Driye-leyel and flexibility in paired-associate nonsense-syllable learning

“High-anxiety” and “low-anxiety” subjects, selected for extreme scores on the Taylor Anxiety Scale, learned a list of paired-associate nonsense syllables in the belief that they were undergoing an intelligence test. Both groups were then given a second list of paired associates to learn, the stimulus-items being the same as those of the first list but the responses being changed. Before the presentation of the second list, half the subjects in each group were given anxiety-increasing instructions and the remaining half were given reassuring instructions.

The results verified two predictions made from Hull's behaviour theory, using the concept of fear or anxiety as a secondary drive:—“high anxiety” subjects took more trials to master the second learning task than “low-anxiety” subjects; and there was a significant interaction between initial anxiety-level and type of instructions, such that “high-anxiety” subjects who received drive-increasing instructions had a worse performance in the second part than all other sub-groups. There was no indication that “low-anxiety” subjects were significantly affected by the type of instructions received. The “high-anxiety” group had greater difficulty than the “low-anxiety” group in learning the first list, but the difference was non-significant.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

A note on further experiments on the effects of meprobamate on discrimination performance in the monkey

A previous experiment (Gross and Weiskrantz, 1961) has shown that performance on a successive auditory discrimination task is impaired by injections of meprobamate. The present two brief experiments indicate that the drug also impairs simultaneous visual discrimination performance, although not to the same degree as found earlier for auditory discrimination. The original finding, therefore, cannot be attributed simply to unique features of the auditory discrimination situation, such as the “go—no-go” response contingency. Since neither overtraining nor drug habituation appears to be of great importance, it is suggested that the lesser effect of the drug in these experiments reflects the greater stability of visual than auditory habits in the monkey.

Earlier work has shown that meprobamate and reserpine can cause a severe deterioration in auditory discrimination performance of monkeys (Gross and Weiskrantz, 1961). This result was taken as supporting a hypothesis, growing out of still earlier research, that tranquillizers decrease the utilization of sensory information (Weiskrantz and Wilson, 1956; Weiskrantz, 1957).

The auditory task, as is almost always the case with monkeys as subjects, involved a “go—no-go” type of response contingency—i.e. the animal had to respond to the positive stimulus and had not to respond to the negative stimulus in order to achieve reward. It might be objected, therefore, that the deterioration in performance was associated not with discrimination as such but with the animals' willingness to perform at all. In fact, it was found that the animals tended to make most of their errors under the drugs by responding when they should not rather than not responding when they should.

The purpose of the present experiments, therefore, was to test the animals with a visual discrimination task in which both the positive and negative stimuli were presented simultaneously. An effect of the drug could not, in this situation, be characterized simply as altering the responsiveness of the animal. A further purpose in using visual stimuli was to test the generality of the earlier finding in a sense modality other than audition.     

Concrete and abstract terms and relations in testing a rule

Subjects have more difficulty in correctly testing a conditional rule stated in abstract form than the same rule given in “thematic” form. The “thematic” form of the rule involves both concrete terms and a concrete relation. Four experimental conditions were formed by combining concrete abstract terms and relations. Fifty subjects were tested in each condition. The results indicated that concrete-ness of the terms is the main factor leading to improved performance with “thematic” as against abstract material in the rule testing task.     

The sad truth about depressive realism

In one form of a contingency judgement task individuals must judge the relationship between an action and an outcome. There are reports that depressed individuals are more accurate than are nondepressed individuals in this task. In particular, nondepressed individuals are influenced by manipulations that affect the salience of the outcome, especially outcome probability. They overestimate a contingency if the probability of an outcome is high—the “outcome-density effect”. In contrast, depressed individuals display little or no outcome-density effect. This apparent knack for depressives not to be misled by outcome density in their contingency judgements has been termed “depressive realism”, and the absence of an outcome-density effect has led to the characterization of depressives as “sadder but wiser”. We present a critical summary of the depressive realism literature and provide a novel interpretation of the phenomenon. We suggest that depressive realism may be understood from a psychophysical analysis of contingency judgements.*     

