The effects of response-reinforcer contingency on time allocation in the open field

The present experiment explores the effects of the response (1-sec occupancy of a target area in an open field)—reinforcer (intracranial stimulation) contingency on time allocation in the open field in rats. The probability of reinforcement given a response (X) and the probability of reinforcement given the absence of a response (Y) were varied randomly across sessions within a subject. The following (X, Y) values were utilized: (.05, 0), (.15, 0), (.25, 0), (.15, .05), and (.15, .15). The results of this experiment indicate that rate of acquisition of time allocation preference is uniformly rapid during all contingency treatments wherein Y = 0 and is negatively related to the value of Y when X = .15. The relationship between the asymptote of the time allocation acquisition function and the value of X (when Y = 0) is positively sloped and negatively accelerated, while the relationship between asymptote and the value of Y (when X = .15) is negatively sloped with zero acceleration. Proposed contingency metrics are evaluated.     

Information Processing Strategies in Riskless Preference Reversals: The Prominence Effect

A preference reversal occurs whenever an individual prefers one alternative to another in one response mode (e.g., choice) but shows the opposite preference order in another response mode (e.g., attractiveness ratings, matching). In previous studies of riskless multiattribute preferences the most common reversal pattern involves a prominence effect: The more important attribute has a greater influence in choices than in matching judgments. Previous research has suggested that the prominence effect can be accounted for by the strategy compatibility principle, which states that response tasks can evoke different decision strategies and these strategies determine the relative impact of the various attributes. This article attempts to establish the mediating role of decision processes in determining the occurrence and pattern of riskless preference reversals. In a process tracing experiment we replicate previous findings of a prominence effect in riskless two-attribute preferences. In addition, there are clear differences in process between response modes, and these differences are consistent with previous explanations of riskless preference reversals. Finally, we are able to predict subject level differences in choice preferences and choice versus matching reversals using measures of information search.     

The application of the first order system transfer function for fitting the 3-arm radial maze learning curve

A mathematical model is described based on the first order system transfer function in the form Y=B3∗exp(−B2∗(X−1))+B4∗(1−exp(−B2∗(X−1))), where X is the learning session number; Y is the quantity of errors, B2 is the learning rate, B3 is resistance to learning and B4 is ability to learn. The model is tested in a light-dark discrimination learning task in a 3-arm radial maze using Wistar and albino rats. The model provided good fits of experimental data under acquisition and reacquisition, and was able to detect strain differences among Wistar and albino rats. The model was compared to Rescorla-Wagner, and was found to be mutually complementary. Comparisons with Tulving’s logarithmic function and Valentine’s hyperbola and the arc cotangent functions are also provided. Our model is valid for fitting averaged group data, if averaging is applied to a subgroup of subjects possessing individual learning curves of an exponential shape.     

Maximum vs. minimum values: Preferences of speakers and listeners for upper and lower limit estimates

Estimates about uncertain quantities can be expressed in terms of lower limits (more than X, minimum X), or upper limits (less than Y, maximum Y). It has been shown that lower limit statements generally occur much more often than upper limit statements (Halberg & Teigen, 2009). However, in a conversational context, preferences for upper and lower limit statements will be moderated by the concerns of the interlocutors. We report three studies asking speakers and listeners about their preferences for lower and upper limit statements, in the domains of distances, durations, and prices. It appears that travellers prefer information about maximum distances and maximum durations, and buyers (but not sellers) prefer to be told about maximum prices and maximum delivery times. Mistaken maxima are at the same time regarded as more “wrong” than mistaken minima. However, this preference for “worst case” information is not necessarily shared by providers of information (advisors), who are also concerned about being blamed if wrong.     

RISKY CHOICE IN PIGEONS: PREFERENCE FOR AMOUNT VARIABILITY USING A TOKEN-REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM

Pigeons were given repeated choices between variable and fixed numbers of token reinforcers (stimulus lamps arrayed above the response keys), with each earned token exchangeable for food. The number of tokens provided by the fixed‐amount option remained constant within blocks of sessions, but varied parametrically across phases, assuming values of 2, 4, 6, or 8 tokens per choice. The number of tokens provided by the variable‐amount option varied between 0 and 12 tokens per choice, arranged according to an exponential or rectangular distribution. In general, the pigeons strongly preferred the variable option when the fixed option provided equal or greater numbers of tokens than the variable amount. Preference for the variable amount decreased only when the alternatives provided widely disparate amounts favoring the fixed amount. When tokens were removed from the experimental context, preference for the variable option was reduced or eliminated, suggesting that the token presentation played a key role in maintaining risk‐prone choice patterns. Choice latencies varied inversely with preferences, suggesting that local analyses may provide useful ancillary measures of reinforcer value. Overall, the results indicate that systematic risk sensitivity can be attained with respect to reinforcer amount, and that tokens may be critical in the development of such preferences.     

