The Unity of a Tractarian Fact

It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity of the whole, for Wittgenstein the unity of a fact is the product of copulative powers inherent in all its elements. All kinds of constituents of Tractarian facts – all kinds (forms) of object – are, to use Fregean terminology, unsaturated.     

Unconfigured Tractarian Objects

According to the Tractatus , the world consists of atomic objects arranged in various configurations, and the ways the world might be are determined by the ways these objects can be configured. The question I address is whether these very objects can be unconfigured as well as configured. Much depends on a positive answer to this question, including, as I show, the internal coherence of the Tractatus itself. I argue that these objects can be unconfigured, and am critical of certain interpretive claims made by Fogelin which lead to the conclusion that they cannot be.     

The Logical Basis of the Tractarian Ontology

This paper focuses on the relation between logic and ontology. In particular, it demonstrates how classical logical theory can clarify the ontological part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To this end, the work examines the adequacy of a formal system that was devised by the Polish logician, mathematician and philosopher Roman Suszko (1919–1979) as a model for the Tractatus. Following a brief explanation of the Tractarian ontology, the main ideas of Suszko’s system and its philosophical significance will be considered. The latter will be illustrated in the context of central Tractarian concepts. Finally, two implications for a better understanding of the Tractarian ontology will be pointed out.

A Tractarian Universe

In this paper we develop a reconstruction of the Tractatus ontology. The basic idea is that objects are unsaturated and that Sachlagen are like molecules. Bisimulation is used for the proper individuation of the Sachlagen. We show that the ordering of the Sachlagen is a complete distributive, lattice. It is atomistic, i.e., each Sachlage is the supremum of the Sachverhalte below it. We exhibit three normal forms for Sachlagen: the bisimulation collapse, the canonical unraveling and the canonical bisimulation collapse. The first of these forms is unique modulo isomorphism, the second and third are simply unique. The subset ordering on normal forms of the second and third kind reflects the ordering of the Sachlagen.     

The Tractarian Operation N and Expressive Completeness

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, I visit the Fogelin–Geach-dispute, criticizeMiller's interpretation of the Geachian notationN(x:N(fx)) and conclude that Fogelin's argumentagainst the expressive completeness of the Tractariansystem of logic is unacceptable and that the adoptionof the Geachian notation N(x:fx) would not violate TLP5.32. Second, I prove that a system of quantificationtheory with finite domains and with N as the solefundamental operation is expressively complete. Lastly, I argue that the Tractarian system is apredicate-eliminated many-sorted theory (withoutidentity) with finite domains and with N as the solefundamental operation, and thus is expressivelycomplete.     

Tractarian objects and logical categories

It has been much debated whether Tractarian objects are what Russell would have called particulars or whether they include also properties and relations. This paper claims that the debate is misguided: there is no logical category such that Wittgenstein intended the reader of the Tractatus to understand his objects either as providing examples of or as not providing examples of that category. This is not to say that Wittgenstein set himself against the very idea of a logical category: quite the contrary. However, where Russell presents his logical variety of particulars and the various types of universal, and Frege presents his of objects and the various types of function, Wittgenstein denies the propriety of such a priori expositions. Wittgenstein envisages a variety of logical types of entity but insists that the nature of these types is something to be discovered only through analysis. This research was conducted whilst holding a Jacobsen Research Fellowship at the University of London.     

Metaphysical Nihilism and Cosmological Arguments: Some Tractarian Comments

Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of themes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus to the ongoing discussion of metaphysical nihilism. I set out by showing how metaphysical nihilism is of paramount importance for cosmological arguments. Metaphysical nihilism is the position that there might have been nothing. Two conflicting intuitions emerge from a survey of discussions of metaphysical nihilism: Firstly, that metaphysical nihilism is true, and secondly, that formulations of the position are somehow unclear or nonsensical. By considering formalizations of philosophical language, the second intuition is sharpened, while the first intuition is given expression through the Tractarian distinction between what is said and what is shown by our symbolism. I conclude by exploring and rejecting objections to making metaphysical nihilism a scientific, rather than a philosophical question.     

