Differences in the memory-based searching of delayed and normally developing young children

The memory-based searching of developmentally delayed and normal 2-year-old children was compared. The results of the study confirmed the hypothesis that individual differences would be minimal in a relatively noneffortful memory task, but that substantial individual differences would occur when more cognitive effort was required. The performance of the delayed and normal children was very good and quite similar in the basic memory task, which simply involved remembering the location of a toy hidden in a distinctive, natural location in a room. Substantial individual differences were found, however, in the children's ability to draw inferences about plausible locations for a missing toy based on their memory for where it had been hidden. When they discovered that their toy was not where they remembered it had been hidden (it had been surreptitiously moved by the experimenter), a group of normal children searched for the toy in places that were nearby or otherwise related to the original location of the toy. They used their memory for where the toy had been hidden to generate plausible alternative locations to search. In contrast, delayed children, who discovered their toy to be unaccountably missing from a location, persevered in repeatedly searching that same place. Unlike the normal children, they did not try something new. An important aspect of the data reported is that they reveal an important difference-not just a delay-in the cognitive functioning of young delayed children.     

Contributions of dynamic systems theory to cognitive development

We examine the contributions of dynamic systems theory to the field of cognitive development, focusing on modeling using dynamic neural fields. After introducing central concepts of dynamic field theory (DFT), we probe empirical predictions and findings around two examples—the DFT of infant perseverative reaching that explains Piaget's A-not-B error and the DFT of spatial memory that explain changes in spatial cognition in early development. Review of the literature around these examples reveals that computational modeling is having an impact on empirical research in cognitive development; however, this impact does not extend to neural and clinical research. Moreover, there is a tendency for researchers to interpret models narrowly, anchoring them to specific tasks. We conclude on an optimistic note, encouraging both theoreticians and experimentalists to work toward a more theory-driven future.     

The symbol detachment problem

In situated and embodied approaches it is commonly assumed that the dynamics of sensorimotor engagement between an adaptive agent and its environment are crucial in understanding natural cognition. This perspective permits to address the symbol grounding problem, since the aboutness of any mental state arising during agent-environment engagement is guaranteed by their continuous coupling. However, cognitive agents are also able to formulate representations that are detached from the current state of affairs, such as expectations and goals. Moreover, they can act on their representations before—or instead of—acting directly on the environment, for example building the plan of a bridge and not directly the bridge. On the basis of representations, actions such as planning, remembering or imagining are possible that are disengaged from the current sensorimotor cycle, and often functional to future-oriented conducts. A new problem thus has to be acknowledged, the symbol detachment problem: how and why do situated agents develop representations that are detached from their current sensorimotor interaction, but nevertheless preserve grounding and aboutness? How do cognitive agents progressively acquire a range of capabilities permitting them to deal not only with the current situation but also with alternative, in particular future states of affairs? How do they develop the capability of acting on their representations instead of acting directly on the world? In a theoretical and developmental perspective, we propose that anticipation plays a crucial role in the detachment process: anticipatory representations, originally detached from the sensorimotor cycle for the sake of action control, are successively exapted for bootstrapping increasingly complex cognitive capabilities.     

Infants' understanding of actions performed by mechanical devices

Recent research suggests that 9-month-old infants tested in a modified version of the A-not-B search task covertly imitate actions performed by the experimenter. The current study examines whether infants also simulate actions performed by mechanical devices, and whether this varies with whether or not they have been familiarized with the devices and their function. In Experiment 1, infants observed hiding and retrieving actions performed by a pair of mechanical claws on the A-trials, and then searched for the hidden toy on the B-trial. In Experiment 2, infants were first familiarized with the experimenter and the claws but not their function. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with the function of the claws. The results revealed that search errors were at chance levels in Experiments 1 and 2, but a significant proportion of the infants showed the A-not-B error in Experiment 3. These results suggest that 9-month-old infants are less likely to simulate observed actions performed by mechanical devices than by human agents, unless they are familiarized with the function of the devices so that their actions are perceived as goal-directed.     

Does the A-not-B error in adult pet dogs indicate sensitivity to human communication?