Escape from freedom: Choosing not to choose in pigeons

Preference for the availability of food-reinforcement alternatives was investigated with Rachlin and Green's (1972) concurrent-chains self-control paradigm. The terminal link of one chain made available a choice between immediate access to food for T seconds and delayed access to food for 4 seconds. The terminal link of the other chain provided only delayed access to food. When T was reduced to .25 seconds, pigeons began to select the delayed-access key in both terminal links. Even so, the pigeons strongly preferred constraint over choice. This effect could not be accounted for by differences in the actual amount of food obtained in the terminal links, by avoidance of the immediate-reinforcement key when not presented as part of a choice, or by avoidance of a multi-key terminal link. Rather, constraint was preferred over freedom. Apparently, the preference for choice is determined by the particular type of choice offered.     

Correlations between rats' spatial location and intracranial stimulation administration affects rate of acquisition and asymptotic level of time allocation preference in the open field

The present experiment explores the effects of the response (1-sec occupancy of a target area in an open field)-reinforcer (intracranial stimulation) contingency on time allocation in the open field in rats. The probability of reinforcement given response (X) and the probability of reinforcement given nonresponse (Y) were varied randomly across sessions within a subject. The 21 contingency treatments explored included all possible combinations of values (0, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5) of X and Y such that X ≥ Y. The results indicate that rate of acquisition and asymptotic level of time allocation preference to the target area are negatively related to the value of Y (for any given value of X). Variations in X (for any given value of Y) were less effective. Evaluation of proposed contingency metrics revealed that the Weber fraction (X − Y)/X most closely approximates performance, and that the value of the difference detection threshold derived from the Weber fraction is a constant.     

Dual scaling of comparison and reference stimuli in multi-dimensional psychological space

Dzhafarov and Colonius (Psychol. Bull. Rev. 6 (1999)239; J. Math. Psychol. 45(2001)670) proposed a theory of Fechnerian scaling of the stimulus space based on the psychometric (discrimination probability) function of a human subject in a same-different comparison task. Here, we investigate a related but different paradigm, namely, referent-probe comparison task, in which the pair of stimuli (x and y) under comparison assumes substantively different psychological status, one serving as a referent and the other as a probe. The duality between a pair of psychometric functions, arising from assigning either x or y to be the fixed reference stimulus and the other to be the varying comparison stimulus, and the 1-to-1 mapping between the two stimulus spaces X and Y under either assignment are analyzed. Following Dzhafarov and Colonius, we investigate two properties characteristic of a referent-probe comparison task, namely, (i) Regular cross-minimality—for the pair of stimulus values involved in referent-probe comparison, each minimizes a discrimination probability function where the other is treated as the fixed reference stimulus; (ii) Nonconstant self-similarity—the value of the discrimination probability function at its minima is a nonconstant function of the reference stimulus value. For the particular form of psychometric functions investigated, it is shown that imposing the condition of regular cross-minimality on the pair of psychometric functions forces a consistent (but otherwise still arbitrary) mapping between X and Y, such that it is independent of the assignment of reference/comparison status to x and to y. The resulting psychometric differentials under both assignments are equal, and take an asymmetric, dualistic form reminiscent of the so-called divergence measure that appeared in the context of differential geometry of the probability manifold with dually flat connections (Differential Geometric Methods in Statistics, Lecture Notes in Statistics, Vol. 28, Springer, New York, 1985). The pair of divergence functions on X and on Y, respectively, induce a Riemannian metric in the small, with psychometric order (defined in Dzhafarov & Colonius, 1999) equal to 2. The difference between the Finsler-Riemann geometric approach to the stimulus space (Dzhafarov & Colonius, 1999) and this dually-affine Riemannian geometric approach to the dual scaling of the comparison and the reference stimuli is discussed.     

Scaling reward value with demand curves versus preference tests

In Experiment 1, six capuchins lifted a weight during a 10-min session to receive a food piece. Across conditions, the weight was increased across six different amounts for three different food types. The number of food pieces obtained as a function of the weight lifted was fitted by a demand equation that is hypothesized to quantify food value. For most subjects, this analysis showed that the three food types differed little in value. In Experiment 2, these monkeys were given pairwise choices among these food types. In 13 of 18 comparisons, preferences at least equaled a 3-to-1 ratio; in seven comparisons, preference was absolute. There was no relation between values based on degree of preference versus values based on the demand equation. When choices in the present report were compared to similar data with these subjects from another study, between-study lability in preference emerged. This outcome contrasts with the finding in demand analysis that test–retest reliability is high. We attribute the unreliability and extreme assignment of value based on preference tests to high substitutability between foods. We suggest use of demand analysis instead of preference tests for studies that compare the values of different foods. A better strategy might be to avoid manipulating value by using different foods. Where possible, value should be manipulated by varying amounts of a single food type because, over an appropriate range, more food is consistently more valuable than less. Such an approach would be immune to problems in between-food substitutability.     