The Disenchantment of Nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus

This paper aims to argue against the resolute reading, and offer a correct way of reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to the resolute reading, nonsense can neither say nor show anything. The Tractatus does not advance any theory of meaning, nor does it adopt the notion of using signs in contravention of logical syntax. Its sentences, except a few constituting the frame, are all nonsensical. Its aim is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense. I argue that these points are either not distinctive from standard interpretations or incorrect. Instead, the Tractarian elucidations help to shed light on the nature of language and logic, and introduce the correct method in philosophy. Philosophy deals with philosophical utterances and Tractarian elucidations by pointing out that they are nonsensical. By doing this, one is helped to see that what they appear to be saying is shown by significant propositions saying something else.     

Ineffability and Nonsense

There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes (non-trivially) serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, rather than ineffable truth, we can do considerable justice to each of these readings. We can also do considerable justice to the Tractatus.     

神坛鬼影录

神佛世界本为子虚,却被一些别有用心之人讲得神乎其神;鬼域之都实属乌有,亦被神汉、巫婆传得活灵活现。其实,神亦鬼,鬼亦神。因为,有     

Projective Geometry in Logical Space: Rethinking Tractarian Thoughts

Customary interpretations state that Tractarian thoughts are pictures, and, a fortiori, facts. I argue that important difficulties are unavoidable if we assume this standard view, and I propose a reading of the concept taking advantage of an analogy that Wittgenstein introduces, namely, the analogy between thoughts and projective geometry. I claim that thoughts should be understood neither as pictures nor as facts, but as acts of geometric projection in logical space. The interpretation I propose thus removes the root of the identified difficulties. Moreover, it allows important clarification concerning some central aspects of the Tractarian theory of representation, and it yields a unifying elucidation regarding Wittgenstein’s remarks on the solipsistic thesis.     

A Parsons Tale: Tractarian Reflections on a Semantical Paradox

According to Charles Parsons, a liar sentence does not express a proposition at the level of its primary use but does at the level where it is subjected to semantic interpretation. Thus, richer ontological resources unavailable at the level of primary use are available at the level of interpretation. In response to the objection that the correct semantic interpretation of a liar sentence is thereby distorted, I explain how Wittgenstein’s repudiation of “logical objects” and the Tractarian notion of an intrinsically iterative operation show that the liar sentence’s primary use anticipates but does not presuppose the richer interpretive ontology.     

The Influence of Creativity on Incongruity-Resolution and Nonsense Humor Comprehension

Both creativity and humor are high-level cognitive functions and complex concepts. Although creativity and humor are generally deemed positively correlated, it has been difficult to explicitly identify their relationship with each other. The cognitive process of creativity includes divergent thinking, insight, and remote association, whereas humor comprehension includes incongruity resolution and nonsense humor. The difference between the 2 types of humor is in whether individuals can understand the content of jokes through logical deduction. This study explored the relationship of the different dimensions of cognitive creativity and incongruity-resolution and nonsense humor comprehension. Furthermore, we examined the influence of divergent thinking, insight, and remote association on incongruity-resolution and nonsense humor comprehension. The scores from 103 participants on a divergent thinking questionnaire, an insight problem-solving task, and the Chinese compound remote associate problems test were used to analyze their comprehension of incongruity resolution and nonsense humor. The results showed a positive correlation between remote association and incongruity-resolution humor comprehension, as well as a positive correlation between insight and nonsense humor comprehension. These findings indicate that each dimension of cognitive creativity has a particular way of connecting to various types of humor comprehension.     

论孔子思想的实践指归

关于孔子思想的实质与核心问题 ,学界曾进行过多次争论 ,但迄今为止并未形成统一的认识和观点。蔡尚思先生在 6 0年代曾撰文认为 ,“孔学主要是礼学”,80年代初在他的《孔子思想体系》中又明确提出“孔子思想体系的中心是礼”。匡亚明先生则认为 ,“仁”是孔子的哲学 ,也是他的伦理道德学说、政治学说、教育学说 ,一句话 ,是他的全部博大庞杂的思想体系的“一以贯之”的总纲。 (见匡亚明著《孔子评传》,第 1 92页 ,齐鲁书社 1 985年版 )也有人提出 ,中庸是孔子思想的实质和核心 (见郭碧波《孔子思想核心再认识》,载《哲学研究》 1 985年第 9…     

The God of Chance and Purpose

The author argues that ontological randomness is genuine, and that God does not determine the outcome of every scientifically random event, but instead controls randomness by setting broad boundaries. Through paleontological examination, this paper looks at how randomness shapes the world from the bottom up. However, the phenomena known as convergence indicate that evolution through natural selection may proceed along various paths, but the destinations are few. Thus there is a dichotomy: randomness is constrained within pattern.