Recent dog-infant comparisons have indicated that the experimenter's communicative signals in object hide-and-search tasks increase the probability of perseverative (A-not-B) errors in both species (Topál et al. 2009). These behaviourally similar results, however, might reflect different mechanisms in dogs and in children. Similar errors may occur if the motor response of retrieving the object during the A trials cannot be inhibited in the B trials or if the experimenter's movements and signals toward the A hiding place in the B trials ('sham-baiting') distract the dogs' attention. In order to test these hypotheses, we tested dogs similarly to Topál et al. (2009) but eliminated the motor search in the A trials and 'sham-baiting' in the B trials. We found that neither an inability to inhibit previously rewarded motor response nor insufficiencies in their working memory and/or attention skills can explain dogs' erroneous choices. Further, we replicated the finding that dogs have a strong tendency to commit the A-not-B error after ostensive-communicative hiding and demonstrated the crucial effect of socio-communicative cues as the A-not-B error diminishes when location B is ostensively enhanced. These findings further support the hypothesis that the dogs' A-not-B error may reflect a special sensitivity to human communicative cues. Such object-hiding and search tasks provide a typical case for how susceptibility to human social signals could (mis)lead domestic dogs.     

An investigation of everyday prospective memory

Prospective memory, remembering to carry out one’s planned activities, was investigated using a naturalistic paradigm. Three experiments, with a total of 405 participants, were conducted. The goal was to demonstrate that the cognitive processing underlying successful everyday prospective remembering involves components other than mere “memory.” Those components are probably best represented as individual differences in various cognitive capacities. More specifically, metamemory, attentional capacities, and planning processes that reprioritize intentions according to the demands of everyday life may determine how people actually accomplish the plans they establish for themselves. The results of these experiments suggest that researchers interested in the topic will have to contend with a multidimensional set of factors before any comprehensive understanding of prospective remembering can be realized.     

Visible embodiment: Gestures as simulated action

Spontaneous gestures that accompany speech are related to both verbal and spatial processes. We argue that gestures emerge from perceptual and motor simulations that underlie embodied language and mental imagery. We first review current thinking about embodied cognition, embodied language, and embodied mental imagery. We then provide evidence that gestures stem from spatial representations and mental images. We then propose the gestures-as-simulated-action framework to explain how gestures might arise from an embodied cognitive system. Finally, we compare this framework with other current models of gesture production, and we briefly outline predictions that derive from the framework.     

Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual memory palace

In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical challenges, but currently fall short of delivering on that promise. We address both issues in this paper. First, we argue that an embodied, enactive approach to memory can better help us understand the effectiveness of the memory palace. Second, we present design recommendations for a virtual memory palace. Our theoretical proposal and design recommendations contribute to solving both problems and provide reasons for preferring an embodied, enactive account over an information-processing treatment of the memory palace.     

A matter of habit? Stressful life events and cognitive flexibility in 15-month-olds

Exposure to chronic stress is associated with habitual learning in adults. We studied the origins of this association by examining the link between stressful life events and infant cognitive flexibility. The final sample consisted of N = 72 fifteen-month-old infants and their mothers. Mothers completed a survey on pre- and postnatal negative life events. To assess chronic stress physiologically, infant and maternal hair cortisol concentrations were determined for cortisol accumulation during the past 3 months. Each infant participated in two cognitive tasks in the laboratory. An instrumental learning task tested infants’ ability to disengage from a habituated action when this action became ineffective (Seehagen et al., 2015). An age-adequate version of the A-not-B task tested infants’ ability to find a toy at location B after repeatedly finding it at location A. Correlations between cortisol concentrations and postnatal negative life events (number, perceived impact) did not yield significance. Infant and maternal hair cortisol concentrations were not correlated. Infants’ ability to shift to a new action in either task, controlled for acute stress, correlated neither with pre- and postnatal negative life events nor with cortisol concentrations. Taken together, these results indicate that the potential link between long-term stress exposure and cognitive flexibility might not be present in samples with low levels of psychosocial stress.     