An experiment in psoblem solying

Trial-and-error problems are described in terms of “stimulus” difficulty, which is a measure of the number of possible modes of response left to the individual when all the information given is taken into account; and “phenomenal” difficulty, which is a measure derived from the individual's performance. An experiment is described in which three types of problem were presented to human subjects. In all three problems the stimulus difficulty was calculable, stage by stage, in the solution. The problems differed in this stimulus difficulty and also in the qualitative nature of the information provided—from unequivocal to conditional. It is shown that the qualitative difference of the nature of the information bears most relationship to phenomenal difficulty. Some observations are made on the modes of solution adopted, and further experimental work is suggested.     

Effects of lowered temperature on time estimation

Body (ear) temperature of 14 subjects was lowered in order to examine its effect upon performance of a task requiring estimation of an interval of 60 s. Although there was some evidence that subjects counted more slowly at lower body temperatures, the inconsistency of the effect was such as to cast doubt on the hypothesis of a “biochemical clock” or “metabolic pacemaker” in the brain said to subserve human time estimation of brief intervals.     

Differential effects of personality on access to various long-term memory codes

Arousal, as indexed by personality measures, has been related to memory encoding, organization, and retrieval. In an attempt to investigate one of the component information-processing mechanisms underlying both encoding and retrieval, the effects of introversion-extraversion on performance in a simultaneous matching task was investigated. As predicted from earlier research, personality did not influence performance on a physical identity matching task but extraverts were faster than introverts in making taxonomic category matches (a semantic task). Somewhat unexpectedly, extraverts were also faster at making “homophone” identity matches. Arousal, then, appears to influence access to long-term memory codes of any type—a characteristic that may be reflected in tests of both encoding and retrieval.     

Disconfirmation and dual hypotheses on a more difficult version of wason's 2-4-6 task

This paper reports two experiments in which subjects worked to solve a more difficult version of Wason's 2-4-6 task: instead of the usual “numbers must ascend in order of magnitude” rule, a more general rule, “the three numbers must be different”, was used. The first experiment established that instructing subjects to disconfirm on the “three different numbers” did not significantly improve their performance, as compared with confirmatory and control groups. Disconfirmatory subjects did try to propose more triples at variance with their hypotheses but were unable to obtain the necessary disconfirmatory information.

To help subjects represent the task in a way that facilitated disconfirmation, the second experiment utilized a procedure in which subjects were told that they were looking for two rules, Dax and Med-the Dax rule corresponding to “three different numbers” and the Med rule to its complement, i.e. two or more numbers the same. Of subjects in the Dax-Med condition, 88% solve the rule, as opposed to 21% of subjects in a control condition. Dax-Med subjects tended to search for positive instances of the Med rule, which, in turn, forced them to test the limits of the Dax rule. It was concluded that the Dax-Med manipulation did facilitate a different mental representation of the task than the normal procedure.     

Bias in Conditional Inference: Implications for Mental Models and Mental Logic

Three experiments are reported in which subjects are given the opportunity to make any of the four inferences associated with conditional statements: modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC), and modus tollens (MT). The primary purpose of the research was to establish the generality and robustness of polarity biases that may be occasioned by systematic rotation of negative components in the conditional rules. In Experiments 1 & 2, three forms of conditionals were used: “if (not) p then (not) q”, “(not) p only if (not) q” and “(not) q if (not) p”. Experiment 1 used a conclusion evaluation task, whereas Experiment 2 used a conclusion production task. In Experiment 3, thematic conditionals were presented with and without a preceding scenario.

The biases investigated were (a) affirmative premise bias—the tendency to draw more inferences from affirmative premises and (b) negative conclusion bias—the tendency to draw more inferences with negative conclusions. The suggestive evidence for affirmative premise bias in the literature was not supported: very little evidence was found for it in the current experiments. Robust findings of negative conclusion bias were, however, found across the three experiments, although the bias was mostly restricted to DA and MT inferences. This suggests that the bias is best regarded as a difficulty with double negation.

