriminate on the basis of the name per se, and appear to rapidly learn words following minimal exposure to a single word. We introduced children to four novel objects. For half the children, only one of the objects was named and for the other children, all four objects were named. Only children introduced to one word reliably selected the target object at test. This demonstration highlights the over-simplicity of one-word learning paradigms and the need for a shift in word learning paradigms where more than one word is taught to ensure children disambiguate objects on the basis of their names rather than their degree of salience.     

How young children judge whether a word is one they know: a dual criterion account

Word familiarity judgment may be important for word learning, yet little is known about how children make this judgment. We hypothesized that preschool-age children differ in the judgment criteria that they use and that this difference derives from individual differences in basic memory processes. Those who have superior phonological working memory, but who retrieve less semantic information than their peers, base the judgment on whether they recognize a word’s sound form. Those who show the opposite memory profile base the judgment on whether they retrieve a word’s meaning. The results of two studies of 3- and 4-year-olds were consistent with these claims. Among those performing poorly on one memory measure, judgment accuracy was directly related to performance on the other memory measure. These memory-judgment relations were also found to be highly specific. This is the first investigation to demonstrate the usefulness of an individual differences approach for identifying relations between linguistic judgment processes and basic memory processes during early childhood.     

Orthogonality is not a panacea: backpropagation and "catastrophic interference"

Connectionist models with the backpropagation learning rule are said to exhibit catastrophic interference (or forgetting) with sequential training. Subsequent works showed that interference can be reduced by using orthogonal inputs. This study investigated, with a more rigorous assessment method, whether all orthogonal inputs lead to comparable extent of interference using three coding schemes. The results revealed large differences between the coding schemes. With larger networks, dense inputs led to severer interference compared with sparse inputs. With smaller networks, all the three schemes led to comparable extent of interference. Therefore, this study proved that not all the orthogonal inputs cause the same extent of interference, and that severity of interference depends on the interaction of the input coding scheme and the network size.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

"Remember where you last saw that card": children's production of external symbols as a memory aid

Four experiments examined the age at which children start to use external symbols to aid their memory and how external symbol use affects both their memory performance and information allocation strategies. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 played a memory card game (Concentration) twice, once with the opportunity to make notes to aid performance and once without the opportunity. Grades I and 3 students tended to produce nonmnemonic notations, whereas Grades 5 and 7 students were more likely to produce functional, adultlike notations that aided performance in the task. In Experiments 2a and 2b, unexpected removal of children's notations led to a decrease in performance. suggesting that the spontaneously produced notations were being used as an external store rather than as an aid to encoding information. Experiment 3 examined whether all information was placed in external storage or if some types of information remained in memory. Grade 7 students who had their notations unexpectedly taken away were able to recognize the identity of the cards they had previously seen but had more difficulty remembering their locations. They appeared to place the location information mainly in external storage while retaining the identity information in memory. These results suggest that in mid-childhood, children begin to distribute information actively between internal and external memory storage.     

Young adult outcome of children with "situational" hyperactivity: a prospective,controlled follow-up study

To examine the importance of symptom pervasiveness in ADHD, we conducted a prospective, 12-year follow-up study of boys (ages 6–12) considered hyperactive at school and home (Pervasive ADHD), boys considered hyperactive by teachers but not parents (School Only ADHD), boys considered hyperactive by parents but not teachers (Home Only ADHD), and nonhyperactive comparisons. Follow-up was completed on 82–94% participants. Clinicians interviewed participants and their parents, blind to childhood status. At follow-up, antisocial disorder was significantly more prevalent among Pervasive and School Only ADHD (29% for both) than Home Only ADHD (0%) and comparisons (8%). In a similar manner, severity of behavioral problems distinguished groups (Pervasive, School > Home, comparisons), as did educational attainment and academic performance (poorest for Pervasive and School). These findings stress the validity of teacher reports in the diagnosis of ADHD.     

Effects of the "beauty is good" stereotype on children's information processing

The authors tested schematic information processing as a function of attractiveness stereotyping in two studies. An adult experimenter read children (ages 3 to 7 years) eight different stories in which a child narrator encountered two characters who varied in level of attractiveness and displayed positive or negative traits that were either consistent or inconsistent with the "beauty is good" stereotype. Following the story, the experimenter showed each child a photograph of the two characters' faces and asked the child to point to the character who displayed the positive trait. In Experiment 1, children made more errors in identifying female characters with stereotype inconsistent traits but did just the opposite with male characters. Experiment 2 replicated the findings with female characters but found no difference in errors with male characters. The findings have implications for how attractiveness and gender stereotypes affect children's information processing, how attractiveness schemata may be organized, and why physical attractiveness stereotypes are maintained.     

从"杀盗非杀人"看逻辑与价值的混淆

"杀盗非杀人"是墨辩的一个自相矛盾的诡辩命题,墨者之所以提出这个命题,论者之所以倾心辩护,是由于逻辑与价值的混淆.本文对这个命题进行了逻辑分析和价值分析,通过追究墨者提出这个命题的用意和后果,发现了墨辩停留在逻辑萌芽状态而未能发展为逻辑学的症结所在,就是:逻辑屈从价值,价值牺牲逻辑.     

"That's not a real body": identifying stimulus qualities that modulate synaesthetic experiences of touch

Mirror-touch synaesthesia is a condition where observing touch to another’s body induces a subjective tactile sensation on the synaesthetes body. The present study explores which characteristics of the inducing stimulus modulate the synaesthetic touch experience. Fourteen mirror-touch synaesthetes watched videos depicting a touch event while indicating (i) whether the video induced a tactile sensation, (ii) on which side of their body they felt this sensation and (iii) the intensity of the experienced sensation. Results indicate that the synaesthetes experience stronger tactile sensations when observing touch to real bodies, whereas observing touch to dummy bodies, pictures of bodies and disconnected dummy body parts elicited weaker sensations. These results suggest that mirror-touch synaesthesia is not entirely bottom-up driven, but top-down information, such as knowledge about real and dummy body parts, also modulate the intensity of the experience.