Neurobehavioral evidence for individual differences in canine cognitive control: an awake fMRI study

Based on behavioral evidence, the domestic dog has emerged as a promising comparative model of human self-control. However, while research on human inhibition has probed heterogeneity and neuropathology through an integration of neural and behavioral evidence, there are no parallel data exploring the brain mechanisms involved in canine inhibition. Here, using a combination of cognitive testing and awake neuroimaging in domestic dogs, we provide evidence precisely localizing frontal brain regions underpinning response inhibition in this species and demonstrate the dynamic relationship between these regions and behavioral measures of control. Thirteen dogs took part in an in-scanner go/no-go task and an out-of-scanner A-not-B test. A frontal brain region was identified showing elevated neural activity for all subjects during successful inhibition in the scanner, and dogs showing greater mean brain activation in this region produced fewer false alarms. Better performance in the go/no-go task was also correlated with fewer errors in the out-of-scanner A-not-B test, suggesting that dogs show consistent neurobehavioral individual differences in cognitive control, as is seen in humans. These findings help establish parity between human and canine mechanisms of self-control and pave the way for future comparative studies examining their function and dysfunction.     

The role of effort type and intensity in children's decisions about effort-based outcomes

Despite the importance of persistence in early learning, we know little about how children reason about outcomes that result from their efforts. Here we examined the role of effort type (i.e., physical vs. cognitive) and intensity (i.e., high vs. low effort) in shaping children's decision making about effort-based rewards. Five- to 7-year-olds (N = 133) were assigned to one of four conditions (High Physical Effort, Low Physical Effort, High Cognitive Effort, Low Cognitive Effort) and completed a series of tasks to construct a toy. Tasks varied in the type (physical/cognitive) and intensity (high/low) of effort required to complete them. After constructing their toy, children completed a series of tasks to probe how much they valued that toy. Across conditions, children preferred their toy and gave it a higher monetary value, relative to a stranger's. However, when choosing their toy came at a cost, children no longer preferred it. Only children who built their toy through either cognitive or low effort were willing to incur a cost for their toy. Older children, across conditions, were also more likely to incur a cost for their toy. These findings demonstrate that by age five, children are sensitive to variations in effort type and intensity, and these factors shape how they evaluate effort-based rewards.     

The importance of "what": Infants use featural information to index events

Dynamic spatial indexing is the ability to encode, remember, and track the location of complex events. For example, in a previous study, 6-month-old infants were familiarized to a toy making a particular sound in a particular location, and later they fixated that empty location when they heard the sound presented alone (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2004, Vol. 133, pp. 46-62). The basis and developmental trajectory of this ability are currently unclear. We investigated dynamic spatial indexing across the first year after birth and tested the hypothesis that the structure of visual cues supports infants' learning of sound and location associations. In our study, 3-, 6-, and 10-month-olds were tested in a dynamic spatial indexing eye movement paradigm that paired two sounds with two locations. In one condition, these were reliably paired with two sets of visual features (two toys condition), replicating the original studies. We also presented a single set of visual cues in both locations (one toy condition) and multiple sets of visual features in both locations (six toys condition). Infants from 3months of age onward showed evidence of dynamic spatial indexing in the two toys condition, but only the 10-month-olds succeeded in the one toy and six toys conditions. We argue that this may reflect a broader developmental trajectory, whereby infants first make use of multiple cue integration but with age are able to learn from a narrow set of cues.     

Episodic-like memory in zebrafish

Episodic-like memory tests often aid in determining an animal’s ability to recall the what, where, and which (context) of an event. To date, this type of memory has been demonstrated in humans, wild chacma baboons, corvids (Scrub jays), humming birds, mice, rats, Yucatan minipigs, and cuttlefish. The potential for this type of memory in zebrafish remains unexplored even though they are quickly becoming an essential model organism for the study of a variety of human cognitive and mental disorders. Here we explore the episodic-like capabilities of zebrafish (Danio rerio) in a previously established mammalian memory paradigm. We demonstrate that when zebrafish were presented with a familiar object in a familiar context but a novel location within that context, they spend more time in the novel quadrant. Thus, zebrafish display episodic-like memory as they remember what object they saw, where they saw it (quadrant location), and on which occasion (yellow or blue walls) it was presented.     

