紧缩论,证明与保守性

紧缩论者主张真谓词表达了一种逻辑概念,它的全部意义都体现在所有塔斯基式的T-语句中。Shapiro近来论证说,将紧缩论的公理添加到一阶皮亚诺算术公理系统(PA)中,在该扩张理论中能够证明PA的可靠性,并在此基础上证明PA的一致性,这表明紧缩论不具有保守性,因此真谓词不是紧缩的。本文论证,扩张理论预设了反射原则,这导致它推出了更多的东西,而反射原则是可证性谓词定义的推论,这才是造成扩张理论非保守性的真正根源。针对紧缩论的非保守性论证因此失效了。     

试图定义真乃是愚蠢的

围绕塔斯基真之语义学看法的讨论形成了语言哲学的核心内容。从塔斯基的T语句以及他的一些相关论述出发,不少人认为他与亚里士多德一样,是一个真之符合论者;也有人认为他为紧缩论提供了支持;还有人依据他的思想提出了去引号的真之理论。这些不同看法和讨论涉及语言层面与其所表达的事实层面之间的关系,涉及语言的句法形式和语义结构的特征之间的关系,等等。戴维森对这些不同看法以及其他一些看法进行了讨论,并且提出了自己多年来一些反复思考的看法。     

真之符合论与真之等同论辨析

传统的真之符合论面临一个问题:由谁来判别一个命题是否符合事实?为从"上帝之眼"回归人类之眼,普特南提出内在实在论,以区别于外在实在论。这里进而提出关于"真"的内在符合论,以区别于传统的外在符合论;其关键在于把事实看作语言性的,并将语言性事实的观点分为外延等同论和内涵等同论。从主观性和客观性的角度看,内涵等同论和外在符合论处于两个极端,而外延等同论和内在符合论则处于中道,并且是二位一体的。在哲学史上,这两种符合论和两种等同论的要素贯穿于弗雷格、罗素、塔斯基和普特南等人的"真"理论之中。     

真的概念

弗雷格的语义学蕴涵了两个不可调和的推论:其一认为语句的意义先于命题,命题先于真,这种观点发展成为最少量论;其二认为真先于命题,因而也先于语句的意义,这种观点发展成为成真条件论.结合维特根斯坦的意义即用法的观点,得出的结论是:意义理论的核心概念并不是真,而是一个陈述得到证明的观念,意义理论并不必须采取成真条件论的形式.作为最少量论和成真条件论共同基础的奎因式语义转换原则是包含矛盾的.结合了语义转换原则和塔斯基真的定义的最少量论者必定排除戴维森式成真条件论.     

对塔斯基“真”理论的批评与重建

塔斯基首先提出关于真之定义的T模式即:"p"是真的,当且仅当,p。随后他又用X取代T模式中的"p",并且用"满足"来定义"真"。本文一方面根据"内容恰当性"要求,提出另一种模式T′即:"p"是真的,当且仅当,p是存在的;用以补充T模式,并完善塔斯基的语言层次论。另一方面根据"形式正确性"要求,指出塔斯基对T模式的这两项修改都是多余的。     

塔斯基的真理定义与物理论

塔斯基（Tarski）于1933年发表了他著名的真理定义,并相信该定义能够为其物理论的哲学立场服务;但费尔德（Field）批评说,塔斯基实际上所给出的真理定义并没能成功地达成这个目标。不过,费尔德同时也认为,一个部分奠基在塔斯基真理定义之上、并且是物理论者可以接受的化约性真理理论并非不可能。费尔德对于塔斯基真理定义的这些批评,在哲学家中曾经引起了许多意见不一的反应。本文的目的是想回答在这些讨论当中曾经被提出过的三个问题。首先,塔斯基实际上所给出的真理定义是不是一个物理论者可以接受的化约性定义？其次,费尔德所设想的那种可被物理论者所接受的化约性真理理论是否可能成功？最后,如果塔斯基实际上所给出的定义并不能符合物理论的化约目标,那么,一个物理论者是否便应该据此去反对塔斯基的真理定义？本文的最终结论是：这三个问题的正确答案都是否定的。     

吉拉·谢尔的多重符合真理论CSSCI

领域问题是对传统真理一元论的诘难,为解决领域问题,产生了紧缩论和多元论两种途径。谢尔的真理论就是一种多元真理论,她反对紧缩主义,认为“真”是一种实质属性,其核心属性为“符合”,但符合的方式是多样的,具体的符合方式是由不同领域的情况以及人们的认知能力决定的。谢尔以数学为例展示了一种多重符合的方式。她的理论为实质真理论提供了凭证,又改良了赖特和林奇理论的不足,合理地解释了“真”的统一性和多元性的关系。但也面临着理论依据不足、理论不完善以及很多传统符合论的遗留问题有待解决。     