The results are discussed with respect to both the mental logic and mental model accounts of propositional reasoning. Neither theory as currently formulated can explain all of our findings, although a plausible revision of each is considered.     

Nonstutterers'' perceptions of stuttering and speech difficulty

Two versions of Woolf's (1967) Perception of Stuttering Inventory (PSI) were administered to nonstuttering college students in three experiments. In one (Woolf's published version) the word “stuttering” appeared and in another [a version developed by Daly, Oakes, Breen, and Mishler (1981)] “stuttering” was replaced by “speech difficulty.” Nonstutterers' scores on the PSI were found to be affected by knowledge of—or attention to—“stuttering” or “stutterers” as well as orientation toward speech or speech pathology. It was concluded that a total PSI score of 5 is presently a more defensible criterion of normality for stutterers than the more commonly used score of 10.     

Information processing by performers and observers in a paired associate learning task

The effects of two training procedures on learning and performance are compared. Performers select a response alternative for each stimulus on Trial 1 and receive feedback in terms of “Right” or “Wrong”. Observers receive the same information by listening to the experimenter. Experiment I tests the hypothesis that performers and observers are using a different learning strategy when there are only two response alternatives available for each stimulus on Trial 1. A recognition procedure was used on Trial 2; each stimulus was followed by four alternatives, two of them being the same as presented on Trial 1. Subjects have to recognize the two “old” alternatives. Performers are always better at recognizing the chosen alternative, whereas observers are better at recognizing the correct alternative. Experiment II extends the comparison between performers and observers to a task with four response alternatives on Trial 1. There are no longer differences in performance between the two training procedures.     

Negative Correlations between Control Performance and Verbalizable Knowledge: Indicators for Implicit Learning in Process Control Tasks?

Negative correlations between task performance in dynamic control tasks and verbalizable knowledge, as assessed by a post-task questionnaire, have been interpreted as dissociations that indicate two antagonistic modes of learning, one being “explicit”, the other “implicit”. This paper views the control tasks as finite-state automata and offers an alternative interpretation of these negative correlations. It is argued that “good controllers” observe fewer different state transitions and, consequently, can answer fewer post-task questions about system transitions than can “bad controllers”. Two experiments demonstrate the validity of the argument by showing the predicted negative relationship between control performance and the number of explored state transitions, and the predicted positive relationship between the number of explored state transitions and questionnaire scores. However, the experiments also elucidate important boundary conditions for the critical effects. We discuss the implications of these findings, and of other problems arising from the process control paradigm, for conclusions about implicit versus explicit learning processes.     

A philosophical and empirical analysis of subjects' modes of inquiry in wason's 2-4-6 task

Investigations of hypothesis-testing behaviour typically conclude that subjects' methods are characterized by “confirmation bias.” However, these studies (a) relied exclusively upon Karl Popper's philosophy of science, (b) only described subjects' strategies via a falsificationist terminology, and (c) failed to determine subjects' precise intentions in the task situations. Alternative philosophies of science can be used to describe hitherto ignored aspects of rule discovery in Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 task as well as reinterpret findings from previous research. Using Wason's task, Experiment 1 adopted J. S. Mill's inductive methodology in order to assess better the extent of elimination in experimentation. While it was found that subjects did eliminate a large proportion of their hypotheses rather than merely confirm them, Mill's eliminative methods applied to this task failed to account for the entirety of subjects' behaviours. Experiment 2 examined subjects' methods in more depth by asking subjects during the task either to: (1) describe their procedures, (2) select from a list of methodology terms those that best characterized their methods, and (3) state on each learning trial their preferred hypotheses and their subjective assessments that those hypotheses were correct. Although subjects were generally unable to describe their methods of inquiry, they were able to typify them via the methodology terms as if their methods were tacitly held skills. Contrary to presumptions of previous research, analyses indicated that subjects were not testing particular hypotheses on every trial but were often examining possible instances of the rule “at random” or “different from ones examined” to that trial. It is also suggested that subjects' decisions to announce rules and their thematic lines of inquiry be given further consideration by researchers.     