Spatial perseveration error by alpacas (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Vicugna pacos</Emphasis>) in an A-not-B detour task

Spatial perseveration has been documented for domestic animals such as mules, donkeys, horses and dogs. However, evidence for this spatial cognition behavior among other domestic species is scarce. Alpacas have been domesticated for at least 7000 years yet their cognitive ability has not been officially reported. The present article used an A-not-B detour task to study the spatial problem-solving abilities of alpacas (Vicugna pacos) and to identify the perseveration errors, which refers to a tendency to maintain a learned route, despite having another available path. The study tested 51 alpacas, which had to pass through a gap at one end of a barrier in order to reach a reward. After one, two, three or four repeats (A trials), the gap was moved to the opposite end of the barrier (B trials). In contrast to what has been found in other domestic animals tested with the same task, the present study did not find clear evidence of spatial perseveration. Individuals’ performance in the subsequent B trials, following the change of gap location, suggests no error persistence in alpacas. Results suggest that alpacas are more flexible than other domestic animals tested with this same task, which has important implications in planning proper training for experimental designs or productive purposes. These results could contribute toward enhancing alpacas’ welfare and our understanding of their cognitive abilities.     

Object permanence in adult common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): not everything is an “A-not-B” error that seems to be one

In this paper, we describe a behaviour pattern similar to the “A-not-B” error found in human infants and young apes in a monkey species, the common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In contrast to the classical explanation, recently it has been suggested that the “A-not-B” error committed by human infants is at least partially due to misinterpretation of the hider’s ostensively communicated object hiding actions as potential ‘teaching’ demonstrations during the A trials. We tested whether this so-called Natural Pedagogy hypothesis would account for the A-not-B error that marmosets commit in a standard object permanence task, but found no support for the hypothesis in this species. Alternatively, we present evidence that lower level mechanisms, such as attention and motivation, play an important role in committing the “A-not-B” error in marmosets. We argue that these simple mechanisms might contribute to the effect of undeveloped object representational skills in other species including young non-human primates that commit the A-not-B error.     

The Self-Organization of Explicit Attitudes

ABSTRACT— How do minds produce explicit attitudes over several hundred milliseconds? Speeded evaluative measures have revealed implicit biases beyond cognitive control and subjective awareness, yet mental processing may culminate in an explicit attitude that feels personally endorsed and corroborates voluntary intentions. We argue that self-reported explicit attitudes derive from a continuous, temporally dynamic process, whereby multiple simultaneously conflicting sources of information self-organize into a meaningful mental representation. While our participants reported their explicit (like vs. dislike) attitudes toward White versus Black people by moving a cursor to a "like" or "dislike" response box, we recorded streaming x - and y -coordinates from their hand-movement trajectories. We found that participants' hand-movement paths exhibited greater curvature toward the "dislike" response when they reported positive explicit attitudes toward Black people than when they reported positive explicit attitudes toward White people. Moreover, these trajectories were characterized by movement disorder and competitive velocity profiles that were predicted under the assumption that the deliberate attitudes emerged from continuous interactions between multiple simultaneously conflicting constraints.     

Enhanced embodied response following ambiguous emotional processing

It has generally been assumed that high-level cognitive and emotional processes are based on amodal conceptual information. In contrast, however, "embodied simulation" theory states that the perception of an emotional signal can trigger a simulation of the related state in the motor, somatosensory, and affective systems. To study the effect of social context on the mimicry effect predicted by the "embodied simulation" theory, we recorded the electromyographic (EMG) activity of participants when looking at emotional facial expressions. We observed an increase in embodied responses when the participants were exposed to a context involving social valence before seeing the emotional facial expressions. An examination of the dynamic EMG activity induced by two socially relevant emotional expressions (namely joy and anger) revealed enhanced EMG responses of the facial muscles associated with the related social prime (either positive or negative). These results are discussed within the general framework of embodiment theory.     

具身双加工观点：解析具身效应的边界条件

为了找出具身效应在认知加工上的边界条件,在综合分析具身理论中的双加工内涵和具身实验研究中的双加工证据基础上,提出了具身双加工观点：具身效应与直觉性的一型加工更为契合,会被反思性的二型加工所抑制。具体而言,抽象思维的发展程度、认知加工的无意识状态、认知负荷和心理冲突性均可能会导致两种加工类型之间的转换,从而调节具身效应。该观点对提高具身实验操控的有效性,解决具身效应的可重复性危机具有指导意义。     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use.