真与意义理论

意义理论是语言哲学的核心内容。意义理论与语言相关,因而与对语言的使用和理解相关,与语言所表达的世界相关。今天,意义理论受到哲学家们的高度重视,有关讨论广泛而深入,观点各异,成果多样。在今天的讨论中,真之极小论、真之紧缩论、真之去引号论、真之代句子理论等一些新的真之理论业已成为重点。但是,真之符合论、真之实用论等传统理论也仍然被涉及,并且由于深入讨论而得到新的认识,尽管许多结论是否定的。在我看来,意义理论的最大特征是与真这个概念密切相关,或者说,真这个概念是意义理论的核心概念。正因为这样。如今的讨论,无论是什么观点,几乎都预设了一个前提:塔尔斯基的语义理论。如果引申开来,甚至可以看到,正是基于真的解释,人们对意义理论形成不同的看法。比如戴维森的意义理论被称为真之理论,即基于T语句提出了一种如何理解语言的真之理论,而达米特则认为这只是对部分语言提出解释,并没有对整个语言的运作提出一种解释。所以,戴维森的解释顸设了对真这个概念的理解,他认为要围绕着真来考虑问题,而达米特虽然承认真这一概念的重要,却认为对真这个概念本身要进行思考,而且要超出这个概念来考虑我们的语言。我翻译过奎因的《真之追求》(三联书店,1999年)、达米特的《分析哲学的起源》(上海译文出版社,2005年),戴维森的《真与谓述》(上海译文出版社,2007年即出),也翻译过一些文章发表在本刊(例如参见《世界哲学》2006年第1期、第2期)。我希望国内读者能够了解和重视这方面的研究情况。编译下面这些内容,也有相同的意思。     

论弗雷格的“真之收缩”思想

弗雷格运用逻辑分析的方法,提出了自己独特的"真"之思想,形成了关于"真"的完整理论。在他看来,"真"不具有实体属性,不存在与客体在存在方式或存在状况的符合与对应,"真"只用来表达断定句形式中的断定力。当"5是素数"这个句子带有断定力时,真也就被表达出来,它与"5是素数是真的"表达了同样的内容。另外,他将"真"作为初始概念,认为真是不可定义的。如果对"真"进行定义,将走入"定义的循环"。因为要知道什么是"真",就需要论证表象与现实的一致性,而二者的一致又依赖于"真"的定义。这种思路与做法必将导致循环定义,故弗雷格认为"真"是不可定义的。基于以上两点的分析,他再次对符合论提出批评。他认为,如果符合论对"真"的理解是正确的话,那么结论是"事实比真更为基本,应该在事实的基础上定义真",但这显然是错误的,因为我们总是通过真来确定事实,而不是通过事实来确定真。我们似乎可以在弗雷格思想中找到收缩论的雏型,因为他关于"真"的认识与收缩论在很大程度上是一致的。收缩论最重要的观点在于说"P是真的"和说"P"有相同的涵义,谓词"是真的"是多余的。"真"本身是可收缩的,不带有实体性质。于是,我们可把弗雷格作为表达真之收缩观点的第一位哲学家,虽然他并不是坚定的收缩论者。     

真与悖论的逻辑分析:从目的论解释到定量描述

根据克莱因观点,近代科学的兴起源于伽利略在研究目标上的一个新设定:对科学现象获得独立于目的论解释的定量描述。本文论证了同样精神的目标设定正发生在真理论领域。塔斯基、克里普克、弗里德曼和谢尔德的真理论以消除悖论为基本目的是典型的目的论解释性理论,而古普塔和赫兹伯格的真理论则通过悖论的周期性特征把定量分析引入到悖论的研究之中。而对悖论的矛盾性刻画把定量描述引向深入。本文呈现了现代真理论的这一变革进程,预示了真理论的发展方向。     

More on Putnam and Tarski

Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory oftruth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The otherignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.     

On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth

The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief outlook on the “family” of theories of truth generated by the new methodology. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Truth in the Tractatus

My paper takes issue both with the standard view that the Tractatus contains a correspondence theory and with recent suggestions that it features a deflationary or semantic theory. Standard correspondence interpretations are mistaken, because they treat the isomorphism between a sentence and what it depicts as a sufficient condition of truth rather than of sense. The semantic/deflationary interpretation ignores passages that suggest some kind of correspondence theory. The official theory of truth in the Tractatus is an obtainment theory – a sentence is true iff the state of affairs it depicts obtains. This theory differs from deflationary theories in that it involves an ontology of states of affairs/facts; and it can be transformed into a type of correspondence theory: a sentence is true iff it corresponds to, i.e. depicts an obtaining state of affairs (fact). Admittedly, unlike correspondence theories as commonly portrayed, this account does not involve a genuinely truth-making relation. It features a relation of correspondence, yet it is that of depicting, between a meaningful sentence and its sense – a possible state of affairs. What makes for truth is not that relation, but the obtaining of the depicted state of affairs. This does not disqualify the Tractatus from holding a correspondence theory, however, since the correspondence theories of Moore and Russell are committed to a similar position. Alternatively, the obtainment theory can be seen as a synthesis of correspondence, semantic and deflationary approaches. It does justice to the idea that what is true depends solely on what is the case, and it combines a semantic explanation of the relation between a sentence and what it says with a deflationary account of the agreement between what the sentence says and what obtains or is the case if it is true     