Task switching: the effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

Speech—Language clinicians'' and university students'' impressions of women and girls who stutter

To identify impressions speech—language clinicians and university students have of females who stutter, a 47-scale semantic differential form was administered to members of each group to obtain their responses to eight hypothetical constructs, i.e., “A Girl,” “A Girl Who Stutters,” “A Boy,” “A Boy Who Stutters,” “A Woman,” “A Woman Who Stutters,” “A Man,” and “A Man Who Stutters.” Both groups were found to possess negative stereotypes for all four categories of stutterers. The nature of the stereotypes appeared to be influenced by a stutterer's gender and relative age. Clinicians considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on females and on children. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Girl Who Stutters.” University students considered stuttering to exert a stronger negative impact on males. Their stereotypes of stutterers seemed unaffected by the relative age of the stutterer. Their strongest stereotype was of “A Man Who Stutters.” Several theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

EEG correlates of cumulative expectancy and subjective estimates of alertness in a vigilance-type task

Occipital EEG was monitored during a slow presentation rate vigilance task. EEG samples were taken for each of 400 task events. The EEG is correlated with increases and decreases in “expectancy” built into the task. Post-trial subjective estimates of alertness parallel the EEG changes. Reaction time to “wanted signals” does not correlate with measures of pre-signal EEG.     

Frustration and stereotyped behaviour in human subjects

The investigation was designed to show the effects upon behaviour of three different durations of frustration, and two degrees of motivation during the frustrating period. Frustration was induced in 144 subjects by setting them the task of “learning” an insoluble temporal maze; they had to record their responses by pressing on one or other of two morse-type keys. Its effect was measured in terms of:

(1) The time taken to learn a soluble maze introduced, without the subjects' knowing it, by changing the system of “rewarding” responses from one based on chance to one based on the constant repetition of a pattern requiring the responses: Left—Right—Right, for its solution.

(2) The tendency for the subjects to show stereotypy of behaviour by responding on the same key for a number of trials in succession without reaching a solution.

(3) The pressure exerted on the response keys, which was taken to be a measure of vacillation.

Predictions that the time taken to learn the soluble task, and the stereotypy, would increase in direct relation to the duration of the frustrating period and the degree of motivation were tested.

It was found that, while there was an immediate increase in both the time taken to learn the soluble task and the stereotypy after a short period of frustration, a point was reached under conditions of prolonged frustration after which no further increase occurred and some adjustment to the situation was shown.

Some confirmation of the effect of increase in motivation in the direction predicted was obtained in all cases, but the differences were not statistically significant. The rankings of the subjects according to the time taken to learn the soluble task and the degree of stereotypy were found to be closely correlated. A definite tendency towards increased vacillation of response was seen in many of the records during the period when frustration might have been expected to have been at its peak.

These findings are discussed in relation to Maier's theory of frustration and to Selye's concept of a “general adaptation syndrome.” The latter theory is more suitable for the interpretation of the results of the present investigation.     

The effect of cue-familiarity, cue-distinctiveness, and retention interval on prospective remembering

Five experiments investigated the effects of cue familiarity, cue distinctiveness, and retention interval on prospective remembering. Results showed that (1) performance in a prospective memory task is facilitated when the cue is unfamiliar and/or distinctive; and (2) it is impaired by 3-minutes' delay between the instructions and the task (Experiment 1). A beneficial effect of distinctiveness was also found when perceptual rather than semantic distinctiveness was tested (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out the hypotheses that “unfulfilled expectancy” of an event (i.e. non-appearance of the cue during training) (Experiment 3), or some sort of “habituation” in the target context (Experiment 4), may have caused the low performance observed in the delayed conditions. Finally, results from Experiment 5 showed that delay negatively affected prospective remembering when it was filled with either a demanding interpolated activity (practice in a STM task) or an undemanding motoric activity (repetitive hands movements). Unfilled delay and an undemanding verbal activity (counting) were found not to affect prospective memory. Implications for the mechanisms underlying prospective remembering are discussed.