The IAT as a predictor of food choice: The case of fruits versus snacks

One of the issues concerning the application of implicit measures like the IAT is whether they can be successfully applied to consumer choices. The empirical evidence of the predictive validity of the IAT so far has been mixed, both at the level of eating habits and of specific behavioural food choices. Moreover, whereas the predictive validity of the IAT has been tested in a number of studies, its incremental validity has not been studied as thoroughly. In this contribution, four studies, run at different points in time and analysed as a single sample (N = 399), tested the predictive and incremental validity of an IAT of attitudes towards fruits versus snacks on the choice of a fruit or a snack at the end of the experimental session. Specifically, an additive pattern in which both implicit and explicit measures predict independently, and an interactive one in which implicit and explicit measures predict interactively, were tested for the prediction of the behavioural preference towards snacks or fruits. The results showed that the IAT has both predictive and incremental validity, over and above the significant prediction provided by explicit measures for behavioural food choice. Furthermore, no interaction effect between implicit and explicit measures in the behavioural prediction was obtained, supporting the additive rather than the interactive pattern. Finally, only the explicit attitude towards snacks predicted behavioural choice whereas the explicit attitude towards fruits did not. This result indirectly suggests that a single target IAT might be fruitfully adopted in future research.     

Stating Preference for the Ethereal but Choosing the Concrete: How the Tangibility of Attributes Affects Attribute Weighting in Value Elicitation and Choice

Marketers routinely make use of stated consumer preferences and the relative attribute‐importance weights implied by these preferences when making decisions on issues such as advertising messages and product design. Using this information as a basis for managerial decision making is risky, though, if stated preferences diverge from actual choices. Practical evidence that such a divergence is of concern is provided by the current trend toward the use of stated choice‐based conjoint analysis. This article examines differences between the attribute‐importance weights consumers use during value elicitation and the attribute weights revealed to influence actual choice. The results of an empirical analysis of automobile stated preference and purchase decisions, and an experiment and subsequent qualitative analysis of wine choice, converge to suggest that consumers’ attribute weightings differ in value elicitation versus choice in a reliable manner. Specifically, we demonstrate a tangibility effect—the tendency for tangible attributes to be weighted relatively more heavily than intangible attributes in choice as compared to in value elicitation. The process underlying the tangibility effect is discussed, as are the implications for researchers and managers.     

Trichotomous preferences for gambles

Let G_X be the set of all gambles on a set X of decision outcomes. Trichotomous preferences divide G_X into three disjoint subsets, viz., the set P⁺ of preferable gambles, the set P⁰ of indifferent gambles, and the set P^- of unpreferable gambles. Those preference comparisons are made against the status quo, i.e., the do-nothing alternative. This paper presents and discusses dyadic representations of such trichotomous preferences and identifies necessary and sufficient axioms for the existence of those representations.     

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X _i and Y _i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X _i ,Y _i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.     

ISOLATING BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS OF INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE: NICOTINE EFFECT ON DELAY DISCOUNTING AND AMOUNT SENSITIVITY

Many drugs of abuse produce changes in impulsive choice, that is, choice for a smaller—sooner reinforcer over a larger—later reinforcer. Because the alternatives differ in both delay and amount, it is not clear whether these drug effects are due to the differences in reinforcer delay or amount. To isolate the effects of delay, we used a titrating delay procedure. In phase 1, 9 rats made discrete choices between variable delays (1 or 19 s, equal probability of each) and a delay to a single food pellet. The computer titrated the delay to a single food pellet until the rats were indifferent between the two options. This indifference delay was used as the starting value for the titrating delay for all future sessions. We next evaluated the acute effects of nicotine (subcutaneous 1.0, 0.3, 0.1, and 0.03 mg/kg) on choice. If nicotine increases delay discounting, it should have increased preference for the variable delay. Instead, nicotine had very little effect on choice. In a second phase, the titrated delay alternative produced three food pellets instead of one, which was again produced by the variable delay (1 s or 19 s) alternative. Under this procedure, nicotine increased preference for the one pellet alternative. Nicotine‐induced changes in impulsive choice are therefore likely due to differences in reinforcer amount rather than differences in reinforcer delay. In addition, it may be necessary to include an amount sensitivity parameter in any mathematical model of choice when the alternatives differ in reinforcer amount.     