Review

I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth compatible with a realist ontology, that a redundancy theory cannot account for the value of truth, and that the only kind of truth theory which can account for the value of truth, and is compatible with a realist ontology, is a pragmatic theory. The kind of truth theory I wish to defend is objective and naturalistic, and the ontology is realistic. My position is, therefore, one of objective, naturalistic realism.     

Are natural languages universal?

Summary We began by distinguishing Tarskian and Fitchean notions of universality in such a way that the claim that no language is universal in the sense of Tarski is compatible with accepting Fitchean universality. Then we examined a proposal involving two truth concepts — one that fit the Fitchean notion and another that followed Tarski's views on truth — finding little advantage in such generosity. We attempted a reformulation of Herzberger's argument for the negative view — the view that no language is universal in Tarski's sense — but found it unsuccessful when the language of the argument's formulation was brought under consideration. A more persuasive argument for EI was found, free of the defect of the previous one. EI was then shown to have unsettling consequences, prompting us to inquire about avoiding it. We found this possible, noting that EI is itself a solution to the semantic paradoxes, to which there are alternatives that avoid the unwelcome aspects of EI. However, whether any such alternative is ultimately preferable to EI remains to be seen.Section 4 of this paper was presented at the 1973 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and I am particularly grateful to the paper's commentator, Stephen P. Stich, for his helpful comments. I have also profited from correspondence with Paul Teller, whose paper The Universality of Natural Languages and Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics: A Response to Herzberger (1971, ditto) presents a position similar in certain respects to mine.     

Zitierte zeichenreihen

We use quotation marks when we wish to refer to an expression. We can and do so refer even when this expression is composed of characters which do not occur in our alphabet. That's why Tarski's, Quine's, and Geach's theories of quotation don't work. The proposals of Davidson, Frege, and C. Washington, however, do not provide a plausible account of quotation either. The problem is to construct a Tarskian theory of truth for an object language which contains quotation marks, without appealing to quotation marks in the metalanguage. I propose to supply Tarski's truth definition with an axiom which determines the denotation of all expressions containing quotation marks. According to this axiom, quotation marks create a non-extensional context. Since our admitting such contexts does not lead to any difficulties in our recursive truth characterization, we may indeed dispense with extensionalism. Finally, I argue that we classify and denote expressions in the very same way that we classify and denote extralinguistic entities.     

Wahrheit und Selbstrückbezüglichkeit

This paper is intended to discuss the problems occurring in the relation between the notion of truth and the question of self-reference. To do this, we shall review Tarski's (T) convention and its related terminology. We shall clarify the relation between truth and extension in order to lead into the question of semantic paradoxes appearing in the theoretical models concerned with truth. Subsequently, we shall review the logical system which develops in the reformulation of the modal proposal of the (T) convention. In closing, we shall critically examine Kripke's interpretation from the proposals made by Tarski.     

Tarski ‐ a dilemma

Tarski's correspondence theory of truth (which he spells out in his semantic conception of truth) is open to two interpretations. This ambiguity in the theory has led philosophers to find support in it for metaphysical reali sm. In fact, Tarski's theory turns out to support a form of ontological relativism. In different passages Tarski himself gives support to each of these interpretations. The first interpretation leads to ontological relativism, while the second sacrifices the connection between language and the world. I clarify the dilemma that I see in having to choose between these two interpretations, explain how these interpretations have their source in different problems which occupied Tarski, and consider a possible solution to the dilemma. Finally, finding good reasons to claim that Tarski's theory is indeed a correspondence theory of truth, I argue in favour of the first interpretation with its relativistic implications.     

A Recommendation for Correspondence Theory of Truth

The purpose of this paper is to show that the correspondence theory as a truth-maker theory has certain advantages over some of the other theories of truth. The cost of this advantage is postulating extra entities—facts. However, the benefits outweigh the costs; facts facilitate our understanding of the nature of truth made by the world. Facts are required for understanding this world; therefore, one cannot claim that a separate cost is incurred for explaining truth. It is further argued that because of specific reasons the correspondence theory can be treated even better than the truth-maker theory and so the recommendation for correspondence as the most efficient theory of truth.