Weekly Cycles in Daily Report Data: An Overlooked Issue

Daily diaries and other everyday experience methods are increasingly used to study relationships between two time‐varying variables X and Y. Although daily data potentially often have weekly cyclical patterns (e.g., stress may be higher on weekdays and lower on weekends), the majority of daily diary studies have ignored this possibility. In this study, we investigated the effect of ignoring existing weekly cycles. We reanalyzed an empirical dataset (stress and alcohol consumption) and performed Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the impact of omitting weekly cycles. In the empirical dataset, ignoring cycles led to the inference of a significant within‐person X–Y relation whereas modeling cycles suggested that this relationship did not exist. Simulation results indicated that ignoring cycles that existed in both X and Y led to bias in the estimated within‐person X–Y relationship. The amount and direction of bias depended on the magnitude of the cycles, magnitude of the true within‐person X–Y relation, and synchronization of the cycles. We encourage researchers conducting daily diary studies to address potential weekly cycles in their data. We provide guidelines for detecting and modeling cycles to remove their influence and discuss challenges of causal inference in daily experience studies.     

Natural choice in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Perceptual and temporal effects on selective value

In three experiments, four chimpanzees made choices between two visible food options to assess the validity of the selective value effect (the assignment of value to only the most preferred type of food presented in a comparison). In Experiment 1, we established that all chimpanzees preferred single banana pieces to single apple pieces before presenting the critical test. In this test two chimpanzees preferred a mix of one banana piece and one apple piece to a single banana piece when both banana pieces were approximately the same size, but two chimpanzees were indifferent between the two options, exhibiting the selective value effect. In Experiment 2, when the banana pieces in both options were more closely equated in size, the chimpanzees were biased to choose the single banana piece over the mixed array even though this was the smaller total amount of food. However, in Experiment 3, when we introduced longer intervals between each trial, the chimpanzees preferred the mixed set and thus the larger total amount of food. The results demonstrate that only some chimpanzees exhibit the choice pattern indicative of the selective value effect, and they do so only when item size is not carefully controlled and trials are presented quickly in succession. Thus, the behavior pattern originally labeled the selective value effect may actually be explained by a combination of chimpanzees’ sensitivity to small differences in preferred food amount and chimpanzees tendency to avoid less preferred foods that would delay the acquisition of further preferred food items.     

Reinforcement uncertainty enhances preference for choice in humans

Under concurrent‐chains schedules of reinforcement, participants often prefer situations that allow selection among alternatives (free choice) to situations that do not (forced choice). The present experiment examined the effects of reinforcement probability on choice preferences. Preferences for free versus forced choice were measured under a condition in which participants' choices were always reinforced (reinforcement probability of 1.0) and a condition in which outcomes were uncertain (reinforcement probability of 0.5). Forty‐four college students participated and preferences were examined under a concurrent‐chains schedule of reinforcement. Participants preferred free choice under uncertain reinforcement, but a bias toward free choice was not observed when reinforcement was certain. These results align with previous findings of preference for free choice under conditions of uncertainty, but suggest that preference may be dependent upon probabilistic reinforcement contingencies in the terminal links of the concurrent‐chains arrangement. Thus, reinforcement probability is an important variable to consider when conducting similar studies on the value of choice.     

‘Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson

A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. In this reply, we argue that Lowry and Peterson's argument is unsuccessful.     

On the choice between eating and aggressive display in the Siamese fighting fish (Betta splendens)

In Expt 1, male Betta splendens were given a choice between food and a mirror image in a T-maze. All fish consistently preferred food. In Expt 2, the choice of fish that lived in the T-maze for the duration of the experiment was compared with the choice of fish that were transferred to the T-maze for each experimental session. Fish that lived in the T-maze consistently preferred food, but fish that were transferred showed a shift in preference toward mirror image. Differential inhibition of hunger and aggression by fear is suggested as the cause of the preference shift.     

Verification of algebra step problems: A chronometric study of human problem solving

A class of simple problem solving tasks requiring fast accurate solutions is introduced. In an experiment subjects memorized a mapping rule represented by lists of words labeled by cue words and made true/false decisions about conjunctions of propositions of the form “Y is in the list labeled by X”, written “X → Y”. Response times are analyzed using a “stage modeling” technique where problem solving algorithms are composed using a small set of psychological operations that have real time characteristics specified parametrically. The theoretical analysis shows that response time performance is adequately described in terms of the sequential application of elementary psychological operations. Unexpectedly, it was found that the proposition “X → YandX → Z” was verified as quickly as the apparently simpler “X → Y”. A case is presented for the modeling technique as applied to memory and problem solving tasks in terms of theoretical parsimony, statistical simplicity, and flexibility in investigative empirical research. Suggestions are made as to possible theoretical relations among fast problem solving, more complex and slower problem solving, and research in fundamental memory processes.